Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals of a termination-of-parental-rights judgment, appointed counsel for the appellant parent moved to withdraw on the ground that continued representation was barred by Rule 3.1 of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon review of the attorney's brief on the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that, absent client consent, a motion to withdraw by appointed appellate counsel in termination proceedings will generally not be granted, and therefore denied the motions.View "In re S.C." on Justia Law

Mother appealed a trial court’s final divorce order. She asserted that the court erred in granting the parties a divorce because the statutory requirements for divorce were not satisfied. She also challenged the court’s award of primary legal and physical custody of the parties’ five children (including her son, but father’s stepchild) to father. Lastly, she argued that the court abused its discretion in its award of parent-child contact. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s order in all respects with the exception of its decision to award father primary parental rights and responsibilities in his stepchild. On this issue, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "LeBlanc v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 1981. In 1998, husband retired from the United States Army after almost twenty-two years of service. About two years later, the parties were divorced in Vermont pursuant to a stipulated judgment. The judgment provided that husband’s military pension “shall be shared by the parties as a portion of their marital property” where, as pertinent to this case, Wife would receive 41.8% of husband’s total army pension as marital property. The DFAS thereafter garnished wife’s share of the pension and paid it directly to her. In 2009, eleven years after husband’s retirement and nine years after the parties’ divorce, he was recalled from retirement to serve as a military instructor in the ROTC program at the University of New Hampshire. He was discharged from the military in 2012, after three years in this position. During the three years of husband’s recall, his pension benefits were suspended so that neither he nor wife received any benefits. Husband’s additional service resulted in an increase in his monthly pension benefit. When contacted by husband, the DFAS indicated that it would continue to pay wife 41.8 percent of the benefit, as provided in the divorce judgment, resulting in an increase in the total amount of her payment. Husband then filed a motion to amend his support obligation, asserting that payment of the “straight percentage” provided in the divorce judgment would result in “over-payments” to wife. He proposed modified language that wife’s payment would to be calculated based on husband’s completed service at the time of the divorce. The trial court denied the husband's motion. Husband appealed, arguing: the trial court abused its discretion in: (1) denying the motion, and (2) failing to hold a hearing on the merits. The Supreme Court reversed. "[T]his is not a case where [. . .] the parties’ intentions about husband’s post-divorce service were “inescapably speculative,” as one might reasonably conclude in the more typical divorce situation involving the division of a spouse’s pension who was still employed at the time of the divorce." The case was remanded to afford the parties a hearing to address whether the modification sought by husband was absolutely necessary to “prevent hardship or injustice.” View "Spencer v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Husband Gilles Richard appealed a family court order awarding wife Ellen Richard interest on a payment due under the final divorce decree. Husband argued that the award of interest was an impermissible modification of the final decree. Pursuant to the final divorce judgment, husband had a fixed obligation to pay wife $11,500 in cash or through QDRO, and any delay in payment was subject to interest by operation of law. "The trial court’s approach to ordering the statutorily due interest in this case was admittedly confusing - the court purported to add a 'clarifying' provision to the final divorce decree, but the clarifying language was nothing more than a statement of the law that applies to post-judgment interest even without the 'addition' to the decree." The trial court did not substantively modify its final property division after the fact; the language it purported to add to the final order was entirely redundant. The trial court’s ruling was not a substantive modification at all; the final order had the exact same implications for husband’s obligation to pay, the timing of that obligation, and his liability for interest after the trial court’s order as before. To the extent that husband argued that the absence of any reference to interest in the final divorce decree reflects “an implied ruling that no interest would accrue prior to transfer,” regardless of husband’s delay in making that transfer, the argument is squarely at odds with well-established law providing for post-judgment interest on fixed obligations. View "Richard v. Richard" on Justia Law

Husband appealed the trial court’s final divorce order. He argued the court erred by including certain items as part of the marital estate, awarding wife a disproportionate share of the marital estate, and failing to award him maintenance. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion with respect to "the Danby property," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case so that the trial court could further consider the Danby property under the appropriate statutory provision. Given that the case was remanded, the Court did not reach husband’s final argument that the court’s distribution of marital property unfairly favored wife. View "Coburn v. Cook" on Justia Law

