Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father filed a parentage action on March 19, 2015. On April 8, 2015, mother filed a stipulation of parentage and a motion that she be granted sole parental rights and responsibilities for the children and that father be denied any right to parent-child contact. Father appealed a Family Division order that awarded mother sole legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities but did not award father any parent-child contact at the time. The order contained a provision permitting father to file a motion for parent-child contact, even without any change in circumstances, within forty-five days after the pending criminal charges against him had been resolved. On appeal, father argued that: (1) the court effectively terminated his parental rights without finding by clear and convincing evidence that doing so was in the best interests of the children; and (2) that the court erred in creating a prerequisite to the resumption of contact (that is, the resolution of the criminal charges) beyond his control. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Groves v. Green" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's consideration centered on the circumstances a child support order could compel an obligor parent whose income was below the self-support reserve to make monthly payments toward outstanding arrearages on a child support surcharge. Father appealed pro se a family court order affirming a magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to modify a child support order that related solely to outstanding arrearages owed for surcharges. He argued that because his limited income from social security disability benefits was below the self-support reserve, he should not have been ordered to make $50 monthly payments toward outstanding surcharges. The magistrate considered the possibility of reducing or eliminating father’s monthly payment obligation, as opposed to discharging the underlying judgment. The magistrate noted that father’s living circumstances had changed on account of a recent divorce and that his income had fallen. However, the magistrate found that his modest monthly income was still sufficient to meet his modest expenses and allow him to continue paying $50 per month toward his surcharge arrearages. In addition, the magistrate found that father’s consistent payment of the $50 per month over the course of years supported the finding that he was, in fact, able to afford the payment. For these reasons, the magistrate declined to reduce father’s monthly surcharge arrearage payment. The statute relating to computation of a parent’s support obligation provided that if a noncustodial parent’s available income is less than the self-support reserve, the court shall use its discretion in determining support and shall require payment of a nominal support amount. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The magistrate made no findings that mother had shown good cause why the payment of arrears should be ordered notwithstanding father’s monthly income below the self-support reserve. Nor did the magistrate make any findings from which we might infer a determination of good cause, such as a finding that, notwithstanding his low monthly income, father has access to significant assets, or a finding that for some other reason this case was extraordinary. View "Leitgeb v. Leitgeb" on Justia Law

Husband appealed a final divorce order, arguing that the Family Division: (1) inequitably divided the marital assets; (2) committed reversible errors of fact; and (3) issued a decision based on impermissible bias. Finding no reversible error in the Family Division's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Casavant (Allen) v. Allen" on Justia Law

May 7, 2015 was the second day of Kenneth and Melissa Coons' divorce hearing. Near the end of the hearing, the trial court called a brief recess and asked counsel to meet in chambers. According to the trial court, during the meeting, it told the parties that “it would not and could not distribute [husband’s] military retirement because he had not yet served the requisite number of years to vest in the system. In short, there was not yet anything to distribute because [husband] had no entitlement to the benefit.” The trial court indicated that the benefits could be distributed only once they vested; because husband was ten months shy of a full twenty years of service as of the final hearing date, there was nothing to distribute. Following this conference in chambers, the parties entered into an stipulation resolving all outstanding issues. With respect to property division, wife agreed to accept a lump-sum payment of $15,000 and waived any claims to husband’s expected but not-yet-vested military retirement benefit. Wife affirmed on the record her satisfaction with the stipulation, and the trial court incorporated the stipulation into the final divorce decree. The court signed the final order the next day. Wife sought to set aside the stipulated final order for divorce on the ground that she entered into the agreement in reliance on that in-chambers “weather report” in which the trial judge misstated the applicable law. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion in declining to set aside the stipulation, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Coons v. Coons" on Justia Law

