Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A neighbor, Myrna Nathin, appealed the Environmental Division's denial of her motion to reopen a judgment declaring an Act 250 land-use permit for an adjoining property abandoned. Nathin argued she did not receive adequate notice of the petition to abandon the permit. The property in question, located on Burchard Road in Dover, Vermont, was initially permitted for subdivision and infrastructure development in 1993, with extended deadlines for completion. However, no construction occurred, and the current landowners, the Beasleys, sought to abandon the permit in 2022.The district commission declined to review the abandonment petition, citing jurisdictional issues, and the Environmental Division later declared the permit abandoned in January 2023. Nathin, who lives in New Jersey, claimed she did not receive the notice sent to her Vermont address and only learned of the abandonment in August 2023. She filed a motion for relief from judgment under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which the Environmental Division denied, stating she lacked standing as she was not a party to the original proceeding.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that Nathin did not have standing to file a Rule 60(b) motion because she was not a party to the abandonment proceeding. The Court also found that the Environmental Division had adhered to its procedural rules and that Nathin's lack of notice did not warrant reopening the case. The Court emphasized that procedural rules must be enforced to ensure fairness and regularity, and Nathin's failure to intervene in the original proceeding precluded her from seeking relief. View "In re Burchard Road Petition" on Justia Law

The case involves Aerie Point Holdings, LLC (Aerie Point) and Vorsteveld Farm, LLC (Vorsteveld). Aerie Point owns a property in Panton, Vermont, which is located downhill from Vorsteveld's dairy farm. In 2017, Vorsteveld began installing tile drains in its fields to improve soil quality. The excess water drained from these tiles was discharged into public ditches, then through culverts, and finally towards Lake Champlain over Aerie Point’s property. This led to increased water flow, sediment, and contaminants on Aerie Point's land, causing shoreline erosion and algae blooms in Lake Champlain. In April 2020, Aerie Point filed a lawsuit against Vorsteveld for trespass and nuisance.The civil division found in favor of Aerie Point in March 2022, concluding that Vorsteveld's actions constituted trespass and nuisance. The court issued an injunction in August 2022, preventing Vorsteveld from allowing water from its drain tile system to flow into the public ditches and culverts on Arnold Bay Road. Vorsteveld did not appeal this judgment.In August 2023, Vorsteveld moved for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) and (6), arguing that postjudgment changes in fact and law justified relief from the injunction. Vorsteveld claimed that an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigation regarding filled wetlands on the farm prevented it from complying with the injunction, and that the federal investigation/enforcement action preempted the state injunction. Vorsteveld also argued that changes to Vermont’s Right-to-Farm law justified relief from the injunction. The court denied the motion and the request for an evidentiary hearing.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Vorsteveld's arguments were attempts to relitigate issues that had been resolved by the judgment. The court also found that Vorsteveld had not demonstrated that there were significant postjudgment changes in factual circumstances or the law that made prospective application of the injunction inequitable. The court concluded that Vorsteveld's arguments relating to the EPA investigation and changes to the Right-to-Farm law were insufficient to merit relief under Rule 60(b). The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vorsteveld's request for an evidentiary hearing. View "Aerie Point Holdings, LLC v. Vorsteveld Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Vermont Public Utility Commission approving a contract under 30 V.S.A. § 248(i) for the purchase of out-of-state renewable natural gas by Vermont Gas Systems, Inc. (VGS). The contract, which was proposed to last for fourteen-and-a-half years, required VGS to purchase a minimum volume of renewable natural gas that would be produced and transported from a landfill in New York. The contract was part of VGS's efforts to invest in nonfossil gas and incorporate renewable natural gas into its gas supply to meet regulatory requirements and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.The appellant, Catherine Bock, a ratepaying customer of VGS, challenged the Commission's findings with respect to the contract’s contribution towards satisfying emissions reductions under the Vermont Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020. Bock also disputed the Commission’s finding that the contract, with a condition imposed by the Commission, would comply with least-cost planning principles.The court rejected Bock's arguments, finding that the Commission's conclusions were supported by the evidence in the record and were not clearly erroneous. The court noted that the contract was only one of VGS's strategies to reduce emissions pursuant to the Vermont Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020. It also pointed out that there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission's determination that the contract was cost-effective and consistent with least-cost planning principles. View "In re Petition of Vermont Gas Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the developer of a solar electric generation facility and the owner of the project site, appealed the dismissal of their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR). Plaintiffs sought a ruling that two guidance documents and a plant-classification system created by ANR were unlawful and therefore could not be relied upon by ANR or the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in determining whether to issue a certificate of public good for a proposed facility under 30 V.S.A. § 248. The civil division granted ANR’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that the guidance documents and classification system were not rules and did not have the force of law, and that the proper forum to challenge the policies was in the PUC proceeding. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Otter Creek Solar, LLC, et al. v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, et al." on Justia Law

