Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants Susan Beal and David Pearson appealed a Public Service Board decision to grant a certificate for public good (CPG) for the installation of a telecommunications facility by VTel Wireless, Inc. in Bennington. Appellants argued on appeal that the Board erred in finding that they had failed to demonstrate: (1) a "substantial interest" to intervene in the proceeding; and (2) a "significant issue" to warrant a hearing. Finding no reversible error in the Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Petition of VTel Wireless Inc. for a Certificate of Public Good" on Justia Law

A decision of the Environmental Division came to the Vermont Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal. Applicants, Richard J. Bove, Sr. and Rick Bove, applied to the City of Burlington Development Review Board (DRB) to construct a development on their two adjacent lots. A zoning-district-boundary line runs through the middle of the proposed development, dividing the two parcels. The city’s zoning ordinance required a fifteen-foot setback intended to be a buffer between the two districts (one downtown and the other residential). The DRB denied the application, and applicants appealed to the Environmental Division. The Environmental Division concluded that, although the merger of the two adjacent lots eliminated the property line dividing the two parcels, the merger did not eliminate the fifteen-foot buffer required by the zoning ordinance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Bove Demolition/Construction Application" on Justia Law

Mary McGuire and Douglas Grover separately appeal from orders of the Public Service Board granting Basin Harbor Club (BHC) a certificate of public good for the installation of a photovoltaic net metering system, and denying McGuire’s motion for reconsideration. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board erred in denying McGuire’s motion for reconsideration on the ground that she lacked party status, reversed and remanded. View "In re Application of Beach Properties, Inc. d/b/a Basin Harbor Club" on Justia Law

Claimant Roxanne Moran appealed a superior court's dismissal of her complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Claimant, a former employee of the Vermont State Hospital, separated from state service and applied for ordinary disability-retirement benefits in November of 2011. The Medical Review Board denied benefits, and claimant requested an evidentiary hearing after which benefits were again denied. Claimant then pursued an appeal to the superior court under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75. The court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, and claimant appealed. On appeal, claimant argued that because the superior court had jurisdiction over the appeal the Rule 75 action should not have been dismissed. In the alternative, claimant argued that, even if the superior court did not have jurisdiction to review the Board's decision, her timely filed Rule 75 complaint was sufficient to preserve the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Vermont Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4. In addition to its brief directly responding to claimant's arguments on appeal, the State also filed a motion to dismiss a portion of the appeal as untimely. Finding no reversible error and that the superior court indeed lacked jurisdiction to hear claimant's appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moran v. Vermont State Retirement Board" on Justia Law

A.M. was born in October 2011 to parents who admitted to their struggle with substance abuse. A.M. was taken into emergency DCF custody in June 2013. In its petition alleging that A.M. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS), DCF indicated that A.M. had been found in a motel room with parents in the presence of heroin and drug paraphernalia. The court issued a temporary-care order on June 4, 2013 transferring temporary legal custody of the child to DCF, and A.M. was placed with his maternal grandmother. A.M.'s Mother appealed the trial court’s disposition order continuing legal custody of the minor child A.M. with the Department for Children and Families (DCF). She argued that the court erred by failing to take evidence on whether the disposition plan should be amended to include reunification with A.M.’s maternal grandmother as a third concurrent goal. Mother contended that the court should not have taken judicial notice of a prior ruling concerning grandmother’s unsuitability to provide even temporary care for A.M. Based on these assertions, mother argued that the court’s order was unsupported by any findings. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

The City of Burlington and the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) applied for an Act 250 permit amendment to complete a project known as the "Champlain Parkway," a roadway designed to route traffic more efficiently from Interstate 89 in South Burlington to the City of Burlington’s downtown area. The environmental court concluded that the application complied with Act 250’s transportation criterion subject to conditions requiring that applicants monitor and report on the project’s traffic-congestion and safety impacts, and work with the opposing party in this proceeding, Fortieth Burlington, LLC, to resolve any remaining issues. Fortieth appealed, arguing that: (1) the conditions imposed by the court were not supported by the evidence and findings, exceeded the court’s authority, and were insufficient to mitigate the project’s adverse impacts; (2) the court misapplied the burdens of production and proof; and (3) the court erred in rejecting Fortieth’s proposed conditions. After review, the Supreme court "discern[ed] no basis to disturb the trial court’s finding that Fortieth failed to provide sufficient “details of [the alleged] improvement or the corresponding impacts on traffic,” and no ground to disturb the judgment." View "In re Champlain Parkway Act 250 Permit (Fortieth Burlington LLC, Appellant)" on Justia Law

