Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a separation agreement made thirty-seven years ago between a now-deceased husband and plaintiff, his first wife. Plaintiff contended that her ex-husband promised to devise to her certain assets upon his death, and she brought various claims for equitable relief against defendant, her ex-husband's second wife, who survived him. The superior court concluded that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, plaintiff argued that this conclusion was erroneous because, under the governing Massachusetts law, claims based on a contract to make a will do not accrue until the promisor's death. Although the Supreme Court accepted plaintiff's legal premise, it do not accept that it governed this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "Mueller v. Mueller and Joseph F. Mueller Trust" on Justia Law

Wife Maura Breslin appealed a family court order that required her to sign a waiver to correct a previously filed Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) which erroneously gave her survivorship benefits in her former husband's pension. The divorce order, fully incorporating the terms of the separation agreement, awarded wife “one half of the pension, as of the date of separation and the [husband] is awarded the remainder." A QDRO signed by wife’s attorney was filed in 2009 to implement the terms of the order. The QDRO mistakenly awarded wife survivorship benefits in husband’s pension, contrary to the divorce order which merely provided wife with one-half of the pension, with remainder to husband. The family division approved the QDRO, and the plan administrator implemented it, which resulted in payments being made to wife. Husband did not object to the submission of the 2009 QDRO, and did not appeal its approval. In 2010, wife and husband jointly filed a new QDRO, which omitted the erroneous section regarding survivorship benefits. The family division approved the QDRO. In January 2011, the plan administrator rejected the QDRO because payments had already begun under the 2009 QDRO. The plan administrator noted that wife could fix this problem by “waiv[ing] away her right” to the survivorship benefits. Husband’s attorney contacted wife’s attorney numerous times between January and March, inquiring as to her position on the waiver issue. Having not heard anything, husband filed a motion to enforce in March 2011. The court held a chambers conference in August 2011, and issued an entry order the same month concluding that wife is not entitled to the survivorship benefits. The court found that the divorce order merely granted wife “a defined, independent right to one half the pension,” while husband was granted his own separate pension rights. The court ordered wife to execute the waiver to restore to husband and his family the sole right to any survivorship benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the 2009 QDRO purported to modify the underlying property division, it was invalid and not entitled to preclusive effect. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the family court order. View "Breslin v. Synnott" on Justia Law

Margaret Chickansoky (Mother) appealed a family court order that modified her parent-child contact rights. The parties originally agreed to share parental rights and responsibilities as part of a December 2005 divorce order. In 2009, the family court granted, in part, father’s motion to modify the original divorce order by awarding him sole legal parental rights and responsibilities. In July 2010, the family court granted father's second motion to modify based on his planned move to Missouri. The court awarded him legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities, with mother having summertime and vacation parent-child contact. The parties then got into a dispute over mother's unplanned or short-notice visits to Missouri. Following a hearing in July 2011, the court entered a twenty-five page order which clarified and modified parent-child contact. The court found that mother placed her needs ahead of the best interests of daughter, engaged in selfish and unreasonable behavior, has been patently unreasonable, has had "no insight whatsoever" as to why her behavior has caused daughter stress, and has failed to gain insight "as to the devastating impact of her behavior." The court also found that father attempted to relieve daughter's stress and that his "good basic parenting" has allowed daughter to have a "consistent, stable routine." Turning to the best-interests analysis, the court found that daughter's emotional development would be harmed if she spent the whole summer with mother. Thus, the court set forth a specific contact schedule and limited mother’s summertime contact to approximately one month. Mother appealed, arguing that: (1) the court exceeded its jurisdiction and violated her right to due process by issuing an order limiting her summertime contact with daughter insofar as she was never notified that summertime contact would be at issue; (2) father failed to make an adequate showing that there was a real, substantial, and unanticipated change in material circumstances to modify the previous custody order; and (3) the court failed to consider the best-interests factors in further limiting her contact with daughter. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented before the family court supported the court’s findings about mother’s unreasonableness and lack of insight, and father’s efforts to minimize daughter's stress, which in turn supported the conclusion that daughter's best interests would be served by limiting mother's summertime contact. View "Chickanosky v. Chickanosky" on Justia Law

