Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, defendant Robert Vezina pleaded guilty to one count of petit larceny in connection with the theft of seven pieces of musical equipment in July 2012. Defendant's sentence included a restitution order. The items taken were from the victim's rare drumming equipment collection, much of which was no longer being produced. The court found that the items which were damaged or stolen were collector's items, for which there is no "blue book" value as there is for automobiles. They were in "impeccable" condition before the larceny, as the owner did not let others play or touch his drum equipment. Because they are no longer being produced, most of the items in the owner's collection, when they were intact, were probably more valuable than when the owner originally purchased them. The cymbals that were damaged are no longer valuable collector's items. Defendant challenged the restitution order for the cymbals, arguing the trial court erred by concluding that certain cymbals that had been stolen but then returned in a degraded but functional condition were worthless; by awarding restitution based on the subjective value of the cymbals to the victim; and by ordering defendant to pay restitution without making a finding on his ability to pay. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed on the first two issues, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings concerning defendant's ability to pay. View "Vermont v. Vezina" on Justia Law

Defendant Gordon Campbell appealed two special sex-offender conditions of probation imposed upon him following being sentenced on a plea agreement for one count of aggravated assault and one count of sexual assault. The charges stemmed from an incident occurring earlier that March during which defendant, after drinking several pitchers of beer at several bars in downtown Burlington, was approached on the street by a young man looking for directions to a local house and for some cocaine. During the encounter, defendant offered the young man money in exchange for oral sex. The young man declined and began to walk away, but defendant followed him, repeatedly asking for oral sex and offering to pay. After the young man told defendant that he was not a "faggot," defendant physically and sexually assaulted the young man behind a restaurant. In March 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, defendant pled guilty to all counts and was sentenced that August. Subsequently, defendant filed a post-conviction relief petition in the civil division and moved for summary judgment. The civil division granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, vacated defendant's sentence, and remanded to the criminal division with leave for defendant to withdraw his plea. Thereafter, defendant and the State negotiated a new plea agreement where defendant agreed to plead guilty to the two assault charges and the State agreed it would dismiss the violation-of-conditions charge. A pre-sentence investigation (PSI) and psycho-sexual evaluation were ordered to accompany the new plea agreement, and the court delayed accepting the agreement until it had a chance to review the PSI. Defendant, upon receipt of the PSI and prior to the sentencing hearing, filed various written objections to the PSI with the court, including objections to the two special sex-offender conditions of probation, in the language originally proposed by DOC in the PSI. Specifically, defendant challenged condition 42, requiring that defendant submit to and pay for polygraph examinations; and condition 44, requiring that defendant reside and work only where approved by his probation officer. After the Supreme Court's review, defendant's sentence was affirmed in all respects except that the work / employment provisions of condition 44 were stricken and the matter remanded to the criminal division of the superior court for an opportunity to justify, revise, or remove those provisions of condition 44 consistent with the Court's opinion, and to make any findings the criminal division deemed necessary. View "Vermont v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury of sexual assault and sexual assault of a vulnerable adult based on a single incident. Defendant was in his seventies at the time of the incident that led to the charges against him, and lived in the same residential facility for disabled adults and senior citizens as the complaining witness, a woman with intellectual disabilities. He argued on appeal of his convictions that the court erred by: (1) allowing a three-week separation period between jury selection and the commencement of his trial; (2) denying his motion to dismiss one of the convictions on double-jeopardy grounds; and (3) admitting the hearsay testimony of the complainant's brother under the excited-utterance exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the sexual assault conviction on double jeopardy-grounds, but rejected defendant's other arguments and affirmed his conviction of sexual assault of a vulnerable adult, as well as the sentence imposed for that conviction. View "Vermont v. Breed" on Justia Law

In June 2013, defendant was driving through downtown Bennington when he was stopped by a police officer. The officer stopped defendant after the officer saw a pine-tree-shaped air freshener hanging from the defendant's rearview mirror. As a result of observations the officer made in connection with the stop, and ensuing events, defendant was charged with driving over the legal limit and driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of the traffic stop based on the presence of that air freshener hanging from his rearview mirror, and his ensuing conviction. The State argued that hanging an air freshener from the rearview mirror violated 23 V.S.A. 1125. The defendant argued that hanging an air freshener from the rearview mirror did not violate that statute if the item did not materially obstruct the driver's vision. At the subsequent bench trial, the arresting officer testified that a driver of the car could "observe the road directly ahead," notwithstanding the presence of the air freshener. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on that statutory authority: whether 23 V.S.A. 1125 prohibited the hanging of any item on the inside of a windshield, including a pine-tree-shaped air freshener, without regard to whether the item materially obstructs the driver's vision. The Court concluded that the applicable statute did not per se prohibit the hanging of any item on the inside of a windshield without regard to whether it obstructs the driver's vision. However, because the officer's mistake of law on this point was objectively reasonable and thus justified the stop, the Court affirmed the judgment below. View "Vermont v. Hurley" on Justia Law

