Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Robert Kolibas was convicted by a jury of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal of his conviction, Defendant claimed the trial court in its instructions to the jury eliminated the element of intent from the State's burden of proving the aggravated assault charges. Defendant is the father of twelve-year-old A.K., who invited her thirteen-year-old friend, T.F., to a sleep-over. That evening, Defendant made smoothies for the two girls, his wife, and himself. At trial, Defendant testified that he placed one Ambien (a sleep aid) and half of a Valium (an anti-anxiety medication) into his wife's drink because she was "stressed out" and he "didn't want her bothering [him]." Defendant's wife testified that after Defendant left the kitchen to bring two smoothies to the girls, she poured her part of her drink into Defendant's cup. The girls drank the smoothies as they lay on a futon in A.K.'s bedroom and watched a movie. She soon felt dizzy and tired, and fell asleep in about thirty minutes. T.F. fell asleep and woke to Defendant touching her chest and genitals. The court instructed the jury that "[t]he State is not required to prove, but may prove, that the Defendant intended that a specific person be harmed in this [drugging] manner." Defendant admitted at trial he deliberately gave "stupefying drugs" to his wife. With the court's instruction, the Supreme Court concluded it was virtually assured the jury would find Defendant guilty of aggravated assault. "This is constitutional error: [b]ecause the State built its case around the theory that Defendant intended to drug the girls, Defendant built his defense on the theory of mistake. . . . However, after Defendant testified, the court decided that the State did not have to prove that he intended to drug a particular person, and that Defendant would not be permitted to argue to the jury a defense of mistake. As a result, the jury could have found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault against T.F. and A.K. if they did not believe he actually intended to drug them." Defendant's ability to defend against the specific charges brought by the State was so substantially prejudiced that the Court ordered a new trial. Because Defendant did not challenge his conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct, the Court did not disturb that conviction. View "Vermont v. Kolibas" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph McCarthy appealed his conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Defendant set up a dangerous shooting range on his property and invited others to join him in firing weapons at the site. An errant bullet struck and killed a neighbor in his nearby home. Defendant argued on appeal that: (1) a jury view of the scene presented misleading and prejudicial evidence and was not conducted with the necessary procedural and evidentiary safeguards; (2) the trial judge impermissibly assumed the roles of an advocate and a witness in reviewing the jury view; (3) the court erred by failing to excuse one of the jurors; and (4) his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Juvenile Defendant A.C. appealed an adjudication of delinquency. On the basis of an incident at school, the State filed a delinquency petition against him, alleging that he engaged in open and gross lewdness and lascivious conduct towards the complaining witness, A.R. A.C. raised several evidentiary issues and argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling, and affirmed the adjudication of delinquency. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee the Rutland Herald appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants the Vermont State Police (VSP) and the Office of the Attorney General (collectively the State), and to deny disclosure of records related to a criminal investigation of possession of child pornography by employees of the Criminal Justice Training Council at the Vermont Police Academy. The court concluded that the records sought by the Herald, which included inquest records, were exempt from disclosure as "records dealing with the detection and investigation of crime." The Herald asserted on appeal that a strong policy in favor of public oversight of law enforcement actions should have lead to a different result. It argued that the Legislature could not have intended that records relating to the investigation and detection of crime be confidential forever. The Supreme Court rejected the Herald's arguments, finding the investigatory records were entitled to a blanket exemption under 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(5) and upheld the trial court's decision. View "Rutland Herald v. Vermont State Police" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether the State may prosecute an adult defendant for crimes alleged to have occurred when he was a juvenile. The prosecution was late in bringing the charged because the alleged victims did not come forward until defendant was eighteen years of age and beyond the jurisdiction of the family division.  The State tried to file the information in the criminal division.  The criminal division transferred the case to the family division because it found there was no criminal jurisdiction to adjudicate even the most serious of the offenses without first filing the matter in the family division.  The family division, however, determined it was without jurisdiction to entertain the charges because defendant had reached eighteen years of age. Accordingly, it dismissed all of the charges against defendant. On appeal, the State argued that the family division erred by dismissing the more serious felony charges because: (1) a recent legislative enactment addressing what it called a "gap" in the jurisdictional provisions of the statutes was a mere clarification  demonstrating that the Legislature had always intended that adult defendants be subject to prosecution for serious crimes committed when they were juveniles; and (2) even if the new amendment did not clarify the statutes and fill the gap, there was jurisdiction in the criminal division because that division has always had jurisdiction over all serious felonies. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the Legislature's recent enactment did not clarify existing law but rather established entirely new law that could not be applied retroactively to this case; therefore, to the extent that the Legislature has filled the "gap," it has done so only prospectively; and (2) the statutory scheme applicable at the time of the offenses  did not allow either the family or criminal division to exercise its jurisdiction over an adult defendant accused of offenses committed as a juvenile under the age of fourteen.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the family division's order dismissing all charges in this case. View "In re D.K., Juvenile" on Justia Law

