Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father appealed a superior court family division's order that upheld a magistrate’s denial of his motion to modify his child support obligation. Specifically, father argued: (1) that the magistrate erred in declining to impute income to mother; and (2) that the magistrate failed to properly apply a credit in his favor to account for derivative benefits paid directly to mother on behalf of the minor child by the Social Security Administration on account of father’s disability. Upon review of the superior court record, the Supreme Court found that although the magistrate properly invoked the methodology established in the Court's holding in "Cantin," it did not complete its analysis: "[t]he magistrate conducted the first step of the guidelines analysis properly, imputing the derivative benefit to father and calculating a child support obligation accordingly. . . . However, the magistrate [. . .] never actually took the second step described in Cantin of applying [a $190 as a] payment from father to mother as a credit toward his child support obligation. Had it done so, it would have found that mother owed father a substantial monthly child support obligation on account of the imputed payment of child support from father to mother, by way of the derivative benefit, well in excess of the nominal child support obligation from father to mother pursuant to the guidelines calculation." Accordingly the Court reversed the superior court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. Furthermore, the Court held that in the absence of a deviation from the guidelines calculation, father was entitled to an award of child support in the amount of the credit to him for the derivative benefit payment to mother less his child support obligation pursuant to the guidelines. The Court found that neither the magistrate nor the family division specifically addressed the proper accounting with respect to a $4370 lump sum derivative benefit arrearage payment to mother on behalf of the minor child. Because the obligation in question was payable to a third party, on remand the magistrate was ordered ensure that mother applied the lump sum toward father’s share of the child's medical bills, and that father was credited accordingly. View "LaMothe v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

Defendant ex-husband appealed a superior court - family division order which found him in contempt for failure to pay spousal maintenance as ordered. He claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction to find him in contempt because he was not personally served with the underlying order upon which the finding of contempt was based, as required by statute and our case law. Finding defendant's argument to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Welch v. Welch" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court addressed disputes over child support. The disputes were described as "so stale that the parties' children are in and approaching their thirties." The basic questions were whether father could register and enforce a child support order obtained in Oklahoma against mother and, inversely, whether mother could register and enforce an earlier child support order obtained in Georgia against father. Upon review, the Court concluded that mother's various jurisdictional challenges to the Oklahoma order were without merit and precluded by the unappealed adjudication in Oklahoma. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Vermont court had personal jurisdiction over father with respect to mother's child support claims against him and a statutory immunity provision in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) did not apply. As a result, the Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of mother's enforcement action, affirmed the superior court's jurisdictional holdings with regard to the Oklahoma order. The Court remanded the adjudication of father's enforcement action for consideration of counterclaims raised by mother. View "OCS/Pappas v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the constitutional rights of a putative biological father who seeks an order of parentage when a court has already issued a parentage order determining the minor child's parents. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Vermont's parentage statute does not authorize a court to allow a second parentage action involving a particular child brought by or against a different putative parent unless constitutional considerations require the court to entertain the second parentage case. In this case, even if plaintiff was the genetic parent of the minor child, he did not have constitutionally-protected parental rights. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying plaintiff's motion for genetic testing and dismissed his complaint for establishment of parentage. View "Columbia v. Lawton" on Justia Law

Defendant Donna Mae Peck appealed a superior court judgment that granted plaintiff Victor Shattuck a writ of possession for the parties' former residence in Cavendish and that denied her counterclaim for an equitable interest in the Cavendish property and another former residence in Springfield. Between December 1997 and June 1999, plaintiff purchased two adjoining parcels of land in Cavendish. He made most of the payments for the first parcel, but defendant made a significant financial contribution toward payment of the second parcel. In 2001, plaintiff conveyed the Cavendish properties to himself and defendant as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, and defendant conveyed the Springfield property to herself and plaintiff as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The parties lived together in Cavendish until June 2010, when plaintiff decided to end their relationship. Following an angry confrontation, defendant obtained a relief-from-abuse order against plaintiff and was awarded sole possession of the Cavendish property. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in superior court seeking to evict defendant from the Cavendish property. Defendant answered and counterclaimed, alleging that the Cavendish and Springfield properties were the subject of a partnership agreement between the parties. Alleging that she had been induced to convey the Springfield properties by plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentations, she also sought equitable relief through imposition of a resulting or constructive trust. She later claimed that the Cavendish property was also held in a constructive trust for her benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court: "pursuant to the principles of equity, not every unmarried cohabitant who confers an economic benefit on his or her partner is entitled to payback if the relationship ends. In this case, defendant may or may not ultimately be entitled to restitution, whether in the form of a constructive trust or a money judgment, for her substantial investments in the Cavendish and Springfield properties, and any such judgment could well be subject to offsets for benefits received." View "Shattuck v. Peck" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a CHINS decision by the superior court based on a finding that she repeatedly induced the child to make false allegations of abuse against father. On appeal, Mother contended the judgment was unsupported because there was no evidence or finding that the allegations of abuse were the product of intentional coaching or mental illness. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law