The trial court dismissed Wife's post-divorce motion for relief from judgment based on Husband's alleged fraudulent concealment of assets without requiring completion of the discovery sought by wife, and without a hearing. Wife and Husband entered into a stipulated final divorce agreement, approved and incorporated into a final order by the family court. Several months after the parties' divorce became final, Wife filed a motion to set aside the final divorce decree on several grounds, including that husband had not disclosed a bank account. The family court denied the motion, noting that both parties had personal checking accounts opened post-separation from which they paid their bills and neither party had included those accounts in their financial disclosures. The court also concluded that the post-judgment questions raised by Wife's motion were relatively minor in the context of the overall case. Several years later Husband filed a motion to modify spousal maintenance due to an unanticipated decline in his income. In connection with that motion, he produced copies of his bank statements that included for the first time, an account that had his and his sister's names on it--an account he opened and used prior to the divorce stipulation. Wife subsequently filed a motion for contempt and enforcement, arguing that Husband indeed had hidden some accounts from her that were to be used in creating the stipulated divorce agreement. The trial court dismissed her motion. On appeal, Wife challenged the trial court's refusal to hold further hearings several outstanding issues pertaining to the accounts issue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in declining to hear Wife's motion on the Husband's concealment of the last bank account. The Court found that the motion was time-barred. Therefore, if the motion was time barred, it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion in refusing to hold another hearing on the issues raised in that motion. View "Olio v. Olio" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether the State may prosecute an adult defendant for crimes alleged to have occurred when he was a juvenile. The prosecution was late in bringing the charged because the alleged victims did not come forward until defendant was eighteen years of age and beyond the jurisdiction of the family division.  The State tried to file the information in the criminal division.  The criminal division transferred the case to the family division because it found there was no criminal jurisdiction to adjudicate even the most serious of the offenses without first filing the matter in the family division.  The family division, however, determined it was without jurisdiction to entertain the charges because defendant had reached eighteen years of age. Accordingly, it dismissed all of the charges against defendant. On appeal, the State argued that the family division erred by dismissing the more serious felony charges because: (1) a recent legislative enactment addressing what it called a "gap" in the jurisdictional provisions of the statutes was a mere clarification  demonstrating that the Legislature had always intended that adult defendants be subject to prosecution for serious crimes committed when they were juveniles; and (2) even if the new amendment did not clarify the statutes and fill the gap, there was jurisdiction in the criminal division because that division has always had jurisdiction over all serious felonies. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the Legislature's recent enactment did not clarify existing law but rather established entirely new law that could not be applied retroactively to this case; therefore, to the extent that the Legislature has filled the "gap," it has done so only prospectively; and (2) the statutory scheme applicable at the time of the offenses  did not allow either the family or criminal division to exercise its jurisdiction over an adult defendant accused of offenses committed as a juvenile under the age of fourteen.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the family division's order dismissing all charges in this case. View "In re D.K., Juvenile" on Justia Law

Mother Jacqueline Parker appealed a superior court judgment that transferred physical parental rights and responsibilities to Father Brian Parker.  She contended that the court erred in concluding that her desire to relocate to Buffalo, New York satisfied the threshold requirement of changed circumstances and supported its decision to transfer physical parental rights and responsibilities to Father. The court's rationale noted that the parties' ability to communicate effectively with each other was "completely dysfunctional," although they were able to exercise legal parental rights and responsibilities in most areas.  After noting that the children's "relationship to Father has been constant and multi-day on a weekly basis," the court concluded that a permanent move to Buffalo "[was] not in the children's best interest, and is so far in derogation of the obligation to promote and provide maximum parent-child contact under 15 V.S.A. § 655(b)(5), that it trumps [Mother's] primary caretaker role, as well as other statutory factors that might otherwise trend in [Mother's] favor." On appeal, Mother emphasized that she was not challenging the court's denial of her motion to modify or her request to move to Buffalo with the children, but rather only the court's transfer of physical parental rights and responsibilities to Father.  She argued that the court erred by arriving at its threshold finding of changed circumstances and its best-interests determination based solely on Mother's conditional intent to relocate. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded the case for more findings, taking no position on the family court's decision: "our examination of the transcript of the custody hearing reveals abundant testimony by both Mother and Father on issues surrounding the breakdown of the parties' relationship, their inability to communicate, and the children's best interests generally.  Thus, on remand, the trial court may in its discretion conclude that additional evidence is not required in order to make supplemental findings and may instead clarify its rationale, or even alter its decision if duly supported, on the basis of the existing transcript and case file." View "Parker v. Parker" on Justia Law

