Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father appealed a family court judgment modifying the disposition plan and terminating his parental rights to the minors A.M., E.M., and L.M. After review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that a single transgression by father, in the face of otherwise positive evidence and findings as to his compliance with the case plans and his observed parenting abilities, did not support a finding of changed circumstances to warrant modification of the case plan goal. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "In re A.M., E.M., L.M." on Justia Law

Mother appealed a superior court decision denying her motion to set aside a previous order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, P.K. Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights in the same proceeding in which she entered into a postadoption-contact agreement with P.K.’s paternal grandmother, with whom the child had been placed by the Department for Children and Families (DCF). After DCF removed P.K. from the paternal grandmother’s home and placed her with another pre-adoptive foster family, mother moved to set aside the termination order. The trial court found that mother agreed, at the termination hearing, that "all parties agreed that it was in P.K.’s best interest that custody be transferred to DCF, without limitation as to adoption." Mother argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred by not employing available legal remedies to safeguard her ongoing relationship with P.K., which the court necessarily found to be in P.K.'s best interest in approving the postadoption-contact agreement. She contended that relief was available based on changed circumstances, in this case, the changed circumstances of the paternal grandmother's removal as a preadoptive parent. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s denial of mother’s motion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re P.K." on Justia Law

Mother and father separately appealed a family court judgment terminating their parental rights to the minors D.S. and W.S. Mother contended the court improperly relied on factors beyond her control in concluding that her ability to parent had stagnated. Father contended: (1) the court improperly failed to address individually whether his ability to parent the children had stagnated; (2) the evidence failed to show that he was unable to resume parenting within a reasonable time; and (3) the court violated his right to due process of law by relying on expectations not in the case plan. The Supreme Court concluded that the predicate finding that mother’s failure to progress amounted to stagnation was unsupported, and therefore that the judgment terminating mother’s parental rights was reversed. The Court agreed with father that the trial court's findings were insufficient to support a conclusion that a termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The Court reversed as to both parents and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re D.S. and W.S." on Justia Law

Mother and father were the parents of a daughter, born in 2009. Mother and father were never married and their relationship ended before daughter was born; daughter lived exclusively with mother for the first twenty-one months of her life. In April 2011, the parties entered into a parenting agreement, accepted by the court as an order, that gave mother sole legal and physical rights and responsibilities for daughter, subject to father's parent-child contact. Mother appealed a family court order modifying parental rights and granting father sole legal and physical rights and responsibilities for their daughter. Mother argued that the family court's decision modifying parental rights was based on erroneous facts and improper consideration of the child's bests interests and resulted from bias against her by the court. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Clark v. Bellavance" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a dispute regarding the parties’ obligations with respect to several tax liens discovered post-divorce in light of two hold-harmless provisions in a final divorce decree. Wife argued that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enforce the hold-harmless and indemnification provisions and failing to address the parties’ respective obligations with respect to the tax liens. After review of the decree and the provisions at issue here, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, and accordingly reversed and remanded so the trial court could address wife’s claims. View "Flanagan v. duMont" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Melissa Solomon appealed the dismissal, without consideration of the merits, of her petition for dissolution of a nonresident civil union. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a civil union in 2001 in Brattleboro, Vermont, but both resided in Wake County, North Carolina. The parties were separated by May 2014. The parties had no children. In 2015, they decided to dissolve their civil union and filed an uncontested complaint in Vermont, accompanied by a final stipulation as required by 15 V.S.A. 1206(b). The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the parties failed to produce evidence that they attempted to obtain a dissolution of the civil union in North Carolina. The court expressed concern that if Vermont courts “continue[d] to accept these filings and allow courts in other states to ignore precedent [set by Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015)], the situation [would] never be resolved.” Because civil marriage and civil unions remained legally distinct entities in Vermont and because "Obergefell" mandated that states recognize only same-sex marriage, uncertainty remained as to whether Obergefell required other states to recognize and dissolve civil unions established in Vermont. The parties here followed the section 1206(b) mandates. Plaintiff contended that the provided affidavit satisfied the “acknowledgment” required by § 1206(b), and thus the court erred when it refused to consider the issue and held that North Carolina was the proper venue for all filings and appeals. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff, and reversed and remanded the trial court's dismissal. View "Solomon v. Guidry" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a superior court order finding that her proposed relocation and parents’ breakdown in communication were changed circumstances warranting modification of parental rights and responsibilities and transferring sole legal and physical responsibilities of their autistic son to father. She argued that the court erred in finding a real, substantial, and unanticipated change in circumstances, and that the decision to modify the extant custody agreement was not in the best interests of the child. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s finding of changed circumstances with respect to the court’s award of legal rights and responsibilities to father based on the breakdown in parental cooperation, but reversed and remanded the modification in the order with respect to physical rights and responsibilities and parent-child contact. View "Wener v. Wener" on Justia Law

