Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A cannabis cultivation business was licensed to operate in Vermont but became the subject of regulatory action after laboratory testing detected myclobutanil, a prohibited pesticide, in its products. The business had previously entered into a corrective action plan with the regulatory board following similar violations in 2023, agreeing to remediation, penalties, and compliance measures. In 2024, after further detections of myclobutanil in both retail and on-site samples, the regulatory board issued a notice of violation with immediate effect, including a stop-sale order for all of the business’s products, a recall requirement, and a proposed license revocation.The business contested the notice and requested a hearing before the Cannabis Control Board. At the hearing, it raised several arguments, including challenges to the Board’s authority under the Vermont Constitution, claims of bias by the Board chair, and alleged due process violations. The Board chair denied a motion for recusal, and after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, the Board found that the business had violated its corrective action plan and used unauthorized pesticides. The Board dismissed one violation as duplicative but upheld others, ultimately revoking the business’s license. The business appealed to an appellate officer, who affirmed the Board’s decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, applying a standard that precludes reweighing factual findings unless clearly erroneous or affected by legal error. The Court held that the Board acted within its statutory authority in issuing a stop-sale order for all products, that the Board’s interpretation of its regulations was reasonable, and that the business failed to preserve or adequately brief its constitutional and evidentiary arguments. The Court also found no due process violation regarding the impartiality of the Board chair, as the business did not make an evidentiary record to support its claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of the business’s license. View "In re Holland Cannabis, LLC" on Justia Law

Three organizations—Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust, Lake Bomoseen Association, and SOLitude Lake Management—jointly applied for a permit from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to use pesticides in Lake Bomoseen to control an invasive species. Lindsey Waterhouse, who does not own property on the lake but lives nearby and is a board member of one of the applicant organizations, supported the application during public comment. ANR denied the permit, finding the proposed pesticide use posed unacceptable risks to the environment.After the denial, Mr. Waterhouse filed an appeal to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, on his own behalf as a “person aggrieved.” None of the permit applicants appealed the denial. The Environmental Division questioned whether Mr. Waterhouse, who was not an applicant, could maintain the appeal in the absence of the actual applicants. The court also addressed motions from the Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust to intervene and to be represented by Mr. Waterhouse, a nonattorney, but denied both, finding he was not authorized or qualified to represent the organization.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Environmental Division’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Waterhouse lacked standing to appeal because he did not demonstrate a particularized injury distinct from the general public and could not show that the court could redress his alleged injury, especially since the permit applicants were not pursuing the application. The Court also concluded that Mr. Waterhouse lacked standing to challenge the denial of the motions on behalf of the Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust, as he was not authorized to represent the organization’s interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "In re Lake Bomoseen Association and Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust Denial" on Justia Law

Central Vermont Medical Center (CVMC) submitted its proposed budget for fiscal year 2025, seeking an 11.9% increase in net patient service revenue (NPR) and a 5.5% increase in commercial rates, both of which exceeded the benchmarks set by the Green Mountain Care Board. The Board’s benchmarks, established in its annual guidance, were 3.5% for NPR growth and 3.4% for commercial rate growth. The Board required hospitals exceeding these benchmarks to provide credible justification, such as evidence of improved access or quality of care. CVMC’s submission was reviewed through hearings and public comment, during which the Board found that CVMC’s justifications were insufficient, particularly regarding efficiency, productivity, and cost containment.The Green Mountain Care Board, after considering the evidence and statutory obligations, modified CVMC’s budget, allowing a 6% NPR growth and a 3.4% commercial rate increase. The Board found that CVMC could achieve financial sustainability through cost reductions and improved productivity rather than higher price increases. The Board imposed specific terms and conditions on the budget, emphasizing the need for efficient operations and balancing financial needs with statewide health care affordability and access.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision under a deferential standard, presuming the Board’s actions valid unless shown otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. The Court rejected CVMC’s arguments that the Board acted with unfettered discretion, violated procedural due process, or was required to regulate on a per-capita basis. The Court found that the Board’s process was guided by statutory standards, rules, and annual guidance, and that CVMC had adequate notice and opportunity to participate. The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the Board’s decision. View "In re Central Vermont Medical Center Fiscal Year 2025" on Justia Law

