Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Armand Brisson was the owner of a two-story brick structure built around 1850 and located in the Town of Milton. He had lived in that building for most of his life. At the time of the events in question, he was living on the second floor of the building and utilizing the large attic for storage, while renting the first floor for use as a small bar/restaurant. In 2012, the Milton Police Department notified the Town’s deputy health officer that bricks were falling off the western exterior of the building onto the street and sidewalk below. After confirming this and observing that a part of the western brick wall was bulging out, the health officer issued an emergency health order later that same day condemning the building and declaring it unfit for any use or occupancy. Defendant did not contest either the civil penalty or the compensatory costs for engineering fees assessed against him by the court, but contended that the court’s award of attorney’s fees was neither authorized under the applicable statute nor warranted under an equitable exception to the American Rule requiring each party to bear the cost of its own attorney’s fees. After review, the Supreme Court agreed and therefore vacated the attorney’s fee award. View "Town of Milton Board of Health v. Brisson" on Justia Law

Prior to a March 3, 2015 town meeting, plaintiffs submitted three separate petitions to amend the Brattleboro town charter. Among other things, the petitions sought to: (1) allow residents sixteen and older to vote at town meetings; (2) allow voters to seek a referendum on articles authorizing the Town to spend more than $2 million; (3) limit the terms of town meeting representatives;1 (4) hold the elections of town representatives and town officials in November rather than March; (5) require employers within the Town to provide two hours paid leave for employees to vote at town meetings; and (6) have the town grand juror enforce the minimum wage and function as a district attorney for the Town. An "information sheet" was prepared by the selectboard, then emailed to town meeting representatives, the media, selectboard members, town staff, and a few other persons who requested it. Among other things, the information sheet stated that: (1) setting term limits would be “anti-democratic” in that it would “ban Brattleboro residents from [t]own meeting[s] because they had attended six years in a row”; (2) moving elections from March to November “would damage the link between . . . important parts of government and leave Brattleboro out of step with the rest of Vermont”; (3) requiring employers to provide paid leave for employees to attend town meetings “would mandate Brattleboro employers to pay employees to attend town meetings in other towns and states” and would impact “Brattleboro residents [who] already face very steep property taxes”; (4) giving powers to the town grand juror, which “is essentially obsolete in this modern era,” is unnecessary “because enforcement of laws and ordinances is handled by other elected officials and clear structures”; and (5) “setting separate rules for voter review of budget items over $2 million is confusing and arbitrary.” On March 3, 2015, town voters defeated the three petitions. Plaintiffs appealed a superior court order granting the Town summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ lawsuit claiming that the town selectboard unlawfully interfered (by way of the information sheet) with an election on their petitions to amend the town charter. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Daims v. Town of Brattleboro" on Justia Law

The Town of Rutland and five adjoining landowners (“neighbors”) appealed the Vermont Public Service Board’s grant of a certificate of public good (“CPG”) to Rutland Renewable Energy, LLC (“RRE”) for construction of the Cold River Solar Project (“Project”), a 2.3 megawatt (Mw) solar photovoltaic electric generation facility. The Town and neighbors argued that the Board incorrectly held that the project will not unduly interfere with the orderly development of the region, would not have an undue adverse effect on aesthetics, and would not have an undue adverse impact on historic sites. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Petition of Rutland Renewable Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1990, the City of Burlington obtained a land-use permit for the Waterfront Park (the Park). The City hosted a number of events at the Park in the summer of 1993 and may have hosted others prior to that time. In December 1993, the City applied for an amendment to its permit to allow for hosting of festivals and public events at the Park. During the amendment process, the City argued against any express permit condition regarding the timing, duration, and frequency of events and sound levels, taking the position that the City Parks and Recreation Commission should regulate these matters. In February 1994, after considering the impact on neighboring residents caused by noise and traffic from events, the district commission granted the amendment and imposed twenty-six conditions, some of which related to the maximum sound levels associated with events at the Park, when and where to measure those sound levels, and the timing and number of events that could be held at the Park. In August 2008, Allison Lockwood purchased her property located at 200 Lake Street, adjacent to the Park. Prior to purchasing the property, she researched and read the 1994 Permit, and specifically relied on the permit conditions governing the timing and frequency of events at the Park and the maximum allowed sound levels. At the time of her purchase, the neighbor was aware that festivals and events would take place at the Park, but she understood these events would be limited by the conditions in the permit. Neighbor was nevertheless significantly impacted by the events and festivals, experiencing loud noise for extended periods of time, significant vehicular and pedestrian traffic congestion, and limits on her ability to sleep, spend time outdoors, open her windows, and enjoy her property. This case began in November of 2012 when the City filed an application with the district environmental commission to amend a number of conditions in the 1994 permit. Lockwood appealed the amended land-use permit to the Environmental Division, then appealed when the Environmental Division awarded summary judgment to the City of Burlington. The Environmental Division ruled that the City is entitled to seek an amendment to its Act 250 permit covering the Waterfront Park located on the shores of Lake Champlain. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Waterfront Park Act 250 Amendment (Alison Lockwood, Appellant)" on Justia Law

