Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In consolidated cases, the common issue centered on whether Vermont laws allowed the Town of Colchester to consider certain intangible factors in assessing seasonal lakefront camps located on leased land. The Supreme Court held that the Town was not precluded from considering such factors in assessing properties. View "Lesage v. Town of Colchester" on Justia Law

Vanderminden, a Family Limited Partnership, owned a contiguous piece of property in the adjoining towns of Poultney and Wells. The Wells portion was at issue in this case: the state appraiser affirmed the Town's valuation of the property. On appeal, the partnership argued that the appraiser failed to supply a sufficient explanation for its decision to accept the Town's valuation; in assessing the Wells and Poultney properties as a single parcel then valuing the Wells portion as a seasonal dwelling; and for not accepting the partnership's evidence that the Wells portion was assessed above fair market value of the entire parcel. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the valuation of a single property in more than one town includes both the fair market value of the entire parcel, and of the portion in the town involved in the appeal. Because the partnership presented evidence to demonstrate that the Wells portion's valuation exceeded the fair market value of the entire parcel, Wells' appraisal should have been reduced accordingly. Furthermore, the state appraiser should have given its reason for the high valuation. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vanderminden, A Family LTD Partnership v. Town of Wells" on Justia Law

Defendants Timothy Persons and the Trust A of Timothy Persons appealed an Environmental Division decision holding that certain excavation work performed on their property violated the state Wetlands Protection and Water Resources Management laws and the state Wetlands Rules. Among other things, defendants contended they were not given adequate notice that portions of the lands in question contained a protected wetland, and therefore, should not have been subjected to fines. The Supreme Court found no merit to defendants' contentions, and affirmed the Environmental Division. View "Agency of Natural Resources v. Persons" on Justia Law

The Town of Vernon appealed a superior court decision that reversed its decision to fire police chief Kevin Turnley. The Selectboard determined that the chief made inaccurate statements at public meetings when asked about his knowledge of a certain criminal defendant's (a sex-offender) residence in town and why he didn't tell the community. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that Selectboard failed to make the necessary findings on record to support the chief's firing, so the Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Turnley v. Town of Vernon" on Justia Law

The Town of Hartford and Marc and Susan Wood have been involved in a property dispute for over a decade. At issue: the construction of a large concrete retaining wall along the Woods property. They appealed the latest superior court decision in the matter. In 1999, the Town approved the Woods' application for a zoning permit to construct the wall. In early 2000, Woods began stockpiling recycled concrete slab sections in order to construct it. The Town served Woods a Notice of Violation (NOV) and filed an enforcement action, arguing that the concrete was not what was specified in the zoning permit. A court determined that Woods failed to meet the specifications for the permit. Woods appealed, and thus began the litigation that ultimately wound up before the Supreme Court in this case. In 2011, the superior court concluded that Woods still had not adhered to the permit's specifications. Woods raised thirteen claims of error on appeal, mostly challenging the sufficiency of evidence and errors in interpretation of the zoning code. Finding no error in the superior court's 2011 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Wood NOV, Town of Hartford v. Wood" on Justia Law

The Town of Fairfax cited homeowner Leon Beliveau for changing the use of his property from a single-family dwelling to a rooming-and-boarding house without obtaining the necessary zoning permits. Beliveau argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding his property was used as a boarding house, and that the Town's zoning laws were unconstitutionally vague. Finding no error in the trial court's view of Beliveau's property, and that the town's zoning laws were not unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Beliveau NOV, Town of Fairfax v. Beliveau" on Justia Law

"J.H." appealed an adjudication that she was a child in need of care and supervision (CHINS) for being "habitually and without justification truant from compulsory school attendance." J.H. contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the findings; and (2) the court improperly shifted the burden of proof on the question of whether she was habitually truant "without justification." The only witness was a Bennington County deputy sheriff who testified that he served as the County's truancy officer. The officer testified that he ended up transporting J.H. to school on two subsequent days in January. On the third occasion, the officer served a "truancy notice," the purpose of which was to warn a parent or guardian that a truancy case could be brought if their child is continually absent. The officer went to the home twice more in January (the fourth and fifth visits that month) but there was no response from anyone at the residence. At the conclusion of the officer's testimony, J.H.'s counsel moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to establish that J.H. was habitually truant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that five truancy reports within "a matter of weeks . . . meet[s] the definition of being habitually not at school."  The court also observed it had "no evidence . . . of justification for [J.H.] not being in school." Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the record evidence was fundamentally insufficient to establish that J.H. was truant on the days alleged. "Inasmuch as the evidence here was plainly insufficient under [33 V.S.A. 5102(3)(D)], we are compelled to conclude that the adjudication of CHINS based on truancy must be reversed." View "In re J. H." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a superior court order affirming the University of Vermont's denial of his application for in-state tuition status. He raised a host of challenges to the court's ruling, arguing primarily that it was inconsistent with the court's finding that plaintiff was domiciled in Vermont. Plaintiff moved to Vermont in 2007 to enroll as an undergraduate at the University of Vermont ("University" or "UVM"). He paid the out-of-state tuition rate through the first three years of his undergraduate studies, and first applied for in-state tuition status in June 2010. In his application he stated that, although he first came to Vermont to attend UVM, he chose to permanently relocate to Vermont because he loved the area and intended to reside in Burlington after graduating. UVM denied the application, citing several pertinent provisions of UVM's In-State Status Regulations. In his administrative appeal, plaintiff reiterated that he came to UVM because of the reputation of its pre-medical program and medical school, and he explained that during his freshman year he was accepted into a premedical program that leads to automatic acceptance to UVM medical school for students who complete the program. Plaintiff also explained that, although he needed only one more course to complete his graduation requirements, he was seeking in-state tuition status to enable him to take additional electives in the fall of 2010 and spring of 2011 to become "a more diversified medical school applicant." UVM denied his administrative appeal. In light of the review standards the University used in denying Plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff's reliance on the superior court's "finding" was misplaced: "[f]or our purposes here, the critical findings are those of the University, not the trial court. UVM was the adjudicator of the facts in this matter, and the record is clear that it employed the original version of Regulation 3, which both parties agree governed plaintiff's application." Moreover, UVM made no finding as to plaintiff's common-law domicile, but rather concluded on the basis of its review of the record that plaintiff did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was eligible for in-state tuition. The Court concluded that the record contained ample competent evidence to support the University's determination, and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Roberts v. University of Vermont" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned whether the Vermont Public Service Board had jurisdiction to regulate interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services provided in Vermont. The Board concluded that fixed VoIP was a "telecommunications service" under Vermont law and Vermont regulation of VoIP was not preempted by federal law because intrastate calls could be separately identified. The Board deferred consideration of what type of regulation to impose to a separate phase of the proceeding. On appeal, Comcast Phone of Vermont, LLC argued that the Board erred in not addressing whether interconnected fixed VoIP was an information service or telecommunications service under federal law because, according to Comcast, VoIP is an information service and therefore any regulation is preempted by federal law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Board must reach this question and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Investigation into Regulation of Voice Over Internet Protocol" on Justia Law

New England Coalition, Inc. (NEC) filed a complaint to the Supreme Court seeking injunctive relief to enjoin Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) from continuing to operate the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. NEC alleged that Entergy was operating in violation of the Public Service Board’s final order approving the 2002 sale of the power plant to Entergy in Docket No. 6545. Finding no grounds to grant equitable relief, the Supreme Court dismissed NEC's complaint. View "In re Investigation into General Order No. 45" on Justia Law