Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On the afternoon of June 5, 2009, Defendant Theodore de Macedo Soares was stopped on Interstate 91 and issued a citation for speeding.  The citation stated that Defendant was traveling eighty miles per hour in a sixty-five-mile-per-hour speed zone.  The citation further stated that the accused could either pay the specified waiver amount or challenge the ticket. For the latter, if the prosecution proved its case, any fine within the specified penalty range could be imposed.  The citation noted that the waiver amount plus $50 for court costs is commonly assessed following a hearing.  The citation indicated a waiver amount of $140 and a penalty range from $36 to $1186. Defendant elected to contest the ticket at a judicial bureau hearing.  At the hearing, Defendant did not testify but cross-examined the state trooper who had cited him for speeding.  At the close of the hearing, the hearing officer upheld the citation and fined defendant $140 plus $50 for court costs, noting that defendant had been stopped for speeding nine times.  Defendant appealed to the district court, which upheld the judicial bureau's judgment.  The Supreme Court then granted defendant's request for permission to appeal. Defendant first argued that the traffic citation was unconstitutional because: (1) the penalty range applies only when a defendant chose to maintain a constitutionally protected right to challenge the citation; (2) the $50 in court costs is assessed only if a defendant is found guilty following a hearing; (3) the waiver amount is an improper incentive to settle that chills a defendant's right to challenge a citation; (4) the solicitation of a guilty plea violates the principle of a presumption of innocence; and (5) the process for issuing a citation does not assure a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court found "no constitutional violation and no merit to these arguments." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Vermont v. de Macedo Soares" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Combs appealed a trial court order that denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) where he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner was initially arrested and charged with murder in 1990.  At that time, he retained a private attorney as his defense counsel.  Shortly after his arrest, petitioner's competency and sanity were evaluated, and he was deemed incompetent to stand trial because he suffered from schizophrenia paranoid type.  Petitioner spent the following four years involuntarily committed to the Vermont State Hospital, until the State raised the issue of his competency again in 1994.  A second psychiatric evaluation in 1994 led to the conclusion that petitioner was competent to stand trial, though the evaluation deemed his competence to be "marginal."  Both physicians who evaluated petitioner concluded that the insanity defense could be supported given petitioner's psychiatric condition at the time of the crime.  All psychiatric evidence suggested that petitioner was insane at the time of the murder.  At a later hearing, the State prosecutor questioned the ethics of prosecuting a defendant who may have been legally insane at the time of the alleged crime. Without consulting petitioner, who was present in court, defense counsel responded that he had discussed "all of this" with his client and that petitioner was "quite adamant about the fact that he [did] not wish to pursue [the insanity] defense in any way, shape or strategy." In 1995, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to serve thirty-five years to life in prison. In October 2006, Petitioner filed a PCR petition claiming that the State had not met its burden of proof in his criminal case.  Petitioner amended his petition several years later, focusing on the claim that he had received ineffective assistance from his defense counsel.  The trial court adjudicating petitioner's petition (PCR court) conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 6, 2009, and subsequently denied the PCR petition. On appeal, Petitioner made two arguments: (1) the trial court erred in holding that petitioner's criminal defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to seek a bifurcated trial and explaining its merit to petitioner; and (2) the trial court failed to consider his claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not seeking a stipulation that petitioner was insane at the time of the offense.  Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on Petitioner's first claim, but agreed that the trial court failed to resolve the second.  For this reason, the Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Ronald Combs" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Jeffrey Kinney of driving while intoxicated and attempting to elude an officer while operating a vehicle.  On appeal, Defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred in admitting defendant’s refusal to take a preliminary breath test; (2) the prosecutor, in closing, impermissibly injected personal opinion about his credibility and commented on his failure to testify; and (3) the State failed to introduce sufficient identity evidence to support the verdict. A Bennington police officer was patrolling in his cruiser at about ten o’clock at night when he observed an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) being driven on the street in Bennington.  Although it was dark, the officer was able to observe the driver, whom he recognized as Defendant from prior contacts and from his knowledge that Defendant owned that particular model of ATV. The ATV ultimately went over an embankment and the police pursuit continued on foot.  Another officer testified that he found the abandoned two-seat ATV in the woods, followed voices, and found two men, Defendant and another individual.  Defendant appeared to be intoxicated; he was unsteady on his feet, had slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol.  Defendant’s clothes generally matched the clothes worn by the driver of the ATV.  Defendant told the officer that a third person named Jason Webb had been driving the ATV, and had since taken off running.  Defendant also said that he was in the area for a bonfire.  The officer saw no signs of a bonfire, and no third person was ever located in the area. The officers recovered the key to the ATV from defendant’s pocket. Upon review, the Supreme Court found " no basis to disturb the judgment" and affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Kinney" on Justia Law

