Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jeffrey Davis appealed after a jury convicted him for financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult. In 1995, defendant’s mother and father had an attorney draft a conditional power of attorney document. The terms of the power of attorney were general, granting the attorney-in- fact “full power to act for [defendant’s mother and in defendant’s mother’s] name in all matters and to do all things which [defendant’s mother] could do if personally present.” The power of attorney named defendant’s father as primary attorney-in-fact and listed conditions that had to be met before defendant’s father could assume this role. The power of attorney named defendant as secondary attorney-in-fact, and, again, the document required that conditions be met before defendant could assume his role as his mother’s attorney-in-fact. Specifically, defendant was required to attach one of three documents to the power of attorney: a statement signed by defendant’s father to the effect that he was unable or unwilling to serve as defendant’s mother’s attorney-in-fact, a statement signed by a medical doctor stating that defendant’s father was unable or unwilling to serve as attorney-in-fact, or a copy of defendant’s father’s death certificate. There was no evidence presented showing that any of these conditions precedent were ever met. Defendant’s father died in 2006. Upon his death, defendant’s mother moved into an assisted living facility. In early 2014, defendant’s mother suffered a fall. An employee of the elder living facility testified that, at this point, defendant became more involved in his mother’s care. Employees of the elder living facility and defendant’s mother’s doctor testified that around this time defendant began to represent himself as his mother’s attorney-in-fact. It is undisputed that at this time defendant began controlling his mother’s finances, including taking her checkbook and credit card and redirecting her mail for delivery at his address. Rent checks to the assisted living facility began bouncing; facility later initiated eviction proceedings and, in December 2014, made a report to Adult Protective Services. Adult Protective Services eventually referred the matter to local police, ultimately leading to charges filed and later this conviction. Defendant raised four arguments on appeal. His first two arguments arose from the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal and the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. He also argued the court’s instructions to the jury were erroneous, and that the court erroneously permitted the victim’s guardian, rather than the victim, to testify during sentencing. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-inmate Kirk Wool appealed the dismissal of his claim that the Vermont Department of Corrections violated a statutory obligation to negotiate and award a contract to provide telephone services to inmates serving in state correctional facilities in a manner that provided for the lowest reasonable cost to inmates. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for money damages, but reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for mandamus relief and remanded for further proceedings. As plaintiff alleged, DOC was required by Vermont law, albeit not specifically and exclusively by the statute he identified in his complaint, to use a competitive bidding process in contracting for telephone services for inmates. The Court found plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to confer standing and give fair notice to DOC of the claim and the grounds upon which it rested. View "Wool v. Menard" on Justia Law

Defendant Nathaniel Peatman appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for first-degree aggravated domestic assault, aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, and resisting arrest. Defendant argues that his convictions must be reversed because the jury instructions failed to guarantee unanimous verdicts. The Vermont Supreme Court found that all of the alleged acts (as grounds for defendant’s convictions) took place over a span of six minutes as part of one continuous assault. From this, the Court concluded, it was clear that this case fit within the “election exception” because the acts were “inextricably intertwined” as one continuous offense. Therefore, the trial court’s initial instructions, which included a list of alleged acts that the court suggested the jury consider, and its answer to the jury question, which clarified that the jury did not have to elect specific acts and instead had to be unanimous that the element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, was not in error. “It breathed the true spirit of the law” that there is an exception to the election rule in multiple-act acts and that the evidence presented qualified this case for said exception. Thus the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Vermont v. Peatman" on Justia Law

Defendant Nathaniel Peatman appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for first-degree aggravated domestic assault, aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, and resisting arrest. Defendant argues that his convictions must be reversed because the jury instructions failed to guarantee unanimous verdicts. The Vermont Supreme Court found that all of the alleged acts (as grounds for defendant’s convictions) took place over a span of six minutes as part of one continuous assault. From this, the Court concluded, it was clear that this case fit within the “election exception” because the acts were “inextricably intertwined” as one continuous offense. Therefore, the trial court’s initial instructions, which included a list of alleged acts that the court suggested the jury consider, and its answer to the jury question, which clarified that the jury did not have to elect specific acts and instead had to be unanimous that the element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, was not in error. “It breathed the true spirit of the law” that there is an exception to the election rule in multiple-act acts and that the evidence presented qualified this case for said exception. Thus the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Vermont v. Peatman" on Justia Law

Defendant Landon Urban appealed a trial court's imposition of probationary conditions in connection with a plea agreement. In May 2016, defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and simple assault arising from an altercation at a mud bog event in Ferrisburgh. The arresting officer’s affidavit indicated defendant appeared extremely intoxicated when the officer spoke with him shortly after the incident. The charges were tried to a jury in September 2016, resulting in a conviction on the simple assault count. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the count alleging aggravated assault. In February 2017, the parties reached a plea agreement wherein defendant agreed to plead nolo contendere to the aggravated assault charge in exchange for concurrent sentences on both the aggravated assault and the simple assault charges. The plea agreement provided that a portion of the sentences was suspended, and defendant was placed on probation for a period of two years. Defendant argued on appeal that a condition forbidding the purchase, possession, or consumption of alcohol, to which he objected at sentencing, violated public policy or was unduly restrictive. He further contended, for various reasons, that additional conditions to which he agreed in the plea agreement should be modified or vacated. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Urban" on Justia Law

