Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, a felony under Vermont law. At arraignment, the State sought to have the defendant held without bail pending trial, arguing that the charged offense involved an act of violence, which would permit pretrial detention under Vermont’s constitutional and statutory exceptions to the general right to bail. The parties agreed that the offense was a felony and that the evidence of guilt was great, but the defendant contended that lewd or lascivious conduct with a child did not qualify as a crime involving an act of violence for purposes of denying bail.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, denied the State’s motion to hold the defendant without bail. The court concluded that, despite a statutory provision designating lewd or lascivious conduct with a child as a violent act for bail purposes, the offense did not have an essential element involving an act of violence as required by the Vermont Constitution. The court relied on prior single-justice decisions, including State v. Madigan, which interpreted “violence” narrowly to require physical force or contact, and declined to give effect to the legislative designation in 13 V.S.A. § 2602(f).On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the definition of “violence” in the context of bail eligibility. The Court held that lewd or lascivious conduct with a child is a felony with an element involving an act of violence, as the offense inherently involves an abusive or unjust use of power over a child, even if physical contact is not required. The Court overruled the contrary reasoning in State v. Madigan, reaffirmed a broader definition of violence, and concluded that the statutory designation in § 2602(f) was consistent with constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings on the State’s request to hold the defendant without bail. View "State v. Shores" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with several offenses, including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, grand larceny, unlawful mischief, carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon while committing a felony, and assault and robbery, following an incident in which he ran at a teenager who was leaving a friend’s house, causing the teenager to abandon his belongings out of fear. The defendant then destroyed some of the teenager’s property and took the rest. The complainant testified that the defendant appeared to be holding a knife, which contributed to his fear and decision to flee.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, presided over the trial. After the State presented its evidence, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on all but the unlawful-mischief charge, arguing insufficient evidence, particularly regarding the presence of a knife and intent to place the complainant in fear. The court granted acquittal on the grand-larceny charge due to insufficient evidence of value but denied acquittal on the remaining charges. The jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon while committing a felony but convicted him of unlawful mischief, larceny from the person, and assault and robbery. The defendant’s post-trial motion to vacate the assault and robbery conviction, based on alleged inconsistency with the acquittals, was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of assault and robbery, even without proof that he possessed a knife. The Court also held that the jury instructions did not require proof of a knife and that the verdicts were not inconsistent. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

A police officer observed a vehicle late at night on a rural road in Vermont, where the passenger-side wheels of the vehicle left the paved portion of the road twice in quick succession. The road had only a center line and no edge markings. The officer, who had extensive training and experience in detecting impaired driving, interpreted the vehicle’s movements as erratic and indicative of possible impairment. The officer stopped the vehicle, and the driver was subsequently arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with a suspended license. The officer’s observations were recorded on the cruiser’s camera.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Criminal Division, held a hearing and denied the motion to suppress, finding the officer’s testimony credible and concluding that the observed driving behavior—specifically, the vehicle’s wheels leaving the paved road twice—constituted erratic driving and provided reasonable suspicion of impairment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the DUI charge and appealed the denial of her suppression motion to the Vermont Supreme Court. The charge for driving with a suspended license was dismissed with prejudice.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and considered de novo whether those facts met the legal standard for reasonable suspicion. The Court held that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant based on the totality of the circumstances, specifically the erratic driving observed. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the stop was justified under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. View "State v. Norton" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with aggravated stalking, violation of an abuse-prevention order, and violation of conditions of release. The charges stemmed from allegations that the defendant, who was subject to a relief-from-abuse order and criminal conditions of release due to an earlier assault, approached the complainant in a Walmart parking lot, maintained eye contact, circled the lot, and parked behind her, in violation of the orders prohibiting contact.