Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Timothy Perley was charged with numerous crimes in March 2013, including: leaving the scene of an accident; violating conditions of release; operating with a suspended license driving under the influence (DUI), third offense; and refusing to submit to an evidentiary test. Defendant pled nolo contendere to the first three charges. Defendant appealed his conviction for refusing to submit to an evidentiary test, arguing that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove the “reasonableness” of the State’s request for an evidentiary breath test beyond a reasonable doubt. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Perley" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Aiken appealed a superior court order denying his motion to suppress his refusal to submit to an evidentiary breath test on grounds that he was denied his right to counsel. Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol prior to operating the vehicle, and preliminary breath and field sobriety tests indicated that defendant’s blood-alcohol content was above the legal limit. Defendant was detained and taken to the police barracks for processing. During processing, the sergeant read defendant his rights under Vermont’s implied-consent law. Defendant asked to speak with an attorney, and two on-call public defenders were telephoned. Defendant explained to the sergeant that he had been on hold for ten minutes, the sergeant again attempted to call both public defenders. There was no answer at any of the numbers called for the on-call attorney, and the back-up attorney’s line was busy. The sergeant told defendant that he had ten more minutes and that if neither public defender returned his call he would have to decide whether or not to take the evidentiary breath test regardless of obtaining legal consultation. After the thirty minutes elapsed, the sergeant asked defendant if he would submit to the breath test. Defendant refused to answer, and the sergeant understood this as a refusal to take the test. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant renewed on appeal his argument that Vermont case law holding that the defender general’s office had a statutory obligation to provide twenty-four-hour legal consultation to DUI detainees, and while he was on hold for a public defender, defendant received no substantive advice. "Although the consultation here was brief, an attorney-client relationship was formed," and the Supreme Court believed "that peering behind the veil of that privacy to ascertain the quality of the consultation would open the door to eroding the privacy afforded to detainees in their right to counsel." Because defendant failed to make a decision on whether or not to take the test, the trial court did not err in denying is motion to suppress. View "Vermont v. Aiken" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeremy Lucas appealed a trial-court order finding him in violation of a probation condition (imposed as part of a deferred-sentencing agreement) requiring prior approval from a probation officer before he changed his residence. Defendant argued that because his probation conditions included two inconsistent provisions governing his choice of residence, he did not have adequate notice that his conduct would violate the conditions of his probation. Defendant also argued that the condition at issue here contained an overly broad delegation of authority to his probation officer, and that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his deferred sentence because the violation was minor and the probation officer ultimately approved the View "Vermont v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a superior court decision that concluded he violated the condition of his probation requiring him to complete the Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual Abusers (VTPSA). The court found that defendant failed to complete the required program, but it refused to review the underlying disciplinary action of the Department of Corrections (DOC) that resulted in defendant's removal from the program. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the DOC's decision to terminate him from VTPSA. Specifically, defendant argued that: (1) the court was authorized by statute to make a final determination of whether there were grounds for revocation; (2) the court's delegation of decisionmaking authority to the DOC in a probation-violation matter violated the separation-of-powers doctrine; and (3) violation-of-probation hearings involved constitutional questions that the court had the power to review. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the alleged substantive ground central to this appeal was a violation of VTPSA's cardinal rule against physical violence or threats of physical violence. The trial court failed to determine whether the requirement was violated. Nor did it exercise its discretion to determine whether the alleged violation was such that revocation should be ordered. Because the Supreme Court reversed on these bases, it did not reach defendant's other arguments. View "Vermont v. Cavett" on Justia Law

Defendant Stephen L. Eldert appealed the revocation of his probation resulting from a violation of a probation condition that he not purchase, possess, or consume alcohol. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court erred in admitting unreliable hearsay evidence at the revocation hearing, and therefore reversed. View "Vermont v. Eldert" on Justia Law

