Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Scott Provost appealed the decision of the criminal division that he violated his probation when he refused to admit the offense and failed to complete a domestic violence program in a timely manner, and engaged in threatening behavior while attempting to sign up for the program eight months after his conviction. Defendant argued that the original one-year fixed term of probation expired during the pendency of this appeal, excusing him from the consequences of any subsequent violations. The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the record supported the trial court’s determination that defendant violated the terms of his probation by his delay in enrolling in and completing the domestic violence program. View "Vermont v. Provost" on Justia Law

On the evening of September 9, 2009, the complainant was walking home along Colchester Avenue in Burlington when an unknown man attacked her and tried to force her into the cab of a pickup truck that was parked alongside the road. He punched her repeatedly in the face and she fell to the ground. He pinned her to the ground with his knee. She started screaming. At one point he shoved his finger into her mouth and she bit him. He got up and she managed to escape. She ran to a nearby house and rang doorbells until someone let her in. The assailant drove off in a truck. Police and an ambulance arrived soon afterwards. Several people witnessed the event and offered descriptions of the assailant and the truck to police. While the assailant’s truck was parked on the side of the road, a Chittenden County Transportation Authority (CCTA) bus passed by. Two video cameras attached to the bus captured images of the assailant’s truck at the location identified by the complainant. Defendant Harold Porter, Jr. was arrested and charged with attempted kidnapping, aggravated assault, and unlawful restraint. The latter two charges were eventually dismissed by the State. Defendant’s first trial in July 2011 ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. A second jury trial in March 2012 resulted in a guilty verdict. Defendant was sentenced to serve thirty years to life. He argued on appeal that the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to grant a motion for a new trial because the prosecution failed to disclose important expert testimony; (2) in admitting the testimony of police officers that they had ruled out other suspects based on interviews with out-of-court declarants; (3) in admitting eyewitness identification testimony; (4) in failing to dismiss the case for failure to preserve and test potentially exculpatory evidence; and (5) in excluding the testimony of defendant’s expert on police procedures. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the investigating officers had no basis upon which to offer admissible testimony that the information they received from some of the witnesses met the personal knowledge requirement of Rule of Evidence 602. Consequently, admission of the officers' testimony was prejudicial to defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on this ground. View "Vermont v. Porter, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant Tiffanie Felix appealed her conviction for the sale or delivery of 200 milligrams or more of heroin following a jury trial. She argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow her to impeach the credibility of the State’s key witness in various ways, depriving defendant of a fair trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Felix" on Justia Law

Defendant Yetha Lumumba is a native of the Democratic Republic of Congo. He immigrated to the United States in 2004, where he became a legal permanent resident. In 2012, defendant, then a student at the University of Vermont (UVM), was convicted of sexual assault of a fellow student. In June of 2010, defendant and the victim, J.B, met up for a bike ride to a Burlington beach which ended in sex that J.B. felt was nonconsensual. Several months later, J.B. reported the incident and defendant was subsequently charged with sexual assault against J.B. After a three-day jury trial, defendant was found guilty and received a sentence of eight years to life in prison. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred: (1) in allowing a clinical psychologist to give expert testimony about common reactions and behaviors of rape victims in between J.B.’s testimony and the defense’s cross-examination of J.B.; (2) in not permitting defense counsel to have J.B. look over transcripts of her prior testimony during cross-examination to determine whether she had made a prior inconsistent statement; and (3) in admitting hearsay testimony from a UVM police officer who met with J.B. Defendant also challenged his sentence, arguing that his immigration status prevented him from meeting Vermont’s statutory requirement for sex-offender counseling prior to release from incarceration, thereby effectively sentencing him to a disproportionately harsh punishment of life in prison without the possibility of parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's evidentiary rulings, but reversed on sentencing. The trial court did not have an obligation to reduce the sentence awarded in consideration of imminent deportation upon release from prison, but it did have an obligation under Vermont’s individualized sentencing process to examine defendant’s case and to consider the consequences of his particular situation in fashioning a sentence. Stating that it did not care to understand these consequences was a failure of this obligation and an abuse of discretion; awarding a sentence range of which the only evidence presented at sentencing indicated was not likely to be a range at all required more from the court in the way of findings than the court provided. Because the Supreme Court reversed on these grounds, it did not reach defendant’s Eighth Amendment claim. View "Vermont v. Lumumba" on Justia Law