A childcare provider operating two centers in Vermont participated in the federal Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), which reimburses centers for meals provided to children if certain regulatory requirements are met. The provider had previously been cited for noncompliance in 2019, but the matter was resolved after corrective action. In 2022, the Vermont Agency of Education (AOE) again found serious deficiencies, including inadequate recordkeeping, improper meal claims, and failure to monitor facilities. The provider submitted a corrective-action plan, and AOE initially determined the deficiencies were fully and permanently corrected. However, a subsequent unannounced review in 2023 revealed recurring deficiencies, such as missing enrollment forms, incorrect eligibility determinations, and incomplete documentation.Following these findings, AOE issued a notice proposing to terminate the provider’s participation in CACFP and to disqualify the provider and two employees from future participation. The provider requested an administrative review. At the hearing, the provider acknowledged some paperwork was not in compliance but argued the errors were minor and unintentional. Due to time constraints, the hearing officer allowed both parties to submit post-hearing written arguments and documentation, to which the provider did not initially object but later challenged as a violation of due process and agency procedures.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case after the hearing officer affirmed AOE’s decision to terminate and disqualify the provider. The Court held that the hearing officer applied the correct legal standard and that the record supported the findings of persistent serious deficiencies. The Court also determined that the provider had not properly preserved its objection to post-hearing submissions and, regardless, was not prejudiced by the procedure. The Court affirmed the termination and disqualification from the CACFP. View "In re Butterfly Kisses Child Care Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a petitioner who was substantiated by the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) for placing a child, L.M., at risk of sexual harm. The petitioner had a prior substantiation in 2006 for sexually abusing a minor and a 2019 conviction for open and gross lewdness involving an adult. In 2020, the petitioner and his husband, who had previously been substantiated as a minor, began babysitting L.M., an eight-year-old transgender boy. L.M. would sometimes stay overnight at their apartment, where another adult friend was also present. The petitioner did not inform his probation officer about this arrangement, despite probation conditions restricting his contact with minors. DCF received a report and, after investigation, substantiated the petitioner for risk of sexual harm to L.M.After the substantiation, the petitioner requested review. The Commissioner’s Registry Review Unit upheld the substantiation, and the petitioner appealed to the Human Services Board. A hearing officer recommended reversing the substantiation, but the Board adopted the hearing officer’s factual findings and nonetheless affirmed the substantiation, reasoning that the petitioner’s access to L.M., his prior record, lack of sex-offender treatment, and dishonesty during the investigation supported a finding of risk. The Board found that the petitioner had regular and ongoing access to L.M., including overnight stays, and that the presence of other adults did not amount to constant supervision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Court held that the Board reasonably inferred risk of harm based on the petitioner’s access to L.M., prior substantiation, and other factors. The Court rejected arguments that DCF was required to relitigate the 2006 substantiation or that DCF’s policies were inconsistent with statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision upholding the substantiation. View "In re Appeal of S.C.-M." on Justia Law

A hospital submitted its proposed budget for the upcoming fiscal year, requesting a 6.1% increase in net patient revenue (NPR) and a 2.8% increase in commercial negotiated rates. The hospital justified its request by citing increased patient volume and efforts to reduce wait times. The Green Mountain Care Board, which regulates hospital budgets in Vermont, had previously issued guidance setting a 3.5% benchmark for NPR growth and a 3.4% benchmark for commercial rate increases, requiring hospitals to justify any requests above these benchmarks.After reviewing the hospital’s proposal, the Green Mountain Care Board approved a 5.0% NPR increase—higher than the benchmark but lower than requested—citing the hospital’s strong financial health and the need to balance access to care with cost containment. The Board also approved the requested 2.8% commercial rate increase but included a footnote reducing this increase to 1.2% due to a prior budget overage, referencing a separate budget-enforcement order. The hospital appealed the Board’s decision to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the Board’s NPR decision was arbitrary and that the reduction in the commercial rate increase violated procedural requirements under the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act (VAPA).The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Board had adequately explained its decision to approve a 5.0% NPR increase and acted within its discretion, given the statutory mandate to balance cost control and access to care. However, the Court struck the footnote reducing the commercial rate increase to 1.2%, because the underlying budget-enforcement order had been reversed by the Vermont Superior Court for failure to follow VAPA procedures and was no longer valid. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the Board’s decision. View "In re Rutland Regional Medical Center Fiscal Year 2025" on Justia Law

