Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner D.C. appealed the denial of post-conviction relief (PCR), alleging that the change-of-plea hearing that preceded his adjudication of juvenile delinquency was constitutionally inadequate. The superior court held that the PCR statute did not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings and that the only remedy available to petitioner was through 33 V.S.A. 5113 and Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but that route was foreclosed because petitioner’s claim was untimely raised. On appeal, petitioner argued that the case was not moot, despite the fact he was over the age of majority at the time of his appeal (and no longer committed to state custody), and that the PCR statutes permitted juveniles to collaterally attack their adjudications. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, reversed the superior court’s order dismissing petitioner’s PCR complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

The State appealed mental health orders involving D.H. and B.C. The State's Attorney contended it was entitled to a hearing on its motions for the continued treatment at the expiration of the mental health orders at issue; both D.H. and B.C. had been charged with criminal offenses. The criminal division found the State’s Attorney had no standing to seek continued treatment at the expiration of a mental health treatment order and denied the State’s motion. Finding no reversible error in the orders, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. B.C." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a road rage incident in which defendant Jason Gagne chased a couple across town, eventually pulling up next to their truck and pointing a rifle at them. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the results of an alcohol breath test on the ground that he was not able to meaningfully communicate with his lawyer before submitting to the test due to his belief (which turned out to be well-founded) that his conversation with counsel was being recorded by the police. The trial court denied the motion, and following trial, a jury convicted defendant of aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence, and negligent operation of a vehicle. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred: in denying his motion to suppress; failing to instruct the jury that the definition of “threat” for the purposes of aggravated assault and simple assault was based on an objective standard; and in allowing convictions for aggravated assault, simple assault, and reckless endangerment for the same conduct, in violation of defendant’s double jeopardy rights. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on the suppression motion and reversed and remanded defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence. The Court upheld the trial court’s jury instructions; and affirmed the aggravated assault and reckless endangerment convictions. The simple assault conviction was reversed on double jeopardy grounds. View "Vermont v. Gagne" on Justia Law

Defendant Amy Koenig appealed the denial of her motion to suppress evidence that ultimately led to her arraignment for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Defendant’s main argument on appeal was that the arresting trooper's entrance into the attached structure to her home (a "carport") and the resulting discovery of the damage to her vehicle constituted a warrantless search of the curtilage of her home in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. Defendant contended that the trooper conducted an investigative stop in an area in which she had an expectation of privacy by approaching the residence through the attached structure, which was not a means of public access to the residence, and that a reasonable visitor would understand that the illuminated entranceway marked by a walkway was the normal access route. The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by defendant's argument, concluding the trooper’s conduct was reasonable and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment or Article 11. View "Vermont v. Koenig" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his “Petition for Extraordinary Relief” under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 and Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 21. Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in construing and dismissing his pleading as a successive petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) that raised claims decided on the merits in an earlier PCR proceeding under 13 V.S.A. 7134. He argued that the bar on successive applications does not apply to his extraordinary relief petition and, in any event, his petition was not a successive application because his claims regarding his unlawful conviction, particularly those alleging he has endured “severe collateral consequences” as a result of the conviction, were never heard on the merits. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, despite plaintiff’s characterization of his petition as a pleading pursuant to Rule 75 and Rule 21, the trial court correctly recognized it as a successive PCR action and affirmed the dismissal. View "Chandler v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction by jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and disorderly conduct. Defendant was acquitted of reckless endangerment. Defendant was charged with these crimes after allegedly pointing a shotgun at and threatening to shoot two men who were repossessing a vehicle from a tenant parking lot on his property. Defendant admitted confronting the men with a gun, but steadfastly denied pointing it at them or threatening to shoot them. Defendant argued on appeal that the court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on self-defense, defense-of-others, and defense-of-property. He contended that the court compounded its error through its instruction on repossession of collateral. The Supreme Court found no plain error, and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Buckley" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant was convicted by jury of simple assault and placed on probation. He petitioned the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial because the trial court improperly defined reasonable doubt for the jury, thus lowering the standard of proof. In the alternative, he raised three arguments regarding his probation conditions: (1) that they were unlawfully imposed on the grounds that the sentencing court mistakenly believed they were “standard”; (2) that the court failed to inform defendant of the content of the conditions at sentencing; and (3) that the imposed individual conditions were overbroad and vague, impermissibly delegated court authority to his probation officer, were unrelated to his offense, rehabilitation, or public safety, and were not supported by factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s conviction and conditions "H," "J," and "L," but remanded on condition "I" and struck all the other complained-of conditions. View "Vermont v. Levitt" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Kelley argued that the Vermont Supreme Court should have vacated his domestic assault conviction because numerous reversible errors occurred during his jury trial. Specifically, he claimed that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted two pieces of hearsay evidence; (2) that the trial court incorrectly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) that the State made prejudicial remarks during its closing statement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed a superior court’s order granting judgment to the State on his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) challenging his third conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) following his sentencing for a fourth DUI offense that had been enhanced by the DUI-3 conviction. He argued that the trial court that accepted the plea agreement that led to his conviction for DUI-3 did not ensure his guilty plea was voluntary and supported by a factual basis as required by Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(d) and 11(f). As relief, he sought an order vacating the DUI-3 conviction. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the plea colloquy for the DUI-3 was inadequate to establish the factual basis required by Rule 11(f), but that Vermont's established law did not provide for an order vacating the DUI-3 conviction. Because the remedy for the improper conviction for the DUI-3 lied in the post-conviction challenge to the sentence for the DUI-4, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to enter a judgment vacating the 2014 sentence for DUI-4 and conduct a resentencing on that charge. View "In re Wight Manning" on Justia Law

This appeal raised "a narrow, but novel, issue:" whether offenders previously convicted of home improvement fraud could be found guilty under the same statute if they subsequently perform home improvement activities but claim lack of knowledge of the statutory obligation to notify the Attorney General and file a surety. Defendant Robert Witham argued that the statute’s notice and surety section necessarily included a scienter element. The State asserted that the section should be read without a fault element. The trial court held that the notice and surety section delineated a strict liability offense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Witham" on Justia Law