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Criminal Division, granted the State’s motion to hold the defendant without bail, finding that aggravated stalking was a felony involving an act of violence, as required by the Vermont Constitution and relevant statutes. The defendant appealed the hold-without-bail order. A specially assigned single Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court conducted a de novo review and concluded that aggravated stalking did not necessarily involve an act of violence as an element of the offense. The single Justice reversed the hold-without-bail order, imposed interim conditions, and remanded the case for the trial court to set conditions of release. The trial court then imposed conditions of release. The State subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the single Justice’s order.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the State had a statutory right to appeal the single Justice’s decision. The Court held that the State does not have a statutory right to appeal a single Justice’s order reversing a hold-without-bail decision under the relevant statutes. The Court reasoned that the statutory language only provides the State with a right to appeal from trial court orders regarding release, not from decisions of a single Justice of the Supreme Court. As a result, the Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal. View "State v. Beldiman" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder of his wife and second-degree attempted murder of his mother-in-law after a violent attack with a meat cleaver in October 2017. Following his arrest, he was evaluated by multiple mental health experts, all of whom opined that he was legally insane at the time of the offenses. The initial prosecution was dismissed without prejudice by the Chittenden County State’s Attorney, who concluded there was insufficient evidence to rebut the insanity defense. After the defendant was released from psychiatric care, the Vermont Attorney General refiled the same charges.In the Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Criminal Division, the defendant moved to dismiss the renewed charges, arguing that the prior dismissal barred further prosecution under principles of collateral estoppel and judicial admissions, and that the Attorney General lacked authority to refile. The trial court denied these motions, finding that dismissal without prejudice did not constitute a final judgment on the merits and did not preclude reprosecution. The case proceeded to trial, where the defendant raised an insanity defense, but the jury convicted him on both counts.On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, the defendant raised five claims: (1) the prior dismissal barred the second prosecution; (2) his rights to a public trial and to participate in his defense were infringed; (3) the jury instructions were confusing and incomplete; (4) the court failed to protect jury impartiality by allowing unsupervised access to a graphic video; and (5) the court did not ensure competent language interpretation. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Attorney General had authority to refile charges, that dismissal without prejudice did not bar reprosecution, and that collateral estoppel did not apply. The Court found no reversible error in the conduct of jury selection, jury instructions, video access, or interpretation services, and affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Gurung" on Justia Law

In September 2018, six-year-old L.F. made statements to her foster mother about inappropriate touching by her stepfather, Andy LaGore. These statements were recorded and reported to the Department for Children and Families. L.F. later reiterated these allegations during an interview at the Children’s Advocacy Center, identifying LaGore as the perpetrator. LaGore was subsequently charged and convicted of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child.During pretrial motions, LaGore sought to introduce evidence of a 2016 incident where L.F. had made similar allegations against her biological father, Jordan. The trial court denied this motion, ruling that the 2016 statements were not relevant and did not demonstrate that L.F. was confused about the identity of the perpetrator in the 2018 incident. The court found no evidence that L.F.’s statements about her biological father were false or that she was confusing the two men.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s decision. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 2016 statements, as they were not relevant to the 2018 allegations. The court emphasized that the exclusion of irrelevant evidence does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed LaGore’s conviction, finding that the trial court acted within its discretion and that LaGore’s constitutional rights were not violated. View "State v. LaGore" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Julio Davila, was released on furlough in October 2021 following a 2014 conviction. In April 2022, he absconded from furlough, leading the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) to issue a "Return on Mittimus Request" and an arrest warrant. In August 2022, Davila was arrested in Massachusetts for driving with a suspended license and cocaine trafficking. He was held without bail on both the Vermont warrant and Massachusetts charges. In September 2022, Davila waived extradition to Vermont but remained incarcerated in Massachusetts until December 2023, when he was released on his own recognizance and transported to Vermont.Davila filed a grievance with the Vermont DOC, requesting credit towards his Vermont sentence for the time spent incarcerated in Massachusetts. The DOC denied his request, stating he was not under their supervision. Davila then filed a complaint in the Washington Civil Division, seeking a writ of mandamus to credit his Vermont sentence from September 2022 onwards. The court granted summary judgment to the DOC, concluding Davila was not entitled to credit for time served in Massachusetts.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under 28 V.S.A. § 808e(c), Davila was not entitled to sentence credit while a warrant was outstanding. The court also held that 13 V.S.A. § 7031(c) did not apply because Davila was not "awaiting transportation" to Vermont while incarcerated in Massachusetts. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding Davila was not entitled to credit for the 490 days spent in Massachusetts. View "Davila v. Deml" on Justia Law

