Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In February 2004, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) determined that petitioner K.R. placed her son T.F. at risk of harm, and it included her name on the Child Protection Registry. This determination followed a reported 2003 overdose on a controlled substance. In 2011, an independent administrative reviewer accepted the substantiation, and the Human Services Board upheld this decision. In its review, the Board found the social worker's testimony credible in setting out DCF's history with petitioner, DCF's concerns about petitioner's drug use, and the reasons for the substantiation. The social worker also kept contemporaneous case notes detailing the history of her interactions with petitioner, which the Board found corroborated her testimony. Petitioner argued to the Board that DCF failed to meet its burden of proof. She asserted that any information regarding her interactions with DCF after the 2003 overdose were irrelevant pursuant to Vermont case law. She stated that she did not place T.F. at risk of harm because he was not in her care on the day that she overdosed. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that that the hearing officer impermissibly found that "the Board can take notice of information documenting the effects on those using Oxycontin including impaired judgment," and that those effects "can compromise a person's ability to parent resulting in placing a child at risk of harm." She contended that the mere use of illegally obtained regulated drugs could be a per se ground for substantiation. The only order on appeal was that issued by the Board, and the Board expressly declined to adopt the finding that petitioner challenged on appeal before the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found the Board's findings did not support its decision: without any evidence that T.F. was actually at risk, petitioner could not be found to have failed to mitigate a risk to her child by failing to comply with DCF's recommendations. Th View "In re K.R." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case centered on a father's obligation to pay college tuition for his daughters pursuant to a Pennsylvania child-support order. The parties, father Frank A. Scopetti, Jr., and mother Kimberley Marie Scopetti, were married in Pennsylvania and had two daughters. They entered into a separation agreement in 1998, when their elder daughter, Indie, was six years old, and their younger daughter, Francesca, was five years old. The separation agreement was a two-page, handwritten document. Paragraph 4 of the agreement provided: "Frank Scopetti agrees to provide college tuition for Francesca and Indie [at] an institution acceptable to Frank Scopetti." The separation agreement was incorporated into a final decree of divorce issued in Pennsylvania in 2000. Following the parties' divorce, mother and the daughters moved to Vermont, and father moved to Arizona. On September 28, 2010, mother registered the parties' Pennsylvania support order in Vermont. That fall, Indie began studying at George Mason University (GMU) in Virginia. During the 2010-11 school year, father paid only a portion of Indie's tuition. Father appeals the trial-court order requiring him to pay specified college-tuition costs for his two daughters. After review of the trial court order, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Dyke v. Scopetti" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a family division superior court decision terminating her parental rights with respect to her son, C.F. She argued that the decision, which was based in part on the family division's view that C.F. had an immediate need for permanency, was irrational in light of the court's contemporaneous decision not to terminate the parental rights of C.F.'s father.. Although C.F. originally filed the termination petition, which was later joined by the Department for Children and Families (DCF), and did not appeal the family division's decision to terminate mother's parental rights, he also filed a brief asking the Vermont Supreme Court to reverse that decision based on the court's failure to solicit the opinions of C.F.'s attorney and guardian ad litem (GAL) at the termination hearing. Finding no reversible errors, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re C.F." on Justia Law

Mother appealed a superior court (family division) order finding that her five-year-old son, M.K., was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) based on a single incident of abuse. She argued that the CHINS determination must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to prove the allegation of abuse. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.K." on Justia Law

