Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

S.S. was receiving temporary housing assistance through the Department for Children and Families (DCF) and staying at a shelter. After a confrontation with shelter staff over a mistakenly reassigned locker, S.S. was asked to vacate the shelter without prior warning. Consequently, DCF imposed a thirty-day period of ineligibility for further temporary housing assistance due to the shelter-rule violation. S.S. requested a fair hearing to challenge this decision, and a hearing officer recommended reversing the ineligibility period, which DCF subsequently did.S.S. then filed a motion with the Human Services Board to adopt the hearing officer’s findings and issue a final order. The hearing officer questioned the mootness of the case since DCF had already lifted the ineligibility period. The Board ultimately dismissed the case as moot, concluding there was no further relief it could provide since DCF had already granted S.S. the requested relief.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court held that the Board lacked the statutory authority to provide the relief S.S. sought, as the Board can only affirm, modify, or reverse DCF decisions and provide appropriate relief. Since DCF had already reversed the ineligibility period, there was no live controversy for the Board to address. The Court also found that the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply, as S.S. did not demonstrate a reasonable expectation of being subjected to the same action again. Consequently, the Board’s dismissal of the case was appropriate. View "In re appeal of S.S." on Justia Law

An applicant sought admission to the Vermont Bar through a transferred Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) score after passing the UBE in Maine on her sixth attempt. Vermont Rule 13(c) requires that a passing UBE score be achieved within no more than four sittings. The applicant requested a waiver of this requirement, arguing that her unique circumstances and qualifications warranted an exception.The Board of Bar Examiners denied the applicant's request for admission, stating that Rule 13(c) does not allow for a waiver of the four-sittings requirement. The applicant appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the court should read an implied waiver provision into Rule 13(c) and that the absence of such a provision was an oversight.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision, holding that the plain language of Rule 13(c) does not allow for a waiver and that it would be inappropriate to read such a provision into the rule. The court emphasized that the rules are designed to ensure that attorneys meet the standards for professional competence and that limiting the number of attempts to pass the bar examination is rationally connected to this goal. The court also noted that the applicant's arguments regarding fairness and public policy are best directed toward the Board's formal rulemaking process. The court rejected the applicant's request to waive the rule and admit her, stating that it would be inconsistent with the plain language of the rule and the established process for assessing professional competence. View "In re Granger" on Justia Law

A group of Burlington residents appealed a summary judgment order from the Environmental Division that upheld a permit for the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception Parish Charitable Trust to demolish church structures on its property. The residents argued that the court erred in concluding that 24 V.S.A. § 4413(a)(1)(C) prevented the City of Burlington from applying its Comprehensive Development Ordinance (CDO) to restrain the demolition. They also contended that the court erred in denying their motion to compel discovery regarding the pending sale of the property to a nonreligious buyer, asserting that the sale was relevant to the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C).The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the Trust, finding that the intended functional use of the property was for religious purposes, specifically the deconsecration of the Cathedral through demolition, which was an ecclesiastical process. The court concluded that applying the CDO would interfere with this intended functional use. The court also denied the residents' motion to compel discovery, determining that the information sought was unrelated to the issue on appeal, which was limited to whether § 4413(a)(1)(C) exempted the property from regulation under the CDO.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C) depends on the intended functional use of the property at the time of the application, not on the identity of the owner or potential future uses. The Court found that the Trust's intended use of the property for religious deconsecration through demolition was protected under § 4413(a)(1)(C). The Court also upheld the denial of the motion to compel discovery, as the future use of the property by a potential buyer was irrelevant to the current application. Thus, the summary judgment in favor of the Trust was affirmed. View "In re Cathedral of the Immaculate Parish Charitable Trust Appeal" on Justia Law

K.M., an adult with multiple disabilities, including autism and a seizure disorder, has been receiving Medicaid-funded developmental disabilities services for over twenty years. These services, provided by Washington County Mental Health Services (WCMHS), were supposed to include more than thirty hours of community support each week. However, since March 2020, K.M. has only received two to five hours of support weekly, leading to negative health effects.K.M. petitioned the Human Services Board to order the Department of Disabilities, Aging, and Independent Living (DAIL) to provide the full services he is entitled to. The Board dismissed his petition, stating it failed to specify the action required for compliance and that an order to provide services without available staff was too vague. The Board also interpreted K.M.'s request as seeking a broader policy change, which it deemed outside its authority, citing Husrefovich v. Department of Aging & Independent Living.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Board's dismissal. The Court held that the Board has the statutory authority to order DAIL to provide the services K.M. is entitled to under federal and state law. The Court clarified that while the Board cannot issue broad policy injunctions, it can provide specific relief to individuals. The Court found K.M.'s request for services clear and specific enough to inform DAIL of the required action. The case was remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Appeal of K.M." on Justia Law

