Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of relationships among three women: the victim, "Amy", and Defendant Lisa Lampman.  Amy and the victim were romantically involved for two and a half years.  After that relationship ended, Amy moved in with Defendant.  In January 2009, the three women encountered each other in a gas station parking lot where a fight ensued.  Four individuals were criminally charged as a result of the fight: Defendant, Amy, Nathan (Amy's son), and Anthony.  The proprietor of the gas station witnessed the victim being beaten and trying to defend herself.  Amy stated that she observed Defendant deliver a "football style kick" to the victim's face.  Throughout trial, Defendant maintained that the victim was the instigator, starting the fight by pushing Amy and that Defendant had merely acted in self defense.  Defense counsel objected a question posed to one of the witnesses, to which the trial court responded, "I'm finding independently that there was a conspiracy, at least an implicit conspiracy to beat up [the victim]," thus overruling defendant's objection. Defendant made no objection to this ruling at trial, nor did she request a limiting instruction or move for a mistrial.  Further, she did not raise any issue with the court's statement in her motion for a new trial.  However, on appeal, Defendant argued that by finding a conspiracy, the judge usurped the jury's role as fact finder on the ultimate issue of self-defense and deprived her of the right to a trial by jury.  Upon review of the trial record and briefs submitted in this case, the Supreme Court found that because this claim was argued for the first time in this appeal, Defendant failed to preserve her claim of error. With regard to other issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and that Defendant's conviction was supported by the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Vermont v. Lampman" on Justia Law

Defendant Elliott Russell appealed his jury conviction for aggravated assault, arguing: (1) it was an error to admit certain correspondence he sent while incarcerated because its content was irrelevant and prejudicial; (2) the evidence presented was not sufficient to support a jury verdict of guilty; and (3) the court's denial of his request for a jury charge on the lesser offense of simple assault was in error.  This case arose from a 2007 incident at bar in Bennington where Defendant was drinking with a group of companions, including Henry Dummeyer.  The victim and his friend, Felix Rivera, were also drinking in the pub.  Defendant and Dummeyer were smoking outside the pub when Dummeyer's girlfriend told them that the victim had made an upsetting comment directed at her. When Dummeyer and Defendant confronted the men, Dummeyer began yelling about the victim's behavior toward his girlfriend.  As they exchanged angry words back and forth, Defendant and the victim became engaged in a physical altercation. The two men separated, and Rivera saw the victim holding his stomach and defendant with a knife in his hand.  The victim came to Rivera's aid, kicking Defendant out of the way, at which point defendant left the scene.  Dummeyer began physically attacking the victim who tried to fight back while exclaiming "I've been stabbed."  At some point Dummeyer too left the scene.  Rivera contacted emergency services while driving the victim to the hospital and indicated the victim had started the fight.  At the hospital, doctors treated the victim for injuries to the head, chest, and abdomen, consistent with stab wounds. Aggravated assault requires specific intent to harm.  To that end, the State sought to introduce certain letters defendant wrote before the altercation in which he threatened another victim. Over defendant's objections, the court allowed portions of the letters to be read at trial.  The jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault, and Defendant appealed. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found the admission of the letters probative with regard to Defendant's intent to harm. Further, the Court was "unconvinced that the evidence reasonably supported an instruction" for the lesser offense of simple assault. Under these circumstances, the evidence did not reasonably support an instruction on simple assault.  The Court found trial court's determination was therefore proper. View "Vermont v. Russell" on Justia Law

Defendant David Boglioli appealed his conviction for voluntary manslaughter and raised multiple grounds for reversal.  Among them, Defendant alleged he was denied a fair trial when he was precluded from presenting evidence of the victim's threats against others.  Defendant claimed reversible error on various theories regarding the jury instructions.  He also argued that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the verdict of guilty for voluntary manslaughter and that this verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.  Prior to the killing, Defendant and his victim had a history.  The two were neighbors and the victim made a habit of tormenting Defendant.  According to the evidence presented at trial, the victim physically assaulted defendant on numerous occasions and shot projectiles at defendant's home including BBs, darts, pellets, rocks, and bullets.  He also threatened to kill and hurt Defendant and verbally harassed him. Defendant raised the affirmative defense of self-defense.  The State requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, which the trial court granted over Defendant's objection.  The jury convicted defendant of voluntary manslaughter. Upon review of all of the issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court took all in turn and affirmed the trial court's decision in its entirety. View "Vermont v. Boglioli" on Justia Law