The primary issue in this case involved the rights of a former mother-in-law whose property interests were purportedly adjudicated in the final divorce decree between her son and his former wife in an action to which she was not a party. Appellant-former-wife Tammy Barrup appealed an order modifying a final property-division order to account for the recorded interest of her former mother-in-law in property that was purportedly divided in the final divorce decree, and also modifying spousal maintenance. The intervenor, the former mother-in-law Marilyn Barrup, cross-appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, and affirmed the outcome. View "Barrup v. Barrup" on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, defendant Christopher Moreau challenged the Washington family court's dismissal of his emergency petition for child custody and parentage complaint over children with whom he shares no biological or other established legal connection, as well as the Caledonia family court’s issuance of a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order denying him visitation with the children. Defendant contended that he was the children's de facto parent and entitled to assert and be heard on custody, parentage and visitation rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with defendant's arguments and affirmed the family courts' decisions. View "Moreau v. Sylvester" on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant Richard Hardie borrowed money from Brattleboro Savings & Loan Association in order to purchase a vacation home in Weathersfield. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the property and included a "second home rider" clause, asserting that the property was not a primary residence. Hardie was married to intervenor-appellee Lisa Mangini at the time, but was the sole owner of the property, and Mangini did not sign either the promissory note or the mortgage. Hardie twice refinanced the property without Mangini's participation, both with second home riders. By 2007, Hardie and Mangini's marriage was deteriorating. Mangini left the couple's New Jersey home and moved into the Weathersfield property. In 2008, Mangini filed for divorce in Vermont. In her divorce filing, Mangini claimed that the property had become her primary residence as of May 2007. Also in the divorce filing, Mangini requested "an award of the Weathersfield home and the adjoining land either without any encumbrances, or, in the alternative, that [Hardie] be responsible for paying off and releasing the mortgage[] to [Brattleboro Savings]." While Mangini was occupying the property and the divorce was pending, Hardie refinanced the mortgage on the Weathersfield property. The 2008 refinancing was completed without Mangini's participation, and Hardie again claimed that the property was a second home. In 2011, Brattleboro Savings commenced a foreclosure action on the property, naming only Hardie as a defendant. Despite not being named in the foreclosure case, Mangini filed an answer asserting an affirmative defense that she had established a homestead interest in the property prior to the 2008 mortgage, and that therefore the 2008 mortgage was "inoperative to convey" her homestead interest. Brattleboro Savings filed two motions for summary judgment, one requesting a foreclosure judgment against Hardie and the second seeking judgment against Mangini on her homestead claim. Mangini filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, detailing for the first time her claim that she had acquired an equitable interest in the property by her divorce filing. Brattleboro Savings appealed a superior court's decision denying its motions for summary judgment and granting Mangini's cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that Mangini held title to the Weathersfield property free and clear of a mortgage to plaintiff. The superior court ruled that the mortgage was inoperative because Hardie, mortgaged the property without the participation of Mangini in violation of 27 V.S.A. section 141(a). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of Mangini's motion for summary judgment and the denial of Brattleboro Saving's motions for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Brattleboro Savings & Loan Assn. v. Hardie, et al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal stems from a final judgment of divorce: whether, as husband contended, the trial court erred in its division of the marital estate by including an offset for the disparity in value between the parties' projected Social Security retirement benefits. The parties did not agree on the assets to be included in the marital estate. Wife submitted a list of assets with a total value of $1,152,325.86, including $88,158 identified as the difference between the present value of husband's and wife's projected Social Security benefits. The value was determined by wife's accountant and credited toward husband's suggested share of the marital estate, with a corresponding offset in value for wife. Wife proposed that she be awarded either sixty percent of the value of the entire estate plus spousal maintenance, or eighty percent without maintenance. Husband submitted a separate list of marital assets which totaled $978,504 and did not include the Social Security differential. Husband proposed an award to wife of sixty percent of the value of the estate plus rehabilitative maintenance for a period of several years. In its written ruling, the trial court found that wife's proposed property division was "a reasonable one" and gave her the option of choosing either the eighty/twenty division that she had proposed or an award of sixty percent plus maintenance until she reached the age of sixty-seven. Wife subsequently opted for the higher percentage of the marital estate without the maintenance, and the trial court entered a final judgment consistent with that choice and with wife's proposed division. Husband's two subsequent motions to reconsider were denied. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in treating the parties' respective anticipated Social Security benefits as assets of the marital estate, reducing them to a purported present value, allocating the differential to husband, and awarding wife a direct offset on account. "Omitting the value of these benefits only marginally affects the marital estate, valued at over $1 million, and we therefore remand for the trial court to recalculate the award pursuant to the original percentage division of eighty percent for wife and twenty percent for husband."View "Manning v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Neal Fox’s brother adopted defendant Eugene Fox when defendant was an infant. On April 6, 2012, defendant, a New Hampshire resident in his sixties, and plaintiff, a Vermont resident, attended a probate court hearing in Manchester, New Hampshire. After the hearing, defendant followed plaintiff to his car and proceeded to punch, kick, and step on plaintiff. Plaintiff was hospitalized as a result of the encounter. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in the context of a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order. Nonresident defendant appeals the family court order granting plaintiff’s request for a final RFA order. Defendant argued: (1) the family court lacked personal jurisdiction over him to issue the final order; (2) defendant and plaintiff were not family members for purposes of the domestic abuse prevention statute; (3) plaintiff failed to establish that a final RFA order was necessary; and (4) the court erred in finding that defendant engaged in stalking, as defined in Vermont’s stalking statute. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a final RFA order, and reversed. View "Fox v. Fox" on Justia Law

The father of L.M. appealed the trial court's finding L.M. to be a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). He raised numerous arguments. The Supreme Court found that while father's unstable living situation, standing alone, might not be sufficient to support a CHINS determination, there were multiple elements of risk under the facts of this case leading to the trial court's conclusion that father and L.M. could end up in an unsafe living situation. Furthermore, father's inability to follow through on recommendations designed to promote L.M.'s safety enhanced the potential risk of harm to L.M.'s well-being. Given these factors, including mother's concession, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court record supported the decision that there was a risk of prospective harm to the child sufficient to justify the State’s temporary intervention to ensure that L.M. was safe. View "In re L.M." on Justia Law