A Mother appealed a superior court's decision that terminated her parental rights to her son, D.C. D.C. spent the first years of his life with both parents, who at the time were not married. When his parents separated, the father took D.C. to stay with him. Although a child-custody order granted mother parental rights, she allowed father to take the child because she had difficulty finding a residence, and she knew that father had the support of his mother in caring for D.C. This arrangement lasted for a few years longer when mother obtained police help to assert her custodial rights to D.C. Mother moved into a motel with D.C., and the Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned that D.C. was a child in need of care due to a lack of proper parental care. The affidavit in support of the petition stated that: (1) five years earlier mother’s parental rights had been terminated with respect to an older child because of unsafe and unsanitary living conditions and the child’s exposure to the risk of being sexually abused; (2) mother had a relationship with a known, untreated sex offender who had been seen frequently with mother at her motel room; (3) the motel room was filthy and unsanitary; (4) D.C. was suffering from an untreated respiratory illness; and (5) school officials had reported D.C. arriving at school hungry and not dressed properly for the cold. On appeal, mother argued that the termination order is invalid because the court failed to: (1) consider whether the State had met its burden of showing changed circumstances, which was required because the State’s termination petition sought modification of the initial disposition order; (2) determine by clear and convincing evidence that mother was presently unfit to care for D.C.; and (3) find that DCF had made reasonable efforts to prevent the unnecessary removal of D.C. from his home. Finding that the record supported the family court’s undisputed findings that during the lengthy period when mother played a limited role in D.C.’s life and agreed to other family members assuming custody of the child, she made no progress in reaching a point where she could care for the child.  The Court concluded that Mother could not challenge the TPR order through a belated claim that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent D.C.’s removal from his home. Accordingly, the Court affirmed termination of Mother's rights. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

This decision resolved two consolidated appeals related to family division proceedings involving juvenile C.P. First, mother and father appealed termination of their parental rights to their son C.P. Father argued the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination proceeding. Mother joined father's jurisdictional argument and contended that the evidence and findings did not support the conclusion that termination was in C.P.'s best interests. Second, father challenged the court's post-termination order striking a sentence of the termination decision, and finding that the Department for Children and Families (DCF) made reasonable efforts toward achieving the permanency plan goal of reunifying C.P. with his parents. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no merit to either of the parents' arguments on appeal and affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "In re C. P." on Justia Law

Mother appealed a final divorce order granting father parental rights and responsibilities for the parties' two children and giving mother parent-child contact in stages beginning with supervised contact with progression through the stages determined by the children’s medical and mental health providers. Mother argued: (1) that the order impermissibly delegated the court's statutory responsibility to determine parent-child contact and parental rights and responsibilities; (2) that the court effectively terminated her parental rights without a finding of parental unfitness supported by clear and convincing evidence; (3) and that the court's findings were inadequate to support the contact provisions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the order improperly delegated authority over parent-child contact to third parties, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Engel v. Engel" on Justia Law

Guardian appealed an order of the probate division directing that a court-ordered guardianship evaluation performed by Rutland Mental Health Services, Inc. (RMHS) be placed with the court under seal. Guardian argued that the court exceeded its authority, or abused its discretion to the extent that it had any, in directing RMHS to return the evaluation to the court to be sealed. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's conclusion after review of this case that the probate court had authority to restrict access to the original evaluation, it agreed with guardian that the court abused its discretion as a matter of law in ordering the sealing of this particular evaluation, given the circumstances of the case and the court’s reasoning for doing so. View "In re Guardianship of A.S." on Justia Law