Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pro se defendant Justin Gonyo appealed a family court order adjudicating nonparentage. The child at the center of this matter was born in 2011. Shortly thereafter, the child’s mother and defendant filed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Parentage (VAP) form with the Department of Health, Agency of Human Services. Both parties signed the form, which stated that they “voluntarily and without coercion, and of our own free will, hereby acknowledge that we are the biological parents of the child” and understand and accept “the legal rights and responsibilities that come with being a parent,” including rights to custody, visitation, and notice before the child may be adopted. The child’s birth certificate identified mother and defendant as the child’s parents. Mother and defendant separated in 2012. About a year later, in October 2013, the Office of Child Support (OCS) filed a Complaint for Support and Recovery of Debt, together with a “Motion for Genetic Testing Despite Parentage Presumption.” The motion alleged that, despite the presumption of parentage arising from the VAP, there were grounds to believe that defendant was not the biological father based on mother’s affidavit naming another individual as the biological father, and stating that she was already fourteen weeks pregnant when she and defendant got together. The following month, defendant filed a pro se pleading in which he opposed the motion for genetic testing and asked the court “to grant [him] a parentage order of the child.” Defendant acknowledged that he was not the child’s biological father and was aware of this when he signed the VAP, but claimed that there was “nothing wrong” with doing so, and that the time for rescinding it had expired. Defendant followed with a more formal motion to establish parentage in December 2013. In the meantime, the family court granted the motion for genetic testing, which took place in early January 2014. The test excluded defendant as the child’s biological father. Mother later filed a pro se motion to dismiss defendant’s parentage action, and OCS moved to set aside the VAP and to set the matter for a hearing. In February 2014, the family court issued a summary “order of non-parentage” based on the genetic test, dismissed defendant’s parentage action, and ordered the case closed. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that undisputed facts supported a motion to set aside the acknowledgment of paternity as a fraud on the court, and affirmed the judgment of nonparentage as to defendant on that basis. View "McGee v. Gonyo" on Justia Law

In September 2012, a four-day hearing was held on father’s petition on behalf of the child for a final relief-from-abuse order against mother, as well as on mother’s cross-motion to modify parental rights and contact. According to father, in May 2012, the child related that over the prior few months, mother and her boyfriend had sexually abused him. Mother vigorously denied the allegations. The court found that, taking all of the credible evidence into consideration, father failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that mother abused the child. It thus denied his request for a final restraining order. As to mother’s motion, the court found that the ongoing dispute between parents had not abated over the years. Mother had created a website in which she posted intensely critical tirades about father. The court found that mother’s behavior impaired the child’s ability to have a good relationship with the three adult caregivers in his life. The court also had concerns about mother’s parenting skills based on her in-court demeanor. The court did not believe that the child was deliberately lying about the alleged assaults, but concluded that he was making extraordinarily serious and very negative statements about mother because he lacked the ability to cope with mother’s evident hatred of father, and he wanted it to stop. Mother, acting pro se, appealed a trial court order on the parents’ cross-motions concerning their son. Father moved to terminate efforts to reestablish parent-child contact with mother, and mother moved to modify parental rights and responsibilities. The court denied mother’s motion to modify, and it did not allow mother any rights of parent-child contact until August 2016, unless the child’s trauma therapist recommended contact earlier. Mother argued that the court’s findings were inadequate, and that the findings did not support the court’s conclusion. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion, and affirmed. View "Knutsen v. Cegalis" on Justia Law

M.M. was born in September 2006; C.M. was born on June 25, 2014. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) began working with mother in June 2012. On June 25, 2014, DCF filed a petition alleging that M.M. and C.M. were children in need of care or supervision (CHINS). The parties agreed to a conditional care order with mother retaining custody subject to extensive conditions. Father was incarcerated at the time. Following a January 2015 merits hearing, the court found the children to be CHINS. Mother appealed the trial court’s order finding M.M. and C.M. to be CHINS. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the record supported the court’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.M. and C.M." on Justia Law

This case arose from a divorce proceeding between plaintiff Kenneth Felis and his former wife, Vicki. Defendant Downs Rachlin Martin, PLLC (DRM) represented Vicki Felis in the divorce proceeding, and defendant Gallagher, Flynn & Company, LLP (GFC) was retained by DRM on behalf of Ms. Felis to prepare business valuations related to the proceeding. Plaintiff appealed the Superior Court decision to grant defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty based on DRM’s representation of Ms. Felis. GFC cross-appealed the superior court’s denial of its motion to strike pursuant to 12 V.S.A. 1041. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Felis v. Downs Rachlin Martin, PLLC" on Justia Law

M.O. was born on December 14, 2014. Mother was twenty-one years old at the time; father was thirty-four. On December 17, 2014, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that M.O. was child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). It sought emergency custody of the child. In the accompanying affidavit, a DCF social worker asserted that DCF had received a report from hospital staff expressing concern about parents' ability to adequately care for M.O. The court issued an emergency care order on December 17, 2014, and transferred temporary custody to DCF. On appeal of the trial court's finding, the father argued the trial court's findings were too vague to support its conclusion that M.O. was CHINS. He asserted that, at most, the court's findings reflected speculation that there was a potential higher risk of harm to M.O. because M.O.'s parents had unidentified "risk factors." According to father, there was nothing in the court's findings about the prenatal nurse visits or the hospital social worker's testimony that would establish the basis for a CHINS finding. Father maintained that a potential risk of harm to M.O. was not enough. Father also contended that the court failed to make sufficient findings to enable the Vermont Supreme Court to review its decision. The Supreme Court, after review, disagreed and affirmed. "We emphasize that, contrary to father's characterization of the facts, the evidence here suggests something far more serious than garden-variety new-parent jitters. Even after many months of prenatal coaching, mother was not attuned to M.O.'s cues, and could not perform basic parenting tasks such as holding the baby, feeding the baby, and checking and changing the baby's diaper. And the evidence before the court was that simple coaching of mother by professionals in the hospital would not be enough to ensure M.O.'s safety. … The trial court did not base its determination on any presumptions arising from mother's self-described learning disability, or her observed cognitive limitations. It based its determination on her observed parenting ability." The Court considered all of father's other arguments and found them to be without merit. View "In re M.O." on Justia Law