Daniel Pomerantz appealed the Cannabis Control Board’s denial of his request to waive application and licensing fees for his proposed commercial cannabis cultivation establishment. Pomerantz claimed he qualified as a “social equity applicant” due to past incarceration for a cannabis-related offense and coming from a community historically impacted by cannabis prohibition. The Board determined he did not meet the criteria and denied his request.Initially, Pomerantz applied for a Tier 5 cultivation license on behalf of Rebel East, LLC, asserting he qualified for social equity status due to a past cannabis-related offense in Nevada. The Board found he was not eligible because his sentencing was deferred, and he was not incarcerated as a penalty for the offense. Pomerantz then argued he qualified as a socially disadvantaged individual due to his residency in Humboldt County, California, a region he claimed was disproportionately affected by cannabis prohibition. The Board allowed him to amend his application but ultimately found he did not demonstrate personal harm from living in Humboldt County.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision. The Court upheld the Board’s interpretation that “incarcerated” meant serving a prison sentence as a penalty for a cannabis-related conviction, which Pomerantz did not. The Court also agreed with the Board’s assessment that merely living in Humboldt County did not automatically qualify Pomerantz as being from a disproportionately impacted community. Furthermore, the Court found that Pomerantz did not sufficiently demonstrate personal harm from his residency in Humboldt County, noting his significant personal and professional advancements during that time.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that Pomerantz did not qualify as a social equity individual applicant under the Board’s rules. View "Pomerantz v. Cannabis Control Board" on Justia Law

The petitioner worked part-time as a bus fueler and washer at Marble Valley Regional Transit (MVRT) for approximately four years. He passed a preemployment drug screen and signed an acknowledgment of MVRT’s drug and alcohol policy, which included random drug testing and termination for a positive drug test. In December 2022, he tested positive for marijuana during a random drug test and was terminated in January 2023 for violating U.S. Department of Transportation and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regulations. The petitioner had a medical marijuana card issued in early 2020.The petitioner applied for unemployment benefits, which were denied by a claims adjudicator on the grounds of misconduct. He appealed to an administrative law judge (ALJ), who affirmed the denial but reduced the disqualification period to six weeks, recognizing the medical use of cannabis. The petitioner then filed a document with the Employment Security Board, seeking a declaratory ruling on the applicability of the misconduct disqualification provision to off-duty medical cannabis use. The Board treated this as an appeal and affirmed the ALJ’s decision, stating that the petitioner’s actions constituted misconduct under MVRT’s drug policy.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court held that the Board properly declined to issue a declaratory ruling because the petitioner had an available remedy through a direct appeal. The Court emphasized that declaratory rulings are not a substitute for timely appeals of agency decisions. The petitioner’s appeal of the Board’s decision was dismissed as untimely, and the Court affirmed the Board’s order declining to issue a declaratory ruling. View "Skoric v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

