Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In December 2011, wife Andrea Joseph filed for divorce after twenty-three years of marriage to husband Neil Joseph. In October 2012, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing to equally divide certain joint Morgan Stanley accounts. They also agreed in the stipulation that husband would continue to pay, out of the portion of the joint accounts designated to him, “those obligations that were being paid prior to the divorce action, which would include but not be limited to: mortgages, taxes, insurance and utilities for the properties that are owned by either one or both of the parties.” The trial court approved the stipulation and entered it as a court order. This issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the effect of an arrearage accrued under a temporary order following a final divorce decree when the arrearage was not incorporated into the final order or otherwise reduced to judgment. Wife appealed the family court’s denial of her motion to enforce husband Neil Joseph’s obligations under the temporary order after the final divorce decree issued. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s analysis as to the impact of the final divorce order on the allegedly unsatisfied obligations pursuant to the temporary order, and affirmed. View "Joseph v. Joseph" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the family court’s adjudication of her daughter B.A. as a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). She argued that the court erred in combining the merits of the CHINS proceeding with the disposition of a concurrent delinquency proceeding. Mother contended that the court lacked statutory authority to combine the hearings and that striking the CHINS adjudication is necessary to cure the error. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.A." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals of a termination-of-parental-rights judgment, appointed counsel for the appellant parent moved to withdraw on the ground that continued representation was barred by Rule 3.1 of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon review of the attorney's brief on the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that, absent client consent, a motion to withdraw by appointed appellate counsel in termination proceedings will generally not be granted, and therefore denied the motions.View "In re S.C." on Justia Law

Mother appealed a trial court’s final divorce order. She asserted that the court erred in granting the parties a divorce because the statutory requirements for divorce were not satisfied. She also challenged the court’s award of primary legal and physical custody of the parties’ five children (including her son, but father’s stepchild) to father. Lastly, she argued that the court abused its discretion in its award of parent-child contact. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s order in all respects with the exception of its decision to award father primary parental rights and responsibilities in his stepchild. On this issue, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "LeBlanc v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 1981. In 1998, husband retired from the United States Army after almost twenty-two years of service. About two years later, the parties were divorced in Vermont pursuant to a stipulated judgment. The judgment provided that husband’s military pension “shall be shared by the parties as a portion of their marital property” where, as pertinent to this case, Wife would receive 41.8% of husband’s total army pension as marital property. The DFAS thereafter garnished wife’s share of the pension and paid it directly to her. In 2009, eleven years after husband’s retirement and nine years after the parties’ divorce, he was recalled from retirement to serve as a military instructor in the ROTC program at the University of New Hampshire. He was discharged from the military in 2012, after three years in this position. During the three years of husband’s recall, his pension benefits were suspended so that neither he nor wife received any benefits. Husband’s additional service resulted in an increase in his monthly pension benefit. When contacted by husband, the DFAS indicated that it would continue to pay wife 41.8 percent of the benefit, as provided in the divorce judgment, resulting in an increase in the total amount of her payment. Husband then filed a motion to amend his support obligation, asserting that payment of the “straight percentage” provided in the divorce judgment would result in “over-payments” to wife. He proposed modified language that wife’s payment would to be calculated based on husband’s completed service at the time of the divorce. The trial court denied the husband's motion. Husband appealed, arguing: the trial court abused its discretion in: (1) denying the motion, and (2) failing to hold a hearing on the merits. The Supreme Court reversed. "[T]his is not a case where [. . .] the parties’ intentions about husband’s post-divorce service were “inescapably speculative,” as one might reasonably conclude in the more typical divorce situation involving the division of a spouse’s pension who was still employed at the time of the divorce." The case was remanded to afford the parties a hearing to address whether the modification sought by husband was absolutely necessary to “prevent hardship or injustice.” View "Spencer v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Husband Gilles Richard appealed a family court order awarding wife Ellen Richard interest on a payment due under the final divorce decree. Husband argued that the award of interest was an impermissible modification of the final decree. Pursuant to the final divorce judgment, husband had a fixed obligation to pay wife $11,500 in cash or through QDRO, and any delay in payment was subject to interest by operation of law. "The trial court’s approach to ordering the statutorily due interest in this case was admittedly confusing - the court purported to add a 'clarifying' provision to the final divorce decree, but the clarifying language was nothing more than a statement of the law that applies to post-judgment interest even without the 'addition' to the decree." The trial court did not substantively modify its final property division after the fact; the language it purported to add to the final order was entirely redundant. The trial court’s ruling was not a substantive modification at all; the final order had the exact same implications for husband’s obligation to pay, the timing of that obligation, and his liability for interest after the trial court’s order as before. To the extent that husband argued that the absence of any reference to interest in the final divorce decree reflects “an implied ruling that no interest would accrue prior to transfer,” regardless of husband’s delay in making that transfer, the argument is squarely at odds with well-established law providing for post-judgment interest on fixed obligations. View "Richard v. Richard" on Justia Law

Husband appealed the trial court’s final divorce order. He argued the court erred by including certain items as part of the marital estate, awarding wife a disproportionate share of the marital estate, and failing to award him maintenance. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion with respect to "the Danby property," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case so that the trial court could further consider the Danby property under the appropriate statutory provision. Given that the case was remanded, the Court did not reach husband’s final argument that the court’s distribution of marital property unfairly favored wife. View "Coburn v. Cook" on Justia Law

Mother and father were in a long-distance relationship for several years, throughout which mother lived in Vermont and father in Florida. In 2006, the parties had a child together. Although they never lived together as a family, parents continued taking regular trips with the child to visit each other until 2010, when they ended their relationship and mother filed a parentage action. Following the superior court’s amendment of a parent-child contact order, and in response to a child support order remanded to the magistrate by the superior court, appellant mother sought to overturn the superior court’s amendment and raised a number of issues with both the superior court and the magistrate’s treatment of father’s income for child support purposes. Upon review of the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s amended parent-child contact order and dismissed mother’s appeal of issues regarding the child support order. View "Patnode v. Urette" on Justia Law

Mark, the father of D.S., and Todd, the father of M.H., appealed the trial court’s order terminating their residual parental rights. The children shared the same mother. Both fathers had extensive criminal records and were incarcerated for most of their children’s lives. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) became involved with the family in December 2008 based on concerns of substance abuse, sexualized behavior, domestic violence, and neglect. In January 2012, the children were taken into custody pursuant to an emergency care order. At the time of the termination hearings, the court found that neither father played constructive roles in their children's lives. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of parental rights. View "In re D.S., In re M.H." on Justia Law

Father appealed a trial court’s order adjudicating B.R. a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). He argued that the court’s decision was not supported by evidence. B.R. was born in November 2012. On Monday, March 4, 2013, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that B.R. was CHINS, and it obtained an emergency care order. Shortly before the CHINS petition was filed, an affidavit was filed describing the circumstances surrounding mother’s March 1, 2013, arrest for driving under the influence of drugs with her two older children in the car; mother’s statements to the arresting officers about being stopped the day before for possessing a methadone pill and crystal methamphetamine, drugs that she stated belonged to father; mother’s admission to the arresting officers that she had cooked methamphetamine with father at the family’s home the night before her DUI arrest; mother’s concern at that time about B.R.’s welfare in father’s care, and her fears that father had taken the three-month-old child to a "meth house" in New York; and mother’s subsequent statements to police on Saturday, March 2, that she had retrieved B.R. from a "meth house" in New York where father had taken him. Finding sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.R." on Justia Law