Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the civil suspension of his driver's license and the admission of the breath-test results in his criminal prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). Defendant contended on appeal that because the test results were obtained after the testing machine registered a "fatal error," the breath-test analysis did not meet the requisite performance standards, and thus the necessary foundation for admissibility was not laid. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying suppression in the criminal case, but reversed and remanded the civil suspension. View "Vermont v. Burnett" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Johnson appealed his convictions for attempted aggravated murder, kidnapping, lewd and lascivious conduct, unlawful trespass, and enhancement under Vermont's habitual offender statute. On appeal, he argue: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when a member of the jury pool mentioned in front of prospective jurors that defendant had another case; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant's identity as the perpetrator or that he had the requisite intent to kill. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "Vermont v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the superior court's denial of his motion to modify his sentence. He contended the court erred in failing to award credit for time served. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision and granted defendant credit against the controlling burglary sentence for the time he spent in jail between arrest and sentencing on the later charges. View "Vermont v. LeClair" on Justia Law

The complainant in this case and defendant Tyler Waters lived together for several years and have a minor child together. After they broke up, complainant got a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order against defendant. A 2009 modification of the final RFA order was based on findings that defendant had abused complainant, there was a danger of further abuse, and defendant represented a credible threat to complainant’s safety. The order prohibited defendant from, among other things, abusing, threatening, stalking, or harassing complainant. It prohibited defendant from communicating or attempting to communicate directly or indirectly with complainant, except that it specifically stated, "[d]efendant may have contact by telephone only." Complainant reported to the police that due to the volume of communications from defendant she felt "harassed, bullied, and made to feel guilty." The State charged defendant with violating the RFA order. Specifically, the State alleged that defendant had violated the prohibition against harassing complainant. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether it was plain error for the trial court to instruct a jury that it could convict defendant for violating an abuse-prevention order prohibiting him from harassing petitioner if it concluded that he engaged in conduct that would cause a reasonable person to be "annoyed, irritated, tormented or alarmed." The Supreme Court concluded that the instruction was plain error, and that the evidence presented at trial could not support a conviction for violating the abuse-prevention order, as worded. View "Vermont v. Waters" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to dismiss a two-count information alleging kidnapping and aggravated domestic assault. Defendant contended on appeal that the Orleans County State's Attorney who filed the information was invalidly appointed, and that his prosecutions were therefore unlawful and violated due process. The trial court disagreed, concluding the appointment was consistent with the Vermont Constitution and statute; and that, even if the appointment was infirm, the de facto officer doctrine validated the State's attorney authority to prosecute. The Supreme Court concluded the State's attorney was acting as a de facto officer and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Kenvin appealed the sentence he received upon reconsideration by the superior court, which reduced the time to serve on his conviction for careless and negligent driving from eleven-to-twelve months to nine-to-twelve months. Defendant contended the trial court erred: (1) by finding him "very negligent" in causing the death of a collision victim, despite the jury's acquittal on the underlying charge of grossly negligent operation, death resulting; and (2) by ruling that defendant was not entitled to credit for time served while on restrictive conditions of pretrial release. Upon review of the superior court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's sentence but remanded the case back to the trial court to provide credit to defendant for the period between March 10, 2010 and March 22, 2010 during which defendant was subject to a twenty-four hour curfew. View "Vermont v. Kenvin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his jury conviction for negligent operation of a motor vehicle and the sentence he received. He contended the trial court impermissibly allowed the State's crash reconstruction expert to testify about defendant's speed at the time of the collision. Defendant also contended that, at sentencing, the trial court erred in considering the death that resulted from the accident as a factor in sentencing. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Vermont v. Scott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Daniel Inman appealed a superior court judgment granting the State of Vermont's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying judicial review of the Department of Corrections (DOC)'s decision to terminate his participation in the Incarcerative Domestic Abuse Treatment Program (InDAP). Plaintiff was serving a twenty-six-month to eight-year sentence for aggravated assault and escape. Plaintiff began participating in the InDAP program in December 2010, and continued to participate even after he had finished the minimum one-year program requirement. As his anticipated release date approached, plaintiff sought a telephone hearing in the superior court to seek visitation with his children upon his release. The Superior Court held such a hearing. According to plaintiff, he was polite and well-behaved throughout the hearing, despite multiple interruptions from his wife, who was the complainant in his domestic assault case. Upon conclusion of the hearing, plaintiff's caseworker informed his InDAP coordinator that plaintiff had asked his wife several times to "be quiet so I can tell my side of the story" and accused her of lying. Plaintiff vehemently contested this characterization of his behavior during the telephone hearing, claiming that the transcript "altogether refuted" the caseworker's representation. InDAP staff placed plaintiff on 90-day probation from the InDAP program and gave him specific requirements to return to good standing. InDAP staff also suspended his phone privileges. Six days later, plaintiff was terminated from the InDAP program. The termination notice indicated that plaintiff "continuously justifies abuse towards his partner and blames others for his actions," he "is just going through the motions to get through the program," and he had "another person call his victim of record after being placed on probation for abuse towards her during the court call." Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the termination within the DOC. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the termination of his participation in InDAP to the superior court, claiming that the decision was appealable under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 and that his termination was grounded in false accusations. The State filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case, which was granted. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Inman v. Pallito" on Justia Law

In 2005, petitioner lived with his girlfriend (witness) and their two young children. Their infant daughter was hospitalized for symptoms and injuries consistent with head trauma. A year later, petitioner was charged with two counts of first-degree aggravated domestic assault for allegedly causing the child's injuries. Petitioner appealed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the State and dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Petitioner was assigned counsel; trial was scheduled for February 2007. As a defense strategy, counsel wanted to highlight that other people had access to the child and could have injured her. In particular, counsel contemplated that if the witness claimed her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when called to testify at trial, the jury might infer that she was involved in the crime and therefore reasonably doubt petitioner's participation. Counsel's affidavit acknowledges that the strategy was his idea, stating that it "came to [him]" during a meeting with witness and petitioner. Petitioner's counsel discussed the strategy at that meeting with both the witness and petitioner. Petitioner's counsel also advised witness to discuss the proposed tactic with her own counsel. The witness did consult with an attorney and ultimately decided not to claim her Fifth Amendment privilege at trial. Instead, she testified as a prosecution witness that petitioner had encouraged her to invoke the Fifth Amendment when testifying. Petitioner's counsel objected to this testimony based on attorney-client privilege. After his objection was denied, Petitioner's counsel failed to address the matter on cross-examination or in his closing argument. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the PCR court disregarded material disputed facts on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and prematurely concluded that, as a matter of law, counsel's performance was professionally reasonable and did not prejudice the outcome of petitioner's trial. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found that the trial court record was inadequate to determine on summary judgment whether counsel reasonably anticipated the consequences of suggesting the risky defense strategy, including sufficiently informing petitioner about its risks; and, if he did not, whether petitioner's defense was therefore prejudiced. The Court reversed the PCR court's grant of summary judgment to the State and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Lowry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edwin Towne appealed the trial court's denial of his request for post-conviction DNA testing under Vermont's Innocence Protection Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial because the court correctly concluded that the results of the requested test would not have created a "reasonable probability" of a different outcome at trial. View "In re Towne" on Justia Law