The Board of Allied Mental Health Practitioners denied an application for a license to practice clinical mental-health counseling in Vermont, citing the applicant's failure to meet educational prerequisites. The applicant, who graduated from a non-accredited program, argued that her coursework met the requirements through a combination of two courses. She also claimed that the Board had previously accepted similar coursework from another candidate, J.L., and sought to present evidence to support this claim.The Office of Professional Regulation (OPR) upheld the Board's decision. The applicant appealed, arguing that the Board and OPR improperly limited her ability to demonstrate that she was treated differently from similarly situated candidates. She also contended that the Board failed to justify its allegedly inconsistent application of licensing regulations. The appellate officer denied her motion to present additional evidence, concluding that the Board's evidentiary ruling was a matter of record and that the applicant was not seeking to introduce evidence of procedural irregularities but rather the excluded evidence itself.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the decisions of the Board and OPR. The Court held that comparator evidence might be relevant in some circumstances but found that the applicant failed to make a threshold showing that the Board had accepted credits from two courses in J.L.'s case. The Court also concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in excluding further evidence about J.L.'s coursework as cumulative and of dubious relevance. The appellate officer's denial of the motion to present additional evidence was also upheld, as the applicant did not demonstrate good cause for the motion. The Court affirmed the lower decisions, finding no basis to disturb them. View "In re McNamer" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Miriam Lowell and Seth Healey, challenged the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) after being investigated for child abuse and neglect. DCF substantiated the allegations and notified the plaintiffs, who then requested an administrative review. The review process was delayed, and the plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit claiming the process violated their due process rights. The federal court denied their injunction request, and the plaintiffs later filed a similar complaint in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and mandamus under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the complaint, assuming the plaintiffs had a protected liberty interest but finding the administrative review process constitutionally sufficient. The court noted that the plaintiffs' claims of potential procedural violations were speculative and not reviewable. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the administrative review process did not provide adequate due process protections.The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed Lowell's claims as moot because the administrative reviewer overturned the substantiation against her, providing her with no further relief. For Healey, the court assumed a protected liberty interest but found the administrative review process constitutionally adequate under the Mathews v. Eldridge test. The court noted that the process provided sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard, with a neutral arbiter and the ability to present evidence. The court emphasized the importance of DCF's interest in protecting children and the availability of a prompt post-deprivation hearing before the Human Services Board, which offers more extensive procedural protections. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Healey's complaint, concluding that the administrative review process met due process requirements. View "Lowell v. Department for Children and Families" on Justia Law

This case involves two consolidated appeals from Northwestern Medical Center and Rutland Regional Medical Center against the Green Mountain Care Board (GMCB). The GMCB had approved the proposed budgets of both medical centers for the fiscal year 2024, but with certain conditions. The medical centers challenged the GMCB's imposition of budgetary conditions that capped increases to rates charged to commercial payers. However, the medical centers had not properly raised their claims with the GMCB, leaving them unpreserved for review.The GMCB is an independent board that regulates the health care industry in Vermont. It reviews and establishes hospital budgets annually, with the aim of reducing the per-capita rate of growth in expenditures for health services in Vermont across all payers. The GMCB had released its established benchmarks for the 2024 fiscal year budget submissions, which included a benchmark that limited a hospital’s growth of net patient revenue/fixed prospective payment (NPR/FPP) to 8.6%, effectively capping increases to NPR/FPP growth by that amount. It also included a benchmark for commercial rate increases which provided that the GMCB would “also review and may adjust requested hospital commercial rate increases.”The GMCB approved the budgets of Northwestern and Rutland Regional, subject to certain conditions. These conditions included a cap on increases to commercial rates. However, neither Northwestern nor Rutland Regional had raised their claims with the GMCB, leaving them unpreserved for review.On appeal, Northwestern and Rutland Regional argued that the GMCB deprived them of due process by failing to provide adequate notice that it would impose the Commercial Rate Cap Conditions on their proposed budgets. They also claimed that the GMCB had no authority to impose the Commercial Rate Cap Conditions because the conditions lacked a factual basis and contradicted the GMCB’s initial approval of their proposed budgets. However, the Vermont Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of these claims because they were not preserved for review. The court noted that Northwestern and Rutland Regional had several opportunities to raise their claims with the GMCB before the GMCB issued its final budget decisions, but they failed to do so. Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the GMCB. View "In re Northwestern Medical Center Fiscal Year 2024" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by the Department of Corrections (DOC) against a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff P. Mark Potanas under the State Employee Whistleblower Act. Potanas, a former superintendent of Southern State Correctional Facility (SSCF), claimed that the DOC fired him in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. These activities included notifying the state about potential savings on a building renovation project and advocating for more mental health staff at SSCF. The DOC argued that Potanas did not engage in any "protected activity" under the Act, and thus, the trial court should have granted its request for judgment as a matter of law.The trial court denied the DOC's motion, finding that Potanas's report of potential waste and his complaints about mental health staffing were sufficient to meet the definition of "protected activity" under the Act. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Potanas, leading to the DOC's appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling, agreeing with the DOC that Potanas did not engage in protected activity under the Whistleblower Act. The court held that the Act does not encompass reports about the possibility of future waste and that reporting on a known problem or disagreeing about how to resolve a known problem is not protected activity. The court remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the jury’s verdict and enter judgment for the DOC. View "Potanas v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law