Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Vermont Spay/Neuter Incentive Program (VSNIP) was created in 2006 to subsidize dog, cat, and wolf-hybrid sterilization procedures for low-income Vermonters. Sue Skaskiw and the organization she directed, Vermont Volunteer Services for Animals Humane Society (VVSA), administered the VSNIP program from its inception in 2006 until the expiration of Skaskiw's contract in October 2012. Defendant Vermont Agency of Agriculture initially managed the program but responsibility was transferred to defendant Department for Children and Families (DCF), a department within the Agency of Human Services, in 2011. Defendant Kristin Haas was an employee of the Agency of Agriculture; defendants Kathleen Smith and Carol Maloney were employees of DCF. Sometime after the program's inception, the Agency of Agriculture contracted with Skaskiw to run VSNIP. She still held the contract when responsibility shifted to DCF in 2011, but at that time DCF put the contract out for a competitive bid. Two bidders, Skaskiw and VT-CAN!, submitted proposals, and VT-CAN! won the contract. Skaskiw subsequently filed this lawsuit. Skaskiw appealed the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss of defendants Vermont Agency of Agriculture, Department for Children and Families, Haas, Smith, and Maloney on Skaskiw's claims of defamation, violation of due process, economic interference, and failure to discharge a mandatory duty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Skaskiw v. Vermont Agency of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the civil suspension of his driver's license and his conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI). He argued that the police lacked reasonable grounds to stop him, and thus, the court should have granted his motion to suppress and dismiss. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Hinton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kathleen Langlois owned a building with commercial space on the first floor and an apartment on the second. She failed to pay the water bill for the property. Plaintiff alleged that she arranged with a representative of the Town of Proctor to disconnect the water service so she would not incur further water expenses, but that the Town failed to do so. In reliance on the Town's promised undertaking, plaintiff discontinued heating the building, causing the pipes containing water to freeze and split under the first floor of the building, which, in turn, flooded the first floor and basement, causing extensive damage to the building. Plaintiff brought this action with four counts: negligence, breach of contract, consumer fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. With respect to the negligence count, the Town argued that it had no duty to disconnect the water service or to disconnect the service with reasonable care or, alternatively, that any duty was based on its contractual obligations and could not give rise to tort liability. With respect to the contract claim, the Town argued that it had no contractual obligation to disconnect the water service and that it was exercising its right under a statutory delinquency collection procedure. It further argued that the contractual relationship between plaintiff and the Town was terminated when plaintiff failed to pay her water bill. The case was then tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict for plaintiff. In answering the special interrogatories, the jury found that there was a contract between plaintiff and the Town "regarding the turning off of her water service," but that the Town had not breached that contract. It found that the Town was negligent, that its negligence was a proximate cause of harm to plaintiff, and that plaintiff's damages were $64,918.44. Among the things the Town argued on appeal, it argued that the court should have instructed the jury to apply comparative negligence, and that the instructions on damages were erroneous because the proper measure of damages was the diminution in value of the building and, in any event, there was no evidence of that diminution. Plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the jury instructions improperly failed to allow the jury to find that the Town breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court rejected the Town's argument on appeal that it had no tort duty to properly turn off plaintiff's water. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury: "the instructions as a whole did not contain the spirit of the law. If we could determine from the damages award or the interrogatories that the jury found that plaintiff was not negligent and was not obligated to mitigate damages, we could find an absence of prejudice. We cannot do so here; the damages awarded by the jury were less than plaintiff claimed." On remand, the trial court was ordered to instruct the jury on comparative negligence. Because of the defect in the jury instructions, the Court did not address the remaining issues on appeal. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Langlois v. Town of Proctor" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review involved the power of a court to require an estate to create a trust to satisfy potential future claims against the estate, as well as the proper application of the dead man's statutes. Developers of a residential subdivision died, triggering various claims by and against their estates relating to the estates' responsibilities for the subdivision's private roadway, water, and sewer infrastructure. The Town of Manchester appealed a superior court decision denying the Town's request that the court create a trust from the assets of the estates to pay for repairs, maintenance, and improvements to the subdivision's sewer system to protect the Town's water supply. A group of homeowners separately appealed the trial court's denial of their request for a ruling that the estates had a legal obligation to dedicate the infrastructure to the Town and, until that happened, to maintain the infrastructure at their expense. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments and the applicable statutes and Vermont case law, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's refusal to create the trust requested by the Town, but reversed the court's denial of the homeowners' request for a ruling on their claims. The case was remanded for reconsideration of those claims based on the evidence, including evidence that the trial court previously excluded under the dead man's statute, to determine whether an enforceable promise was made concerning maintenance of the infrastructure pending its dedication to the Town. View "Hayes v. Town of Manchester" on Justia Law

Petitioners Garfield and Lucille Goodrum owned 41.54 acres in Reading; all but two acres of land surrounding their home was enrolled in the UVA Program as undeveloped forest land. The Goodrums formed Turtle Hill Farm of Vermont Animal Sanctuary, Inc. (THF), a non-profit corporation whose mission is to rescue, rehabilitate, foster, and adopt out animals, including horses, chickens, rabbits, and guinea pigs. The Goodrums leased four barns and two sheds to THF. THF is funded almost exclusively by donations, which it uses to cover its operating expenses. Most of the donations come from the Goodrums. In 2010, the Goodrums applied to enroll the barns and sheds leased to THF in the UVA Program, which would exempt the buildings from property taxation, but the Department of Taxes Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR) determined that the buildings were ineligible. The Goodrums appealed to the Director of PVR, who also determined that the buildings were ineligible. The Goodrums then appealed to the superior court, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted PVR's motion, concluding that the buildings are not eligible for enrollment because THF did not operate for gain or profit and is therefore not a farmer under 32 V.S.A. 3752(7). The Goodrums appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Goodrum v. Vermont Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

