Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

M.W. was born in August 2010. M.W. lived with his young parents in the maternal grandparents’ home for several months before moving into an apartment that the maternal grandfather built over a garage located fifty feet from the grandparents’ home. During the approximately three years that the parents lived there, the mother and her parents were M.W.’s primary caregivers, as father worked two jobs and was away from the home much of the time. In 2013, father was arrested and charged with four counts of aggravated sexual assault on minors under the age of thirteen and four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. Father was also charged with two counts of obstructing justice, one count of violating an abuse prevention order, and one count of violating conditions of release. M.W. was not the putative victim of any of the charged crimes. Ten of the twelve counts were felonies, the most serious of which (aggravated sexual assault on a minor under the age of thirteen) had a potential life sentence with a mandatory minimum of ten years to serve. The lewd-and-lascivious-conduct counts had a mandatory minimum sentence of two years to serve. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) substantiated father for abuse based on the conduct that led to the criminal charges. Father administratively appealed the substantiation, and that appeal was stayed pending resolution of the criminal charges. In the meantime, a petition was filed to terminate his parental rights as to M.W. He appealed a superior court order that ultimately terminated those rights, contending that an extended pre-trial incarceration could not support the family court’s termination order. Finding no reversible error as to the termination petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

M.W. was born in August 2010. M.W. lived with his young parents in the maternal grandparents’ home for several months before moving into an apartment that the maternal grandfather built over a garage located fifty feet from the grandparents’ home. During the approximately three years that the parents lived there, the mother and her parents were M.W.’s primary caregivers, as father worked two jobs and was away from the home much of the time. In 2013, father was arrested and charged with four counts of aggravated sexual assault on minors under the age of thirteen and four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. Father was also charged with two counts of obstructing justice, one count of violating an abuse prevention order, and one count of violating conditions of release. M.W. was not the putative victim of any of the charged crimes. Ten of the twelve counts were felonies, the most serious of which (aggravated sexual assault on a minor under the age of thirteen) had a potential life sentence with a mandatory minimum of ten years to serve. The lewd-and-lascivious-conduct counts had a mandatory minimum sentence of two years to serve. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) substantiated father for abuse based on the conduct that led to the criminal charges. Father administratively appealed the substantiation, and that appeal was stayed pending resolution of the criminal charges. In the meantime, a petition was filed to terminate his parental rights as to M.W. He appealed a superior court order that ultimately terminated those rights, contending that an extended pre-trial incarceration could not support the family court’s termination order. Finding no reversible error as to the termination petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

A father appealed a superior court order terminating his parental rights with respect to his two children, A.M. and T.M. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the State failed to meet its threshold burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that sufficient changed circumstances existed to modify the previous disposition order establishing concurrent goals of reunification and adoption. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re T.M. and A.M." on Justia Law

Mother appealed a superior court order adjudicating the minors J.C. and T.F. to be children in need of care and supervision (CHINS). An in-home service provider with the Early Head Start program who visited the family on several occasions in 2014 observed a number of cruel and abusive interactions between mother and her stepdaughter K.P. Based on the Head Start provider’s report, a social worker with the Department for Children and Families also visited the home. She observed that mother appeared to be stressed, overwhelmed, and agitated throughout the visits, noted the cruel treatment of K.P., and also observed an incident in which mother grabbed J.C. by the arms and forced the child onto a couch. Mother testified that she regularly suffered from depression, and had been prescribed medication but was not taking it. Father testified about his own extensive history of drug abuse and struggles to stay clean and sober. Although his work kept him away from the home for much of the time, he testified that he had no concerns about mother’s treatment of the children. The court concluded that mother had emotionally and physically abused K.P., and further concluded that the evidence demonstrated mother’s general inability to properly care for J.C. and T.F. and her need for parenting education. The court noted father’s need for continued substance abuse treatment. Based on these conclusions, the court adjudicated both children to be CHINS, and set the matter for a disposition hearing. This appeal by mother followed. Mother argued that the evidence and findings failed to support the judgment, and that the court’s findings were conclusory and inadequate. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re J.C. & T.F., Juveniles" on Justia Law