In this complaint for review of governmental action under Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 75, Plaintiff-inmate Brian LeClair appealed a superior court's refusal to order the Department of Corrections to give him double credit for time served in a correctional facility after his furlough status was improperly revoked.  In November 2006, Plaintiff was charged with burglary. This charge was based on an incident that occurred in April 2004, before Plaintiff's conviction on previous charges.  The new charge arose when DNA evidence connected Plaintiff to the earlier offense.  At the time of the new charge, Plaintiff had completed his minimum, but not his maximum, sentence.  Although he was on conditional reentry furlough when the new charge was filed, he was incarcerated for what was to be a short period of time for violating the terms of his conditional reentry furlough agreement.  When the new charge was filed, however, the Department revoked Plaintiff's furlough status, and he remained incarcerated.  Independent of his furlough revocation, Plaintiff was held for lack of bail on the new charge. In an August 2007 decision, the superior court ruled that because the sole basis of the revocation was plaintiff's alleged violation of his promise in the furlough agreement not to commit any illegal act, his furlough status had been improperly revoked based on an incident that occurred before he signed the agreement. Plaintiff filed a complaint for review of governmental action under Rule 75, arguing that the Department was compelled to award him credit for the 279 days between the revocation of his furlough and his conviction on the new burglary charge not only against his original sentences, but also against his sentence on the new charge.  In a May 2010 decision, the superior court ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to double credit for those 279 days, notwithstanding the fact that his furlough status had been improperly revoked. According to the State, the expiration of Plaintiff's underlying sentences and his acceptance into drug court on the most recent charge means that the Supreme Court's decision on the merits of Plaintiff's appeal would have no impact on Plaintiff, and thus there is no live controversy.  Plaintiff responded that a live controversy continued to exist because, if the Court found in his favor in this appeal, his maximum sentence would be considered completed in February 2010, before the latest charge, and thus he could receive credit against any new sentence for the time he spent in custody after the new charge was filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal as moot. View "In re LeClair" on Justia Law

