Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this termination of parental rights case, the Supreme Court considered two separate appeals pertaining to a mother’s and father’s respective rights to their two daughters, seventeen-year-old R.W. and thirteen-year-old N.W. The case presented novel jurisdictional questions because the parents and children are citizens of Sri Lanka and, although mother and the children have been residents of Vermont for a number of years, father resided in Sri Lanka and has never been to Vermont. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned to terminate both mother’s and father’s residual parental rights. The family division granted the request as to mother, but concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over father. Mother appealed termination of her parental rights, arguing that the superior court applied the incorrect standard of proof with respect to changed circumstances and engaged in a faulty best-interests analysis. DCF filed a separate appeal as to father, arguing that even though father lacked minimum contacts with Vermont, the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of his children, who were within the court’s jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the termination of parental rights was a determination of status and could be adjudicated when the forum state has a sufficient connection to the children, even absent minimum contact jurisdiction over a parent. Further, in this case, the Court held that exercise of jurisdiction was authorized by the UCCJA and was reasonable given the strong interests of the state and the children in resolution of father’s rights as well as the lack of any conflicting jurisdictional claims by another state or country. The Court affirmed the termination of the mother's parental rights. View "In re R.W. and N.W." on Justia Law

Husband-Petitioner John Towslee appealed a post-divorce ruling by the family court. The parties were divorced in 1997. By stipulation, which was incorporated into the final divorce order, Wife-Respondent Cathleen Callanan was awarded the marital home until the parties' youngest child turned eighteen. Wife was responsible for all costs and expenses associated with the home, including "the current mortgage," of which there were two, totaling $87,500, a value near the property's purchase price. The stipulation provided that the proceeds from the sale of the property would be divided equally after deducting the usual and customary expenses associated with the sale of the property, the remaining balance of the current mortgage, the cost of the appraisal, and "the cost of all capital improvements and capital contributions (mortgage)." At issue was the "capital contributions": when Wife tried to sell the property in 2008, the bank required Petitioner to sign off on the sale. He refused, claiming that his Wife owed him money under the terms of the divorce decree. The dispute turned on whether she was entitled to deduct not only the principal component of the mortgage payments she made, but also the interest component of those payments. Following a hearing, the court found the phrase "capital contributions (mortgage)" ambiguous, and it examined extrinsic evidence to discern the parties' intent. After hearing testimony from husband's attorney, who drafted the language in question, as well as from wife, the court concluded that the more reasonable interpretation, given the use of the word "mortgage," was that Wife could deduct the entirety of the payments made on the debt secured by the original two mortgages. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the family court's construction of the decree "was not unfair or unreasonable." As such, the Court affirmed the family court's decision. View "Towslee v. Callanan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Natalie Billings appealed a family court's final judgment order in favor of her husband Jireh Billings, Sr.  Plaintiff argued on appeal: (1) the family court abused its discretion by granting husband's motion in limine excluding evidence of any revocable trusts or wills under which he may be a beneficiary; (2) the family court abused its discretion when it refused to include as marital property suitable for distribution two irrevocable trusts of which husband is a beneficiary; and (3) the family court abused its discretion by nullifying husband's maintenance arrearage of $8,312.74.  Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the family court's decision with regard to the distribution of property and the maintenance award. The Court affirmed the family court on all other issues. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Billings v. Billings" on Justia Law

John Pegues (Father) appealed a family court's denial of his motion to reinstate parent-child contact with his daughter following a voluntary suspension of such contact due to an allegation of child sexual abuse.  Father and Ann Marie DeSantis (Mother) were married in 1991, adopted their daughter in 1996, and separated in 2004. The parties worked out an informal visitation schedule, though there was no overnight contact due to Mother's concerns about Father's drinking. Mother was also concerned about Father's "physical boundary" issues: the level of play between Father and the daughter and its intensity became a source of concern for Mother. For two years following the divorce, that "play" would ultimately end in allegations of sexual abuse against Father. In 2006, Father was charged with felony aggravated sexual assault of his daughter.  After an eighteen-month investigation, the state dismissed the charges with prejudice.  Father moved to dissolve an interim suspension order in July 2008. The family court concluded that the effect of abuse on daughter and on her relationship with father was "the most critical factor in this case," and that it was not in the daughter's best interest to have visitation with her Father. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the family court's finding of sexual abuse by a preponderance of the evidence was insufficient to support the family court's order that effectively terminated Father's parental rights.  The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "DeSantis v. Pegues" on Justia Law

