Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his jury conviction for negligent operation of a motor vehicle and the sentence he received. He contended the trial court impermissibly allowed the State's crash reconstruction expert to testify about defendant's speed at the time of the collision. Defendant also contended that, at sentencing, the trial court erred in considering the death that resulted from the accident as a factor in sentencing. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Vermont v. Scott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Daniel Inman appealed a superior court judgment granting the State of Vermont's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying judicial review of the Department of Corrections (DOC)'s decision to terminate his participation in the Incarcerative Domestic Abuse Treatment Program (InDAP). Plaintiff was serving a twenty-six-month to eight-year sentence for aggravated assault and escape. Plaintiff began participating in the InDAP program in December 2010, and continued to participate even after he had finished the minimum one-year program requirement. As his anticipated release date approached, plaintiff sought a telephone hearing in the superior court to seek visitation with his children upon his release. The Superior Court held such a hearing. According to plaintiff, he was polite and well-behaved throughout the hearing, despite multiple interruptions from his wife, who was the complainant in his domestic assault case. Upon conclusion of the hearing, plaintiff's caseworker informed his InDAP coordinator that plaintiff had asked his wife several times to "be quiet so I can tell my side of the story" and accused her of lying. Plaintiff vehemently contested this characterization of his behavior during the telephone hearing, claiming that the transcript "altogether refuted" the caseworker's representation. InDAP staff placed plaintiff on 90-day probation from the InDAP program and gave him specific requirements to return to good standing. InDAP staff also suspended his phone privileges. Six days later, plaintiff was terminated from the InDAP program. The termination notice indicated that plaintiff "continuously justifies abuse towards his partner and blames others for his actions," he "is just going through the motions to get through the program," and he had "another person call his victim of record after being placed on probation for abuse towards her during the court call." Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the termination within the DOC. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the termination of his participation in InDAP to the superior court, claiming that the decision was appealable under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 and that his termination was grounded in false accusations. The State filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case, which was granted. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Inman v. Pallito" on Justia Law

In 2005, petitioner lived with his girlfriend (witness) and their two young children. Their infant daughter was hospitalized for symptoms and injuries consistent with head trauma. A year later, petitioner was charged with two counts of first-degree aggravated domestic assault for allegedly causing the child's injuries. Petitioner appealed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the State and dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Petitioner was assigned counsel; trial was scheduled for February 2007. As a defense strategy, counsel wanted to highlight that other people had access to the child and could have injured her. In particular, counsel contemplated that if the witness claimed her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when called to testify at trial, the jury might infer that she was involved in the crime and therefore reasonably doubt petitioner's participation. Counsel's affidavit acknowledges that the strategy was his idea, stating that it "came to [him]" during a meeting with witness and petitioner. Petitioner's counsel discussed the strategy at that meeting with both the witness and petitioner. Petitioner's counsel also advised witness to discuss the proposed tactic with her own counsel. The witness did consult with an attorney and ultimately decided not to claim her Fifth Amendment privilege at trial. Instead, she testified as a prosecution witness that petitioner had encouraged her to invoke the Fifth Amendment when testifying. Petitioner's counsel objected to this testimony based on attorney-client privilege. After his objection was denied, Petitioner's counsel failed to address the matter on cross-examination or in his closing argument. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the PCR court disregarded material disputed facts on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and prematurely concluded that, as a matter of law, counsel's performance was professionally reasonable and did not prejudice the outcome of petitioner's trial. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found that the trial court record was inadequate to determine on summary judgment whether counsel reasonably anticipated the consequences of suggesting the risky defense strategy, including sufficiently informing petitioner about its risks; and, if he did not, whether petitioner's defense was therefore prejudiced. The Court reversed the PCR court's grant of summary judgment to the State and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Lowry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edwin Towne appealed the trial court's denial of his request for post-conviction DNA testing under Vermont's Innocence Protection Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial because the court correctly concluded that the results of the requested test would not have created a "reasonable probability" of a different outcome at trial. View "In re Towne" on Justia Law

Defendant was driving along a gravel country road at night in a scarcely populated area. A state trooper was traveling in the opposite direction and saw defendant's approaching vehicle. Defendant was not speeding or driving erratically, and his vehicle did not display any equipment defects or violations. The trooper decided to turn his cruiser around and follow defendant for a while. Eventually, defendant pulled his car to the right side of the road and stopped with the engine and lights on. There were no businesses, homes, or other structures in the area that would explain why defendant stopped his car there.  The trooper, who had been following at a distance of two or three car-lengths behind the car, also pulled over and stopped. The trooper then waited to see what the car or its driver would do next, but nothing immediate happened. After about thirty seconds, the trooper decided to turn on his blue lights. He testified that he thought it was "unusual" for the car to stop where it did, and decided that he should approach defendant's car to make sure defendant was "alright." While speaking with defendant, the trooper made observations that eventually led to defendant's arrest for suspected driving under the influence. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the motor-vehicle stop was justified by the community caretaking doctrine. Defendant contended that it was not and argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidentiary fruits of the stop. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's decision and reversed. View "Vermont v. Button" on Justia Law

Both petitioner and the State appealed two March 2012 orders in which the superior court vacated petitioner’s aggravated stalking conviction after granting each party summary judgment on different aspects of petitioner's post-conviction relief petition. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decisions granting petitioner summary judgment, reinstated the aggravated stalking conviction, affirmed the court’s grant of summary judgment to the State on petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, and dismissed petitioner’s PCR petition. View "In re Hoch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was sentenced to three to eight years in prison for lewd and lascivious behavior, appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his request for post-conviction relief on his claim of an Ex Post Facto Clause violation. During petitioner’s incarceration, the Legislature enacted a delayed-release statute extending the minimum terms inmates convicted of certain crimes must serve before becoming eligible for early release. Although petitioner successfully challenged in an earlier suit the application of the statute to him as a violation of the Federal Constitution’s prohibition on the retroactive enhancement of punishment, he nevertheless claimed that the Department of Corrections’s (DOC) application of the delayed-release statute constituted an ongoing violation because it delayed his participation in pre-release rehabilitative programming, effectively denying him a chance for parole upon the completion of his minimum sentence. Petitioner also argues that this delay violated his plea agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court already remedied the Ex Post Facto Clause violation by restoring petitioner’s minimum sentence and that he was serving the sentence he bargained for. View "In re Blow" on Justia Law

Defendant Corinna Sullivan challenged her conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), arguing the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress statements she made to police officers in her apartment. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

The State of Vermont appealed the suppression of evidence obtained in the stop of defendant Marek Tuma's vehicle that led to his arrest and charge of driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that the fact that one side of defendant's front license plate was one to two inches below the other gave rise to reasonable suspicion that he was committing a traffic violation. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed with defense counsel that although there were cases where the angle of a license plate would be enough to justify a stop based on non-horizontality, this was not that case. View "Vermont v. Tuma" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. On appeal, he asserted that the trial court erred in: (1) prohibiting cross-examination of complainant about certain statements she allegedly made; (2) denying his motion for a new trial upon the discovery of an exculpatory post on complainant's MySpace page; and (3) permitting the State to introduce uncharged, prior bad act evidence. Finding that the introduction of defendant's prior contact with the complainant was admitted in error, the Supreme Court concluded the error was harmless. Finding no other error or abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Lawrence, Sr." on Justia Law