Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In July 2010, Defendant Donald Shepherd pled guilty to charges of aggravated sexual assault, lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, and sexual exploitation of a child in exchange for dismissal of several other pending charges. His victim was a ten-year-old child. Defendant was serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison. At issue on this appeal was the court-ordered restitution for relocation expenses of the victim and his family. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the relocation in this case was a direct result of defendant’s criminal acts. Restitution was therefore appropriate, and the Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Crannell appealed the decision of the Rutland Civil Division that he was no longer entitled to an appointed attorney to handle his post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings.  Appellant’s previously assigned counsel filed a notice of withdrawal based on lack of legal merit in the PCR. Appellant argued that, having filed his PCR petition before the Legislature enacted the amended version of the applicable statutory authority, he had a vested right to counsel under the pre-amendment version. Alternatively, Appellant argued that the Defender General’s Office waived its right to withdraw because it represented him in his PCR proceedings for nine years before seeking to do so. In addition, Appellant asserted that because counsel is necessary for effective advocacy in PCR proceedings at the trial court level, the Supreme Court should read the applicable statute to provide a right to assigned representation in such proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellant was correct that the old version of the statute still governed his right to assigned PCR counsel and granted him a statutory right to representation at his own, rather than the Defender General’s, discretion. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Crannell" on Justia Law

Petitioner Timothy Wiley appealed the Windham Civil Division's denial of his request for DNA testing pursuant to Vermont's Innocence Protection Act. Following an unsuccessful appeal of convictions for aggravated sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct stemming from charges that he raped his girlfriend's daughter, and for obstruction of justice in connection with threatening and encouraging the mother to commit perjury, petitioner claimed innocence and filed for relief under the Innocence Protection Act. Petitioner claimed the trial court erred in reaching its conclusion that his anticipated test results would not have created a reasonable probability of a different result had they been available at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of petitioner's request on the ground that the testing he sought was not of any evidence "obtained during the investigation or prosecution of the crime" for which innocence is claimed, as required by the Act, rendering his request outside of the Act's relief. View "In re Wiley" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, defendants Paul Edmonds and Francis Cobb appeared their conditional pleas to driving with a suspended license, claiming that the Windsor Criminal Division erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence. Defendants argued that they were subject to investigative stops unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They alternatively argued that Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution affords greater protection against such detentions than does the Fourth Amendment, and that, even if lawful under the Fourth Amendment, the investigative stops in each case violated Article 11. The trial court, treating the reasonable suspicion standard as the same under the Fourth Amendment and Article 11, held that defendants' detentions were supported by reasonable suspicion that they were driving with suspended drivers licenses. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial.  He appeals that conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial based on a newly discovered witness corroborating defendant’s self-defense claim; (2) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss two jurors for cause; and (3) the jury instructions on diminished capacity failed to inform the jury it must acquit defendant of second-degree murder if defendant could not form the specific intent for that offense due to diminished capacity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Defendant's contentions on appeal to be without merit and affirmed his conviction. View "Vermont v. Bruno" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Brandt was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault and one count of driving with a license suspended (DLS). On appeal to the Supreme Court, he raised three arguments: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges and grant him separate trials; (2) the jury instruction on excited utterances improperly bolstered the credibility of the complainant's out-of-court statement; and (3) the prosecutor's opening and closing arguments were inappropriate and denied him a fair trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Brandt" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Bourn was convicted in superior court of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon following an incident where he pointed an unloaded muzzleloader toward two police officers who were attempting to remove him from a home. He appealed his convictions, arguing first that the court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of specific intent to threaten, and second, that such intent may be negated by the defendant's diminished capacity. Holding that Vermont's aggravated assault statute requires specific intent, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Vermont v. Bourn" on Justia Law

In 2006, Petitioner Paul Kirby was charged with five counts of possessing child pornography after a search of his computer revealed five different video depictions of sexual conduct by a child or children. Evidence suggested that each video was downloaded independently and stored as a separate file on petitioner's computer. Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of possession in exchange for dismissal of the remaining two counts. Petitioner was sentenced to three concurrent prison terms of four to fifteen years. In 2008, Petitioner acting pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), and amended the petition with the assistance of counsel in 2009. The petition contained two claims: (1) that petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to research, investigate, and inform him of the possibility of asserting a challenge to the multiple charges of possession that could have resulted in the five charges being reduced to one; and (2) because counsel failed to advise him on this legal theory prior to entering his plea agreement, petitioner's subsequent guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The State opposed Petitioner's motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on both claims. The superior court granted the State's motion for summary judgment. Petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counsel's assessment of the viability of a multiplicity challenge under 13 V.S.A. 2827(a) was not unreasonable, and thus did not create a material misunderstanding upon which Petitioner based his guilty pleas. Petitioner's pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily and therefore he was not entitled to post-conviction relief. View "In re Kirby" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Reid appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual assault. In the summer of 2008, when she was six years old, the child "A.V.", made statements to her neighbors indicating that defendant had sexually abused her. A neighbor filed a report with the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF). The following day, a DCF investigator and a police officer went to A.V.’s school to question her about the alleged abuse. The investigators found that there was sufficient evidence that defendant had sexually abused A.V., and she was transported to the hospital for further examination. At the hospital, an experienced and trained Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) questioned A.V. and conducted a brief physical examination. Defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault on August 28. In October 2008, the State provided notice that it intended to offer into evidence hearsay statements made by A.V. through various witnesses pursuant to V.R.E. 804a. Defendant asserted that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting hearsay evidence because the State failed to establish that the time, content, and circumstances of the child-victim’s statements provided substantial indicia of trustworthiness. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Reid" on Justia Law

Hartford police officers responded to a report of a possible burglary in progress, and used considerable force in restraining the suspect. The alleged burglar turned out to be the homeowner, who was disoriented due to a medical condition. Journalist Anne Galloway requested records relating to the police contact with the homeowner from the chief of police. The chief denied Galloway's request, as did the town manager when Galloway appealed the chief's decision. After Galloway filed an action to compel production of the records, the superior court ruled that under the Public Records Act's (PRA) exemption for police investigations, the police did not need to provide Galloway with any records produced or acquired before the point at which the officers decided against charging the homeowner with a criminal offense. Galloway then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the homeowner's detention amounted to an arrest, the records in question must be disclosed under the PRA's proviso that "records reflecting the initial arrest of a person . . . shall be public." View "Galloway v. Town of Hartford" on Justia Law