Appellant Allstate Bail Bonds ("Allstate") challenged the trial court's decision to grant the State's motion for forfeiture of bond. Defendant was arraigned for grand larceny and possession of stolen property. Two days later, the court set bail at $35,000. Defendant posted bail on July 2, 2013 through a bond procured from Allstate. Allstate delivered a surety bond for defendant. On January 10, 2014, defendant was incarcerated in New York on separate charges. As a result of his incarceration, defendant failed to appear at Bennington Superior Court for final calendar call on February 4, 2014, a required appearance. The next day, the court issued a warrant for defendant's arrest. On March 11, 2014, the State filed a motion to forfeit bail due to defendant's failure to appear. On June 17, 2014, the court ordered full forfeiture, finding that defendant's incarceration did not justify relief from forfeiture. On appeal, Allstate argued that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to reduce the amount of bail forfeiture when Allstate could not produce defendant due to his out-of-state incarceration. The Supreme Court agreed that Allstate was entitled to a reduction in bail forfeiture, and therefore reversed. View "Vermont v. Mottolese" on Justia Law

Defendant John Galanes appealed a superior court order that concluded he violated certain conditions of his probation, notably, the condition that required him to notify his probation officer if he was planning to begin a sexual relationship. Defendant was convicted of several felony and misdemeanor offenses and placed on probation. In August 2013, after two separate probation violations in 2010 and 2013, defendant was placed on stricter conditions regarding sexual relationships. The testimony of defendant and his housekeeper disclosed that, at the time of the encounter underlying this suit, the housekeeper did not know that defendant was at home and in the shower. Defendant came out of the shower in a towel while the housekeeper was in the bedroom folding laundry. At that point, the two had sex. The housekeeper testified that there was no planning on the part of either her or defendant. Although the trial court made no explicit findings on the number of incidents and when they occurred, its decision reflected that it was deciding the case based on the occurrence of only one sexual encounter after the date the probation condition was added. Consistent with the trial court's decision, the State based its argument on appeal on the same single incident and did not rely on multiple encounters. In revoking defendant's probation, the trial court acknowledged that defendant did not plan the sexual encounter with his housekeeper but that he should have anticipated the encounter based upon the close friendship between the two. The Supreme Court reversed, "[t]o anticipate that something may happen is not the same as to plan for it. In fact, the court concluded only that defendant should have anticipated the encounter, not that he actually did anticipate it. As such, even if we put aside the question of whether the term is ambiguous, we do not accept the trial court's conclusion as sufficient to support a finding that defendant violated the condition." View "Vermont v. Galanes" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary and aggravated assault arising from an August 2012 incident in which he and a co-defendant entered a home in the Town of Enosburg, assaulted a resident, and stole prescription drugs. Defendant pled guilty to the charges in August 2013, and appeared for a contested sentencing hearing in February 2014. In addition to the burglary and assault, defendant was also appearing for sentencing on two unrelated convictions of grand larceny and simple assault. Defendant challenged his sentence of imprisonment for convictions of aggravated assault and burglary, asserting that the trial court improperly relied on evidence from his co-defendant's trial without providing defendant with notice and an opportunity to respond. After review, the Supreme Court agreed, vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "Vermont v. Delisle" on Justia Law

Defendant Lawrence Alers was convicted by jury of simple assault. He appealed, arguing: (1) that the trial court's admission of a particular out-of-court statement under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) that without the offending evidence, the State did not present sufficient evidence of bodily injury to support the conviction. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the out-of-court statement was testimonial, its admission did violate defendant's confrontation rights. Although the error was not harmless, the Court concluded that even in the absence of the offending evidence, the State presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Accordingly, defendant's conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Alers" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles (Hank) Madigan appealed his conviction on three counts of lewd and lascivious behavior with a child. The charges related to three incidents which the victim, A.R., described in her testimony. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing two witnesses to testify to the victim's character and reputation for truthfulness; (2) that the trial court admitted impermissible hearsay; and (3) that the prosecution's closing argument was improper. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the admission of testimony to bolster A.R.'s truthfulness was admitted improperly; (2) the trial court indeed, admitted impermissible hearsay; and (3) the prosecution's closing argument was improper and not harmless. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Madigan" on Justia Law