Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff T.C. sought an order of protection against stalking or sexual assault (SSA order) against defendant L.D. Plaintiff was seventeen at the time she sought the order; defendant was thirteen. The court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint without reaching the merits, holding that the statute pertaining to SSA orders did not permit claims against a minor defendant. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, finding nothing in the SSA statute that expressly limited who may be the subject of an SSA complaint. View "T.C. v. L.D." on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Rolls was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a minor, was acquitted by a jury of that charge, but convicted of the lesser-included offense of sexual assault. Defense counsel objected to the State’s requested jury instruction of the lesser-included offense. The trial court overruled the objection, explaining that it had to provide a lesser-included-offense instruction upon either party’s request if the evidence supported the instruction, as it did in this case. Defense counsel did not object to the language the court proposed for the lesser-included-offense instruction. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in its jury instructions, mandating reversal of his conviction and sentence. Finding no error in the trial court’s instruction, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Rolls" on Justia Law

Petitioner Gregory FitzGerald appealed two superior court decisions entering judgment for the State on his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). On appeal, petitioner argued he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of errors trial counsel made during his 1994 criminal trial. He also alleged the State knowingly presented false evidence at his trial. Finding no such errors, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. View "In re Gregory FitzGerald" on Justia Law

Petitioner Reco Jones appealed the civil division’s denial of his postconviction relief (PCR) petition alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. Due to his immigration status, federal deportation policies, and Department of Corrections (DOC) policies, the sentence petitioner agreed to, nominally twelve years to life, likely amounted to a life sentence without the possibility of parole with only a minimal chance of deportation. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the voluntariness of his plea was compromised by misinformation given to him. The Court therefore reversed and vacated petitioner’s conviction, and remanded to the civil division with instructions to refer the case to the criminal division for further proceedings. View "In re Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant Donald Bouchard pled guilty to two sex offenses, and challenged several of the special sex-offender probation conditions imposed on him. The two offenses related to lewd and lascivious conduct, and one count of unlawful restraint in the second degree. The offending conduct involved his niece and nephew. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed the agreed-upon sentence. The State presented no evidence in support of any of the contested probation conditions. The trial court expressed its concern about defendant’s ability to complete the sex-offender treatment program, and told defendant that “if you don’t complete the program and a violation of probation is filed and your probation is revoked, there is no room in the sentence that you’ve negotiated with your attorney for any other programming. It really is as close to a flat ten-year sentence as I’ve ever seen.” The court imposed various probation conditions, including the “sex [-] offender special conditions of probation” at issue on appeal. The Vermont Supreme Court remanded the two conditions limiting contact with minors for clarification as to the age restrictions and the rationale behind them. The Court upheld the conditions prohibiting defendant from accessing or loitering in places where children congregate, and requiring defendant to give his probation officer notice within 48 hours of a change in contact information. View "Vermont v. Bouchard" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant Venessa Sarkisian-Kennedy was convicted of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, second offense (DUI-2), and criminal refusal of an evidentiary breath test (refusal). She appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in: (1) admitting, subject to what she contended was an ineffective limiting instruction) the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test offered by the State absent scientific, foundational testimony from an expert witness; and (2) allowing the State to present evidence of her refusal to consent to a preliminary breath test (PBT) on the theory that it was relevant to consciousness of guilt. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concurred with defendant’s first contention, but not the second. The Court therefore reversed and remanded the refusal conviction and affirmed the DUI-2 conviction. View "Vermont v. Sarkisian-Kennedy" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Grant was charged with one count of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, to which he pled not guilty. He was not fingerprinted or photographed before arraignment. At arraignment, the State asked the court to impose four conditions of release. The first three conditions, to which defendant did not object, were: that he come to court when directed; keep a current address and phone number on file with his attorney and the court clerk; and not engage in criminal behavior. The last condition required defendant to “report to Brattleboro PD for the taking of fingerprints and photographs.” Defendant objected to the final condition at his arraignment. The issue in this case was whether, as a matter of course, every defendant charged with a misdemeanor may be ordered to submit to fingerprinting pursuant to 20 V.S.A. 2061(d). In ordering Defendant to submit to fingerprinting, it essentially created a blanket rule authorizing fingerprinting in every misdemeanor case. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s action was counter to the Legislature’s direction, therefore reversing the trial court’s imposition of the condition. View "Vermont v. Grant" on Justia Law