Defendant Owen Cornell was convicted by jury of lewd and lascivious conduct with a twelve-year-old child. Defendant argued on appeal: (1) that the boilerplate "sex offender conditions" imposed by the trial court were not sufficiently individualized to comply with statutory sentencing requirements; (2) that the vague and ambiguous wording of some of the conditions violated defendant’s due process rights and impermissibly delegated the court’s authority to his probation officer; (3) and that several of the conditions were unduly restrictive and invasive in violation of defendant’s substantive due process rights. Defendant raised these issues in response to a limited remand from the Supreme Court, but the trial court did not address them because its authority on remand, as requested by the parties, was limited to clarifying the conditions it had already imposed. In accordance with the Supreme Court’s September 2013 entry order extending the trial court’s authority on remand to resolve defendant’s challenges, the case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings on defendant’s motion to reconsider the probation conditions. View "Vermont v. Cornell" on Justia Law

Defendant Patrick Bostwick was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and sentenced to three to fifteen years, all suspended but six months. Defendant's probation order contained "special sex offender conditions": "You will not live in an apartment complex that allows children, in neighborhoods with large numbers of children, or in neighborhoods near parks, schools, playgrounds, etc, unless directed otherwise by your Supervising Officer"; and "You shall reside where your Supervising Officer directs. You shall not change your residence without the prior written permission of your Supervising Officer." While defendant was still incarcerated, the State filed a probation violation complaint, claiming that defendant had violated the condition stating: "You shall reside where your Supervising Officer directs." The State claimed that defendant had violated this condition because he did not submit a residence for his probation officer's approval prior to his release and therefore he would be homeless upon his release. The court dismissed the complaint for "impossibility of performance." Defendant was subsequently released and, with approval from his probation officer, resided at a few temporary addresses in succession. In its analysis, the court found that defendant did not look for housing for approximately one month, and that defendant "certainly should have known that abandoning his efforts to find housing for several days . . . was not in compliance with his obligations under the terms of his probation." Defendant argued that the requirements that he make housing search calls every day and find housing by a certain date were not part of his court-ordered probation conditions. Therefore, defendant claimed that his probation officer lacked authority to impose those requirements on him and that defendant had no notice of the consequences of failing to fulfill those requirements. Defendant further argued that he had no meaningful opportunity to find housing, that it was in fact impossible for him to find housing, and that his failure to find housing was not willful. Because the Supreme Court agreed with defendant that he did not violate any of his court-ordered conditions of release, it did not reach the remainder of his other arguments made on appeal. The Court held that defendant's conduct was not inconsistent with the plain language of his probation conditions, and reversed. View "Vermont v. Bostwick" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a restitution order requiring him to pay $2,427.36 for damage to a car. On appeal, he argued: (1) the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the victim’s loss was uninsured; (2) the court failed to make a specific finding that the damage was uninsured; (3) the court erred in admitting and using a repair estimate because it was hearsay; and (4) the court erred in calculating the amount of restitution by using the cost of repair rather than the difference in fair market value before and after the accident. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order. View "Vermont v. Morse" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Aubuchon appealed the superior court’s denial of his request under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 for additional credit toward his aggregated minimum sentence. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Vermont v. Aubuchon" on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire attempted to extradite Vermont resident and petitioner William LaPlante for failing to appear at a 2009 hearing allegedly related to a criminal conviction in New Hampshire in 1998. Following a Governor’s warrant from Vermont, petitioner requested a writ of habeas corpus from the Vermont superior court in Rutland, which was granted on grounds that the warrant lacked information required by statute. Vermont appealed this grant of habeas corpus relief, contesting the court’s holding and its findings regarding the contents of the Governor’s warrant. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re LaPlante" on Justia Law

Petitioner Roy Girouard appealed the superior court’s denial of a motion to reopen his Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 post-conviction relief petition and to order the Department of Corrections (DOC) to release him on furlough. Petitioner argued that the superior court’s 2009 order directing DOC to evaluate petitioner for furlough was the law of the case and the superior court had “inherent authority” to enforce it. Petitioner alleged that DOC’s actions constituted a “bad faith evasion” of the court’s order and argued that the superior court erred by failing to develop a factual record to determine whether DOC followed the court’s mandate. The State counters that DOC complied with the 2009 superior court order, and that its programming decisions are unreviewable under Rule 75. "The fact that a colorable constitutional claim implicates a programming decision committed to the DOC’s discretion does not insulate the alleged constitutional violation from judicial review. [. . .] To the extent that petitioner is not merely challenging the propriety of the programming decision here, but is raising a colorable constitutional claim, his claim is reviewable. [. . . ] Petitioner’s allegations state a claim sufficient to survive dismissal." The Court reversed and remanded. View "In re Girouard" on Justia Law