Defendant Louis Fucci, Jr. pled guilty to two counts of soliciting another person for a murder-for-hire plot, and one count of obstruction of justice by seeking to have an opposing party in a civil lawsuit killed. The hiree turned out to be a confidential informant for law enforcement. The State originally charged defendant with two counts of attempted first-degree murder and two counts of inciting to felony. He appealed his conviction for obstruction of justice by challenging the validity of his guilty plea. He argued that: his conviction was void because the State failed to establish jurisdiction over the matter; the plea was unsupported by a factual basis; and, without establishing that he had the "requisite evil purpose" to obstruct the due administration of justice, his plea was involuntary. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Fucci" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the criminal division's denial of his motion to suppress and dismiss his charge for driving under the influence (DUI). In that motion, defendant claimed the evidence underlying his DUI charge should have been suppressed because the arresting officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop of his vehicle. The issue this case presented for review was whether all turns of the steering wheel require a signal. The trial court found that defendant violated Vermont's turn-signal statute, so the arresting officers had justification to pull him over. It accordingly denied defendant's motion. After review, the Supreme Court held that defendant did not violate that statute, and therefore reversed. View "Vermont v. Hutchins" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a fight between defendant and his brother. Defendant Gordon Noyes, Jr. appealed his convictions for disorderly conduct and simple assault by mutual affray following a jury trial. He argued these convictions should have been reversed because: (1) the prosecutor improperly elicited evidence suggesting that defendant was having an affair with his stepdaughter; (2) the court erroneously allowed the State to confront its witness with a prior inconsistent statement; (3) the prosecutor improperly led witnesses and made comments on the evidence; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his disorderly conduct conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Noyes" on Justia Law

E.W. was fifteen years old, in the custody of the Department for Children and Families (DCF), and living in a foster home when in 2013, a Vermont state trooper in uniform arrived at E.W.'s foster home to investigate a break-in and motor-vehicle theft. E.W.'s foster father then spoke privately with E.W. and told him not to say anything to the officer until the foster father contacted DCF. When asked what he and E.W. discussed, the foster father responded, "[h]onesty," explaining that he was "trying to encourage E.W. to be honest," and how "[i]t's not always easy to do the right thing." He denied specifically directing E.W. to do the right thing, however, or telling him that he had to speak with the officer. The foster father telephoned for guidance from E.W.'s guardian ad litem (GAL), who told him that "[u]sually the attorneys do not like the children interviewed unless they are there." The GAL then attempted to reach E.W.'s attorney, leaving a voice mail, and then spoke with the foster father again. The GAL advised him to be present during any conversation between E.W. and the police officer. The GAL could not reach E.W.'s attorney. The interview was not recorded; no Miranda warnings were given. The foster father was present throughout. He recalled that the officer "asked E.W. about where the car was," informing him that the police "were aware" he had taken it to Derby "but didn't know where it had gone after that." The foster father also recalled that he twice interrupted the officer's questioning to speak privately with E.W. when it appeared that "the floodgates . . . opened" and E.W. started making admissions to offenses beyond those that the officer had described. E.W. was subsequently charged with two counts of burglary, four counts of unlawful trespass in an occupied residence, three counts of petit larceny, one count of unlawful mischief, and one count of operating a vehicle without owner consent. He moved to suppress his statements to the officer and dismiss all counts, asserting violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as well as his rights under Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that E.W. was not in custody at the time of the interrogation, and that Miranda warnings were therefore not required. E.W. then entered a conditional plea to all counts except the unlawful-mischief count, which was dismissed by the State, and reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal, E.W. argued that his motion to suppress should have been granted under both the federal and state constitutions. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that E.W. was in custody, and his motion to suppress should have been granted. The trial court's judgment was reversed. View "In re E.W." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the civil suspension of his driver's license and his conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI). He argued that the police lacked reasonable grounds to stop him, and thus, the court should have granted his motion to suppress and dismiss. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Hinton" on Justia Law

Latonia Congress was convicted by jury of second-degree murder. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether, in a murder prosecution, a jury can find a defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to murder, on grounds that the evidence of defendant's actions were influenced by a serious psychological condition that does not rise to the level of insanity, and does not negate the defendant's specific intent to kill. The Court concluded after review of the particular circumstances of this case, that the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury that it could consider the evidence of defendant's psychological condition as a basis for convicting her of voluntary manslaughter, and rejected defendant's challenges on appeal to several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. View "Vermont v. Congress" on Justia Law