Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gwendolyn Hallsmith was the planning and community development director for the City of Montpelier. Her employment was protected by a "justifiable cause" provision in the City's personnel plan. In November 2013, City Manager William Fraser placed Hallsmith on paid administrative leave, and sent a letter to her indicating that he was contemplating firing her under the City's personnel plan. In the letter, the city manager described various acts of unprofessional behavior and insubordination, damage to relationships with key individuals and governing bodies within city government, and inappropriate use of City resources. He asserted that these acts were grounds for disciplinary action under the City's personnel plan, and offered to meet with Hallsmith to consider any response she wanted to make. Hallsmith, accompanied by counsel, met with the city manager and argued her case. Following that meeting, the city manager dismissed Hallsmith from employment with the City. Hallsmith timely filed a grievance pursuant to the personnel plan, which provides for review of disciplinary action. At the grievance hearing, the city questioned Hallsmith and her witnesses extensively. Hallsmith was not permitted to cross-examine the city manager, the City's only witness. The assistant city manager, serving as the hearing officer, upheld the City's termination decision. Hallsmith subsequently filed a Rule 75 petition at the trial court, seeking reinstatement, reimbursement for lost compensation, and other remedies. In her petition, Hallsmith contested the merits of her termination, arguing that the City's decision to terminate her employment was not supported by sufficient evidence of justifiable cause, and that the hearing officer's decision to uphold the termination was not supported by the evidence and applied the wrong legal standard. She also raised a due-process challenge to the post-termination hearing procedures. In response, the City moved to dismiss the due-process claim, arguing that Hallsmith got all the process that was due. The City did not argue that the post-termination grievance hearing was constitutionally adequate. Instead, its sole argument was that the pre-termination "Loudermill" meeting, combined with the availability of a post-termination judicial remedy "Rule 75" petition challenging governmental action or a common-law action for breach of contract satisfied due process. On the merits, the City argued that there was credible evidence establishing justifiable cause for the assistant city manager's decision to sustain the City's firing of Hallsmith. The trial court rejected the City's argument that the availability of a post-termination judicial remedy in the form of a Rule 75 petition or a breach-of-contract action satisfied due process. The City appealed that decision, but after careful review of the trial court and Board records, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Hallsmith v. City of Montpelier" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a decision by the Town of Middlebury Development Review Board (DRB) to approve appellee Jolley Associates, LLC's application for a Planned Unit Development (PUD) to add a car wash to an existing gas station and convenience store within the Town limits. Appellant MDY Taxes, Inc. operated an H&R Block tax franchise in property rented in a shopping center adjacent to the Jolley lot. Appellant Village Car Wash, Inc. operated a car wash located approximately one-quarter of a mile from the Jolley lot. Appellants did not participate in the DRB proceeding, but sought to challenge the approval of the PUD through an appeal to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court. The environmental court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that appellants did not have standing, to appeal the DRB decision because they had not participated in the proceedings before the DRB as required by statute, and because they did not meet any of the exceptions to that statutory requirement. On appeal, appellants argued that a procedural defect prevented them from appearing before the DRB, and that it would be manifestly unjust if they are not afforded party status to appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Appeal of MDY Taxes, Inc., & Village Car Wash, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent T.S.S. appealed a Superior Court decision granting the commissioner of the Department of Mental Health's application for a continued order of non-hospitalization (ONH) compelling T.S.S. to continue undergoing mental-health treatment. T.S.S. argued that the superior court erred in interpreting 18 V.S.A. 7101(16) and applying it to the evidence. T.S.S. suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. T.S.S. "has demonstrated a clear pattern that for a short period of time, despite denying that he has a mental illness, he, on orders of non-hospitalization, will take medications and improve significantly. But when he is off the order of non-hospitalization, he quickly goes off medications and deteriorates." Over the fifteen-year history testified to at the hearing, there was no evidence that T.S.S. exhibited assaultive behavior or posed a danger to others. There was evidence, however, that at times T.S.S. posed a danger to himself. In June 2013, the commissioner filed an application for continued treatment. T.S.S. did not contest the application and stipulated to entry of the order. On May 27, 2014, the superior court granted the commissioner's application. T.S.S. appealed. Upon review of the Superior Court's interpretation of 7101(6), the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court applied the wrong legal standard to the evidence, and that the evidence and findings did not support a continued ONH in this case. View "In re T.S.S." on Justia Law

