Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant William Therrien Jr. appealed the civil suspension of his driver’s license and his conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence obtained after administration of a preliminary breath test (PBT) because the State failed to prove that defendant voluntarily consented to take the PBT. The record reflected that the arresting trooper put the machine in front of Defendant and told Defendant to take the test. He also provided Defendant with instructions on how to proceed. The trooper did not ask Defendant if he consented to take the test or advise defendant that he had a right to refuse. The court found that Defendant did not think he had a choice and therefore provided a sample of his breath. The PBT indicated that defendant’s blood alcohol was above the legal limit. The Supreme Court "look[ed] no further than the plain language of the statute to conclude that when an officer has a reasonable suspicion of DUI, he may 'request' that the suspect provide a breath sample, but not order such participation." The Court concluded that the trooper omitting the formal "request" was harmless error and affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Therrien" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Kenvin appealed a district court's judgment that required him to pay restitution and sentenced him to a twelve month term in jail. Following a car accident that resulted in a fatality, a jury convicted defendant of negligent operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, he contended the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution where: (1) the State failed to establish the amount of loss by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) the State failed to show that the loss was the direct result of the crime committed or that the decedent’s family members were the direct victims of the crime; and (3) the court failed to make findings regarding his ability to pay. Defendant also contended the trial court erred in sentencing him to eleven to twelve months to serve because a sentence with a gap of thirty days between the minimum and maximum term is a fixed sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court "recognize[d] that the decedent’s family members have suffered greatly. The decedent, however, was the sole victim of defendant’s crime for consideration of restitution. Under statute, any restitution award must be limited to the material losses that the decedent incurred as a direct result of defendant’s crime." Here, the only loss included in the restitution orders, according to the State’s description, was the medical bill not covered by insurance. The Court reversed the district court's order pertaining to the calculation of restitution. On all other matters, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Kenvin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case raised the question of the meaning of "expungement" within the Vermont judicial system. Defendant F.M. sought the removal of references to a dismissed count from docket entries regarding his case. In December 2008, Defendant was charged with four counts. In June 2009, under a plea agreement with the State, Defendant pled guilty to Count 2, reckless endangerment; the State dismissed the other three counts; and Defendant received a deferred sentence and the promise that Count 2 would be dismissed if Defendant successfully completed mental health court proceedings. In February 2010, the court, upon request, Recognized that Defendant had successfully completed mental health court requirements and, per the plea agreement, dismissed Count 2 and ordered expungement of the record pursuant to 13 V.S.A. 7041(e). Following this order, however, the docket sheet for Defendant’s case still referred to Count 2, labeling it "expunged" in the list of disputes and referring in the descriptive docket entries to "disputes 1-4." The following month, Defendant moved to correct the clerical record to remove all references in the docket entries to the expunged count. The court denied the motion "[i]n light of the problems outlined in the emails" among count clerks, administrators, and information services personnel describing the complexities involved in deleting docket entries from the electronic system. Defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to enforce its expungement order because of the difficulty of compliance, noting that the docket entries concerning his case continue to refer to "disputes 1-4," rather than "disputes 1, 3-4," a direct violation of the expungement required by statute. The State filed a letter with the Court explaining its decision not to file a brief "given that the sole issue concerns how the judiciary carries out expungements rather than whether or not the record in this particular case should be expunged." Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and ordered the expungement: "[t]he difficulties inherent in deleting docket entries from our current docket entry system-while real-do not justify a violation of the statute on the part of the judiciary." View "Vermont v. F.M." on Justia Law

Defendant Tina Marie Lamonda entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a narcotic drug. She challenged the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress and dismiss. Defendant was charged following a traffic stop. She moved to suppress the evidence against her, arguing that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of her purse. Following a hearing, the court denied her motion. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction. The Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Vermont v. Lamonda" on Justia Law

Defendants Michael Weisler and Raymond King contended the trial court erred in denying their respective motions to suppress evidence seized from a vehicle in which they were passengers. On a fall 2009 evening, a Vermont state trooper stopped a vehicle containing Defendants and driver Timothy Stone. The officer observed what he believed to be "marijuana flakes" on Weisler's shirt. The officer ordered Stone out of the vehicle, and as Stone exited, Weisler reached under the seat. The officer observed what appeared to be a cellophane bag of cocaine. The officer ordered everyone out of the car while he performed a safety-sweep of the vehicle. The trial court found that the vehicle's owner voluntarily consented to the search. Defendants contended: (1) the finding of voluntariness must be reviewed de novo on appeal; (2) the consent to search was not voluntary; and (3) the consent was tainted by the owner's unlawful de facto arrest. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the finding of voluntariness is subject to de novo review, but concluded that the consent was neither involuntary nor tainted. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Vermont v. Weisler" on Justia Law

