Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Peter Williams and Peter Boissoneault brought a consolidated appeal of the criminal court’s denial of motions to exclude evidence filed in their respective driving under the influence, third offense (DUI-3) prosecutions. They argued the trial court erred in declining to suppress their evidentiary breath test results as gathered pursuant to a warrantless search in violation of Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the court correctly determined that these tests satisfied the consent exception to Article 11’s warrant requirement, and therefore affirmed. View "Vermont v. Williams" on Justia Law

Juvenile A.P. appealed an adjudication of delinquency based on “open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior” under 13 V.S.A. section 2601. Juvenile argued: (1) the evidence did not support a finding that his conduct was open or gross; (2) section 2601 was ambiguous and therefore unenforceable against him; and (3) section 2601 was unconstitutionally vague. The incident giving rise to the adjudication at issue here dated back to 2018, when Juvenile approached the complainant in the hallway of school. Complainant testified: “[A]ll of a sudden, he asked if he could touch my breasts, and then he just reached out, and his hand was on me.” No one else was present, although school was in session. When juvenile touched complainant’s breast with his hand, she turned around and ran. She was furious and upset. Juvenile testified that he reached out his hand toward complainant’s chest but never touched it. He testified that he regretted disregarding complainant’s feelings and felt his actions were “disgusting.” The family court found complainant to be credible. It concluded that juvenile had touched her breast and in doing so had committed a delinquent act. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the court’s findings were supported by the record. The Court further concluded the statute unambiguously proscribes the type of conduct at issue here, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. View "In re A.P., Juvenile" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Stephens appealed after he was convicted by jury of attempted sexual assault. On appeal, he argued: (1) the State’s evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the offense charged in the State’s information, and the trial court’s instruction permitted the jury to convict him for conduct not charged by the State; (2) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of an alleged prior sexual encounter between defendant and the complainant; (3) the court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of flight as consciousness of guilt and by not giving the jury a precautionary instruction on the limited probative value of that evidence; (4) the conviction must be vacated because the criminal case was not disposed of within the time frame set forth in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD); and (5) the court erred by not granting him a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Defendant Jacob Rillo appealed his conviction for selling or dispensing a regulated drug (fentanyl) with death resulting, arguing that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis. After review of the trial court record, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed and reverse defendant’s conviction and sentence for that count. The matter was remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the remaining counts. View "Vermont v. Rillo" on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory Welch was convicted by jury of lewd and lascivious conduct. At trial, the State introduced evidence that defendant fled when police tried to arrest him, and the court instructed the jury on the use of flight evidence as suggesting consciousness of guilt. Defendant argued on appeal that the court erred in failing to instruct jurors that they could not return a guilty verdict based solely on the evidence of flight. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Welch" on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Hinton appealed a superior court’s sentence following his guilty plea to escaping from furlough. Defendant argued that new legislation decriminalizing the conduct should have been applied retroactively to him. Separately, he argued the court abused its discretion when it ordered the sentence to run consecutively to two other sentences. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Hinton" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Gauthier appealed his conviction for violating the Sex Offender Registration Act after he he knowingly failed to comply with reporting requirements while released on furlough status. He argued on appeal that furlough status was a form of “incarceration,” and therefore he fell under the exception to the sex-offender reporting requirements that relieved sex offenders of the reporting requirements “during periods of incarceration.” The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that based on the plain language of the statute that the reporting requirements applied to furloughed individuals living in the community, and therefore affirmed. View "Vermont v. Gauthier" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Harwood appealed after a trial court concluded he violated one of the conditions of his probation. In 2017, defendant was charged by information with one count of aggravated domestic assault, and two counts of disturbing the peace by phone. He ultimately pled guilty to first-degree aggravated domestic assault with a weapon for threatening to use a deadly weapon on his ex-girlfriend. Defendant received a sentence of eighteen months to six years, all suspended except for one year to serve. As part of the plea agreement, defendant was placed on probation under standard and special conditions and the two counts of disturbing the peace by phone were dismissed. About a week later, while defendant was in his jail cell, a corrections officer and a unit supervisor saw defendant squirting water out under his cell door. The corrections officer first spoke with defendant and warned him the facility would not tolerate this behavior. Defendant then became “verbally assaultive.” The unit supervisor reminded defendant that he could violate his probation if he continued to engage in this behavior. Defendant responded flippantly and loudly yelled several expletives at the supervisor. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred because threatening behavior required some accompanying physical conduct. If verbal statements qualify as threatening behavior, defendant alternatively argued that he did not receive adequate notice that his verbal statements could result in a violation of probation. After review of the trial court record, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded defendant's verbal statements to the corrections officer qualified as threatening behavior. The Court also concluded defendant was on sufficient notice that verbal statements could have qualified as threatening behavior. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that defendant violated a condition of his probation. View "Vermont v. Harwood" on Justia Law

Defendant Christina Allcock appealed her convictions for aggravated assault on a police officer, simple assault on a police officer, and impeding a police officer. Law enforcement responded to an emergency call in March 2015 and discovered a man stabbed in defendant’s residence. Defendant, her boyfriend, her parents, and her adult son were present when the officers responded to the call. While the officers were investigating the scene, defendant and some of the others left the residence and went to sit in defendant’s father’s car, which was parked outside. At some point an officer approached the vehicle, where defendant, her boyfriend, and her son were sitting in the back seat of the car. The doors were unlocked. When the officer tried to persuade defendant’s son to get out of the car to speak with him, defendant resisted. The officer testified at trial that defendant wrapped her arms around her son to prevent his exit; yelled at the officer; “slapp[ed],” “claw[ed],” and “gouged” his hands; held a lighter, which was lit, against his hand; and punched him in the mouth. Another officer also testified that defendant held the lighter against the first officer’s hand and sleeve. A jury found defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of eighteen months to six years for the aggravated assault, twelve to twenty-four months for the simple assault, and eighteen months to three years for the impeding-officer offense. On appeal, defendant argued her conviction for aggravated assault on a police officer had to be reversed because the trial court erred in admitting Facebook messages that were not properly authenticated, and that the trial court should not have allowed the State to alter the elements of the impeding charge after the evidence was closed. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the aggravated assault conviction, but affirmed the simple assault and impeding a police officer convictions. View "Vermont v. Allcock" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review in this interlocutory appeal centered on the available legal means for collaterally challenging a predicate conviction to an enhanced charge in light of two distinct lines of case law. Petitioner Joseph Benoit pled guilty to driving under the influence, third offense (DUI- 3), and subsequently challenged his underlying predicate convictions in a petition for post- conviction relief (PCR). The State sought summary judgment on the basis that by pleading guilty to DUI-3, petitioner waived his PCR challenges to any of the predicate convictions. The trial court denied summary judgment, concluding that Vermont case law required petitioner to raise his challenges in a post-sentencing PCR proceeding. The Supreme Court concluded defendant could raise collateral challenges to predicate convictions by preserving the challenge on the trial court record. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment on different grounds than the trial court, and remanded for the court to consider whether petitioner's waiver was knowing and voluntary. View "In re Joseph S. Benoit v. (State of Vermont, Appellant)" on Justia Law