In February 2004, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) determined that petitioner K.R. placed her son T.F. at risk of harm, and it included her name on the Child Protection Registry. This determination followed a reported 2003 overdose on a controlled substance. In 2011, an independent administrative reviewer accepted the substantiation, and the Human Services Board upheld this decision. In its review, the Board found the social worker's testimony credible in setting out DCF's history with petitioner, DCF's concerns about petitioner's drug use, and the reasons for the substantiation. The social worker also kept contemporaneous case notes detailing the history of her interactions with petitioner, which the Board found corroborated her testimony. Petitioner argued to the Board that DCF failed to meet its burden of proof. She asserted that any information regarding her interactions with DCF after the 2003 overdose were irrelevant pursuant to Vermont case law. She stated that she did not place T.F. at risk of harm because he was not in her care on the day that she overdosed. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that that the hearing officer impermissibly found that "the Board can take notice of information documenting the effects on those using Oxycontin including impaired judgment," and that those effects "can compromise a person's ability to parent resulting in placing a child at risk of harm." She contended that the mere use of illegally obtained regulated drugs could be a per se ground for substantiation. The only order on appeal was that issued by the Board, and the Board expressly declined to adopt the finding that petitioner challenged on appeal before the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found the Board's findings did not support its decision: without any evidence that T.F. was actually at risk, petitioner could not be found to have failed to mitigate a risk to her child by failing to comply with DCF's recommendations. Th View "In re K.R." on Justia Law

The New England Police Benevolent Association (NEPBA) appealed the Vermont Labor Relations Board's dismissal of NEPBA's petition for election of a collective-bargaining representative for NEPBA's failure to provide justification for its untimely filing. On January 30, 2014, NEPBA filed a petition for the election of a collective-bargaining representative to represent the sworn law enforcement officers of the Vermont Department of Fish and Wildlife, Vermont Department of Liquor Control, and Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles (collectively "the officers"). The officers seeking new representation were among those in the Non-Management Bargaining Unit, which was covered by a collective-bargaining agreement between the Vermont State Employees Association (VSEA) and the State of Vermont. The existing collective-bargaining agreement was set to expire on June 30, 2014, and the Non-Management Bargaining Unit was scheduled to conduct a ratification vote on a successor agreement on January 31, 2014, the day after the petition was filed. On appeal, NEPBA argued that the Board failed to consider its proffered justification and instead improperly concluded that the NEPBA provided no justification. Moreover, NEPBA asserted that the Board failed to conduct any analysis in support of its position, explain its findings, or define the applicable legal standard. NEPBA also argued that its proffered justification that the pending ratification of the successor agreement would foreclose the officers' opportunity to select a collective-bargaining representative ­is sufficient to waive the normal period for timely filing. The Supreme Court disagreed with NEPBA on the first issue and held that the Board did not err in dismissing the petition for NEPBA's failure to provide a justification for the untimely filing. View "In re New England Police Benevolent Association Petition for Election of Collective Bargaining Representative" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether Act 250 jurisdiction extended to the siting and related construction proposed for the Vermont Air National Guard Base at the Burlington International Airport to accommodate the anticipated arrival of eighteen F-35A jets. Following a request for a jurisdictional opinion, the Environmental Division concluded that there was no Act 250 jurisdiction because the development served no state purpose and there was no material change to any existing permit. The requesting individuals appealed that decision, arguing that the proposed changes are development for a state purpose and subject to Act 250 review. Those individuals further contended that the project amounted to a substantial change to preexisting development on the Guard base, which required a permit, and a material change to an existing Act 250 permit, which required application for an amended permit. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded there was no Act 250 jurisdiction, and affirmed. View "In re Request for Jurisdictional Opinion re: Changes in Physical Structure and Use at Burlington International Airport for F-35A" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ralph Nelson, the former town manager of St. Johnsbury, appealed a trial court decision granting partial summary judgment to defendants, the Town of St. Johnsbury and its individual selectboard members (collectively "the Town"), on his claims of wrongful termination; violation of procedural due process under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983; violation of Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution; and promissory estoppel. In September 2010, the selectboard formally hired plaintiff as town manager after he served briefly on an interim basis. According to plaintiff, the Town's attorney advised him on three separate occasions that he could be removed only for serious misconduct, which the attorney assured was "an extremely high bar." As town manager, plaintiff undertook a major project to renovate and lease the Town's Pomerleau Building. He gained voter approval on a renovation budget and negotiated a lease with a potential tenant. The selectboard contended plaintiff made certain misrepresentations about the proposed lease, which plaintiff denied. Selectboard chair James Rust informed plaintiff that the board had concerns about his performance and gave him a letter stating that the board would be conducting an inquiry. Rust called plaintiff and notified him that the selectboard would be meeting but that plaintiff was not obligated to attend (plaintiff nonetheless attended). When the meeting convened that evening, the selectboard immediately recessed to executive session. After forty-five minutes, the board asked plaintiff to join them, at which time they discussed the lease. The selectboard asked plaintiff if he wanted to resign, and he declined. Consequently, the board returned to public session and passed a vote of "no confidence." According to plaintiff, he did not understand until that time that the selectboard was terminating his employment. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful termination, Civil Rights Act, and state constitutional claims. The Court affirmed the court's dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim and its grant of summary judgment on the qualified immunity defense. View "Nelson v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Blimar Team Cleaners appealed a superior court decision to uphold the Burlington Board of Tax Appeals' appraisal of its property at 150 Shelburne Road in Burlington at a value of $193,500. Taxpayer contended on appeal that: (1) there was sufficient evidence that the property was not assessed at fair market value to overcome the city appraisal's presumption of validity; and (2) the City of Burlington failed to meet its burden of proof demonstrating the property was assessed at fair market value. Finding no reason to disturb the appraisal or the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Bilmar Team Cleaners" on Justia Law