On the afternoon of June 5, 2009, Defendant Theodore de Macedo Soares was stopped on Interstate 91 and issued a citation for speeding.  The citation stated that Defendant was traveling eighty miles per hour in a sixty-five-mile-per-hour speed zone.  The citation further stated that the accused could either pay the specified waiver amount or challenge the ticket. For the latter, if the prosecution proved its case, any fine within the specified penalty range could be imposed.  The citation noted that the waiver amount plus $50 for court costs is commonly assessed following a hearing.  The citation indicated a waiver amount of $140 and a penalty range from $36 to $1186. Defendant elected to contest the ticket at a judicial bureau hearing.  At the hearing, Defendant did not testify but cross-examined the state trooper who had cited him for speeding.  At the close of the hearing, the hearing officer upheld the citation and fined defendant $140 plus $50 for court costs, noting that defendant had been stopped for speeding nine times.  Defendant appealed to the district court, which upheld the judicial bureau's judgment.  The Supreme Court then granted defendant's request for permission to appeal. Defendant first argued that the traffic citation was unconstitutional because: (1) the penalty range applies only when a defendant chose to maintain a constitutionally protected right to challenge the citation; (2) the $50 in court costs is assessed only if a defendant is found guilty following a hearing; (3) the waiver amount is an improper incentive to settle that chills a defendant's right to challenge a citation; (4) the solicitation of a guilty plea violates the principle of a presumption of innocence; and (5) the process for issuing a citation does not assure a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court found "no constitutional violation and no merit to these arguments." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Vermont v. de Macedo Soares" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Combs appealed a trial court order that denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) where he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner was initially arrested and charged with murder in 1990.  At that time, he retained a private attorney as his defense counsel.  Shortly after his arrest, petitioner's competency and sanity were evaluated, and he was deemed incompetent to stand trial because he suffered from schizophrenia paranoid type.  Petitioner spent the following four years involuntarily committed to the Vermont State Hospital, until the State raised the issue of his competency again in 1994.  A second psychiatric evaluation in 1994 led to the conclusion that petitioner was competent to stand trial, though the evaluation deemed his competence to be "marginal."  Both physicians who evaluated petitioner concluded that the insanity defense could be supported given petitioner's psychiatric condition at the time of the crime.  All psychiatric evidence suggested that petitioner was insane at the time of the murder.  At a later hearing, the State prosecutor questioned the ethics of prosecuting a defendant who may have been legally insane at the time of the alleged crime. Without consulting petitioner, who was present in court, defense counsel responded that he had discussed "all of this" with his client and that petitioner was "quite adamant about the fact that he [did] not wish to pursue [the insanity] defense in any way, shape or strategy." In 1995, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to serve thirty-five years to life in prison. In October 2006, Petitioner filed a PCR petition claiming that the State had not met its burden of proof in his criminal case.  Petitioner amended his petition several years later, focusing on the claim that he had received ineffective assistance from his defense counsel.  The trial court adjudicating petitioner's petition (PCR court) conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 6, 2009, and subsequently denied the PCR petition. On appeal, Petitioner made two arguments: (1) the trial court erred in holding that petitioner's criminal defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to seek a bifurcated trial and explaining its merit to petitioner; and (2) the trial court failed to consider his claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not seeking a stipulation that petitioner was insane at the time of the offense.  Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on Petitioner's first claim, but agreed that the trial court failed to resolve the second.  For this reason, the Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Ronald Combs" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Jeffrey Kinney of driving while intoxicated and attempting to elude an officer while operating a vehicle.  On appeal, Defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred in admitting defendant’s refusal to take a preliminary breath test; (2) the prosecutor, in closing, impermissibly injected personal opinion about his credibility and commented on his failure to testify; and (3) the State failed to introduce sufficient identity evidence to support the verdict. A Bennington police officer was patrolling in his cruiser at about ten o’clock at night when he observed an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) being driven on the street in Bennington.  Although it was dark, the officer was able to observe the driver, whom he recognized as Defendant from prior contacts and from his knowledge that Defendant owned that particular model of ATV. The ATV ultimately went over an embankment and the police pursuit continued on foot.  Another officer testified that he found the abandoned two-seat ATV in the woods, followed voices, and found two men, Defendant and another individual.  Defendant appeared to be intoxicated; he was unsteady on his feet, had slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol.  Defendant’s clothes generally matched the clothes worn by the driver of the ATV.  Defendant told the officer that a third person named Jason Webb had been driving the ATV, and had since taken off running.  Defendant also said that he was in the area for a bonfire.  The officer saw no signs of a bonfire, and no third person was ever located in the area. The officers recovered the key to the ATV from defendant’s pocket. Upon review, the Supreme Court found " no basis to disturb the judgment" and affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Kinney" on Justia Law

Petitioner Allen Rheaume is currently serving a life sentence as a habitual offender. He has forty-eight convictions, five of which either involve sex crimes or have a sexual element. He also has had sixty-three disciplinary report convictions while incarcerated. He challenged his classification by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as a "high risk" sex offender and that designation's concomitant programming requirements. The trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that review under the state rules of civil procedure was unavailable for classification and programming decisions made by the DOC. The question of whether an inmate designated as "high risk" can appeal his programming requirements through Vermont Rule of civil Procedure 75 is one of first impression for the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that no statute provides for review of DOC programming decisions, "so the question becomes whether these fall within the class of decisions appealable at common law under one of the extraordinary writs." The Court concluded that while an inmate may have review of his designation under Rule 75, the particular programming requirements promulgated after that designation becomes final are a matter of DOC discretion and as such are non reviewable under Rule 75. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the programming requirements are not reviewable under Rule 75. View "Rheaume v. Pallito" on Justia Law

Defendant Graham Simmons appealed a district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a computer and other stolen items discovered in the execution of a search warrant at his residence. Probable cause supporting the warrant was obtained through subpoenas requiring production of internet addresses and data from internet service providers. Defendant challenged the subpoena of internet records as a warrantless search in violation of the state constitution. Furthermore, Defendant contended that information in the warrant was supplied by an unknown tipster whose reliability was not reasonably established. Upon review of the evidence and the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant failed to properly preserve his first contention and held that the trial court's refusal to suppress the evidence was not plain error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the informant's input and credibility was ultimately irrelevant to issuing the warrant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Vermont v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Charbonneau unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on simple assault. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying him a new trial over evidence that was not available at the time of trial. The Supreme Court emphasized that the decision to grant a motion for a new trial was within the discretion of the trial court, and absent plain error in the record, the Supreme Court would not disturb the decision. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.