Defendant Landon Urban appealed a trial court's imposition of probationary conditions in connection with a plea agreement. In May 2016, defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and simple assault arising from an altercation at a mud bog event in Ferrisburgh. The arresting officer’s affidavit indicated defendant appeared extremely intoxicated when the officer spoke with him shortly after the incident. The charges were tried to a jury in September 2016, resulting in a conviction on the simple assault count. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the count alleging aggravated assault. In February 2017, the parties reached a plea agreement wherein defendant agreed to plead nolo contendere to the aggravated assault charge in exchange for concurrent sentences on both the aggravated assault and the simple assault charges. The plea agreement provided that a portion of the sentences was suspended, and defendant was placed on probation for a period of two years. Defendant argued on appeal that a condition forbidding the purchase, possession, or consumption of alcohol, to which he objected at sentencing, violated public policy or was unduly restrictive. He further contended, for various reasons, that additional conditions to which he agreed in the plea agreement should be modified or vacated. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Urban" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Larkin appealed his conviction of second-degree aggravated domestic assault. Defendant argued the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of complainant’s previous conviction for providing false information to a police officer (FIPO), offered by defendant to impeach complainant, deprived defendant of a fair trial. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, and that the error was not harmless. "Here, the jury was faced with the competing narratives of complainant and defendant. The outcome of the case hinged on the credibility of these two individuals, and thus we must take extra caution when analyzing the effect of the exclusion of defendant’s impeachment evidence - complainant’s FIPO conviction. . . . The jury could reasonably find that, because complainant had lied to police previously, her statements to testifying witnesses were less credible than they would have been otherwise." View "Vermont v. Larkin" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Bellanger appealed after a jury found him guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 13 and lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under 13. On appeal, defendant raised arguments related to the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the State’s evidence, and the prosecutor’s closing argument. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Bellanger" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edwin Towne, Jr. appealed the dismissal of his tenth and eleventh petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR). In 1989, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder. In his ninth petition, petitioner argued the 1986 traffic stop that precipitated his arrest for murder, he had ineffective assistance of counsel during both his trial and direct appeal. In the tenth and eleventh petitions, petitioner raised arguments similar to those previously raised in petitions one through nine. In March 2013, the PCR court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. With respect to petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the court concluded on the basis of the reasoning in Martinez v. Ryan, 556 U.S. 1 (2012) and Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012), that ineffectiveness of petitioner’s lawyer in his first PCR proceeding could overcome the procedural bars of successiveness and abuse of the writ to enable the court to consider the merits of petitioner’s PCR claims on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, the court concluded that petitioner had failed to establish that the first PCR court had erred in determining that his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim was without merit. In September 2015, the court dismissed the eleventh petition on the basis that his claims had either already been raised and addressed on the merits in previous petitions, or they could have been raised in previous petitions. Furthermore, the court noted that “there is nothing to suggest that if trial counsel had done what [petitioner] now thinks he should have done, the result at his trial or sentencing would have been different.” The Vermont Supreme Court found that petitioner’s claims that were not addressed on the merits in earlier petitions were an abuse of the writ under any standard of review. “For that reason, our resolution of this case does not turn on whether we review the trial court’s ruling as to newly raised claims for abuse of discretion or without deference. We accordingly decline to decide at this juncture which standard governs our review of the trial court’s dismissal of claims raised in a second or subsequent PCR petition on account of abuse of the writ.” Because his various claims are either successive, an abuse of the writ, or outside the scope of the PCR statute, the Supreme Court affirmed their dismissal. View "In re Edwin A. Towne, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner Edwin Towne, Jr. appealed the dismissal of his tenth and eleventh petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR). In 1989, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder. In his ninth petition, petitioner argued the 1986 traffic stop that precipitated his arrest for murder, he had ineffective assistance of counsel during both his trial and direct appeal. In the tenth and eleventh petitions, petitioner raised arguments similar to those previously raised in petitions one through nine. In March 2013, the PCR court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. With respect to petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the court concluded on the basis of the reasoning in Martinez v. Ryan, 556 U.S. 1 (2012) and Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012), that ineffectiveness of petitioner’s lawyer in his first PCR proceeding could overcome the procedural bars of successiveness and abuse of the writ to enable the court to consider the merits of petitioner’s PCR claims on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, the court concluded that petitioner had failed to establish that the first PCR court had erred in determining that his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim was without merit. In September 2015, the court dismissed the eleventh petition on the basis that his claims had either already been raised and addressed on the merits in previous petitions, or they could have been raised in previous petitions. Furthermore, the court noted that “there is nothing to suggest that if trial counsel had done what [petitioner] now thinks he should have done, the result at his trial or sentencing would have been different.” The Vermont Supreme Court found that petitioner’s claims that were not addressed on the merits in earlier petitions were an abuse of the writ under any standard of review. “For that reason, our resolution of this case does not turn on whether we review the trial court’s ruling as to newly raised claims for abuse of discretion or without deference. We accordingly decline to decide at this juncture which standard governs our review of the trial court’s dismissal of claims raised in a second or subsequent PCR petition on account of abuse of the writ.” Because his various claims are either successive, an abuse of the writ, or outside the scope of the PCR statute, the Supreme Court affirmed their dismissal. View "In re Edwin A. Towne, Jr." on Justia Law