Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a fight between defendant and his brother. Defendant Gordon Noyes, Jr. appealed his convictions for disorderly conduct and simple assault by mutual affray following a jury trial. He argued these convictions should have been reversed because: (1) the prosecutor improperly elicited evidence suggesting that defendant was having an affair with his stepdaughter; (2) the court erroneously allowed the State to confront its witness with a prior inconsistent statement; (3) the prosecutor improperly led witnesses and made comments on the evidence; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his disorderly conduct conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Noyes" on Justia Law

E.W. was fifteen years old, in the custody of the Department for Children and Families (DCF), and living in a foster home when in 2013, a Vermont state trooper in uniform arrived at E.W.'s foster home to investigate a break-in and motor-vehicle theft. E.W.'s foster father then spoke privately with E.W. and told him not to say anything to the officer until the foster father contacted DCF. When asked what he and E.W. discussed, the foster father responded, "[h]onesty," explaining that he was "trying to encourage E.W. to be honest," and how "[i]t's not always easy to do the right thing." He denied specifically directing E.W. to do the right thing, however, or telling him that he had to speak with the officer. The foster father telephoned for guidance from E.W.'s guardian ad litem (GAL), who told him that "[u]sually the attorneys do not like the children interviewed unless they are there." The GAL then attempted to reach E.W.'s attorney, leaving a voice mail, and then spoke with the foster father again. The GAL advised him to be present during any conversation between E.W. and the police officer. The GAL could not reach E.W.'s attorney. The interview was not recorded; no Miranda warnings were given. The foster father was present throughout. He recalled that the officer "asked E.W. about where the car was," informing him that the police "were aware" he had taken it to Derby "but didn't know where it had gone after that." The foster father also recalled that he twice interrupted the officer's questioning to speak privately with E.W. when it appeared that "the floodgates . . . opened" and E.W. started making admissions to offenses beyond those that the officer had described. E.W. was subsequently charged with two counts of burglary, four counts of unlawful trespass in an occupied residence, three counts of petit larceny, one count of unlawful mischief, and one count of operating a vehicle without owner consent. He moved to suppress his statements to the officer and dismiss all counts, asserting violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as well as his rights under Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that E.W. was not in custody at the time of the interrogation, and that Miranda warnings were therefore not required. E.W. then entered a conditional plea to all counts except the unlawful-mischief count, which was dismissed by the State, and reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal, E.W. argued that his motion to suppress should have been granted under both the federal and state constitutions. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that E.W. was in custody, and his motion to suppress should have been granted. The trial court's judgment was reversed. View "In re E.W." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the civil suspension of his driver's license and his conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI). He argued that the police lacked reasonable grounds to stop him, and thus, the court should have granted his motion to suppress and dismiss. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Hinton" on Justia Law

Latonia Congress was convicted by jury of second-degree murder. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether, in a murder prosecution, a jury can find a defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to murder, on grounds that the evidence of defendant's actions were influenced by a serious psychological condition that does not rise to the level of insanity, and does not negate the defendant's specific intent to kill. The Court concluded after review of the particular circumstances of this case, that the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury that it could consider the evidence of defendant's psychological condition as a basis for convicting her of voluntary manslaughter, and rejected defendant's challenges on appeal to several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. View "Vermont v. Congress" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred by allowing certain hearsay testimony to be considered by the jury; (2) the trial court erred in scheduling a six-day delay between jury selection and trial without obtaining a waiver from defendant; and (3) the State's use of inflammatory language and arguments regarding complainant's character during closing arguments was plain error. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial on the first ground without reaching defendant's other arguments. View "Vermont v. Groce" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, defendants Brian Grenier and Jessica Harris's were charged with driving under the influence (DUI), and appealed the trial court's denial of their motions to suppress the results of their breath-alcohol tests taken by the DataMaster DMT machine. Defendants moved to suppress the evidentiary breath-alcohol test results, arguing (1) that the Vermont Commissioner of Health did not approve the DataMaster DMT machine used to obtain the breath-alcohol results, as required by statute and rules adopted by the Vermont Department of Health (DOH); and (2) that admission of the DMT results would violate defendants' due process rights under the United States and Vermont constitutions because of alleged ongoing mechanical problems with the machines and unprofessional practices by DOH employees. Defendants requested an evidentiary hearing on their claims. The court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, finding it unnecessary because, even taking defendants' allegations as true, the parties did not dispute the relevant material facts. At trial, defendants vigorously attacked the reliability of the test and urged the jury to give it no weight. In particular, defendants relied on evidence of ongoing technical problems with the machines and of unprofessional conduct within the DOH, allegations that a subsequent internal investigation determined to be unfounded. Defendant Grenier was convicted by a jury of DUI, and defendant Harris pled guilty to the same charge, but conditioned on her appeal of the trial court's rulings. On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants' requests for an evidentiary hearing and that it erred in denying defendants' motions to suppress. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court's conclusions were supported by the record, and accordingly, affirmed that court's decision. View "Vermont v. Grenier" on Justia Law