Pro se defendant Justin Gonyo appealed a family court order adjudicating nonparentage. The child at the center of this matter was born in 2011. Shortly thereafter, the child’s mother and defendant filed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Parentage (VAP) form with the Department of Health, Agency of Human Services. Both parties signed the form, which stated that they “voluntarily and without coercion, and of our own free will, hereby acknowledge that we are the biological parents of the child” and understand and accept “the legal rights and responsibilities that come with being a parent,” including rights to custody, visitation, and notice before the child may be adopted. The child’s birth certificate identified mother and defendant as the child’s parents. Mother and defendant separated in 2012. About a year later, in October 2013, the Office of Child Support (OCS) filed a Complaint for Support and Recovery of Debt, together with a “Motion for Genetic Testing Despite Parentage Presumption.” The motion alleged that, despite the presumption of parentage arising from the VAP, there were grounds to believe that defendant was not the biological father based on mother’s affidavit naming another individual as the biological father, and stating that she was already fourteen weeks pregnant when she and defendant got together. The following month, defendant filed a pro se pleading in which he opposed the motion for genetic testing and asked the court “to grant [him] a parentage order of the child.” Defendant acknowledged that he was not the child’s biological father and was aware of this when he signed the VAP, but claimed that there was “nothing wrong” with doing so, and that the time for rescinding it had expired. Defendant followed with a more formal motion to establish parentage in December 2013. In the meantime, the family court granted the motion for genetic testing, which took place in early January 2014. The test excluded defendant as the child’s biological father. Mother later filed a pro se motion to dismiss defendant’s parentage action, and OCS moved to set aside the VAP and to set the matter for a hearing. In February 2014, the family court issued a summary “order of non-parentage” based on the genetic test, dismissed defendant’s parentage action, and ordered the case closed. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that undisputed facts supported a motion to set aside the acknowledgment of paternity as a fraud on the court, and affirmed the judgment of nonparentage as to defendant on that basis. View "McGee v. Gonyo" on Justia Law

In September 2012, a four-day hearing was held on father’s petition on behalf of the child for a final relief-from-abuse order against mother, as well as on mother’s cross-motion to modify parental rights and contact. According to father, in May 2012, the child related that over the prior few months, mother and her boyfriend had sexually abused him. Mother vigorously denied the allegations. The court found that, taking all of the credible evidence into consideration, father failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that mother abused the child. It thus denied his request for a final restraining order. As to mother’s motion, the court found that the ongoing dispute between parents had not abated over the years. Mother had created a website in which she posted intensely critical tirades about father. The court found that mother’s behavior impaired the child’s ability to have a good relationship with the three adult caregivers in his life. The court also had concerns about mother’s parenting skills based on her in-court demeanor. The court did not believe that the child was deliberately lying about the alleged assaults, but concluded that he was making extraordinarily serious and very negative statements about mother because he lacked the ability to cope with mother’s evident hatred of father, and he wanted it to stop. Mother, acting pro se, appealed a trial court order on the parents’ cross-motions concerning their son. Father moved to terminate efforts to reestablish parent-child contact with mother, and mother moved to modify parental rights and responsibilities. The court denied mother’s motion to modify, and it did not allow mother any rights of parent-child contact until August 2016, unless the child’s trauma therapist recommended contact earlier. Mother argued that the court’s findings were inadequate, and that the findings did not support the court’s conclusion. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion, and affirmed. View "Knutsen v. Cegalis" on Justia Law

M.M. was born in September 2006; C.M. was born on June 25, 2014. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) began working with mother in June 2012. On June 25, 2014, DCF filed a petition alleging that M.M. and C.M. were children in need of care or supervision (CHINS). The parties agreed to a conditional care order with mother retaining custody subject to extensive conditions. Father was incarcerated at the time. Following a January 2015 merits hearing, the court found the children to be CHINS. Mother appealed the trial court’s order finding M.M. and C.M. to be CHINS. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the record supported the court’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.M. and C.M." on Justia Law

