Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was driving along a gravel country road at night in a scarcely populated area. A state trooper was traveling in the opposite direction and saw defendant's approaching vehicle. Defendant was not speeding or driving erratically, and his vehicle did not display any equipment defects or violations. The trooper decided to turn his cruiser around and follow defendant for a while. Eventually, defendant pulled his car to the right side of the road and stopped with the engine and lights on. There were no businesses, homes, or other structures in the area that would explain why defendant stopped his car there.  The trooper, who had been following at a distance of two or three car-lengths behind the car, also pulled over and stopped. The trooper then waited to see what the car or its driver would do next, but nothing immediate happened. After about thirty seconds, the trooper decided to turn on his blue lights. He testified that he thought it was "unusual" for the car to stop where it did, and decided that he should approach defendant's car to make sure defendant was "alright." While speaking with defendant, the trooper made observations that eventually led to defendant's arrest for suspected driving under the influence. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the motor-vehicle stop was justified by the community caretaking doctrine. Defendant contended that it was not and argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidentiary fruits of the stop. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's decision and reversed. View "Vermont v. Button" on Justia Law

Both petitioner and the State appealed two March 2012 orders in which the superior court vacated petitioner’s aggravated stalking conviction after granting each party summary judgment on different aspects of petitioner's post-conviction relief petition. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decisions granting petitioner summary judgment, reinstated the aggravated stalking conviction, affirmed the court’s grant of summary judgment to the State on petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, and dismissed petitioner’s PCR petition. View "In re Hoch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was sentenced to three to eight years in prison for lewd and lascivious behavior, appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his request for post-conviction relief on his claim of an Ex Post Facto Clause violation. During petitioner’s incarceration, the Legislature enacted a delayed-release statute extending the minimum terms inmates convicted of certain crimes must serve before becoming eligible for early release. Although petitioner successfully challenged in an earlier suit the application of the statute to him as a violation of the Federal Constitution’s prohibition on the retroactive enhancement of punishment, he nevertheless claimed that the Department of Corrections’s (DOC) application of the delayed-release statute constituted an ongoing violation because it delayed his participation in pre-release rehabilitative programming, effectively denying him a chance for parole upon the completion of his minimum sentence. Petitioner also argues that this delay violated his plea agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court already remedied the Ex Post Facto Clause violation by restoring petitioner’s minimum sentence and that he was serving the sentence he bargained for. View "In re Blow" on Justia Law

Defendant Corinna Sullivan challenged her conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), arguing the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress statements she made to police officers in her apartment. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

The State of Vermont appealed the suppression of evidence obtained in the stop of defendant Marek Tuma's vehicle that led to his arrest and charge of driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that the fact that one side of defendant's front license plate was one to two inches below the other gave rise to reasonable suspicion that he was committing a traffic violation. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed with defense counsel that although there were cases where the angle of a license plate would be enough to justify a stop based on non-horizontality, this was not that case. View "Vermont v. Tuma" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. On appeal, he asserted that the trial court erred in: (1) prohibiting cross-examination of complainant about certain statements she allegedly made; (2) denying his motion for a new trial upon the discovery of an exculpatory post on complainant's MySpace page; and (3) permitting the State to introduce uncharged, prior bad act evidence. Finding that the introduction of defendant's prior contact with the complainant was admitted in error, the Supreme Court concluded the error was harmless. Finding no other error or abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Lawrence, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Cahill appealed his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and reckless endangerment following an incident where he pointed a loaded firearm at a farmhand. He argued that the court erred: (1) in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) by improperly instructing the jury on the elements of aggravated assault; and (3) by convicting him of both aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The Supreme Court found that the trial court record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion to acquit. Further, the Court found no error in the jury's instructions, "defendant continues to conflate or confuse the State's obligation to prove intent with a purported, but unnecessary, burden to overcome defendant's evidence of benign motive does not mean the instruction ruined his defense." Because the greater aggravated assault offense was upheld, and the State's concession that the felony convictions were mutually exclusive in this case, the Court did not address defendant's third argument.  On remand, the State was ordered to move to vacate one of the convictions at its election. View "Vermont v. Cahill" on Justia Law

Defendant Loren Senna appealed a superior court decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges against him. Defendant was convicted of the cultivation of more than twenty-five marijuana plants and for possession. Police had been called to defendant's residence when neighbors heard a screaming child inside. The officers sent to investigate detected the strong odor of marijuana as they moved closer to the front door. The officers saw that the children inside did not appear to be in distress. But after speaking with neighbors, the officers obtained a warrant to search defendant's residence. The trial court found that the State had not established that the police's initial entry into defendant's home was consensual, and excluded the evidence the State gathered during that entry. However, the court denied defendant's suppression motion, concluding that the smell of fresh marijuana just outside the front door and the neighbor's statements provided probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether, in light of Vermont's law exempting qualifying registered patients from prosecution for possession and cultivation of marijuana, the smell of fresh marijuana outside a home, without determination of whether any occupants are registered patients, could support a finding of probable cause; and (2) whether the hearsay statements of an identified neighbor were sufficiently credible to meet the requirements of Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c) and the underlying constitutional requirements that Rule embodies. The Supreme Court concluded that both the marijuana odor and the neighbor's statements were properly considered in the probable-cause analysis, and accordingly affirm. View "Vermont v. Senna" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendant challenged his conviction for unlawful trespass and his obligation (as condition of probation) to complete a Domestic Abuse Education Program (DAEP). Defendant was charged with entering or remaining in a place where notice of trespass was given. The "place" at issue here was his ex-girlfriend's car when, in the course of an argument, she repeatedly demanded he leave. At sentencing, the State asked the court to order defendant to complete DAEP as a special condition of probation. The court recognized that DAEP was a unique recommendation for this type of offense but found the State's request warranted. Defendant's probation officer later filed a probation violation complaint alleging defendant violated the DAEP condition of his probation. The probation officer averred that when defendant attended his intake meeting to determine his eligibility for DAEP, he refused to admit to the information, which was a condition of enrollment. The probation officer asked the court to revoke probation and impose the underlying sentence. Defendant asserted that because he had been convicted of unlawful trespass after trial and did not plead guilty, he should not have been ordered to complete DAEP because the DAEP condition "set him up to fail" because he never agreed with the State's information and affidavit. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court recognized defendant's perception that he was not guilty and therefore could not admit his guilt. At that point, the court told defendant DAEP became obligatory in order to avoid incarceration, regardless of his disagreement with the conviction or sentence, or both. Upon review of defendant's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court denied his challenge to his conviction. "An unpleasant choice is not synonymous with no choice and, in any event, probation was imposed as a condition to the suspension of the jail term otherwise deemed fitting by the trial court in response to defendant's conviction for unlawful trespass . . . it is not unreasonable for the court to require acknowledgment of those facts by the defendant as a condition of probation.  The evidence amply support[ed] the court's conclusion that defendant violated probation by failing to complete DAEP as ordered." View "Vermont v. Stokes" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea, arguing that he was not sufficiently advised of the potential immigration consequences of his conviction. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the language employed during defendant's plea colloquy adequately advised him that a guilty plea could result in deportation or denial of U.S. citizenship. Therefore the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Vermont v. Mutwale" on Justia Law