Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, the petitioner pled guilty to simple assault and unlawful trespass without expressly agreeing to the facts of the charges, instead accepting the affidavits provided by police officers. Later, he was charged with new crimes, including gross negligent operation resulting in death and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death. The State sought an enhanced sentence based on his prior felony convictions, including the 2009 unlawful trespass conviction. In March 2018, the petitioner pled guilty to the new charges and admitted to being a habitual offender, resulting in an enhanced sentence of nineteen years to life.The petitioner filed a postconviction relief (PCR) petition in March 2022, arguing that the enhanced portion of his sentence was unlawful due to the lack of a factual basis for his 2009 conviction. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioner, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing without the habitual-offender enhancement, citing that the law at the time of his plea allowed for such a challenge.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner waived his right to challenge the predicate convictions supporting the enhanced sentence when he entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea in 2018. The court referenced its previous decisions, including In re Torres and In re Gay, which established that a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to collaterally attack the sentence based on prior convictions. The case was remanded for consideration of the petitioner's unaddressed ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. View "In re Velde" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with attempted second-degree murder for allegedly stabbing his roommate in the neck with a fillet knife in November 2019. The defendant admitted to the stabbing but claimed self-defense. The roommate testified that they had a good relationship and were drinking buddies, but a scuffle at a bar led to the incident. The bartender corroborated the roommate's account, adding that the defendant was angry and mentioned having a knife. The defendant testified that he acted in self-defense because the roommate threatened to kill him.The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Criminal Division, conducted the trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, a lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder. The defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the court erred in handling a discovery violation, denying judicial notice of the bartender's dismissed DUI charge, and failing to ensure the jury could hear defense counsel's questions due to COVID-19 mask protocols. The court denied the motion, finding no prejudice from the discovery violation and offering remedies the defendant declined. It also found no error in denying judicial notice and attributed any hearing issues to defense counsel's failure to speak up.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not commit plain or structural error by failing to sua sponte inquire if jurors could hear defense counsel's questions. It found no prejudice from the discovery violation, as the defendant declined offered remedies. The court also upheld the trial court's decision not to take judicial notice of the bartender's dismissed DUI charge, finding the proposed method appropriate. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "State v. L'Esperance" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. The charges stemmed from allegations made by J.P., the son of the defendant’s girlfriend, who claimed that the defendant had sexually abused him over several years. The abuse allegedly began when J.P. was around four or five years old and continued intermittently until early 2018. The allegations surfaced after a physical altercation between the defendant and J.P.’s mother, which led to the defendant moving out of the home. J.P. disclosed the abuse to his mother and school employees shortly after the defendant left.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, initially tried the defendant, resulting in an acquittal on one count and a mistrial on the remaining counts. Before the second trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of J.P.’s “concerning behavior,” including possession of pornography, arguing it was relevant to show an alternative motive for J.P.’s allegations. The court excluded this evidence under Vermont’s Rape Shield Law, which prohibits evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct. The court also found that the evidence was not probative and would likely confuse the jury. The second trial resulted in convictions on the remaining counts.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The court held that the exclusion of evidence regarding J.P.’s “concerning behavior” was proper under the Rape Shield Law and that the evidence was not relevant to the case. The court also found that the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments, which the defendant claimed were prejudicial, did not amount to plain error. The statements did not violate the “golden rule” prohibition, as they were aimed at supporting the credibility of J.P.’s testimony rather than asking the jurors to place themselves in J.P.’s position. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Parker" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of cruelty to a child after a jury trial. The case involved a one-year-old child, O.S., who lived with his mother and the defendant. O.S. began showing symptoms of a stomach bug and was later found to have multiple fractures and bruises, which medical experts determined were consistent with child abuse. The mother recalled incidents where the defendant was rough with O.S. and noticed unexplained bruises. The defendant suggested that O.S. might have been injured accidentally during a shower.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, allowed the State to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for cruelty to a child from 2012 to demonstrate intent. The court excluded evidence of a 2009 incident due to lack of a conviction. The jury was instructed to consider the prior conviction only for assessing the defendant’s intent and not as evidence of propensity. The jury found the defendant guilty.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the admission of the prior conviction did not constitute plain error. The evidence was relevant to proving the defendant’s intent, a necessary element of the charge. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence under Vermont Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court also noted that the trial court provided limiting instructions to the jury to mitigate any potential prejudice. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the admission of the prior conviction did not affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings. View "State v. Nicholas" on Justia Law

In March 2022, a police officer arrested the defendant on suspicion of DUI. At the stationhouse, the officer read the defendant her implied-consent rights from a standard form, including the right to a second breath test after receiving the results of the first. The defendant waived her right to speak with an attorney and agreed to provide a breath sample. Before providing the test result, the officer asked if she wanted a second test, which she declined. The officer then informed her that her blood alcohol content was .121, above the legal limit.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Criminal Division, denied the defendant's motion to suppress the breath-test result. The court found that the officer had informed the defendant of her rights and that she had declined the second test before knowing the result of the first. The court concluded that the defendant's ability to elect a second test did not change between the request and the opportunity to elect.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that under 23 V.S.A. §§ 1202(d)(5) and 1203(c), law enforcement must provide the results of the first breath test before requiring a suspect to decide on a second test. The officer's failure to do so violated the defendant's statutory rights, making her decision uninformed. The court ruled that the breath-test result should be suppressed and remanded the case for further proceedings in the criminal matter and for entry of judgment in the defendant's favor in the civil-suspension proceedings. View "State v. Ettore" on Justia Law