Tinotenda Rutanhira (Father) appealed a family division order awarding Sara Rutanhira (Mother) primary legal rights and responsibilities for the parties' daughter based on the court's conclusion that Father exercised poor judgment in desiring to take his daughter to his birth country, Zimbabwe.  On appeal, Father contended that the trial court abused its discretion by considering evidence outside of the proceeding.  He also challenged the court's finding that he planned to leave daughter in Zimbabwe while he traveled to South Africa and claimed the court erred when it considered testimony regarding his desire to travel to Zimbabwe because of an earlier stipulated agreement between the parties.  Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in relying on evidence gathered outside the proceeding, which Father did not have an opportunity to contest. The Court reversed and remanded the case for the family court to rehear this matter. View "Rutanhira v. Rutanhira" on Justia Law

Margaret Chickanosky appealed a family court order granting Michael Chickanosky sole physical and legal rights and responsibilities over their child. On appeal, the mother contended that: (1) the family court's findings and legal conclusions are inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial and are based on inadmissible evidence; (2) the family court erred in failing to consider her argument that father's reason for moving should be considered when deciding whether there has been a change in circumstance, such that the co-parent's rights to physical custody are reduced; and (3) the family court erred in failing to consider her argument that mother should maintain physical custody when father decided to move and mother had the majority of physical custody. Upon review of the family court record, the Supreme Court found that the family court concluded that the father should have been awarded primary physical rights and responsibilities because "this would best allow daughter to maintain relationships with both parents and families and develop independence and autonomy. We will not overturn such an award when, as here, it reflects the sound judgment of the family court in light of the evidence." View "Chickanosky v. Chickanosky" on Justia Law

Respondent Alan Cote appealed a family court's garnishment order that directed the Social Security Administration to withhold his Social Security benefits to offset alimony arrearages. On appeal, Respondent contended that the garnishment order violated a provision of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act which imposes a cap on the percentage of aggregate disposable earnings that any court, state or federal, may garnish. While the trial court garnished only Respondent's Social Security disability benefits and not his veterans' disability benefits, the court did include the latter in its calculation of aggregate disposable earnings.  This broad calculation of disposable earning increased the percentage of Respondent's Social Security payments subject to garnishment.  Respondent contended that as defined and excluded from such a calculation by federal law, his particular veterans' disability benefits were not to be counted as earnings because they were not paid for a service related disability and are not received in lieu of retirement payments to which he would otherwise be entitled as earnings.  Upon review of the lower court's record and calculations, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed the lower court's order and remanded the case for recalculation of the garnishment. View "Cote v. Cote" on Justia Law

Petitioner Carlema (Limoggio) Iannarone appealed a family court's order that denied her motion to enforce the property division set forth in her and her ex-husband Robert Limoggio's original divorce decree. She contended the court abused its discretion by failing to enforce a provision requiring payment of $150,000 for the marital home and by failing to exercise its equitable power to impose a constructive trust on the home. Upon review of the lower court record and the divorce decree at issue, the Supreme Court concluded that Ms. Iannarone's claims were precluded by res judicata and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Iannarone v. Limoggio" on Justia Law

Michael Hazlett (Father) appealed a trial court's award to Michelle Toomin (Mother) of primary legal and physical rights and responsibilities for their daughter.  On appeal he contended that: (1) the court gave insufficient consideration to his superior ability to foster a positive relationship between the daughter and mother as compared to mother's ability to support daughter's relationship with him; (2) the court did not properly weigh an incident of Mother allegedly abusing the daughter in drawing its conclusion to award her custody; and (3) the court gave undue weight to the conclusion that mother was the primary caregiver because it did not consider the quality of her caregiving relationship with the daughter.  Finding no flaw in the trial court's conclusions, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Hazlett v. Toomin" on Justia Law

Husband Lee Herring appealed the family courtâs denial of his motion to terminate spousal maintenance to his ex-wife Kimberly Herring. Eight months after the order of divorce maintenance was entered, Mr. Herring was found guilty of sexual assault. The stateâs first prosecution of Mr. Herring ended in a hung jury, which occurred before the divorce was granted. After the second trial, he was sentenced. Mr. Herring paid maintenance pursuant to the divorce order for the first six months following the divorce, but stopped making payments once he was incarcerated. Mr. Herring petitioned the family court to modify the maintenance award since he would have no means of paying it from jail. The family court reasoned that the incarceration was not an unanticipated change in his situation and denied his motion to modify the maintenance award. The Supreme Court could not conclude that the pendency of the criminal proceedings made his resulting loss of income âanticipatedâ in terms of his ability to pay the maintenance award. The Court reversed the family courtâs decision to deny Mr. Herring a modification to the maintenance award, and remanded the case for further proceedings.