The Burlington Administrators’ Association and Nicolas Molander (collectively the Association) appealed a trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration decision that Molander, in his capacity as an interim assistant principal, was not entitled to the contractual and statutory protections applicable to regular assistant principals who were not hired on an interim or acting basis. In particular, they challenged the trial court’s conclusion that it had no authority to review the merits of the arbitrator’s ruling for “manifest disregard of the law,” and argued that in this case, the arbitrator’s ruling evinced such a disregard. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator’s award did not in any event reflect a manifest disregard of the law, it did not address the question whether the trial court had authority to review an arbitration award under such a standard. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burlington Administrators' Ass'n v. Burlington Bd. of School Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-taxpayers Fred Osier and Eugene Shaver sued defendants Burlington Telecom, the City of Burlington and the City’s former Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) Jonathan Leopold to recover and restore to the City of Burlington’s general fund $16.9 million in cost overruns incurred by the City in connection with the operation of Burlington Telecom (BT). BT was a City-owned enterprise that provided an optical fiber-to-the-home network to Burlington residents and businesses. The trial court granted judgment to defendants. Taxpayers appealed, challenging the court’s denial of their request for an accounting from the City and its denial of their request to hold Leopold personally liable for the $16.9 million in City funds used for BT. Leopold cross-appealed, offering additional reasons why he should not have been held liable. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying taxpayers’ request for an accounting. The Court also agreed that Leopold was not personally liable for the $16.9 million in cost overruns. In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted the standard identified by the court in its pretrial ruling and held that any claim against Leopold had to include an element of bad faith. That critical element was lacking here. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision as to Leopold’s liability on that basis. View "Osier v. Burlington Telecom" on Justia Law

An interlocutory appeal came before the Supreme Court, involving an issue of the “stream-of-commerce” doctrine of personal jurisdiction. Defendant Total Petrochemicals & Refining USA, Inc. (TPRI) challenged a superior court decision denying its motion to dismiss, for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff State of Vermont’s complaint. The State alleged that TPRI, along with twenty-eight other defendants, contaminated the waters of the state by introducing into those waters a gas additive called methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Atlantic Richfield Company" on Justia Law

Applicants Allen Brisson, Michael Brisson, and Brisson Stone, LLC, claimed that their application for a commercial gravel extraction permit was allowed under the Town of Monkton’s zoning regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s denial of the application on the merits and held that, even if the application was deemed approved, the deemed approval remedy would not have stopped an interested party’s timely appeal to the Environmental Division on the permit’s merits. View "Brisson Stone LLC v. Town of Monkton" on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute between the Treetop at Stratton Condominium Association, Inc. and the Stratton Corporation, Treetop Development Company, LLC, Treetop Three Development Company, LLC, and Intrawest Stratton Development Corporation (collectively, Stratton) was an improperly constructed stormwater management system. The Association appealed District 2 Environmental Commission’s refusal to impose additional conditions on Stratton’s Act 250 permit, which the Environmental Division of the Superior Court determined to be invalid and unenforceable. Finding no reversible error after review of the arguments presented on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "In re Treetop Development Company Act 250 Development" on Justia Law

Pro se defendant Justin Gonyo appealed a family court order adjudicating nonparentage. The child at the center of this matter was born in 2011. Shortly thereafter, the child’s mother and defendant filed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Parentage (VAP) form with the Department of Health, Agency of Human Services. Both parties signed the form, which stated that they “voluntarily and without coercion, and of our own free will, hereby acknowledge that we are the biological parents of the child” and understand and accept “the legal rights and responsibilities that come with being a parent,” including rights to custody, visitation, and notice before the child may be adopted. The child’s birth certificate identified mother and defendant as the child’s parents. Mother and defendant separated in 2012. About a year later, in October 2013, the Office of Child Support (OCS) filed a Complaint for Support and Recovery of Debt, together with a “Motion for Genetic Testing Despite Parentage Presumption.” The motion alleged that, despite the presumption of parentage arising from the VAP, there were grounds to believe that defendant was not the biological father based on mother’s affidavit naming another individual as the biological father, and stating that she was already fourteen weeks pregnant when she and defendant got together. The following month, defendant filed a pro se pleading in which he opposed the motion for genetic testing and asked the court “to grant [him] a parentage order of the child.” Defendant acknowledged that he was not the child’s biological father and was aware of this when he signed the VAP, but claimed that there was “nothing wrong” with doing so, and that the time for rescinding it had expired. Defendant followed with a more formal motion to establish parentage in December 2013. In the meantime, the family court granted the motion for genetic testing, which took place in early January 2014. The test excluded defendant as the child’s biological father. Mother later filed a pro se motion to dismiss defendant’s parentage action, and OCS moved to set aside the VAP and to set the matter for a hearing. In February 2014, the family court issued a summary “order of non-parentage” based on the genetic test, dismissed defendant’s parentage action, and ordered the case closed. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that undisputed facts supported a motion to set aside the acknowledgment of paternity as a fraud on the court, and affirmed the judgment of nonparentage as to defendant on that basis. View "McGee v. Gonyo" on Justia Law