Applicants Christian and Clark Katzenbach appealed the Environmental Division’s decision granting but imposing certain conditions on an Act 250 permit for operating their sand- and gravel-extraction project. Applicants challenged the court’s findings and conclusions under Criterion 5 and Criterion 8 of Act 250. The Vermont Supreme Court found no clear error in the trial court's findings under both criteria, but concluded one condition imposed under Criterion 5 was unreasonable in light of the trial court’s findings. The Supreme Court therefore struck that one Criterion 5 condition and affirmed in all other respects. View "In re Katzenbach A250 Permit #7R1374-1" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Daniels appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Attorney James Goss, Attorney Matthew Hart, and law firm Facey Goss & McPhee P.C. (FGM), arguing the court erred when it concluded he could not prove defendants caused his injury as a matter of law. Defendants represented plaintiff in a state environmental enforcement action where he was found liable for a hazardous-waste contamination on his property. On appeal, plaintiff claimed defendants failed to properly raise two dispositive defenses: the statute of limitations and proportional liability. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded plaintiff would not have prevailed on either defense if raised and therefore affirmed the grant of judgment to defendants. View "The Estate of Richard S. Daniels, by and through Julie Lyford in her capacity as Executor et al." on Justia Law

Following a remand from the Vermont Supreme Court, the Public Utility Commission (PUC) denied petitioner’s request for a certificate of public good (CPG) to construct a 2.0 megawatt (MW) solar facility on Apple Hill in the Town of Bennington, Vermont. Petitioner appealed, arguing the PUC erred in: (1) denying its request to amend its petition; (2) concluding that the Bennington Town Plan and Bennington Regional Plan contained clear community standards and that the project would violate those standards; (3) applying the “modified Quechee” standard in the aesthetics analysis without having gone through rulemaking; (4) treating the provisions of the Bennington Town Plan as if they were binding zoning ordinances in violation of 24 V.S.A. 4413; (5) failing to consider the positive benefits of the project with respect to greenhouse-gas emissions in the contexts of its aesthetics analysis; and (6) applying vague and standardless tests in violation of its constitutional rights. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected significant portions of the PUC’s rationale for denying petitioner a CPG, therefore reversed and remanded for additional proceedings. View "In re Petition of Apple Hill Solar LLC" on Justia Law

Justin and Maureen Savage (landowners) owned a 176-acre parcel of undeveloped land in a rural area near Cavendish, Vermont. Snowstone, LLC, sought to buy a portion of landowners’ property to operate a dimensional stone extraction project. After executing the contract, Snowstone requested a jurisdictional opinion from the Act 250 district coordinator to determine whether the project would need an Act 250 permit. A group of neighboring landowners (neighbors) filed comments, arguing that the project would require said permit. The district coordinator issued a jurisdictional opinion, concluding that the proposed project needed an Act 250 permit because the project constituted “development,” defined in relevant part as “[t]he construction of improvements for commercial or industrial purposes on more than one acre of land within a municipality that has not adopted permanent zoning and subdivision bylaws.” Snowstone appealed the jurisdictional opinion to the Environmental Division, presenting the court with a revised contract that reduced the purchase price, removed the right of first refusal, and excised the deed restriction. Neighbors successfully intervened, arguing that the two parcels would be controlled by the same person due to the nature of the sales transaction, that the retained parcel would be “involved land,” and that the project would require a stormwater discharge permit with stormwater treatment facilities that would increase the amount of land necessary to operate the project beyond one acre. The court scrutinized the revised sales contract and determined that, with the excision of the former objectionable provisions, the contract evinced an arms-length transaction such that Snowstone and landowners were not one person. Accordingly, the court concluded that the entire 176 acres did not require an Act 250 permit. The Neighbors appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's judgment. View "In re Snowstone, LLC Act 250 Jurisdictional Opinion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff R.L. Vallee, Inc. appealed the Environmental Division’s decision granting an Act 250 permit to the Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) for a highway project involving the reconfiguration of an interstate exit. Vallee argued the court applied the incorrect standard in analyzing phosphorus discharges under Act 250 Criterion 1, and improperly evaluated the evidence of phosphorus and chloride discharges under Criterion 1. The Vermont Supreme Court found the Environmental Division applied the correct legal standard to evaluate discharges, and properly considered the evidence before it in determining that the project complies with Criterion 1. View "In re Diverging Diamond Interchange Act 250 (R.L. Vallee, Inc.)" on Justia Law

Katherine Hall appealed an Environmental Division decision granting summary judgment to Chittenden Resorts, LLC and RMT Associates, d/b/a Mountain Top Inn & Resort (the Resort). The Environmental Division concluded the Resort did not need an amended Act 250 permit to run a rental program where, pursuant to a contractual agreement, the Resort rented out private homes near the Resort. On appeal, Hall argued that the Environmental Division erred in determining that the Resort did not need an amended Act 250 permit. Specifically, she argued the Resort needed an amended Act 250 permit because under 10 V.S.A. 6001(14)(A), the Resort and owners of the homes involved in the rental program were a collective "person." Alternatively, she argued the Resort exercised "control" over the rental homes within the meaning of section 6001(3)(A)(i). The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed with Hall's characterization of the Resort and home owners as a collective "person." Further, the Court found the Resort did not control the rented homes contemplated by section 6001(3)(i). Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's judgment. View "In re Mountain Top Inn & Resort, JO 1-391 (Hall, Appellant)" on Justia Law