Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants, in consolidated cases, challenged a recent amendment to Vermont's DNA-database statute as unconstitutional. As of July 2011, the amendment mandated warrantless, suspicionless DNA collection and analysis from anyone arraigned for a felony after a determination of probable cause. Defendants in these cases were all arraigned on qualifying charges and subsequently refused to give a DNA sample. All trial courts found the amendment authorized unconstitutional searches and seizures, either under the Vermont or federal constitutions. The Vermont Supreme Court emphasized that its holding pertained only to the State Constitution, and not the U.S. Constitution. "The marginal weight of the State's interest in DNA collection at the point of arraignment, balanced against the weight of the privacy interest retained by arraignees prior to conviction, persuad[ed] the [Vermont Supreme Court] to hold that 20 VSA 1933(a)(2), and associated sections, which expand[ed] the DNA sample requirement to defendants charged with qualifying crimes for which probable cause is found, violate[d] Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courts' holdings. View "Vermont v. Medina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eric Williams pled guilty to four counts of involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to serve forty to sixty years in prison. These charges stemmed from a fire in an apartment house in which petitioner lived. Three young children and their grandmother died in the fire. Petitioner was nineteen years old at the time of the fire. Petitioner sought to vacate his conviction on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. Following a twelve-day trial, the civil division ruled that although petitioner’s defense attorney provided adequate representation in connection with his guilty pleas, the assistance he provided to his client during sentencing fell below minimum standards of representation. Both petitioner and the State appealed the court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the court's decision that petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his guilty plea. The Court also affirmed the ruling that his representation during the sentencing phase was inadequate and that he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to provide more than perfunctory assistance. The Court agreed with the PCR court that petitioner's sentence should have been vacated and a new sentencing hearing scheduled. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue before the Supreme Court presented centered on whether the same prior conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) could serve both to criminalize a refusal to submit to an evidentiary blood-alcohol test under 23 V.S.A. 1201(b) and to enhance the penalty for that offense under 23 V.S.A. 1210. The trial court held that the statute prohibited such dual use, and the State appealed that decision.  After careful consideration of the two cases, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the plain language of the statute allowed the same prior DUI conviction to be used both as an element of criminal refusal and to enhance the penalty for the refusal.View "Vermont v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

In Fall 2013, defendant pled guilty to a felony charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child as well as four counts of prohibited acts. The court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) and a psychosexual evaluation. Sentencing occurred after submission of the PSI report and the evaluation. In the course of the sentencing hearing, the defense sought testimony from the victim, who was thirteen years old at the time the offense conduct began and sixteen at the time of sentencing. The victim was defendant's younger sister. The defense requested that the judge speak privately with the victim. The State objected although it agreed "to allow the victim to express her preference to the Court outside the presence of counsel." Specifically, the record reflected that when the judge inquired if anyone "would object to my meeting briefly with [the victim] to find out exactly what her comfort level is," the State responded that it had no objection. The judge met with the child in chambers. A record was kept of their conversation. Reading from a prepared statement, the victim told the judge that she did not want her brother to go to jail. During the conversation, the judge discussed general sentencing principles with the victim. The trial judge offered the victim a mixture of advice and sympathy and discussed ways to overcome traumatic experiences in life. At the close of the conversation, the victim stated that she did not want to provide any additional testimony in open court. The court sentenced defendant to two-to-eight years, all suspended except ninety days on the lewd-and-lascivious conduct charge. The State petitioned for extraordinary relief, raising two issues concerning defendant’s sentencing: an objection to a private meeting in chambers between the judge and the minor victim of the offenses and the court’s decision to impose a "split" probationary sentence on the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, first offense. The Supreme Court found no violation of the sentencing provisions applicable to this offense. Accordingly, it denied the State's petition for extraordinary relief. View "Vermont v. Fontaine" on Justia Law

Defendant Aidan Brunner appealed his conviction for possession of brass knuckles or a similar weapon with intent to use it. He argued arguing that the implement at issue is neither brass knuckles nor a similar weapon under State law. The weapon was described as having retractable blades. There was a slot that permitted the wielder to insert his or her fingers and hold the weapon. The concave curve of the metal fit against the palm; once grasped, one section is within the closed grip of the fist, and the remaining portions protrude along the front of the fingers/knuckles. The bar has sharp, serrated teeth. Finding that description fit the statutory definition of "brass knuckles" [or similar weapon], the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Brunner" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed a trial court order granting summary judgment to the State on his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Petitioner was originally charged with aggravated sexual assault for allegedly penetrating his eight-year-old step-granddaughter with his finger. A presentence investigation report (PSI) contained statements referring to petitioner’s digital penetration of the victim. The probation officer recommended a sentence of eight-to-fifteen years, all suspended except eight years. In his written response to the PSI, petitioner focused on rebutting the contention that he had minimized his conduct and the impact that it had on the victim, and he highlighted mitigating factors, such as his age, health, and remorse. Petitioner did not object to the mention of penetration in the PSI. Petitioner’s trial counsel argued for a sentence of one-to-five years, all suspended but one year, but did not address the penetration issue. In response, the State argued only that petitioner’s allocution further illustrated his lack of empathy for the victim. The court sentenced petitioner to eight-to-fifteen years to serve. After sentence was imposed, petitioner’s attorney objected that “[t]his was a plea to [a charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child] and the court’s conclusions are clearly beyond the offense conduct relative to [the] alleged penetration.” He also asserted that the allegations of penetration “were never attested and were never probed” and that the State had conceded that the victim would not be able to substantiate penetration. In a direct appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law by sentencing him based on digital penetration when this was a disputed issue, no evidence was presented concerning penetration at sentencing, and the State admitted that it could not prove this fact. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s assertion that he was not required to object to the mention of penetration in the PSI because the State had admitted that it could not prove penetration. Furthermore, the Court concluded that because petitioner did not challenge the reliability of the penetration evidence prior to being sentenced, he had waived any objection to the court’s use of this evidence on appeal. Petitioner then filed a PCR petition, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the allegation of penetration in the PSI, and that, but for this error, a reasonable probability existed that he would have received a lesser sentence. The State moved for summary judgment, asserting that regardless of whether petitioner could establish deficient performance by counsel, he could not establish that the sentencing court relied on the finding of penetration in reaching its sentence, and thus, he could not show prejudice. The court granted summary judgment to the State. Upon review of petitioner's PCR appeal, the Supreme Court concluded petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would have received a lesser sentence but for counsel’s unprofessional errors. Summary judgment was therefore properly granted to the State. View "In re Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court’s order revoking his probation. On appeal, he argued that he did not receive a “certificate explicitly setting forth” his probation conditions, as required by 28 V.S.A. 252(c), and that he did not have notice of the conditions. He also contended that the court did not make adequate factual findings regarding the credibility of defendant’s wife (the complainant), and that the court’s findings were erroneous. The Supreme Court agreed with defendant’s claim as to the failure to comply with the requirements of section 252(c) and reversed on that ground. View "Vermont v. Hemingway" on Justia Law