Defendant Diana Charland appealed her sentence following her jury conviction on a charge of driving while intoxicated (DWI), third or subsequent offense.  She argued that the trial court improperly enhanced her sentence, without advance notice to her, based on its unsupported assumptions that her husband gave perjured testimony at her trial and that she suborned that false testimony.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[a]lthough we have addressed each of defendant's arguments, we acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court held in 'Dunnigan' that when a defendant objects to sentence enhancement resulting from the court's conclusion that the defendant committed perjury at trial, the trial court 'must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition we have set out.'  In this case, the trial court made no findings meeting the standards of Dunnigan.  The court concluded that defendant had suborned her husband's perjured trial testimony, but offered no rationale for that conclusion other than that it was obvious.  While defendant's failure to object meant that the Dunnigan findings requirement was not triggered, we do not suggest that the court's bare conclusion would have been sufficient if there had been an objection.  We affirm on this record because the record demonstrates that the court could reach the conclusion that it did." View "Vermont v. Charland" on Justia Law

Defendant Yai Bol appealed his conviction for giving false information to a police officer and possession of cocaine. He argued that the trial court erred by preventing his counsel from using a peremptory challenge to strike a black member of the jury pool. After it was seated and the trial conducted, the jury acquitted Defendant of the assault charges but convicted him of providing false information to a police officer and possession of cocaine. On appeal, Defendant contended that the trial court misstated federal constitutional jurisprudence in maintaining that the United States Supreme Court had ruled it impermissible to strike the sole black juror from the venire without stating a reason. He concluded that the court's erroneous denial of his peremptory challenge should result in a new trial because this ruling denied him a fair trial. Having found that the court erred in barring Defendant's peremptory challenge, the Supreme Court turned to the question of appropriate remedy: "[i]t is settled Vermont law that when a defendant is left with an undesired juror after exhausting his peremptory challenges in response to the trial court's failure to remove a juror properly challenged for cause, the court's error is reversible error." The Court remanded the case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Bol" on Justia Law

Defendant Trevor Herrick was convicted by a jury on second-degree murder charges and sentenced to twenty-two years to life.  Defendant was romantically involved with the victim's wife, and fatally stabbed the victim following a verbal and physical altercation. As the jury entered the courtroom to be sworn, three people walked in wearing t-shirts memorializing the victim.  Following voir dire, Defendant moved for mistrial, which the trial court denied.  On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to consider his individual characteristics in connection with its "adequate provocation" charge for the mitigating defense of "passion-provocation manslaughter," and that the court erred in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial when the jury was exposed to potentially prejudicial extraneous influence by the t-shirts. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court effectively concluded that the potential jurors did not demonstrate a state of mind inconsistent with deciding the case fairly: "[i]t made this decision based on its individual voir dire of the prospective jurors, none of whom stated that he or she would be unable to remain impartial.  The trial court is in a unique position to evaluate juror bias, and we defer to its conclusions." With regard to the trial court's ruling to the "adequate provocation" defense, the Court found the jury instructions "track[ed] our case law…and are not plain error." The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions and Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Herrick" on Justia Law

The question before the Court in this case was what style of civil discourse may constitute "threatening behavior."  Defendant Jason Sanville appealed a trial court's revocation of his probation for violating a condition that read, "Violent or threatening behavior is not allowed at any time."  He contended that he could not have violated the condition because his only action was speaking with no accompanying physical conduct.  In December 2008, while Defendant was on probation, his mother entered into a rental agreement for the lease of a mobile home. Defendant, with the landlord's knowledge, lived in the trailer with his mother and performed some repairs on the property in lieu of a portion of the rent.  In March 2009, the landlord claimed that some rent was past due and that Defendant had failed to complete some of the agreed-upon repairs.  Defendant disputed those claims, at times suggesting he would destroy the mobile home, undo the repairs he had made, and, on at least one occasion, saying he was going "to kick [landlord and her husband's] butts."  At no time, however, did he approach or make a physical gesture towards the landlord.  Upon review of the revocation record and applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court did not question "the trial court's findings that defendant had a testy relationship with his landlord and made disrespectful comments to her and her husband on several occasions.  But the conclusion that his choice of words to express his anger and frustration violated his conditions of probation was erroneous.  Defendant's comments to his landlord push the boundaries of appropriate behavior for someone in the process of criminal rehabilitation, but it cannot be said that he was fairly informed that such bluster would result in his loss of freedom the condition is simply too vague." The Court reversed the revocation of Defendant's parole because its conditions failed to thoroughly apprise Defendant of the conduct prohibited. View "Vermont v. Sanville" on Justia Law

Defendant Isaac Faham appealed his conviction of attempted sexual assault after a jury trial. On appeal, Defendant made two arguments: (1) the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of attempted sexual assault; and (2) the trial court unconstitutionally denied him the opportunity to present a complete and adequate defense by precluding him from introducing evidence of complainant’s prior drug use.  Upon review of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that at no point in his post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal did Defendant argue that the State presented insufficient evidence on the element of attempting to engage in a sexual act.  Because this issue was unpreserved, the Court did not reach it. With regard to his second issue on appeal, Defendant maintained that the excluded evidence was relevant to his defense that complainant fabricated the sexual assault complaint in retaliation for Defendant denying her access to drugs and then abandoning her in Charlotte.  Defendant asserted that the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution by denying him the right to present a complete defense and to confront witnesses against him.  The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant’s proffers were insufficient to sustain his challenge to the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Faham" on Justia Law