The defendant, Stacey Vaillancourt, operated a daycare facility in her home. In January 2019, six-month-old H.B. was dropped off at the daycare. On January 24, 2019, H.B. was found unresponsive in her crib and later declared dead at the hospital. An autopsy revealed that H.B. died from diphenhydramine intoxication, a substance found in medications like Benadryl, which is not recommended for infants without a prescription. H.B. had not been prescribed diphenhydramine, and her parents and other caregivers denied giving it to her.The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Criminal Division, denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, and the jury found her guilty of involuntary manslaughter and cruelty to a child with death resulting. The defendant renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal, which was again denied by the trial court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts. The evidence showed that the defendant, an experienced childcare provider, administered diphenhydramine to H.B., leading to her death. The court found that the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant acted with criminal negligence and willfully exposed H.B. to danger, knowing the risks involved.The court also rejected the defendant's arguments that the verdicts were inconsistent and violated double jeopardy. The court explained that the mental states required for the two charges were not mutually exclusive and that the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments for the same conduct under different statutes. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of video evidence showing H.B.'s developmental capacity, as it was relevant to the State's case and not unduly prejudicial. View "State v. Vaillancourt" on Justia Law

In April 2019, the respondent, Jessica Morrill, pled nolo contendere to assault and robbery. In September 2023, she filed a motion in the criminal division to vacate her conviction, arguing that it was obtained as a result of her being a victim of human trafficking, pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 2658. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the criminal division lacked jurisdiction and that the motion should have been filed in the civil division. The criminal division concluded it had jurisdiction and granted the motion, finding that the respondent met the statutory requirements for relief.The State filed a notice of appeal, acknowledging it did not have a right to appeal under the relevant statutes and rules but requested the Vermont Supreme Court to construe the appeal as a petition for extraordinary relief. The Vermont Supreme Court granted the State's request for review due to the importance of the issue and the purely legal nature of the question.The Vermont Supreme Court held that the criminal division has jurisdiction over motions to vacate convictions under 13 V.S.A. § 2658. The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme, including the context and language used by the legislature, indicates that the criminal division is the appropriate venue for such motions. The Court noted that the legislature explicitly assigned jurisdiction to the civil division in other sections of the statute but did not do so for § 2658. Additionally, the Court found that the nature of the relief sought under § 2658, which includes expungement, aligns with the criminal division's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court denied the State's petition for extraordinary relief. View "State v. Morrill" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual assault, lewd and lascivious conduct, and obstruction of justice. The charges stemmed from allegations made by the defendant's daughter, K.O., who reported that her father had sexually assaulted her over a period of seven years, starting when she was ten years old. The State charged the defendant with multiple counts, including sexual assault and aggravated repeated sexual assault of K.O., as well as lewd and lascivious conduct against K.O. and another minor, A.S. The defendant was also charged with obstruction of justice based on his actions during the investigation.The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated due to jury irregularities, that evidentiary rulings undermined his right to a fair trial, and that the jury instructions were misleading. The Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Criminal Division, had previously denied the defendant's motions to exclude certain jurors for cause and had admitted various pieces of evidence over the defendant's objections.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's challenges for cause against certain jurors, as there was no evidence of implied bias. The court also found that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the audio recording of K.O.'s conversation with police, the prenuptial agreement, the photo display, and the diagram of the vulva, as these pieces of evidence were relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The court concluded that the jury instructions were not misleading and did not direct a verdict on any element of the crime. The court also found no plain error in the description of the sexual acts necessary to convict the defendant on each charge. View "State v. Orost" on Justia Law