Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Neighbors Barbara Supeno and Barbara J. Ernst appealed a superior court's decision to uphold the Town of Addison Development Review Board's (DRB) grant of certificates of occupancy for two detached decks and a conditional use permit for an enclosed deck to applicants Linda and John Carrigan for improvements to applicants' seasonal camp on Lake Champlain. At the heart of this dispute was a series of decks that applicants constructed on their property and the efforts of the Town to bring the decks into compliance with the current zoning bylaws. Applicants' seasonal camp was located on Lake Champlain in the Town of Addison's Shoreland Residential (SR) District. Applicants purchased their property in 1984 and shortly thereafter built an attached, uncovered deck on the west side of the camp, facing Lake Champlain, adding ten feet in length to the footprint of the camp. Applicants then replaced an existing concrete platform, retaining wall, and set of stairs located on a slope down to the lakeshore, and added some decking behind the wall. As a result, applicants arguably had two decks within the setback area. In 2003, applicants applied for and received a permit to build a roof over the uncovered deck that was attached to the west side of the camp. Applicants also enclosed the deck by adding walls. In 2010, applicants applied for and received a permit to construct a detached, "standalone deck" on the west side of the camp, abutting the now-enclosed attached deck. The permit application did not disclose the presence of the decking that applicants had placed behind the retaining wall when they reconstructed the concrete platform and stairs in the 1980s. In 2011, neighbors notified the ZA that the standalone deck violated section 2.3(F)(7)(a) of the bylaws, which limited the number of detached decks an applicant could construct within the SR District. They argued that the decking behind the retaining wall constituted a "deck" and that therefore the standalone deck on the west side of the camp was not allowed under the bylaws. Applicants removed the decking from behind the retaining wall to comply with the bylaws. The ZA later discovered that, when constructed, the standalone deck was in fact attached and advised applicants to cut through the connecting boards to create a freestanding structure. The DRB then granted a certificate of occupancy for this deck (the environmental court's affirmance of this certificate of occupancy was another issue on appeal). Neighbors filed this appeal, arguing that the environmental court erred in affirming the DRB's grant of certificates of occupancy for the detached decks and a conditional use permit for the enclosed deck. Neighbors also argued the actions of the ZA and DRB directly contravened state and local policies protecting sensitive shoreland areas and lakes. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of the certificates of occupancy and reversed on the grant of the conditional use permit. View "In re Carrigan Conditional Use and Certificate of Compliance, Certificate of Occupancy, Certificate of Compliance" on Justia Law

Two taxpayers appealed a trial court judgment affirming a decision of the board of abatement of the Town of Pownal, which denied their request for tax abatement. The taxpayers sought abatement of the property taxes on several contiguous properties for the years 2005 through 2011. First, taxpayers argued that the Town's delinquent-tax collector erred in assessing interest and fees on the entirety of an overdue tax bill after refusing to accept a partial payment that taxpayers had proffered in 2011. Second, taxpayers argued that the listers had erroneously and without notice to taxpayers reclassified their property for several years, resulting in improperly inflated tax bills. Third, the taxpayers argued that one sewer-bond payment is applied to each parcel. Fifth, taxpayer Guntlow explained that a house site up to two acres around a house was subject to an exemption in the taxation calculus that was unavailable to taxpayers during the years when their property was misclassified. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case the trial court with instructions to remand to the Board of Abatement, for a more detailed explanation of the reasons for its denial of taxpayers' request for abatement on the ground that the misclassification of their property over a course of years amounted to a manifest error or mistake, and its request for abatement on the ground that taxation of their .66-acre leach field from 2005 to 2010 as an individual property amounted to manifest error or mistake. In the alternative, the Board could hold a new hearing on those two issues. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Guntlow v. Town of Pownal Board of Abatement" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Town of Ira brought this action to recover from its insurer, Vermont League of Cities and Towns Property and Casualty Intermunicipal Fund, Inc. (PACIF), certain losses related to the embezzlement of town funds by the Town's former treasurer. On summary judgment, the trial court found that the Town was entitled to interest on the embezzled amount up to the policy limit and that this amount mooted the Town's claim for audit and attorney's fees, as well as insurer's counterclaims to recoup certain sums already paid. It also granted judgment to insurer on the Town's claim that insurer acted in bad faith by not paying for all of the items it claimed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. View "Town of Ira v. Vermont League of Cities and Towns" on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal of superior court decision, on appeal from a decision of an appellate officer, remanding this disciplinary case to the Board of Nursing to determine whether the Board intended that the case be continued. The central question for the Supreme Court's review was whether an attorney for the Office of Professional Regulation (OPR) within the office of the Vermont Secretary of State has the power to appeal a Board of Nursing decision vacating an earlier consent order suspending from practice appellee, David Shaddy. The Court concluded that the attorney had this power and reinstated the decision of the appellate officer. View "Shaddy v. State of Vermont Office of Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

