Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Eric Manning was charged with possession of cocaine following a traffic stop. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the investigative detention, arguing that it was the result of an unlawful search and seizure that exceeded the scope of the suspended license investigation in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. He also moved to suppress statements made before the officer advised him of his Miranda rights, arguing that the questioning outside his vehicle amounted to a custodial interrogation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion to suppress, and affirmed his conviction. View "Vermont v. Manning" on Justia Law

Defendant Kent Richland was convicted by jury and sentenced to probation for enabling the consumption of alcohol by a minor. In 2013, defendant received a text message from a sixteen-year-old minor asking defendant to purchase alcohol for him. Defendant agreed but could not find his identification and instead arranged for a friend to purchase the alcohol. Later that day, defendant's friend purchased a bottle of gin for the minor at a local beverage store. The next day, the minor was found dead near his family home after crashing his all-terrain vehicle (ATV) while intoxicated. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that he had knowledge of the minor's age or that he created a direct and immediate opportunity for the minor to consume alcohol. The court denied defendant's motion, finding the evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of guilty and reiterating its statement that the age element is strict liability and does not require proof of knowledge. Defendant was found guilty after a short jury deliberation and sentenced to twelve-to-twenty-four-months incarceration, all suspended except for six months to serve. Defendant raised four issues on appeal: (1) the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury that 7 V.S.A. 658(a)(2) did not require knowledge of the minor's age; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove defendant enabled the minor's alcohol consumption; (3) the court's imposition of probation during the pendency of this appeal created a harsher, indeterminate term of probation, thereby penalizing defendant for exercising his right to appeal; and (4) the standard form probation conditions were invalid. The Supreme Court agreed with defendant on the first issue and held that section 658(a)(2) required the State to prove defendant had knowledge of the minor's age and that the court's error in instructing the jury to the contrary was not harmless. Because the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, it did not address the remaining three issues. View "Vermont v. Richland" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury of disorderly conduct and grossly negligent operation. He argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Defendant also challenged various conditions of probation. The charges stemmed from a March 2013 incident involving defendant and his neighbor. The neighbor was driving home on the dirt road. He was traveling approximately ten miles per hour and playing his music loudly with the windows rolled down. After passing defendant's house, the neighbor noticed a white car quickly coming up behind him. The car passed the neighbor on the left, pulled back into the middle of the road, and braked, turning sideways and blocking the road. Defendant got out of the white car and began screaming and swearing at the neighbor. He threatened the neighbor and said he was tired of the neighbor's loud music. Another person also witnessed defendant yelling. The neighbor took several pictures of the scene as he sat in his car, one of which was admitted into evidence. The picture showed tire marks across the road and defendant's car stopped in the middle of the road. The neighbor testified that had he not braked, he would have hit defendant's car. Defendant did not present any evidence on his own behalf. The jury found defendant guilty, and defendant was sentenced to two concurrent thirty-to-sixty-day sentences, all suspended, with two years of probation. With regard to probation, the State requested that the court impose the "standard conditions of probation," with the exception of restrictions on defendant's out-of-state travel, the imposition of a curfew, and the restriction on his associations (other than contacting, abusing, or harassing the neighbor). As a "special" condition, the State requested that defendant visit a mental-health counselor for an initial screening, follow any recommendations thereafter, and sign the necessary waivers to allow his probation officer to monitor his attendance and participation. Defendant also voiced concern over a mental-health condition, and over any "vague" release he may be required to sign in conjunction with mental-health counseling. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction, but struck several of the probation conditions. View "Vermont v. Putnam" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conditional guilty plea to possession of cocaine, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that he was illegally seized when a police officer approached his parked car twice in a short period and, during the second encounter, asked him pointed questions about drugs. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed, and therefore reversed and remanded the trial court's decision. View "Vermont v. Winters" on Justia Law