This case arose from a divorce proceeding between plaintiff Kenneth Felis and his former wife, Vicki. Defendant Downs Rachlin Martin, PLLC (DRM) represented Vicki Felis in the divorce proceeding, and defendant Gallagher, Flynn & Company, LLP (GFC) was retained by DRM on behalf of Ms. Felis to prepare business valuations related to the proceeding. Plaintiff appealed the Superior Court decision to grant defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty based on DRM’s representation of Ms. Felis. GFC cross-appealed the superior court’s denial of its motion to strike pursuant to 12 V.S.A. 1041. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Felis v. Downs Rachlin Martin, PLLC" on Justia Law

M.O. was born on December 14, 2014. Mother was twenty-one years old at the time; father was thirty-four. On December 17, 2014, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that M.O. was child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). It sought emergency custody of the child. In the accompanying affidavit, a DCF social worker asserted that DCF had received a report from hospital staff expressing concern about parents' ability to adequately care for M.O. The court issued an emergency care order on December 17, 2014, and transferred temporary custody to DCF. On appeal of the trial court's finding, the father argued the trial court's findings were too vague to support its conclusion that M.O. was CHINS. He asserted that, at most, the court's findings reflected speculation that there was a potential higher risk of harm to M.O. because M.O.'s parents had unidentified "risk factors." According to father, there was nothing in the court's findings about the prenatal nurse visits or the hospital social worker's testimony that would establish the basis for a CHINS finding. Father maintained that a potential risk of harm to M.O. was not enough. Father also contended that the court failed to make sufficient findings to enable the Vermont Supreme Court to review its decision. The Supreme Court, after review, disagreed and affirmed. "We emphasize that, contrary to father's characterization of the facts, the evidence here suggests something far more serious than garden-variety new-parent jitters. Even after many months of prenatal coaching, mother was not attuned to M.O.'s cues, and could not perform basic parenting tasks such as holding the baby, feeding the baby, and checking and changing the baby's diaper. And the evidence before the court was that simple coaching of mother by professionals in the hospital would not be enough to ensure M.O.'s safety. … The trial court did not base its determination on any presumptions arising from mother's self-described learning disability, or her observed cognitive limitations. It based its determination on her observed parenting ability." The Court considered all of father's other arguments and found them to be without merit. View "In re M.O." on Justia Law

The estate of husband, William E. Simendinger, appealed an injunction order by the Superior Court that encumbered all real property held by the estate. Husband's estate also challenged the family court's award of attorney's fees. Wife Connie Simendinger and husband were married in 1987. They divorced in 2014. The final order and decree of divorce incorporated a stipulation between the parties, which provided in pertinent part that in lieu of alimony, the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $2,250,000 ($50,000 within 30 days and the balance of $2,200,000 in one year). This amount was secured by real estate, and had been owned solely by the husband, free and clear of all mortgages. Wife received the $50,000, but husband did not subsequently pay the $2.2 million balance or secure the unpaid amount in real estate. After the thirty-day deadline passed, wife filed a motion for contempt and enforcement, as well as a motion for attorney's fees. The family court set a hearing date for August 2014 to determine how best to proceed. The decree nisi became absolute on May 3, 2014. Then husband died unexpectedly on July 14. His estate was substituted as party. The family court denied the contempt motion, and enjoined the estate from disposing or otherwise encumbering any real estate that might be subject to the divorce decree stipulation. On appeal, husband's estate argued that the family court abused its discretion by: (1) issuing an injunction against husband's estate absent a hearing to show that husband had violated a court order; (2) including certain "business properties" within the scope of the injunction; and (3) awarding attorney's fees to wife without first clearly establishing a factual basis to support an award of attorney's fees. Upon review of the family court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "Simendinger v. Simendinger" on Justia Law