Costco sought to operate a gas station adjacent to its retail store in Colchester, Vermont, near a busy highway interchange. The company obtained both municipal and Act 250 permits, which included conditions requiring traffic mitigation measures—specifically, improvements at a nearby intersection (the MVD Improvements) or, alternatively, implementation of modified traffic signal timings if a larger state highway project (the DDI Project) was not yet under construction. Two neighboring businesses, who also operated gas stations nearby, actively participated in the permitting process and subsequent litigation, arguing that Costco’s gas station would exacerbate traffic congestion and that Costco should not be allowed to operate the station at full-time hours until the DDI Project was complete.After initial permits were issued, the neighbors appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, which upheld the permits with the mitigation conditions. The neighbors then appealed the Act 250 permit to the Vermont Supreme Court, which affirmed the sufficiency of the mitigation measures. As the DDI Project faced delays, Costco sought and received permit amendments allowing limited-hours operation of the gas station, subject to the same traffic mitigation conditions. The neighbors continued to challenge these amendments and argued that the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) should have been joined as a co-applicant, and that Costco needed further permit amendments to operate at full-time hours.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Environmental Division had jurisdiction to consider whether Costco could operate the gas station at full-time hours. The Court concluded that Costco was not required to seek further amendments to its Act 250 or municipal permits before commencing full-time operation, as the permit conditions were satisfied either by the commencement of the DDI Project or by implementation of the signal timing modifications. The Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision and found the neighbors’ remaining arguments moot. View "In re Costco Wholesale Administrative Decision" on Justia Law

Janet Cote owns a property that was previously a gas station site. After discovering significant petroleum contamination in the soil, she applied for and received reimbursement from the Petroleum Cleanup Fund (PCF). The Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) later denied further reimbursement for costs associated with a licensed engineer and additional items on Cote’s property. The Environmental Division affirmed the ANR’s decision in part and reversed in part. Cote appealed the denied reimbursements.The Environmental Division held a two-day hearing and concluded that the ANR must reimburse Cote for electrical work, concrete work, and wastewater work, as these were pre-approved and the ANR’s subsequent denial was unreasonable. However, the court upheld the ANR’s denial of costs for a licensed engineer and other punch list items, finding the ANR’s decision reasonable and consistent with the law.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ANR’s denial of reimbursement for the licensed engineer and punch list items was reasonable. The court found the Environmental Division’s analysis lacking, as it did not adequately explain why the ANR’s denial was reasonable or provide sufficient findings of fact. The court noted that the Environmental Division merely restated the ANR’s conclusory arguments without proper analysis.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, instructing the Environmental Division to make adequate factual findings and any additional conclusions necessary on the disputed reimbursement claims. The court emphasized the need for clear reasoning and analysis to support the decision. View "In re Cote/Maquam Shore Market" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Vermont’s Auditor of Accounts and the Attorney General. The Auditor sued the Attorney General, alleging non-compliance with the statutory obligation to provide legal advice. The Auditor sought a declaratory judgment affirming his right to retain counsel to sue the Attorney General and mandamus to compel the Attorney General to answer specific legal questions. The trial court dismissed the Auditor’s claims and denied his request for attorneys’ fees.The dispute arose from the Auditor’s audit of a Burlington tax increment financing (TIF) district. The Auditor encountered a perceived gap in TIF statutes and sought advice from the Attorney General, who answered one question but directed the Auditor to other entities for the remaining questions. The Auditor claimed this was a violation of the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159 and threatened to sue. The Attorney General responded, explaining her statutory obligations and asserting that the Auditor lacked authority to sue.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claims for mandamus and declaratory judgment related to the specific TIF questions, concluding that the Attorney General had provided legal advice as required by 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the broader declaratory judgment claim, finding no live controversy as the Attorney General had provided legal advice and there was no policy of refusing to do so.However, the court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claim for declaratory judgment regarding his right to retain counsel and sue for mandamus. The court held that the Auditor has implied statutory authorization to seek mandamus to enforce the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees, finding Rule 54 inapplicable for the relief sought by the Auditor. View "Office of the Auditor of Accounts v. Office of the Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of a dairy farm and residences adjacent to Burlington International Airport, sued the City of Burlington for soil and water contamination caused by runoff from the airport. The contamination was due to the use of aqueous film-forming foam containing PFAS by the Vermont Air National Guard, which leased part of the airport. Plaintiffs alleged negligence, trespass, private nuisance, de facto taking, violation of the Vermont Groundwater Protection Act, increased water surface drainage, and direct negligence.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the complaint for failure to join the United States and the Guard as necessary and indispensable parties, and on the basis of municipal immunity. The court found that the United States and the Guard were necessary parties because their actions were central to the claims and their absence could lead to inconsistent obligations for the City. The court also held that municipal immunity applied to the claims related to firefighting services.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claim (Count 1) because it was based on the Guard’s firefighting activities, making the United States and the Guard necessary parties. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the other claims (Counts 2-5 and 7), which were based on the City’s failure to contain contaminated water on its property. The court found that these claims did not require the presence of the United States or the Guard as necessary parties.The court also remanded the case for further consideration of whether municipal immunity applied to the City’s maintenance and operation activities alleged in the surviving counts. The court noted that municipal airport operations are generally considered proprietary functions, which are not protected by municipal immunity. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Belter v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law