Defendant William Stanley, Sr., appealed his conviction of sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court: (1) erroneously permitted the trial and sentencing to proceed in his absence; (2) erroneously permitted the State to introduce an uncharged prior bad act as evidence; and (3) imposed the habitual-offender enhancement in a way that may have violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Defendant David Tracy's daughter was one of fifteen girls on a junior high school girls’ basketball team. The basketball coach did not play defendant’s daughter in the first two games of the season. Shortly after the end of the second game, defendant approached the coach and the coach’s nineteen-year-old daughter in the school parking lot. The coach and the coach’s daughter both testified that defendant was calm at the start of the conversation, but that the exchange soon became heated and agitated. Defendant began by saying that “he just wanted to know why [the coach] wouldn’t put his daughter in a game.” That exchange lead to charges against defendant for disorderly conduct by “abusive . . . language.” The trial court, following a bench trial, concluded that defendant’s language was not protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it constituted “fighting words.” On appeal, defendant argued that the “abusive language” prong of Vermont’s disorderly-conduct statute was overbroad and impermissibly chills a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech without serving a compelling state interest. He further argued that, even if the statute was constitutional on its face, the speech for which he was convicted in this case was constitutionally protected. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the speech for which defendant was convicted was beyond the reach of the abusive-language prong of the disorderly-conduct statute, and reversed the conviction. View "Vermont v. Tracy" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cherie Hyde brought an action for post-conviction relief (PCR), challenging her felony conviction and sentence for aiding another as an accessory to commit sexual assault on a child under the age of sixteen. She appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the State on that PCR petition, arguing: (1) the three-year statute of limitations governing aiding in the commission of a sexual assault had expired; (2) she was denied effective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to raise the statute-of-limitations defense; and (3) the court failed to establish a factual basis for the claim, and therefore, her plea was not voluntary. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Cherie Hyde" on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Brown petitioned for post-conviction relief following the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the State based on a determination that the criminal court complied with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(4) in deviating from the original plea agreement. In 2003, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault of a minor and one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. In total, petitioner agreed to a five-to-fifteen-year split sentence, with two years to serve, as well as the imposition of sex-offender probation conditions. Petitioner and the criminal court engaged in a colloquy, and the court accepted petitioner’s guilty plea but reserved final sentencing until after the release of the presentence investigation report (PSI). The criminal court reviewed the PSI, which differed from the original plea agreement in two important aspects: (1) the PSI recommended a three-to-twenty-year straight sentence; and (2) the report recommended three additional probation conditions. The State acknowledged that these conditions were not part of the original plea agreement and stated, “I suppose, in theory, if the court was not willing to accept the plea agreement without those conditions . . . then that would be a change in the plea agreement and the defendant would have a right to withdraw from it.” The court stated that it was going forward with the sentence as outlined in the original plea agreement, with the addition of the special probation conditions recommended in the PSI, minus the alcohol condition. Petitioner inquired about the two special conditions, which he felt were contradictory. The court explained the conditions and made sure that petitioner understood them; petitioner confirmed that he did. The court directed the clerk to impose the five-to-fifteen-year split sentence with the two added conditions. In 2014, petitioner filed his PCR petition, alleging that the criminal court violated Rule 11(e)(4) when it failed to explicitly inform him that he had the right to withdraw his plea after the criminal court imposed the additional probation conditions. Finding that the State was entitled to summary judgment based on its review of the criminal court record, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of relief. View "In re Derrick Brown" on Justia Law

In July 2014, defendant Kelly Taylor was stopped by a police officer in Lyndonville on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). At the stop, defendant submitted to a preliminary breath test showing an alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Defendant was arrested and taken to the Vermont State Police barracks in St. Johnsbury, where she took an evidentiary breath-alcohol test using a DataMaster DMT breath-alcohol testing device. This test showed that defendant’s alcohol concentration was 0.158, above the legal limit. Defendant appealed the civil suspension of her driver’s license. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred in finding that the State met its burden of showing that the breath-alcohol concentration “testing methods were valid and reliable” and that “[t]he test results were accurate and accurately evaluated,” when the printout (“ticket”) generated by the DataMaster device was not admitted into evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a minor under the age of thirteen. Defendant was the victim's uncle. After the incident, T.B. left the house and waited in the farm store across the street from her home until her aunt came home. Later that night, T.B. wrote a letter about the incident and about how she no longer felt safe in her home. The next morning on the bus, she showed the letter to a friend, who encouraged her to tell the school principal. T.B. showed the letter to the vice principal, and the school officials called the police and a Department for Children and Families case worker. Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the court erred by: (1) admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements under Vermont Rule of Evidence 804a; (2) admitting expert testimony under Vermont Rule of Evidence 702; and (3) coercing a jury verdict. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "Vermont v. Pratt" on Justia Law