Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a police officer's visual estimate of defendant's speed can support a reasonable suspicion to warrant a traffic stop. Defendants Todd Dunham and Heidi Tatham argued that a visual estimate amounts to nothing more than a mere hunch or guess, and fails to provide objective grounds for a traffic stop. The Court disagreed and affirmed the denial of defendants' motions to suppress. View "Vermont v. Dunham" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Gentes, who entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of driving while intoxicated (DWI), argued on appeal that the superior court’s criminal division erred by denying his motion to dismiss both the criminal charge and the civil suspension of his license. Defendant argued for dismissal based his claim that the Vermont Department of Health's negligence deprived him of his statutory right to obtain an independent blood test result. Having weighed the "Bailey" factors, the Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and agreed with the trial court that dismissal of the charge against defendant was not an appropriate remedy for mistakenly destroyed evidence in the context of this particular case. View "Vermont v. Gentes" on Justia Law

In 2005, defendant Thomas Bogert, Jr. pled guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography and no contest to one count of aggravated sexual assault and one count of sexual assault. He was sentenced to a total of three to twenty-three years, eight years to serve, with the balance suspended. Defendant signed a probation order that included thirty-five conditions. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was the permissibility, under the Vermont Constitution, of a warrantless and suspicionless search of a convicted offender furloughed to his home and subject to a standard condition of a conditional reentry agreement that provides for such searches. Upon review, the Court concluded that the search in this case satisfied the requirements of the Vermont Constitution applicable to offenders on a conditional reentry status and, accordingly, affirmed. View "Vermont v. Bogert" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the hypothetical question "What are the chances?" could be considered a valid legal inference. Defendant Mark Vuley was convicted of arson after several unexplained fires at his rented house took place within an eight-week period. The trial court relied upon the fact that fires are rare occurrences in order to infer that defendant willfully started the fires, and so instructed the jury to rely upon the same inference. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that there ware potentially valid inferences that could be drawn from multiple fires within a relatively short time frame, the Court could not approve of the trial court's instruction to the jury. However, because the error did not rise to the level of plain error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "Vermont v. Vuley" on Justia Law

Defendant Jerald Hawkins appealed his conditional guilty plea to criminal refusal of an evidentiary breath test and the civil suspension of his driver's license, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, Defendant argued: (1) he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution; (2) alternatively, the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 11 due to excessive force; (3) statements he made to police were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment and "Miranda" rights; (4) he was entitled to judgment in the civil license suspension proceeding because the final hearing did not take place within the mandatory timeframe. Defendant was stopped when an deputy sheriff "clocked" him driving over the speed limit. Defendant's car "bottomed out" on a washed-out part of a gravel driveway. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and remanded the case: the determination of probable cause to arrest for negligent operation for "bottoming out" on the washed out portion of the driveway was reversed. "Guided by common experience, we agree with defendant that, as a matter of law, driving over the washout as described was not negligent, so there was no probable cause to arrest him for negligent operation. . . Viewed another way, the court's decision would mean that every time a public highway in this condition is so used a crime could be charged, and any driver operating on a back road in March would risk prosecution. Such an application of the statute is too broad, and no reasonable jury could find negligence on these facts." The trial court has not considered if the State met its burden to show that whatever physical evidence, including Defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test, was not acquired by the deputy in exploitation of the unlawful arrest. Accordingly, the Court remanded for findings and a determination, based on the existing record evidence, on defendant's motion to suppress all physical evidence obtained following his arrest. View "Vermont v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Defendant Damon Dubuque was convicted for refusing a reasonable request for an evidentiary test after being convicted of DUI. He appealed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence of his refusal to give a blood sample, arguing that he should have been offered a breath test instead. Police were dispatched to a rollover accident; the vehicle was operated by Defendant. After speaking with defendant, the officer arrested him on suspicion of driving under the influence and accompanied him in an ambulance to the hospital. Approximately one hour and forty-five minutes after the accident, the officer began processing defendant for the offense of driving under the influence. He asked defendant to provide a blood sample, and defendant refused, stating that he would give only a breath sample. After defendant was released from the hospital, the officer transported him to a residential and detoxification facility. The facility refused to admit him. The officer then took him to a detox facility at the Chittenden Regional Correctional Center. At no point did defendant give either a blood or breath sample, nor did the officer ask defendant to take a test after leaving the hospital. Defendant was arraigned on charges of "DUI #3 or Subsequent – Test Refusal" and one other charge, which was subsequently dropped. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the refusal to give a blood sample. The sole issue at the hearing on the motion to suppress was whether breath-testing equipment was reasonably available when the officer processed defendant, given the unknown amount of time that defendant could be expected to remain in the hospital. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in this case, the time at which the officer began processing and made the request for the test was close to when the permissive-inference window would close. At that point, the officer could not determine when defendant's medical evaluation and treatment would end. It was not reasonable for the officer to prematurely remove defendant from the hospital in order to obtain a breath test. The Court held therefore that the breath-testing equipment was not reasonably available and affirmed the trial court. View "Vermont v. Dubuque" on Justia Law