Following Defendant Jay Handy's conviction for a sex offense, the superior court granted the State's motion to compel Defendant to submit to testing for sexually transmitted diseases under the authority of 13 V.S.A. 3256, which does not require probable cause or a warrant for testing.  On appeal, Defendant argued that the statute is unconstitutional because it does not serve any special need beyond law enforcement justifying abandonment of the normal probable-cause and warrant requirements and because, even if such a special need were present, the governmental goals advanced by the statute do not outweigh his constitutionally protected privacy interests.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order compelling the testing, but remanded the matter for the court to issue an order restricting the victim's disclosure of the test results. View "Vermont v. Handy" on Justia Law

Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Bain was incarcerated as a habitual offender following convictions in 2005 for possession of stolen property and possession of marijuana.  He believed that police unlawfully entered his home following his May 2003 arrest, and he pursued this claim in numerous suits. Beginning in 2006, Plaintiff filed a series of lawsuits against Windham County Sheriff Keith Clark and others in federal court, focusing on allegations of police misconduct.  All of those complaints were dismissed.  In November 2008, Plaintiff filed this complaint against Defendants Clark and Windham County State Attorney Tracy Shriver, reiterating his allegation that police had unlawfully entered his home without a warrant five and a half years earlier.  Plaintiff maintained that Defendants were unlawfully withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of his rights.  He sought the production of "any and all computer, telephone or otherwise generated radio dispatch unit log[s] of [his] arrest and the bona fide activities of law enforcement for the days of May 22 and 23, 2003" under the Vermont Access to Public Records Act (PRA).  Plaintiff stated that he had requested these documents from Clark in December 2007, but received no response.  He did not allege that he requested the documents from Shriver.  Both Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.  Shriver pointed out that Plaintiff failed to make a public records request from her office, and that he thereby failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  In this appeal, the Supreme Court was called on to consider whether "radio dispatch and unit logs" generated by police were exempt from disclosure under the PRA.  The trial court found the records exempt from disclosure, and dismissed Plaintiff's claim against Shriver for lack of jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision as to Shriver, and reversed and remanded as to Clark: "because the evidence in this case has not yet been fully developed, [the Court could not] discern if police radio and dispatch unit logs are the type of records that the Legislature intended to shield from view." View "Bain v. Clark " on Justia Law

Defendant Alexander Stolte appealed the decision of the Orange Criminal Division that denied his motion for bail review.  Defendant was charged with second-degree murder and held without bail. He requested that the court review bail based on evidence developed after his initial bail hearing in March 2010.  The criminal division refused to consider the new evidence and to reopen the question of whether the evidence of Defendant's guilt was "great," as required to deny bail under the Vermont Constitution and 13 V.S.A. 7553, on the ground that it is "modifying evidence."  Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further consideration of whether the proffered evidence, if relevant, was undisputed as to its origin and result as a matter of fact.  If a genuine dispute as to either arose, then the evidence would then be considered modifying evidence.  But if no such conflict existed, the court would then have to determine whether, if admissible, the evidence would have made a difference to its initial determination on whether the state's prima facie evidence of guilt was "great" for purposes of holding defendant without bail. View "Vermont v. Stolte" on Justia Law

In this case, a search warrant was issued to search the home of Defendant Richard Chaplin, and the search turned up incriminating evidence. In response to a motion to suppress however, the superior court determined that the warrant was not supported by an affidavit showing probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a crime under the standards contained in V.R.Cr.P. 41(c). Upon review of the warrant in question and the applicable legal standard, the Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court and affirmed its decision. View "Vermont v. Chaplin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Ali Abdi (a Somali Bantu immigrant) was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual assault on a child. He moved for a new trial based in part on a claim of jury misconduct resulting from a juror's acquisition of information on the internet concerning Somali culture--a subject that played a significant role at trial. The trial court held a hearing, questioned the jurors, and issued a written decision denying Defendant's motion. The court concluded that though the extraneous information had the capacity to affect the jury's verdict, it was a harmless error. Finding that "if even a single juror’s impartiality is overcome by an improper extraneous influence, the accused has been deprived of the right to an impartial jury," the Supreme Court concluded the State had not met its burden of proving the jury had not been improperly influenced. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Abdi" on Justia Law