Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Can a prison superintendent order a second administrative hearing when a hearing panel finds a prisoner not guilty of violating a prison rule at an initial hearing because of a clerical mistake in the prison’s evidence? Petitioner, an inmate in Vermont State prison charged with fighting, appealed summary judgment decision validating a superintendent’s authority to order a second hearing under these factual circumstances. The hearing officer found petitioner not guilty of the charged violation. The disciplinary committee unanimously agreed with the hearing officer. The superintendent then ordered a new hearing on the charge against petitioner. As he did in his motion for summary judgment, petitioner argues on appeal that the principle of collateral estoppel operates to bar a second hearing on the charge that was tried in his initial hearing. While the Supreme Court was unwilling to rule broadly on the superintendent’s power to order a new hearing, the Court held that the new hearing ordered here was appropriate when it was clear that the original decision was based on a mistake in the recording of the date of the incident underlying the disciplinary action. View "McLaughlin v. Pallito" on Justia Law

Defendant Ronald Carter was convicted of domestic assault as a lesser included offense of first degree aggravated domestic assault. He appealed, arguing that domestic assault was not a lesser included offense of aggravated domestic assault when defendant is charged with inflicting serious bodily injury by strangulation. The Supreme Court disagreed that the inclusion of the lesser included offense was improper and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Carter" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Sullivan was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) with death resulting, and leaving the scene of a fatal accident. On appeal, he challenged the trial court’s jury instructions, admission of expert testimony, and denial of his motion for access to necessary services as a needy person pursuant to 13 V.S.A. section 5231(a)(2). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s convictions. However, based on its conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by not continuing the sentencing hearing to allow defendant to present testimony of his expert witness, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for resentencing. View "Vermont v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Ladue appealed his conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that: (1) the State’s principal witness testified on a matter that violated the trial court’s pretrial ruling granting defendant’s motion in limine; (2) the court erred in overruling defendant’s objection to the prosecutor eliciting testimony from the State’s principal witness that defendant never reported to police that he was not driving his vehicle on the night in question; (3) the prosecutor made several impermissible statements during his opening statement and closing argument regarding defendant’s failure to inform police that he was not the driver; and (4) in attempting to define the term “reasonable doubt,” the court diminished the constitutional burden of proof imposed on the State, thereby committing structural error that requires reversal of defendant’s conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Ladue" on Justia Law

The question central to this appeal was whether a petitioner could raise a challenge to a Department of Corrections’ (DOC) disciplinary conviction that was not presented in the underlying DOC proceedings. Petitioner appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 appeal of a DOC disciplinary determination. Because petitioner did not preserve before the DOC the issue he raised for the first time before the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pratt v. Pallito" on Justia Law

In late 2016, Vermont State Police received a call from defendant William Bailey in which defendant told the police that he had accidentally shot his friend Daniel Hein and that Hein was likely dead. When the police arrived at the scene, they found Hein’s dead body in the back seat of defendant’s car; he had been shot in the head. Defendant was charged with manslaughter, and the court set bail at $50,000. Defendant later filed a motion to review bail, and the court held two bail review hearings. The court lowered bail to $25,000, but determined, after hearing testimony from both defendant’s father and defendant’s girlfriend, there was no responsible adult to whom defendant could be released. In cases of bailable offenses, there is a presumption that the defendant may be released before trial either on his or her own recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond. However, the presumption is rebutted if the court determines that such conditions are insufficient to assure the defendant’s appearance at future court proceedings. Defendant appealed the trial court’s order to set bail at $25,000 and its determination that neither his father nor his girlfriend were responsible adults to whom he can be released. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court’s requirement that he post a secured appearance bond in the amount of $25,000 with a ten percent deposit to be paid to the court. Defendant was being held for lack of bail, and he argued that the amount set by the trial court was excessive. Although a court must consider a defendant’s financial resources in determining conditions of release, the Supreme Court concluded that neither the U.S. nor Vermont Constitution nor the applicable Vermont statutes required trial courts to find that a defendant has a present ability to raise bail in the amount set by the court. "Although courts must consider a defendant’s financial resources when they set bail, courts may set bail at a level that a particular defendant cannot secure. In setting bail, courts must always be guided by the goal of securing a defendant’s appearance at trial, and should not set bail at an unattainable level for the purpose of detaining a defendant rather than assuring the defendant’s appearance." View "Vermont v. Pratt" on Justia Law

The patient in this case, G.G., appealed a trial court’s denial of requests by him and his counsel to let him represent himself in his mental-health proceedings and from the court’s subsequent orders of continued treatment and involuntary medication. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded G.G. from proceeding without representation in his involuntary medication and involuntary commitment hearings, given the State’s exceedingly strong interest in an accurate determination on the merits of those hearings. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of G.G.’s motion to waive counsel and his attorney’s motion to withdraw. Additionally, the Court affirmed the decisions on the merits of G.G.’s continued treatment and involuntary medication orders. View "In re G.G." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated murder and two counts of murder in the second degree in the deaths of two men. Plaintiff was the estate of one of the deceased men, which brought a wrongful death action on behalf of the next of kin. In its filing, plaintiff obtained an attachment freezing defendant’s assets, including the retainer she provided for her criminal defense. In an interlocutory appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court’s review was whether the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was violated when the plaintiff in a civil wrongful death action attaches funds the defendant intends to use for her legal defense to homicide charges stemming from the death at issue in the civil case. Defendant appealed a trial court decision permitting such an attachment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Jamis Lott v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

In September 2014, defendant Lamar Scales was tried and convicted of three felony counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child that occurred between June 1, 2004 and June 1, 2006. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting consciousness-of-guilt evidence and then failing to give a limiting instruction on the use of that evidence and that the prosecutor's closing argument violated the "golden rule" by asking the jurors to put themselves in the position of a party - here, the purported victim. Vermont has recognized the impropriety of an appeal to jurors to put themselves in the place of the victim: "A golden rule argument-which asks ‘jurors to place themselves in the position of a party'-is ‘universally condemned' because it encourages the jury to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on evidence." The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, finding the prosecutor's statements "exceeded the bounds of fair and temperate discussion, circumscribed by the evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom." View "Vermont v. Scales" on Justia Law