Husband Robert Molleur appealed the property and maintenance components of a divorce order issued by the family division of the superior court.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the parties a divorce and awarded Wife Susan Molleur: (1) as her share of the marital property, 75% of the marital component of husband's pension (which generated approximately 41.67% of husband's total monthly pension payment; (2) maintenance in the amount of $1900 to $2100 per month for years 2011 to 2013 and $500 per month permanently thereafter, subject to an inflation adjustment; and (3) $2500 in attorney's fees.  Husband appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by awarding wife 75% of the marital component of the pension and permanent maintenance.  Husband also argued that the court erred by ordering an automatic adjustment of maintenance for inflation based upon an arbitrary formula that did not take into account his income. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's findings on this point have support in the record. The Court affirmed in all respects, except that the case was remanded for the trial court to amend the maintenance award's automatic inflation-adjustment provision. View "Molleur v. Molleur" on Justia Law

Craig Wilson appealed a family division order that dismissed his motion to modify part of his 2005 final divorce decree. The court concluded that the provision at issue pertained to property division and he did not demonstrate a sufficient reason to modify its terms. On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the motion as a matter of law and not considering the merits of his request for relief from judgment. The order explained that when the parties' youngest child turned eighteen or graduated from high school (in 2014) the house would be sold and the parties would share in the proceeds. The order specifically delineated that neither party was entitled to maintenance. In August 2010, husband filed a motion to modify the divorce decree, claiming that after being laid off in January 2009, he remained unemployed and did not have the financial means to continue sharing the costs of taxes, insurance and maintenance on the house. He asked to be relieved of his obligation of paying for one-half of the taxes and future maintenance. He also asked that the house be placed on the market immediately instead of in 2014. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the family division did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mr. Wilson's claims of financial hardship were insufficient to warrant relief. Furthermore, the Court found that the provisions of the decree relating to the house were "aspects of property division and not maintenance." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the family divisions' decision to dismiss Mr. Wilson's requests. View "Wilson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

"This is a case of avoidable error and its consequences." The Vermont League of Cities and Towns (VLCT), the workers' compensation insurance carrier for the Town of Randolph, settled a compensation claim of Claimant Stacey Colson and paid the settlement amount to the Office of Child Support pursuant to an earlier order that OCS issued to collect Claimant's back child support payments. VLCT failed to deduct the amount of an attorney's fee lien granted by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor (DOL) to claimant’s lawyer. VLCT acted with the understanding that the lawyer would not seek the fee if, as occurred, claimant was awarded a lump-sum compensation amount. The lawyer sought her fee, but VLCT resisted double paying that amount, and the dispute has ended up before the Supreme Court after two decisions from the Commissioner and one from Superior Court. Claimant appealed the Commissioner’s grant of summary judgment to VLCT, in which the Commissioner concluded that VLCT acted appropriately in paying over the entire proceeds of claimant’s workers’ compensation award to OCS. Claimant argued that his attorney's lien had priority over OCS's claim for child support arrearages. He claimed that the Commissioner's findings were incomplete and contradictory, that the Commissioner erred when she determined his attorney’s lien did not have priority, and that DOL should be compelled to enforce his attorney’s lien for fees. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the OCS lien was first in time and therefore took priority, and affirmed the Commissioner's holding that VLCT could not be required to pay the attorney's fee amount to Claimant's attorney. View "Colson v. Vermont League of Cities & Towns" on Justia Law

Mother Karen Cegalis appealed a family court's order that awarded primary custody of her five-year-old son to Father Raymond Knutsen. On appeal, Mother argued the family court made numerous errors in its decision, that the evidence could have only lead to the conclusion that she should have been awarded primary custody. Even if this was a close case, and even if inclined to reach a different result on the same facts, "[the Supreme Court] repeatedly stated . . . that [its] review of custody matters is limited, and that [the Court] must defer to the judgment of the trial court applying its own common sense and experience." Accordingly, the Court found that the evidence presented to the family court was sufficient to support the court's judgment awarding custody to the Father. View "Knutsen v. Cegalis" on Justia Law