The parties in this dispute were the parents of a daughter, born in August 2004. The parties were living in Vermont and obtained a final parentage order in December 2012: Mother was awarded sole legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities; father was awarded significant parent-child contact (PCC). In October 2013, the court granted father’s motion to enforce his parent-child contact. The court warned mother that if she withheld or denied father’s right to contact in the future, it would seriously consider modifying parental rights and responsibilities. The court was persuaded that mother had no ability or disposition to foster a positive relationship and frequent and continuing contact with father, and that it was in the child’s best interests to have frequent and continuing contact with him. In August 2014, mother and daughter moved to Virginia. Father remained in Vermont. By agreement, father was to be provided with PCC during Christmas 2014 and during the early spring and summer of 2015. The Christmas visitation did not occur. In April 2015, father moved to enforce the PCC order. Father asserted that he had been unable to schedule a spring visit because mother refused to tell him where the child lived and which school she attended. In 2015, father filed emergency motions for sanctions and for enforcement, indicating that mother was not cooperating with father's requests. Shortly before father’s second filing, mother asked the court to relinquish jurisdiction over this case to Virginia courts. Mother argued that she and the child no longer had a significant connection to Vermont and that the “center of gravity regarding the child’s care, protection, schooling and personal relationships center fully in Virginia.” Mother appealed the trial court’s imposition of sanctions against her and its denial of her request that Vermont relinquish jurisdiction over this case to Virginia. She argued that the evidence did not support the imposition of sanctions and that the court erred in evaluating her jurisdictional request. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ward v. LaRue" on Justia Law

J.W. was adjudged child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) because his mother would not adequately protect J.W. from father if the child was returned to mother’s care. Mother did not appeal this adjudication, rather father appealed, arguing that the court “usurped the executive role of investigation and prosecution” by taking judicial notice of his criminal record and filings related to a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order that mother obtained against him. He argued that the court’s findings did not support its conclusion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the family court’s order adjudicating her children A.S. and K.S. as children in need of care or supervision (CHINS). On appeal, mother argued that the court erred in looking exclusively at the facts that existed at the time the CHINS petition was filed and ignoring evidence of the changed circumstances at the time of the evidentiary hearing. Finding no reversible error after review of this matter, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.S. and K.S." on Justia Law

This case arose in early July 2012, when the State filed a CHINS (child in need of care and supervision) petition and request for an emergency care order based on concerns about mother’s ability to care for the minor I.B. The parents had a history with Department for Children and Families (DCF); several older children had been previously adjudicated CHINS based on mother’s continuing use of opiates, and their parental rights to the children were ultimately terminated. Father appealed a family court post-disposition order transferring custody of the minor I.B. to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). He argued the court violated his due process rights by: (1) transferring custody without making an express finding of changed circumstances; and (2) applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof. The Court of Appeal took these arguments into consideration, as well as whether the order at issue is a final appealable order. The Court concluded that it was, and affirmed. View "In re I.B." on Justia Law

Husband Walter Lourie argued the family division of the superior court: (1) failed to consider the relevant statutory factors before incorporating the parties’ pretrial separation agreement into the divorce order; (2) erroneously awarded wife Sharlee Lourie an arrears judgment based on their agreement even though the agreement had not been submitted to the court or incorporated into a temporary order prior to the final divorce hearing; and (3) abused its discretion by awarding wife the bulk of the marital estate in addition to a substantial maintenance award. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the divorce decree, but reversed with regard to the maintenance award, property division and judgment of arrears.The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lourie v. Lourie" on Justia Law

Husband Bryan Zink appealed a trial court order denying his request to modify his spousal maintenance obligation and granting wife’s motion to enforce. He argued that the court erred in finding an absence of changed circumstances, and in finding that wife did not agree to accept reduced payments in satisfaction of past spousal maintenance obligations. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. To the extent that the trial court found that husband had failed to prove that wife had agreed to a permanent prospective modification of his spousal maintenance obligation, that finding was supported by the record. The Court did not read the trial court’s decision as addressing the question of whether, when, and to what extent, wife may have forfeited her ability to collect retroactive support payments that would have been due under the divorce order as a result of agreement, waiver, or equitable estoppel. On remand, in connection with wife’s claim for spousal maintenance arrearages, the trial court was mandated to address these questions. View "Zink v. Zink" on Justia Law