Defendant Maureen Wilt appeals a conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) on grounds that the trial court improperly allowed a police trooper to testify about the results of a field-sobriety test he administered to defendant. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Wilt" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alvin Stocks appealed the superior court’s order granting summary judgment to the State on his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). He argued that the trial court did not comply with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting his guilty pleas to various crimes. In June 2009, petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to: operation without consent of owner; driving under the influence, second offense; possession of marijuana; and domestic assault. In July 2011, petitioner filed a pro se PCR petition. Counsel was appointed and petitioner moved for summary judgment. Petitioner argued that the undisputed facts showed that the plea colloquy failed to comply with Rule 11(f) because the court did not sufficiently establish a factual basis for the pleas. "What is principally required - and what was missing in this case - is evidence of a specific inquiry by the judge into the factual basis for the plea." The Supreme Court reversed, finding that although the trial court asked petitioner if he understood the charges against him and, in connection with some charges, whether he understood the alleged factual basis for the charge, the trial court never asked him if he admitted the truth of the allegations, nor whether the State could prove the underlying facts. "The court never asked him to describe the facts giving rise to the charges in his own words, and never sought any other admissions from him to support the conclusion that the guilty pleas had a factual basis. The court did not elicit from petitioner any information to support the finding of a factual basis. Petitioner confirmed his understanding of the charges but, apart from the actual guilty pleas themselves, admitted nothing." View "In re Stocks" on Justia Law

Defendant Roger Perry appealed the trial court's issuance of a mittimus ordering the Department of Corrections (DOC) not to give defendant credit for time served in connection with prior convictions. The State did not challenge defendant's claim that the mittimus violated the parties' plea agreement and created an illegal sentence, but argued that because defendant has completed the time-to-serve portion of his sentence, this appeal was moot. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the appeal was not moot because defendant was still serving the challenged sentence, and that the amended mittimus violated Vermont's sentencing statute. View "Vermont v. Perry" on Justia Law

Petitioner's state-appointed counsel filed an untimely notice of appeal of the trial court's denial of petitioner's first post-conviction relief (PCR) petition. It was uncontested that by failing to timely file a notice of appeal, counsel performed well below any recognized standard of care. The Supreme Court has held previously that where counsel negligently fails to perfect an appeal, the defendant has not knowingly and intelligently waived the appeal "there is per se ineffective counsel." The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether petitioner had a remedy for his counsel's failure to perfect his PCR appeal. Petitioner argued that his first PCR should be reinstated because the statutory right to PCR counsel includes a minimal level of competence, which was plainly violated in this case. The State supported petitioner's request to reverse the trial court and reinstate the first appeal. "Because this case presents an egregious example of injustice," the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the superior court with directions that petitioner's initial PCR be reinstated with a renewed opportunity for petitioner to file a notice of appeal. View "In re Babson" on Justia Law