Both the State and Defendant Wallace Nolan appealed a trial court's revocation of Defendant's probation, though for different reasons. Specifically, both defendant and the State disputed the trial court’s authority to summarily terminate probation without a hearing. Defendant equated an "unsatisfactory" discharge with findings of a probation violation, or as otherwise reflecting adversely on his conduct as a probationer. Defendant claimed he was denied an opportunity to contest the grounds for such an appellation. The State, on the other hand, argued that when, as in this case, a motion's predicate facts were in dispute, Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 47(b)(2) calls for a hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that a probationer is entitled to a hearing on disputed material facts before the trial court can order a less-than-satisfactory discharge from probation. The trial court's order was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Nolen" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court’s admission of a videotaped deposition of a key state witness who was out of the country but willing to travel to the trial violated defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation where defendant personally objected to admission of the testimony on the record, but his counsel stipulated to the videotape’s admission. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant’s rights were violated by the admission of the hearsay testimony and, accordingly, reversed.  Because the issue was "very likely" to arise on remand, the Court also considered defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in permitting defense counsel to raise a diminished capacity defense over defendant’s objection, concluding that the decision should have been left to defendant.  For similar reasons the Court concluded that defendant, having been found competent to assist in his own defense, retained final authority over the decision to present a diminished capacity case. "Plainly, as other courts have recognized, the fundamental right to maintain a plea of complete innocence would be impaired, if not eviscerated, if counsel were allowed, over defendant’s objection, to assert a defense seeking a less serious conviction. . . .The basic right to contend for outright acquittal that bars defense counsel from overriding a defendant’s objection to instructing the jury as to lesser-included offenses applies with equal force to preclude the assertion of a theory, such as diminished capacity, that supports conviction on a lesser-included charge contrary to a defendant’s express wishes." Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in authorizing defense counsel to assert the defense contrary to defendant’s wishes. View "Vermont v. Tribble" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal was the question of whether defendant Hieu Tran was in police custody when two detectives questioned him in a police cruiser for one hour as part of an investigation into an assault and attempted robbery. The trial court concluded that the interview was a custodial interrogation conducted without the warnings guaranteed by "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and granted defendant’s motion to suppress. On appeal, the State argued that no warnings were necessary because defendant voluntarily spoke with detectives and was not in custody during the interview. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant was in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings, and because such warnings were not provided, defendant’s statements made during the March interview should have been suppressed. View "Vermont v. Tran" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Chittenden Criminal Division’s denial of its motion to seal search warrants and related materials generated during an ongoing investigation into a missing Essex couple. The court determined that the State failed to show with specificity that disclosure would cause “substantial harm to public or private interests.” The State asserted that there was neither a First Amendment nor a common law right of access to search warrant materials in an active, pre-arrest investigation, and argued that a presumptive right of access should not apply in such cases. Instead, the State urged the Supreme Court to hold that there is no right of access to such materials under the Vermont Rules for Public Access to Court Records (PACR Rules). Assuming that the pertinent case law applied to pre-arrest investigations, the State also claimed the criminal division erred by concluding that the standard for sealing was not satisfied. Finally, the State asserted that the court erred in turning down its request for an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court saw no error in the court’s refusal to conduct a further hearing, but reversed its determination that the State failed to cite sufficiently specific reasons to seal the warrant information. View "In re Essex Search Warrants" on Justia Law