Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court’s admission of a videotaped deposition of a key state witness who was out of the country but willing to travel to the trial violated defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation where defendant personally objected to admission of the testimony on the record, but his counsel stipulated to the videotape’s admission. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant’s rights were violated by the admission of the hearsay testimony and, accordingly, reversed.  Because the issue was "very likely" to arise on remand, the Court also considered defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in permitting defense counsel to raise a diminished capacity defense over defendant’s objection, concluding that the decision should have been left to defendant.  For similar reasons the Court concluded that defendant, having been found competent to assist in his own defense, retained final authority over the decision to present a diminished capacity case. "Plainly, as other courts have recognized, the fundamental right to maintain a plea of complete innocence would be impaired, if not eviscerated, if counsel were allowed, over defendant’s objection, to assert a defense seeking a less serious conviction. . . .The basic right to contend for outright acquittal that bars defense counsel from overriding a defendant’s objection to instructing the jury as to lesser-included offenses applies with equal force to preclude the assertion of a theory, such as diminished capacity, that supports conviction on a lesser-included charge contrary to a defendant’s express wishes." Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in authorizing defense counsel to assert the defense contrary to defendant’s wishes. View "Vermont v. Tribble" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal was the question of whether defendant Hieu Tran was in police custody when two detectives questioned him in a police cruiser for one hour as part of an investigation into an assault and attempted robbery. The trial court concluded that the interview was a custodial interrogation conducted without the warnings guaranteed by "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and granted defendant’s motion to suppress. On appeal, the State argued that no warnings were necessary because defendant voluntarily spoke with detectives and was not in custody during the interview. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant was in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings, and because such warnings were not provided, defendant’s statements made during the March interview should have been suppressed. View "Vermont v. Tran" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Chittenden Criminal Division’s denial of its motion to seal search warrants and related materials generated during an ongoing investigation into a missing Essex couple. The court determined that the State failed to show with specificity that disclosure would cause “substantial harm to public or private interests.” The State asserted that there was neither a First Amendment nor a common law right of access to search warrant materials in an active, pre-arrest investigation, and argued that a presumptive right of access should not apply in such cases. Instead, the State urged the Supreme Court to hold that there is no right of access to such materials under the Vermont Rules for Public Access to Court Records (PACR Rules). Assuming that the pertinent case law applied to pre-arrest investigations, the State also claimed the criminal division erred by concluding that the standard for sealing was not satisfied. Finally, the State asserted that the court erred in turning down its request for an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court saw no error in the court’s refusal to conduct a further hearing, but reversed its determination that the State failed to cite sufficiently specific reasons to seal the warrant information. View "In re Essex Search Warrants" on Justia Law

In July 2010, Defendant Donald Shepherd pled guilty to charges of aggravated sexual assault, lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, and sexual exploitation of a child in exchange for dismissal of several other pending charges. His victim was a ten-year-old child. Defendant was serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison. At issue on this appeal was the court-ordered restitution for relocation expenses of the victim and his family. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the relocation in this case was a direct result of defendant’s criminal acts. Restitution was therefore appropriate, and the Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Crannell appealed the decision of the Rutland Civil Division that he was no longer entitled to an appointed attorney to handle his post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings.  Appellant’s previously assigned counsel filed a notice of withdrawal based on lack of legal merit in the PCR. Appellant argued that, having filed his PCR petition before the Legislature enacted the amended version of the applicable statutory authority, he had a vested right to counsel under the pre-amendment version. Alternatively, Appellant argued that the Defender General’s Office waived its right to withdraw because it represented him in his PCR proceedings for nine years before seeking to do so. In addition, Appellant asserted that because counsel is necessary for effective advocacy in PCR proceedings at the trial court level, the Supreme Court should read the applicable statute to provide a right to assigned representation in such proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellant was correct that the old version of the statute still governed his right to assigned PCR counsel and granted him a statutory right to representation at his own, rather than the Defender General’s, discretion. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Crannell" on Justia Law

Petitioner Timothy Wiley appealed the Windham Civil Division's denial of his request for DNA testing pursuant to Vermont's Innocence Protection Act. Following an unsuccessful appeal of convictions for aggravated sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct stemming from charges that he raped his girlfriend's daughter, and for obstruction of justice in connection with threatening and encouraging the mother to commit perjury, petitioner claimed innocence and filed for relief under the Innocence Protection Act. Petitioner claimed the trial court erred in reaching its conclusion that his anticipated test results would not have created a reasonable probability of a different result had they been available at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of petitioner's request on the ground that the testing he sought was not of any evidence "obtained during the investigation or prosecution of the crime" for which innocence is claimed, as required by the Act, rendering his request outside of the Act's relief. View "In re Wiley" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, defendants Paul Edmonds and Francis Cobb appeared their conditional pleas to driving with a suspended license, claiming that the Windsor Criminal Division erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence. Defendants argued that they were subject to investigative stops unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They alternatively argued that Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution affords greater protection against such detentions than does the Fourth Amendment, and that, even if lawful under the Fourth Amendment, the investigative stops in each case violated Article 11. The trial court, treating the reasonable suspicion standard as the same under the Fourth Amendment and Article 11, held that defendants' detentions were supported by reasonable suspicion that they were driving with suspended drivers licenses. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial.  He appeals that conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial based on a newly discovered witness corroborating defendant’s self-defense claim; (2) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss two jurors for cause; and (3) the jury instructions on diminished capacity failed to inform the jury it must acquit defendant of second-degree murder if defendant could not form the specific intent for that offense due to diminished capacity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Defendant's contentions on appeal to be without merit and affirmed his conviction. View "Vermont v. Bruno" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Brandt was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault and one count of driving with a license suspended (DLS). On appeal to the Supreme Court, he raised three arguments: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges and grant him separate trials; (2) the jury instruction on excited utterances improperly bolstered the credibility of the complainant's out-of-court statement; and (3) the prosecutor's opening and closing arguments were inappropriate and denied him a fair trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Brandt" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Bourn was convicted in superior court of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon following an incident where he pointed an unloaded muzzleloader toward two police officers who were attempting to remove him from a home. He appealed his convictions, arguing first that the court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of specific intent to threaten, and second, that such intent may be negated by the defendant's diminished capacity. Holding that Vermont's aggravated assault statute requires specific intent, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Vermont v. Bourn" on Justia Law