On an afternoon in February 2009, two cars collided on State Route 63 in the Town of Berlin. The westbound car crossed the center line and crashed into plaintiff Kathleen Vanderbloom's car, which was heading east. The driver of the westbound car was killed. Plaintiff suffered serious, disabling physical injuries. Plaintiff filed an action against the State of Vermont, alleging that it negligently designed and constructed a state highway, causing her to suffer injuries in a car crash. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State on sovereign-immunity grounds. Finding no reversible error in the dismissal of plaintiff's case, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vanderbloom v. Vermont Agency of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Board hired plaintiff Juanita Burch-Clay as principal of West Rutland School with a two-year contract beginning July 1, 2011. Plaintiff’s contract authorized the Board to not renew her contract by providing written notice of its reasons for non-renewal on or before March 15. By letter dated March 14, the Board notified plaintiff of its decision not to renew her contract, citing “school climate” as the reason for non-renewal. The letter also stated that the Board would be willing to reconsider its decision upon plaintiff’s successful participation in a remedial plan developed and approved by the superintendent and the Board. Plaintiff followed up with a letter dated March 19 expressing her desire to work collaboratively with the Board to address its concerns. While plaintiff and the Board made inroads into fixing "deficiencies" raised by a review of her performance, plaintiff refused to stipulate to those deficiencies as characterized by the evaluation. The Board affirmed its earlier decision not to renew plaintiff's contract. Plaintiff filed a motion at the superior court for review under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 74, raising claims of both procedural defects and a lack of just cause for her termination. The superior court found no error in the conduct of the hearing and concluded that the Board had just and sufficient cause for termination. Finding no error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burch-Clay v. Taylor" on Justia Law

R.B. was born in September 2008; O.B. in December 2009; and K.C. in September 2011. In August 2012, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that the children were in need of care or supervision (CHINS) because they were without proper parental care. The court found it best to place the children with relatives if possible, and determined that the children's father's cousin Kristin and her wife Tammy Hall could take proper care of the children, at least in the short run, while work was done on a disposition plan. It was ultimately recommended that the children be placed for adoption, and the parental rights to both parents be terminated. The trial court found that Mother suffered from Munchausen’s disorder and Munchausen’s disorder by proxy. The court could not find that mother was likely to recover from these disorders at any particular time. It found no reasonable probability that mother could resume her parental duties within a reasonable period of time. Father was unwilling or unable to take over responsibility for the children’s medical care and appointments and ensure that recommendations and plans provided by DCF were implemented. As of the date of the TPR hearing, father continued to live with mother and had not developed the parenting and other skills needed to care for the children safely. It would be impossible, the court explained, for father to care for mother, protect the children, meet all of their needs, and support the family. Father was unemployed at the time of the hearing, although he was receiving some money for his work as a caretaker for mother. The parties received state benefits, which were barely sufficient to meet their financial needs. Finding no abuse of discretion in terminating the parents' rights to the three children, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination decision. View "In re R.B., O.B. and K.C." on Justia Law

Zaremba Group was the owner of the 10.08-acre plot of land in question in this case. The proposed building site lies within the floodway of Lovers Lane Brook. The Project, the building of a Dollar General store, would result in a loss of flood-water storage of 1,305 cubic yards, but was designed to include a flood-mitigation cut area, which would provide additional flood-water storage of 2,544 cubic yards. The Project would narrow the Brook floodway at two points, but both of these areas are at least as wide as the Brook's narrowest section, which is just south of the Project site. The Project includes a minimum fifty-foot buffer along the Brook. Neighbors of the plot of land appealed the environmental division's decision to grant an Act 250 permit amendment to Zaremba Group to build the store on that plot. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Zaremba Group Act 250 Permit" on Justia Law