B.G. was born in September 2006. Mother and father separated in 2007. B.G. has a younger half-sister, C.B., born in August 2009. Mother’s relationships with B.G.’s father and her two subsequent partners, including C.B.’s father, were abusive. In 2010, mother was prescribed pain medication, and this led to a heroin addiction. Mother often left B.G. with his paternal grandfather and step-grandmother. In 2011, when mother planned to move to New York, grandparents began caring for B.G. full time. B.G.’s step-grandmother has been responsible for all interactions with school, doctors, dentists, and counselors. Mother did not participate in any of these aspects of B.G.’s life. B.G. witnessed the domestic violence in mother’s relationships even after 2011 when his time with mother was quite limited. In January 2014, the court removed C.B. from mother’s home. The court issued a Temporary Custody Order transferring custody of the half-sister to grandparents with protective supervision by the Department for Children and Families (DCF). There was no order issued pertaining to B.G., but the court noted that there was an agreement reached by DCF, mother, and step-grandmother that if mother tried to remove B.G. from step-grandmother’s care, DCF would be notified and would seek a conditional custody order. Mother did not progress past supervised visits with C.B. In January 2015, the State filed a petition alleging B.G. was CHINS for lack of proper parental care. Mother appealed the family court’s order concluding that B.G. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS), arguing that the court erred in finding that B.G. was abandoned or without proper parental care because mother made arrangements for B.G.’s care. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the CHINS adjudication on the basis that B.G. was abandoned. View "In re B.G." on Justia Law

Father filed a parentage action on March 19, 2015. On April 8, 2015, mother filed a stipulation of parentage and a motion that she be granted sole parental rights and responsibilities for the children and that father be denied any right to parent-child contact. Father appealed a Family Division order that awarded mother sole legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities but did not award father any parent-child contact at the time. The order contained a provision permitting father to file a motion for parent-child contact, even without any change in circumstances, within forty-five days after the pending criminal charges against him had been resolved. On appeal, father argued that: (1) the court effectively terminated his parental rights without finding by clear and convincing evidence that doing so was in the best interests of the children; and (2) that the court erred in creating a prerequisite to the resumption of contact (that is, the resolution of the criminal charges) beyond his control. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Groves v. Green" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's consideration centered on the circumstances a child support order could compel an obligor parent whose income was below the self-support reserve to make monthly payments toward outstanding arrearages on a child support surcharge. Father appealed pro se a family court order affirming a magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to modify a child support order that related solely to outstanding arrearages owed for surcharges. He argued that because his limited income from social security disability benefits was below the self-support reserve, he should not have been ordered to make $50 monthly payments toward outstanding surcharges. The magistrate considered the possibility of reducing or eliminating father’s monthly payment obligation, as opposed to discharging the underlying judgment. The magistrate noted that father’s living circumstances had changed on account of a recent divorce and that his income had fallen. However, the magistrate found that his modest monthly income was still sufficient to meet his modest expenses and allow him to continue paying $50 per month toward his surcharge arrearages. In addition, the magistrate found that father’s consistent payment of the $50 per month over the course of years supported the finding that he was, in fact, able to afford the payment. For these reasons, the magistrate declined to reduce father’s monthly surcharge arrearage payment. The statute relating to computation of a parent’s support obligation provided that if a noncustodial parent’s available income is less than the self-support reserve, the court shall use its discretion in determining support and shall require payment of a nominal support amount. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The magistrate made no findings that mother had shown good cause why the payment of arrears should be ordered notwithstanding father’s monthly income below the self-support reserve. Nor did the magistrate make any findings from which we might infer a determination of good cause, such as a finding that, notwithstanding his low monthly income, father has access to significant assets, or a finding that for some other reason this case was extraordinary. View "Leitgeb v. Leitgeb" on Justia Law