Petitioner was admitted to a nursing home in September 2010. She was eighty-seven years old at the time, and had a diagnosis of dementia and Alzheimer's disease. Petitioner's adult daughter, who had the authority to act on petitioner's behalf by virtue of a power of attorney, submitted an application for long-term care Medicaid benefits in January 2011. The application sought coverage for petitioner, retroactive to October 1, 2010, pursuant to a Medicaid rule authorizing benefits for up to three months preceding the month of application. A benefits specialist with the Department for Children and Families testified that, in response to the application, she sent two separate verification requests to petitioner's daughter and an administrator at petitioner's nursing home. The Department received no response to these requests. Accordingly, in March 2011, the Department issued a Notice of Decision ("Notice") denying the application. No appeal of the denial was filed by petitioner or a person acting on her behalf within the ninety-day limit. Petitioner's daughter would submit a total of four applications, each with a request from the Department for additional information, and each time, no information was provided, and the applications were denied. With the assistance of her son, petitioner filed a fifth application for benefits in February 2012. This time, additional information verifying petitioner's financial eligibility was provided, and the application was approved by the Department in May 2012 with benefits retroactive to November 2011, which was three months prior to the date of the fifth and final application. Petitioner appealed that decision, seeking coverage retroactive to October 2010, which would have been three months prior to her first application from January 2011. An evidentiary hearing was held in July 2013 before a Department hearing officer. The Board adopted the hearing officer's findings and issued a decision reversing the Department's decision to limit retroactive benefits to November 2011. The Board concluded that, for reasons of equitable estoppel, petitioner could be awarded benefits retroactive to October 1, 2010 based on the date of the initial application. The Department sought review by the Secretary, who reversed the Board's decision. Because petitioner did not respond to the Department's multiple requests for verification, did not advise the Department of any valid reasons for failing to respond, and informed the Department's benefits specialist that the failure to respond was her responsibility, that she had "dropped the ball." Accordingly, the Secretary found no justification to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and reversed the Board's decision. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Secretary's reversal of the Board's ruling. View "In re Bernice Landry" on Justia Law

The subject property was two large parcels of land in the Town of Manchester. Sand, rock, and gravel had been extracted from a portion of one or both parcels for decades. In September 1990, respondents' predecessor-in-interest received an Act 250 permit authorizing a nineteen-lot residential subdivision on the northern parcel. Among other conditions, the Act 250 permit provided that it would expire one year from the date of issuance if the permittee had not demonstrated an intention to proceed with the project in accordance with 10 V.S.A. 6091(b), and otherwise would expire on October 1, 2020 unless extended by the District Environmental Commission. Other permit conditions prohibited any "changes . . . in the design or use" of the project without written approval of the district coordinator or commission, and specified that the permit and all conditions therein would "run with the land and . . . be binding upon and enforceable against . . . all assigns and successors in interest." In September 1992, the district commission issued an amendment to the permit extending the time for construction of the project to October 1994. In June 1994, respondent Dorr Oil Company purchased a portion of the property designated as a residential tract. The warranty deed expressly referenced the Act 250 permit "and any and all amendments thereto." Shortly thereafter, respondent Donald Dorr, on behalf of Dorr Oil applied for and received a further permit amendment extending the time for construction to October 1995. During this period, another company operated by Dorr, respondent MGC, Inc., purchased the southerly parcel (the "adjacent tract"), and continued to operate a gravel pit "most or all" of which the trial court found was located on the adjacent tract. Dorr took no steps to begin the actual subdivision of the project tract or the development of an internal roadway. In March 2006, following a property-tax reappraisal of the tracts by the Town, respondents filed a request with the district commission to declare the Act 250 permit as abandoned through non-use. The commission, in response, issued a notice of intent to abandon the permit. The owners of a nearby residential property filed an objection, asserting that respondents had made a "material change" to the use authorized by the Act 250 permit by expanding gravel extractions activities onto the residential project tract. The commission then "tabled" the abandonment request "pending a jurisdictional opinion from the district coordinator on the material change question." The district coordinator thereupon requested further information from the parties, visited the site with respondent Dorr and his attorney, and issued a draft jurisdictional opinion for comment. In January 2007, the coordinator issued a formal opinion, finding that the "Dorr gravel pit has expanded onto the parcel covered by [the Act 250 permit]," that this constituted "a material change to that permit," and therefore that "a permit amendment [was] required." Respondents neither appealed the jurisdictional opinion to the Environmental Division, applied for a permit amendment, nor abated the gravel extraction activities on the project tract. Following respondents' inaction, in October 2008, the NRB chair issued an administrative order determining that respondents had violated conditions of the Act 250 permit by making a material change to the project without a land-use permit amendment. Respondents appealed the Superior Court, Environmental Division's judgment affirming the NRB's decision that respondents' gravel-extraction activities violated an Act 250 residential-subdivision permit. Respondents argued the ruling was in error because the permit had expired. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nat. Resources Bd. Land Use Panel v. Dorr" on Justia Law