In 1997, the Village of Derby Center and the City of Newport entered into a contract whereby the Village would supply 10,000 gallons of water per day to the City. The City claimed that the contract did not authorize the Village to adopt a new rate schedule in 2006 that included a ready-to-serve fee on top of actual water usage charges. The Village counterclaimed, alleging that the City connected customers who were not authorized under the contract, and that the City’s water use was chronically underreported due to equipment malfunction. After a trial, the superior court ruled for the City on its contract claim, holding that the ready-to-serve fee was not authorized by either contract or statute. As to the Village’s counterclaims, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the unauthorized-connection claim, and referred the water-usage-reconstruction claim to mediation. The Village appealed on all counts. The Supreme Court found: the plain language of the agreement authorized the use of a ready-to-serve fee to support the Village’s maintenance of its facilities. "The court erred in concluding otherwise." With respect to the Village's counterclaims, the Supreme Court found that the trial court indicated that it was clear, based on the billing periods showing a reading of zero usage by the City, that there were some erroneous readings, but it referred the Village’s claims to mediation without further resolution. After the City brought suit, the Village filed a motion to allow its counterclaim as to the underreported usage, which the trial court granted. The trial court’s decision to refer the Village’s counterclaim to mediation in its order, after it had already granted the Village’s motion to allow the counterclaim at trial, served only to create greater delay and expense to the parties, thus undermining the purpose of the alternative dispute resolution clause. "Even if the trial court would ordinarily have discretion over whether to send a counterclaim to mediation, under these circumstances the trial court could not properly rescind its decision, relied on by the parties, to allow the counterclaim after the trial had already taken place. Therefore, we remand the Village’s counterclaim for resolution by the trial court." View "City of Newport v. Village of Derby Center" on Justia Law

This case centered on a disputed permit for a wastewater system and potable water supply granted to applicants David and Martha Musto for a home on Lake Bomoseen. Next-door neighbor Carolyn Hignite appealed the environmental court's decision to deny her request to revoke the permit issued to applicants in 2009, and to dismiss her direct appeal of the permit. Applicants cross-appealed the environmental court's holding that neighbor had standing to appeal in either instance. Along with her brothers, Hignite was part owner of a lake property that has been in their family for sixty-two years. Applicants' property is a .38-acre lot on the western shore of the lake, which contained a single-story seasonal camp of about 960 square feet. In 2009, applicants submitted a permit application to the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to replace the camp's septic system and on-site water supply. On the permit application, applicants described the project as the "reconstruction of a 3 bedroom year-round single use family residence using a new wastewater disposal system and drilled bedrock water supply well." ANR issued the requested permit to applicants on March 30, 2009. In August 2009, Hignite filed a petition with ANR to revoke the permit, claiming that applicants submitted false or misleading information on the permit application regarding the number of bedrooms in the camp. ANR held a hearing in May 2010, and denied neighbor's petition to revoke the permit. Hignite subsequently appealed the permit to the environmental court in 2010, over a year after the permit was issued to applicants. Hignite also appealed ANR's denial of revocation in 2013. The environmental court reviewed both cases de novo but did not conduct a new hearing, instead basing its review on exhibits and testimony from the ANR hearing, as the parties stipulated. Hignite appealed the court's decision on both dockets. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court's holding in both of the neighbor's appeals. View "In re Musto Wastewater System" on Justia Law

Thirteen Town of Williston residents appealed the Superior Court, Environmental Division’s grant of a discretionary permit to All Metals Recycling, Inc., to establish an outdoor storage area and install a scale and scale house. The discretionary permit allowed All Metals to continue operating a previously unpermitted scrap-metals recycling business in Williston. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision. View "In re All Metals Recycling, Inc." on Justia Law

This property tax appeal centered on the valuation of five electrical substations, seven transmission lines, a fiber-optic line, land, and utility easements located within the Town of Vernon. Taxpayer Vermont Transco LLC challenged a decision of the state appraiser fixing the 2011 listed value of taxpayer’s utility property in the Town at $92 million. Taxpayer argued: (1) the state appraiser should have used an alternative nonlinear depreciation schedule (the “Iowa Curve” method) because that method was previously approved by the Supreme Court in reviewing the method of property tax appraisal; (2) the state appraiser’s decision on fair market value was not supported by a sufficient analysis of the “core factual issues, including whether fair market value is best estimated by the economic or physical life of the assets, and what those lives are;” (3) the state appraiser’s decision to follow the Town’s appraiser in not depreciating assets during the first year of service was wrong; and (4) the state appraiser’s decision to include an appraised value for the utility easements was also wrong. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further findings regarding the lifespan of the property to be used in calculating depreciation. View "Vermont Transco, LLC v. Town of Vernon" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Ugo Quazzo appealed a superior court decision to uphold a determination by the Commissioner of Taxes that he failed to prove a change of domicile for purposes of obtaining an income-sensitive homestead property tax adjustment on his Vermont residence for the years 2007 through 2009. He argued that the Commissioner erred in treating this case as one involving a change of domicile, rather than maintenance of domicile, so that taxpayer had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he had changed domicile to Vermont, even though he had declared (and the Department of Taxes did not challenge) his Vermont domicile years earlier. He also argued that the Commissioner’s findings are insufficient to support her conclusions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Quazzo v. Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

"At its heart, the present controversy is about noise - specifically, airport-generated noise and its effects on immediate neighbors." Airport neighbor, George Maille, appealed the Superior Court, Environmental Division's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees City of Burlington and City of South Burlington. The court upheld the South Burlington Zoning Administrative Office's issuance of fifty-four zoning permits to the City of Burlington and Burlington International Airport (BTV) and concluded that applicants were not required to submit a site plan for zoning board approval. Each permit allowed the BTV to demolish, remove, and fill in the cellar hole of a vacant structure on BTV-owned property. Maille contended that the environmental court erred in concluding that site plan review of the applications was not required under the South Burlington Land Development Regulations. Although the Supreme Court disagreed with part of the environmental court’s reasoning, it ultimately affirmed its holding that site plan review was not required for the removal of the structures and the placement of fill in the structures' respective cellar holes. View "In re Burlington Airport Permit" on Justia Law