Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jennifer Wyrocki appealed her conviction of disturbing the peace by telephone. The State charged her with making repeated and anonymous terrifying, intimidating, threatening, harassing, or annoying telephone calls. Defendant first argues that the trial court incorrectly found that the calls were "anonymous," and that as applied to this case, 13 V.S.A. 1027 violated the First Amendment of the federal constitution because it criminalizes protected speech. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant that her calls were not "anonymous" within the meaning of the statute, and therefore reversed. View "Vermont v. Wyrocki" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Blaise appealed a superior court decision that he violated three conditions of his probation for his alleged failure to: (1) adequately participate in counseling as directed by his probation officer; (2) pay required fines; and (3) complete 140 hours of community service.  On appeal, Defendant argued that neither the court nor his probation officer imposed upon him a probation condition requiring him to attend and complete counseling at Teen Challenge, the program he stopped attending, and that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that he violated conditions related to community service or the payment of fines.  Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State failed to prove that Defendant violated any of the probation conditions for which he was charged and that the errors were not harmless because of a later admitted-to violation.  View "Vermont v. Blaise" on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Voog pled guilty to simple assault and reckless endangerment. He appealed the trial court's denial of his motions to strike surplusage from the information and affidavit of probable cause, and sought the return of property seized from him. Following sentencing, Defendant was placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). In 2010, Defendant filed a pro se motion petitioning the court to "strike from the court, adjudicative, and incarcerative records, the unsubstantiated and non-adjudicated allegations" that he alleged were in the arrest affidavit and information "to prevent their continued use by [DOC] and other agencies in a substantially prejudicial manner." Defendant claimed that DOC was improperly using the information and the affidavit of probable cause that supported the assault charge to increase his "incarcerative level," which, in turn, resulted in his transfer to an out-of-state maximum security facility. The trial court denied Defendant's motion explaining that it did not have authority over DOC's decisions "regarding level of incarceration." On its face, nothing in the information was found as irrelevant or surplusage. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to strike "surplusage" from the information was appropriately denied. With regard to his seized property, the Court reversed and remanded the case for consideration of whether Defendant was entitled to return of his lawfully seized property, directing the trial court to consider whether "the government ha[d] a continuing [legitimate] interest" in Defendant's property. View "Vermont v. Voog" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeremy Robitaille appealed his conditional guilty plea to assault and robbery, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Defendant maintained that statements he made to police were taken in violation of his rights under the Public Defender Act (PDA) and the Vermont Constitution. He also asserted that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Defendant was arrested in Burlington following an assault and robbery at the Enosburg Pharmacy. An officer met Defendant at the police station and informed him of his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, and all conversation between the officer and defendant ceased. The officer did not contact a public defender immediately thereafter, and Defendant did not ask for an attorney by name. While arrangements were being made to transfer Defendant to a correctional facility, the advising officer conversed with another police officer about a third officer's pregnancy. Defendant was a few feet away, but none of the conversation was directed at or concerned him. Defendant asked if anyone else was going to be arrested and a few other questions before offering to talk to the officers about the incident at the pharmacy. The officer again informed Defendant of his Miranda rights and asked if he wanted a lawyer present. Defendant stated that he did not. The officer provided Defendant with a written waiver form. Based on these and other findings, the court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court specifically rejected the notion that the officer had induced defendant to speak. Finding that the record supported the trial court's finding that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision to deny the motion to suppress. View "Vermont v. Robitaille" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court's interlocutory order that granted Defendant Bruce Carrolton's motion to merge two counts of lewd-and-lascivious conduct into one. Relying on "State v. Perillo," (649 A.2d 566 (1994)), which involved facts very similar to this case, the trial court ruled that because the alleged offensive touching occurred continuously without any intervening act over a short period of time, the State could not charge defendant with multiple counts of lewd-and-lascivious conduct. Recognizing that the Supreme Court's holding in "Perillo" governed this case, the State on appeal asks the Court to overrule "Perillo" and hold that the touching of two distinct intimate parts of the body are two separate offenses as a matter of law. The Court declined to overrule "Perillo" and accordingly, affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Vermont v. Carrolton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Lay appealed a superior court’s order that granted summary judgment to Defendants William J. Pettengill, Elizabeth F. Novotny, and Daniel K. Troidl on his complaint. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from an internal investigation into his behavior as a state trooper and his subsequent resignation from the Vermont State Police (VSP). Plaintiff argued that the superior court erred in granting judgment to Defendants on his claims of fraudulent nondisclosure, retaliatory prosecution, malicious prosecution, and negligent referral. He also challenged several discovery rulings made by the court. Plaintiff was suspended from duty due to an ongoing investigation by the Internal Affairs Unit. He would later hire a lawyer and settle charges against him which included falsification and misuse of property and evidence; making a false statement; failing to follow-up or make reports in numerous cases; and abuse of authority for conducting a warrantless search. The Windham County State Attorney's office became involved in commencing a criminal prosecution against Plaintiff. A judge found probable cause to issue a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. At the time the second investigation was pending, Plaintiff had found new work by a private company. He was terminated from his job as a result of the arrest warrant. Upon returning to Vermont, he was charged with numerous crimes. He reached a plea agreement. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed suit against defendants raising numerous claims, including fraudulent nondisclosure, violation of his civil rights, and malicious process. In April 2010, the court issued the summary judgment decision from which Plaintiff appealed. Finding no legal basis for Plaintiff's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and dismissed his case. View "Lay v. Pettengill" on Justia Law

Defendant William Therrien Jr. appealed the civil suspension of his driver’s license and his conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence obtained after administration of a preliminary breath test (PBT) because the State failed to prove that defendant voluntarily consented to take the PBT. The record reflected that the arresting trooper put the machine in front of Defendant and told Defendant to take the test. He also provided Defendant with instructions on how to proceed. The trooper did not ask Defendant if he consented to take the test or advise defendant that he had a right to refuse. The court found that Defendant did not think he had a choice and therefore provided a sample of his breath. The PBT indicated that defendant’s blood alcohol was above the legal limit. The Supreme Court "look[ed] no further than the plain language of the statute to conclude that when an officer has a reasonable suspicion of DUI, he may 'request' that the suspect provide a breath sample, but not order such participation." The Court concluded that the trooper omitting the formal "request" was harmless error and affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Therrien" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Kenvin appealed a district court's judgment that required him to pay restitution and sentenced him to a twelve month term in jail. Following a car accident that resulted in a fatality, a jury convicted defendant of negligent operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, he contended the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution where: (1) the State failed to establish the amount of loss by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) the State failed to show that the loss was the direct result of the crime committed or that the decedent’s family members were the direct victims of the crime; and (3) the court failed to make findings regarding his ability to pay. Defendant also contended the trial court erred in sentencing him to eleven to twelve months to serve because a sentence with a gap of thirty days between the minimum and maximum term is a fixed sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court "recognize[d] that the decedent’s family members have suffered greatly. The decedent, however, was the sole victim of defendant’s crime for consideration of restitution. Under statute, any restitution award must be limited to the material losses that the decedent incurred as a direct result of defendant’s crime." Here, the only loss included in the restitution orders, according to the State’s description, was the medical bill not covered by insurance. The Court reversed the district court's order pertaining to the calculation of restitution. On all other matters, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Kenvin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case raised the question of the meaning of "expungement" within the Vermont judicial system. Defendant F.M. sought the removal of references to a dismissed count from docket entries regarding his case. In December 2008, Defendant was charged with four counts. In June 2009, under a plea agreement with the State, Defendant pled guilty to Count 2, reckless endangerment; the State dismissed the other three counts; and Defendant received a deferred sentence and the promise that Count 2 would be dismissed if Defendant successfully completed mental health court proceedings. In February 2010, the court, upon request, Recognized that Defendant had successfully completed mental health court requirements and, per the plea agreement, dismissed Count 2 and ordered expungement of the record pursuant to 13 V.S.A. 7041(e). Following this order, however, the docket sheet for Defendant’s case still referred to Count 2, labeling it "expunged" in the list of disputes and referring in the descriptive docket entries to "disputes 1-4." The following month, Defendant moved to correct the clerical record to remove all references in the docket entries to the expunged count. The court denied the motion "[i]n light of the problems outlined in the emails" among count clerks, administrators, and information services personnel describing the complexities involved in deleting docket entries from the electronic system. Defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to enforce its expungement order because of the difficulty of compliance, noting that the docket entries concerning his case continue to refer to "disputes 1-4," rather than "disputes 1, 3-4," a direct violation of the expungement required by statute. The State filed a letter with the Court explaining its decision not to file a brief "given that the sole issue concerns how the judiciary carries out expungements rather than whether or not the record in this particular case should be expunged." Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and ordered the expungement: "[t]he difficulties inherent in deleting docket entries from our current docket entry system-while real-do not justify a violation of the statute on the part of the judiciary." View "Vermont v. F.M." on Justia Law

Defendant Tina Marie Lamonda entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a narcotic drug. She challenged the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress and dismiss. Defendant was charged following a traffic stop. She moved to suppress the evidence against her, arguing that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of her purse. Following a hearing, the court denied her motion. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction. The Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Vermont v. Lamonda" on Justia Law