This case raised the issue of whether Act 250 required consideration of alternative siting in every case in which a party objects to a proposed land-use project on aesthetic grounds, pursuant to 10 V.S.A. 6086(a)(8), without regard to the presence of competent evidence supporting alternative siting as a reasonable mitigating measure. Goddard College obtained an Act 250 permit from District Environmental Commission No. 5 in 2012, authorizing it to replace individual oil-fired systems in each of twenty-three campus buildings with a new central woodchip boiler system on its campus in Plainfield. Appellant-neighbor Karen Bouffard challenged the Superior Court's grant of the Act 250 permit, arguing that the court failed to properly consider measures to mitigate the aesthetic impact of the project by siting it elsewhere on the college property. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Goddard College Conditional Use, Goddard College Act 250 Reconsideration" on Justia Law

Neighbors Barbara Supeno and Barbara J. Ernst appealed a superior court's decision to uphold the Town of Addison Development Review Board's (DRB) grant of certificates of occupancy for two detached decks and a conditional use permit for an enclosed deck to applicants Linda and John Carrigan for improvements to applicants' seasonal camp on Lake Champlain. At the heart of this dispute was a series of decks that applicants constructed on their property and the efforts of the Town to bring the decks into compliance with the current zoning bylaws. Applicants' seasonal camp was located on Lake Champlain in the Town of Addison's Shoreland Residential (SR) District. Applicants purchased their property in 1984 and shortly thereafter built an attached, uncovered deck on the west side of the camp, facing Lake Champlain, adding ten feet in length to the footprint of the camp. Applicants then replaced an existing concrete platform, retaining wall, and set of stairs located on a slope down to the lakeshore, and added some decking behind the wall. As a result, applicants arguably had two decks within the setback area. In 2003, applicants applied for and received a permit to build a roof over the uncovered deck that was attached to the west side of the camp. Applicants also enclosed the deck by adding walls. In 2010, applicants applied for and received a permit to construct a detached, "standalone deck" on the west side of the camp, abutting the now-enclosed attached deck. The permit application did not disclose the presence of the decking that applicants had placed behind the retaining wall when they reconstructed the concrete platform and stairs in the 1980s. In 2011, neighbors notified the ZA that the standalone deck violated section 2.3(F)(7)(a) of the bylaws, which limited the number of detached decks an applicant could construct within the SR District. They argued that the decking behind the retaining wall constituted a "deck" and that therefore the standalone deck on the west side of the camp was not allowed under the bylaws. Applicants removed the decking from behind the retaining wall to comply with the bylaws. The ZA later discovered that, when constructed, the standalone deck was in fact attached and advised applicants to cut through the connecting boards to create a freestanding structure. The DRB then granted a certificate of occupancy for this deck (the environmental court's affirmance of this certificate of occupancy was another issue on appeal). Neighbors filed this appeal, arguing that the environmental court erred in affirming the DRB's grant of certificates of occupancy for the detached decks and a conditional use permit for the enclosed deck. Neighbors also argued the actions of the ZA and DRB directly contravened state and local policies protecting sensitive shoreland areas and lakes. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of the certificates of occupancy and reversed on the grant of the conditional use permit. View "In re Carrigan Conditional Use and Certificate of Compliance, Certificate of Occupancy, Certificate of Compliance" on Justia Law

Two taxpayers appealed a trial court judgment affirming a decision of the board of abatement of the Town of Pownal, which denied their request for tax abatement. The taxpayers sought abatement of the property taxes on several contiguous properties for the years 2005 through 2011. First, taxpayers argued that the Town's delinquent-tax collector erred in assessing interest and fees on the entirety of an overdue tax bill after refusing to accept a partial payment that taxpayers had proffered in 2011. Second, taxpayers argued that the listers had erroneously and without notice to taxpayers reclassified their property for several years, resulting in improperly inflated tax bills. Third, the taxpayers argued that one sewer-bond payment is applied to each parcel. Fifth, taxpayer Guntlow explained that a house site up to two acres around a house was subject to an exemption in the taxation calculus that was unavailable to taxpayers during the years when their property was misclassified. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case the trial court with instructions to remand to the Board of Abatement, for a more detailed explanation of the reasons for its denial of taxpayers' request for abatement on the ground that the misclassification of their property over a course of years amounted to a manifest error or mistake, and its request for abatement on the ground that taxation of their .66-acre leach field from 2005 to 2010 as an individual property amounted to manifest error or mistake. In the alternative, the Board could hold a new hearing on those two issues. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Guntlow v. Town of Pownal Board of Abatement" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Town of Ira brought this action to recover from its insurer, Vermont League of Cities and Towns Property and Casualty Intermunicipal Fund, Inc. (PACIF), certain losses related to the embezzlement of town funds by the Town's former treasurer. On summary judgment, the trial court found that the Town was entitled to interest on the embezzled amount up to the policy limit and that this amount mooted the Town's claim for audit and attorney's fees, as well as insurer's counterclaims to recoup certain sums already paid. It also granted judgment to insurer on the Town's claim that insurer acted in bad faith by not paying for all of the items it claimed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. View "Town of Ira v. Vermont League of Cities and Towns" on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal of superior court decision, on appeal from a decision of an appellate officer, remanding this disciplinary case to the Board of Nursing to determine whether the Board intended that the case be continued. The central question for the Supreme Court's review was whether an attorney for the Office of Professional Regulation (OPR) within the office of the Vermont Secretary of State has the power to appeal a Board of Nursing decision vacating an earlier consent order suspending from practice appellee, David Shaddy. The Court concluded that the attorney had this power and reinstated the decision of the appellate officer. View "Shaddy v. State of Vermont Office of Professional Regulation" on Justia Law