The estate of husband, William E. Simendinger, appealed an injunction order by the Superior Court that encumbered all real property held by the estate. Husband's estate also challenged the family court's award of attorney's fees. Wife Connie Simendinger and husband were married in 1987. They divorced in 2014. The final order and decree of divorce incorporated a stipulation between the parties, which provided in pertinent part that in lieu of alimony, the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $2,250,000 ($50,000 within 30 days and the balance of $2,200,000 in one year). This amount was secured by real estate, and had been owned solely by the husband, free and clear of all mortgages. Wife received the $50,000, but husband did not subsequently pay the $2.2 million balance or secure the unpaid amount in real estate. After the thirty-day deadline passed, wife filed a motion for contempt and enforcement, as well as a motion for attorney's fees. The family court set a hearing date for August 2014 to determine how best to proceed. The decree nisi became absolute on May 3, 2014. Then husband died unexpectedly on July 14. His estate was substituted as party. The family court denied the contempt motion, and enjoined the estate from disposing or otherwise encumbering any real estate that might be subject to the divorce decree stipulation. On appeal, husband's estate argued that the family court abused its discretion by: (1) issuing an injunction against husband's estate absent a hearing to show that husband had violated a court order; (2) including certain "business properties" within the scope of the injunction; and (3) awarding attorney's fees to wife without first clearly establishing a factual basis to support an award of attorney's fees. Upon review of the family court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "Simendinger v. Simendinger" on Justia Law

A.M. was born in October 2011 to parents who admitted to their struggle with substance abuse. A.M. was taken into emergency DCF custody in June 2013. In its petition alleging that A.M. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS), DCF indicated that A.M. had been found in a motel room with parents in the presence of heroin and drug paraphernalia. The court issued a temporary-care order on June 4, 2013 transferring temporary legal custody of the child to DCF, and A.M. was placed with his maternal grandmother. A.M.'s Mother appealed the trial court’s disposition order continuing legal custody of the minor child A.M. with the Department for Children and Families (DCF). She argued that the court erred by failing to take evidence on whether the disposition plan should be amended to include reunification with A.M.’s maternal grandmother as a third concurrent goal. Mother contended that the court should not have taken judicial notice of a prior ruling concerning grandmother’s unsuitability to provide even temporary care for A.M. Based on these assertions, mother argued that the court’s order was unsupported by any findings. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

R.B. was born in September 2008; O.B. in December 2009; and K.C. in September 2011. In August 2012, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that the children were in need of care or supervision (CHINS) because they were without proper parental care. The court found it best to place the children with relatives if possible, and determined that the children's father's cousin Kristin and her wife Tammy Hall could take proper care of the children, at least in the short run, while work was done on a disposition plan. It was ultimately recommended that the children be placed for adoption, and the parental rights to both parents be terminated. The trial court found that Mother suffered from Munchausen’s disorder and Munchausen’s disorder by proxy. The court could not find that mother was likely to recover from these disorders at any particular time. It found no reasonable probability that mother could resume her parental duties within a reasonable period of time. Father was unwilling or unable to take over responsibility for the children’s medical care and appointments and ensure that recommendations and plans provided by DCF were implemented. As of the date of the TPR hearing, father continued to live with mother and had not developed the parenting and other skills needed to care for the children safely. It would be impossible, the court explained, for father to care for mother, protect the children, meet all of their needs, and support the family. Father was unemployed at the time of the hearing, although he was receiving some money for his work as a caretaker for mother. The parties received state benefits, which were barely sufficient to meet their financial needs. Finding no abuse of discretion in terminating the parents' rights to the three children, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination decision. View "In re R.B., O.B. and K.C." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the parent-child contact and property division orders in a final divorce decree that assign her sole parental rights and responsibilities with regard to the parties' children. On appeal, she argued that the trial court was bound to consider findings of fact made by the presiding magistrate at a temporary hearing and that the court's findings did not support its conclusions. After consideration of the trial court's decision, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that at the final hearing the trial court was not bound to consider the findings from the temporary hearing and that its decision regarding parent-child contact was clearly supported by the evidence. Mother's other arguments failed because there was no clear error in the court's findings, and the findings reasonably support the court's conclusions. View "Frazer v. Olson" on Justia Law

In this parentage action, the family court, in a 2006 order based on the parties' stipulation, assigned physical rights and responsibilities to mother and ordered father to pay mother $175 per month in child support. Because the new order contemplated that the minor child would spend well over thirty percent of nights with father, the parties stipulated to a new child-support order pursuant to the shared custody guidelines. In November 2008, after father was disabled in a motor vehicle accident, the family court issued a modified child-support order, again based on the parties' stipulation, that did not require either party to pay child support. In November 2010, mother, as representative payee, received from the Social Security Administration a $4370 lump-sum derivative disability benefit for the parties' son representing a twenty-three-month period between when father applied for and was granted the derivative benefit. The ongoing derivative benefit was initially $190 per month and had increased "modestly" since then. In a second appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, father argued that the magistrate and the family division of the superior court erred on remand by not awarding him a credit for the entire lump-sum derivative Social Security Disability Insurance benefit given to mother as representative payee for the parties' son, by not imputing income to mother, and by granting mother a deviation from the child-support guidelines calculations. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "LaMothe v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law