The defendant, Allan Washburn, appeals a criminal division order granting the State’s motion for civil forfeiture of his dog, Chad, based on findings of animal cruelty. On three separate occasions, Chad was found locked in the defendant’s car under conditions that included high temperatures, lack of water, and unsanitary environments. The dog was observed to be in distress, unable to move freely, and suffering from malnutrition and lack of exercise. These incidents led to the defendant being issued a criminal citation for animal cruelty and the subsequent seizure of Chad.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, reviewed the case and found by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had subjected Chad to cruelty. The court credited testimony from animal control officers and humane officers who described the poor conditions Chad was kept in, including high temperatures inside the car, lack of water, and inadequate nutrition. The court also noted that Chad required medical attention upon being taken to an animal center. Based on these findings, the court granted the State’s motion for civil forfeiture of Chad.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and addressed three main arguments raised by the defendant: the criminal division’s jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding, the sufficiency of evidence for animal cruelty, and the admissibility of lay witness testimony regarding the car’s internal temperature. The court found no error in the lower court’s jurisdiction or its findings of animal cruelty. The court also determined that any potential error in admitting the temperature estimate was harmless, as there was ample other evidence supporting the finding of cruelty. Consequently, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant the civil forfeiture of Chad. View "State v. Washburn" on Justia Law

In 2001, the defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault after shaking his five-week-old daughter, causing her severe neurological injuries. He pleaded nolo contendere to the charge and served ten years of a fifteen-year maximum sentence. The victim was placed in foster care, later adopted, and died in 2016, at age fifteen, from complications resulting from the injuries she received as an infant. In 2022, the State charged the defendant with second-degree murder relating to the victim's death. The defendant moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that the prosecution was barred by the common-law year-and-a-day rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and his plea agreement. The trial court dismissed the murder charge based on the year-and-a-day rule.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, abrogating the common-law year-and-a-day rule, which stated that no defendant could be convicted of murder unless the victim had died by the defendant’s act within a year and a day of the act. The court concluded that the justifications for the rule were no longer relevant due to advances in medical science and changes in the law. The court also held that the abrogation of the rule applied retroactively to the defendant's case. The court further found that the prosecution was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause or the defendant's plea agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

In 2010, Jason Meade was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years to life, with all but fourteen-to-twenty years suspended. As part of his probation conditions, he was required to complete the Cognitive Self Change (CSC) Program. However, the CSC program was discontinued and replaced with the Risk Reduction Programming (RRP). In 2022, Meade's probation officer moved to modify his probation condition to require him to undergo screening for RRP and complete the program if directed by his probation officer. Meade did not agree to the requested modification.The trial court heard evidence on the motion and subsequently issued an order granting the motion and modifying the probation condition. The court concluded that RRP was consistent with the sentencing goals articulated by the sentencing court and that the modification did not impose harsher or more restrictive conditions on Meade. It therefore modified the condition to require “Risk Reduction Programming as deemed appropriate by PO.”Meade appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the plain language of the original condition did not require him to participate in RRP and there was no change in circumstances sufficient to justify modifying the condition. He further claimed that the modified condition violated his right to due process because it was vague and placed compliance outside his control.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision. The court concluded that the original probation condition could not be construed to require Meade to participate in RRP. Furthermore, the court found that the trial court erred in modifying the condition over Meade’s objection because the State failed to demonstrate that there had been a change in Meade’s circumstances or that RRP was not harsher or more restrictive than CSC. View "State v. Meade" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the interplay between the requirements of the Vermont Sex Offender Registry and the merger provision of the concurrent-sentence statute. The plaintiff, Andrew Wood, was sentenced concurrently for murder and sexual assault. He served the maximum sentence for his sexual assault conviction but remained on parole. Wood filed a grievance with the Department of Public Safety (DPS) requesting removal from the sex offender registry, arguing that he had served his maximum sentence for the sexual assault conviction. The DPS denied his request, stating that the registry statute continued to apply because Wood had not yet been discharged from parole.The civil division of the Superior Court granted summary judgment to the State, ruling that the registry statute continued to apply because Wood had not yet been discharged from parole, regardless of the connection between the parole and the registrable sex offense. Wood appealed this decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, stating that there were unresolved factual and legal questions regarding whether Wood's parole was linked to his sex offense. The court found that the plain language of the statute was insufficient to determine the impact of Wood's concurrent sentence on the registration requirements. The court remanded the case for further factual development to resolve whether the Department of Corrections considered Wood's parole to be connected to his sex offense. View "Wood v. Wallin" on Justia Law

In this case, Scott Phillips appealed against the denial of his motion for acquittal, the jury charge, and his probation conditions by the criminal division of the Superior Court, Bennington Unit. The State of Vermont Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision.The case arose from a domestic violence incident where Phillips assaulted his girlfriend and threw a knife towards her. He was charged with three counts of domestic assault, two of which he was found guilty of by a jury. His post-trial motion for acquittal and a new trial was denied by the lower court.Phillips argued that conviction under 13 V.S.A. § 1043(a)(2) required the State to prove that he threatened a household member in addition to having used or attempted to use a deadly weapon on them. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that the statute criminalizes three distinct actions: (1) using a deadly weapon on a household member; (2) attempting to use a deadly weapon on a household member; or (3) possessing and threatening to use a deadly weapon on a household member. The court found that Phillips' actions of throwing the knife in the victim's direction could be inferred as an attempt to harm her with the weapon, which satisfies the requirements of the statute.Phillips also contested the jury instructions and the lack of a special verdict form. However, the Supreme Court found no error in the lower court's instructions or its decision not to provide a special verdict form.Finally, Phillips objected to his probation conditions, which included substance use screening, a prohibition from consuming alcohol, and a prohibition from possessing deadly weapons. The Supreme Court rejected this objection as well, as Phillips had not preserved these issues for appellate review and failed to adequately argue for plain-error review in his briefing.In sum, the State of Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, finding no error in the interpretation of the statute, the jury instructions, or the probation conditions imposed on Phillips. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law