Defendant Andrew Stewart, Jr. pleaded guilty to assault and robbery with a deadly weapon based on allegations that during the evening of February 11, 2017, defendant held a gun to the complainant’s head in the parking lot of a restaurant, demanded her money, and took her bag, wallet, and phone. At the plea colloquy, Defendant stated, “I’m not denying I robbed anyone, sir. In my heart I know I robbed somebody. . . . Do I remember putting a gun to her head and telling her to give me money? No, sir, I do not. I don’t remember the incident.” He said that he had had sufficient time to discuss the plea agreement with his attorney and had no concerns with his attorney’s work for him. The trial court acknowledged it was “struggling somewhat with the defendant’s acknowledgement of the factual basis here.” But the court accepted defendant’s plea because defendant “repeatedly asserted” the following: the plea was voluntary; he had committed the crime and could not remember the incident only because he was intoxicated at the time; and he did not contest the State’s evidence. On appeal of his ultimate conviction, defendant argued the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Based on the trial court’s “struggle” with accepting defendant’s plea, and “given our liberal standard for granting a withdrawal of plea,” the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion. View "Vermont v. Stewart" on Justia Law

B.B. was charged with aggravated assault based on allegations from August 2016. In November 2018, B.B. was 20 years old, and filed a motion for youthful-offender status based on his age in 2016 . B.B. struggled with alcohol and heroin addiction, and his residential and employment situations were “unstable.” The State opposed the motion. There was prima facie evidence that B.B. “engaged in a new violent act” while he was “under the influence of alcohol,” even though B.B. was underage and was subject to a condition of release that required him to refrain from drinking alcohol. The youthful-offender statutory scheme would have allowed, if the criminal defendant was under twenty-two years old and was at least twelve years old at the time of the alleged offense, a motion to be filed with the criminal division requesting youthful-offender status. Attaining that status would provide for the defendant to obtain a battery of counseling and rehabilitation in addition to any punishment determined by the court. Only if the court finds that public safety will be protected may the court then go on to consider the other statutory factors. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that B.B. had not met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that public safety would be protected if he were granted youthful-offender status, and denied the motion. B.B. requested permission to appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, which was granted. However, finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "In re B.B., Juvenile" on Justia Law

Defendant Clyde Bovat was convicted of shooting a deer in violation of Vermont big-game-hunting laws and failing to immediately tag the deer. On appeal he claimed the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional right to be free from warrantless government intrusions. In the early morning hours of Thanksgiving 2017, a resident of Huntington, Vermont was awoken by a gunshot close to his home. The concerned resident called the state game warden to report a possible deer jackIng. In the course of the ensuing investigation, wardens were lead to defendant’s house. Based in part on their observations through the garage window, wardens obtained a search warrant to seize defendant’s truck and collected samples of the blood they had observed, which matched a sample from the deer at issue. They did not photograph the truck until approximately five days after the seizure, during which time the truck had been left outside in inclement weather. Due to exposure to the elements, a smaller amount of blood than originally observed was visible, and deer hair was no longer visible. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the search warrant. While the Vermont Supreme Court agreed with defendant that his garage is within the curtilage of his home, it was unpersuaded by his remaining arguments. The Supreme Court found the wardens were conducting a legitimate police investigation, during which they observed defendant’s truck in plain view from a semiprivate area. The Court declined to address the merits of defendant’s remaining challenges and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Vermont v. Bovat" on Justia Law