In a post-conviction relief (PCR) proceeding to vacate convictions based on a change of plea following a plea agreement, the court granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. The PCR court concluded that the change-of-plea colloquy was fundamentally flawed because the criminal court did not specifically ask petitioner if his plea was voluntary and free of undisclosed coercion or promises as required by Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. The State appealed that decision, arguing that the colloquy substantially complied with Rule 11, the record demonstrated the plea was voluntary, and petitioner failed to allege actual prejudice. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, and reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "In re Hemingway" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in his underlying criminal case because his lawyers induced him to reject a plea bargain for a much lower sentence "by misrepresenting the potential maximum sentencing exposure petitioner was facing at trial." The superior court appointed a lawyer from the Prisoners’ Rights Office of the Defender General to represent petitioner in that court. The appointed public defender accepted representation and proceeded to represent petitioner throughout the trial court proceeding. The State moved to dismiss the petition under 13 V.S.A. 7134 because it was "a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." The public defender answered that the case did not fit within the statute because the theory on which this petition was based had not been raised in earlier PCR petitions because it was not available at the time of the earlier petitions. The superior court granted summary judgment for the State. Shortly thereafter, the public defender filed a notice of appeal on petitioner’s behalf. In a letter to petitioner, the public defender said she initially thought there were no grounds for appeal, but then said "I changed my opinion and filed a notice of appeal for you." She added, however, that since filing the notice of appeal she discovered the Defender General’s office had a conflict of interest so the case had been assigned to conflict counsel. The first assigned conflict counsel withdrew because her firm had done a merits review for the Defender General on petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in connection with a prior PCR action. Counsel concluded that the firm’s prior negative merits review created a conflict of interest. The case was then assigned to attorney Michael Rose. Attorney Rose filed a motion for leave to withdraw, citing Vermont Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 and case law. Because it became clear during the argument on that motion that the Defender General had not gone through the procedure it typically goes through before seeking leave to withdraw on the basis cited by Attorney Rose, the Supreme Court invited the Defender General to present its position on the motion. Upon further review, the Supreme Court granted Attorney Rose’s motion for leave to withdraw, and it did not appoint new publicly funded counsel. View "In re Bruyette." on Justia Law

Defendant Kyle Bolaski appealed his conviction for second-degree murder after a jury trial. He argued the trial court erred in: (1) not instructing the jury that the jury had to find an absence of passion or provocation; (2) excluding evidence of the victim’s mental health history in the months before the incident; and (3) dismissing a juror during the trial because she reported having followed the case during the time of the grand jury. On appeal, defendant argued that even though his case was presented as a self-defense case, there were sufficient facts in evidence to merit an instruction on passion or provocation for the second-degree murder charge. He also argued that the exclusion of the victim’s mental health evidence was error because it was admissible under Rule 404(b). And lastly, he argued that the dismissal of a juror partway through the trial because she admitted to having followed the story of the case during the grand jury phase was improper. The Supreme Court could not conclude that the instructions in this case were full, fair and correct on the elements of second-degree murder, assuming that the trial court’s decision to charge voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense was proper; nor could the Court conclude that the jury was not misled, despite the more accurate statement of the law in the voluntary manslaughter instruction. Some of the confusion in this case resulted from labeling defendant’s theory as trying to establish the victim’s motives for his actions. The Court concluded that the word was misused in this context. "If the medical records, for example, contained evidence that defendant had engaged in misconduct with respect to the victim’s girlfriend, we might describe that evidence as establishing a motive for the victim pursuing defendant with a splitting maul. Nothing like that is in the medical evidence. Instead, it relates generally to the victim’s mental health condition at the time of the killing, a circumstance that we would not describe in this case as motive." Based on its review of the excluded evidence, the Supreme Court concluded that in general it was relevant to defendant’s self-defense theory for the reason that defendant argued. The Court did not reach defendant's juror dismissal issue, and reversed and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Bolaski" on Justia Law