Petitioner Allen Rheaume is currently serving a life sentence as a habitual offender. He has forty-eight convictions, five of which either involve sex crimes or have a sexual element. He also has had sixty-three disciplinary report convictions while incarcerated. He challenged his classification by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as a "high risk" sex offender and that designation's concomitant programming requirements. The trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that review under the state rules of civil procedure was unavailable for classification and programming decisions made by the DOC. The question of whether an inmate designated as "high risk" can appeal his programming requirements through Vermont Rule of civil Procedure 75 is one of first impression for the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that no statute provides for review of DOC programming decisions, "so the question becomes whether these fall within the class of decisions appealable at common law under one of the extraordinary writs." The Court concluded that while an inmate may have review of his designation under Rule 75, the particular programming requirements promulgated after that designation becomes final are a matter of DOC discretion and as such are non reviewable under Rule 75. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the programming requirements are not reviewable under Rule 75. View "Rheaume v. Pallito" on Justia Law

Defendant Graham Simmons appealed a district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a computer and other stolen items discovered in the execution of a search warrant at his residence. Probable cause supporting the warrant was obtained through subpoenas requiring production of internet addresses and data from internet service providers. Defendant challenged the subpoena of internet records as a warrantless search in violation of the state constitution. Furthermore, Defendant contended that information in the warrant was supplied by an unknown tipster whose reliability was not reasonably established. Upon review of the evidence and the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant failed to properly preserve his first contention and held that the trial court's refusal to suppress the evidence was not plain error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the informant's input and credibility was ultimately irrelevant to issuing the warrant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Vermont v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Charbonneau unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on simple assault. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying him a new trial over evidence that was not available at the time of trial. The Supreme Court emphasized that the decision to grant a motion for a new trial was within the discretion of the trial court, and absent plain error in the record, the Supreme Court would not disturb the decision. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Defendant Gregory Sommer unsuccessfully appealed the sentence he received by trial court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that he was entitled to credit for time he spent in jail while waiting for the trial court to sentence him. The Supreme Court found that Defendant was premature in bringing his request to the court before the Department of Corrections had issued an official sentencing calculation. Furthermore, the Court found that Defendant's own calculation of the time credit was wrong. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Defendant's petition.

Husband Lee Herring appealed the family courtâs denial of his motion to terminate spousal maintenance to his ex-wife Kimberly Herring. Eight months after the order of divorce maintenance was entered, Mr. Herring was found guilty of sexual assault. The stateâs first prosecution of Mr. Herring ended in a hung jury, which occurred before the divorce was granted. After the second trial, he was sentenced. Mr. Herring paid maintenance pursuant to the divorce order for the first six months following the divorce, but stopped making payments once he was incarcerated. Mr. Herring petitioned the family court to modify the maintenance award since he would have no means of paying it from jail. The family court reasoned that the incarceration was not an unanticipated change in his situation and denied his motion to modify the maintenance award. The Supreme Court could not conclude that the pendency of the criminal proceedings made his resulting loss of income âanticipatedâ in terms of his ability to pay the maintenance award. The Court reversed the family courtâs decision to deny Mr. Herring a modification to the maintenance award, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Michael Myers appealed a jury verdict that found him guilty of seven charges all resulting from a drunken altercation in which he drove his truck around the complaining witnessâ lawn, into the witnessâ home, and then fled the scene to be arrested by police a short time later. Defendant made a series of claims on appeal, alleging errors in the trial process and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial that supported his conviction. The Supreme Court analyzed the evidence presented at trial, and found it sufficient to support the juryâs verdict convicting him of all charges brought against him.