Mother and father were in a long-distance relationship for several years, throughout which mother lived in Vermont and father in Florida. In 2006, the parties had a child together. Although they never lived together as a family, parents continued taking regular trips with the child to visit each other until 2010, when they ended their relationship and mother filed a parentage action. Following the superior court’s amendment of a parent-child contact order, and in response to a child support order remanded to the magistrate by the superior court, appellant mother sought to overturn the superior court’s amendment and raised a number of issues with both the superior court and the magistrate’s treatment of father’s income for child support purposes. Upon review of the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s amended parent-child contact order and dismissed mother’s appeal of issues regarding the child support order. View "Patnode v. Urette" on Justia Law

Mark, the father of D.S., and Todd, the father of M.H., appealed the trial court’s order terminating their residual parental rights. The children shared the same mother. Both fathers had extensive criminal records and were incarcerated for most of their children’s lives. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) became involved with the family in December 2008 based on concerns of substance abuse, sexualized behavior, domestic violence, and neglect. In January 2012, the children were taken into custody pursuant to an emergency care order. At the time of the termination hearings, the court found that neither father played constructive roles in their children's lives. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of parental rights. View "In re D.S., In re M.H." on Justia Law

Father appealed a trial court’s order adjudicating B.R. a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). He argued that the court’s decision was not supported by evidence. B.R. was born in November 2012. On Monday, March 4, 2013, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that B.R. was CHINS, and it obtained an emergency care order. Shortly before the CHINS petition was filed, an affidavit was filed describing the circumstances surrounding mother’s March 1, 2013, arrest for driving under the influence of drugs with her two older children in the car; mother’s statements to the arresting officers about being stopped the day before for possessing a methadone pill and crystal methamphetamine, drugs that she stated belonged to father; mother’s admission to the arresting officers that she had cooked methamphetamine with father at the family’s home the night before her DUI arrest; mother’s concern at that time about B.R.’s welfare in father’s care, and her fears that father had taken the three-month-old child to a "meth house" in New York; and mother’s subsequent statements to police on Saturday, March 2, that she had retrieved B.R. from a "meth house" in New York where father had taken him. Finding sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.R." on Justia Law

"Belle" is an eleven-year-old German wirehaired pointer who was greatly loved by husband and wife. The parties had no minor children, and they were able to reach an agreement on the division of their property and other financial issues - except for Belle. They came to the final hearing for a ruling on which one of them would receive the dog in the divorce decree. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court awarded the dog to husband. It found that either party would provide the dog with a good life, but gave a slight edge to husband because the dog was accustomed to the routine of going to the clinic every day. The court balanced that factor against the dog’s familiarity with the marital home, which the parties agreed wife would receive as part of the property settlement. It found that husband "treats the dog like a dog," while wife is more doting and treats the dog like a child. The court concluded that the dog would do better with husband’s balanced attitude towards the animal. On appeal, wife claimed that the court erred in refusing to consider allocating the dog to both spouses in a joint arrangement. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court decision on two grounds: (1) the factors identified and considered by the court in allocating the dog were appropriate; and (2) the family division cannot enforce a visitation or shared custody order for animals: "[t]he court need not specify the weight given to each factor, but is required only to provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why." View "Hament v. Baker" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the family division had exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of marital property acquired during a marriage that ended in annulment. In 2011, wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Family Division of the Franklin Superior Court. Both parties represented themselves. Following a hearing, the family division determined that wife was still married to her first husband at the time of her marriage to husband in March 2000. Wife had received divorce papers filed by her first husband and believed that their marriage had ended in divorce. The family division initially ruled that the marriage between the parties in this case was void by operation of law. The only issue was division of property. Wife was ordered to turn over property belonging to husband. A few months later, the family division changed its mind concerning the property division: "[s]ince the marriage was void at its beginning, this court does not have jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. The parties are referred to the civil division. Either party may start an action there. The family court’s case is closed." Husband followed the court's instructions, and subsequently filed two small claims cases against wife seeking money damages for property he claims was his. The small claims judge entered judgment in favor of wife. Husband appealed to the civil division, which held that the civil division and the small claims court lacked jurisdiction over the division of marital property. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the civil division. View "Cameron v. Rollo" on Justia Law