Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue in two consolidated cases concerned a public housing authority and three of its tenants.  Bennington Housing Authority (BHA) appealed two trial court decisions dismissing ejectment claims against tenants, and granting summary judgment to tenants on two counterclaims: (1) that BHA failed to properly advise tenants of their right to request a grievance hearing when it billed them for repairs and fines; and (2) that BHA’s policy of fining tenants for open windows in the winter is prohibited under federal regulations. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that BHA violated federal regulations for insufficient notice of the grievance procedure in both the termination of lease notices and the bills for maintenance and repair costs sent to tenants. The Court agreed with the trial court that BHA’s window-fine policy was prohibited by federal regulations.  BHA’s ejectment claims were thus dismissed, and the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on tenants’ counterclaims was affirmed. View "Bennington Housing Authority v. Lake" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charlotte Rumsey appealed a decision by the Vermont Human Services Board which denied her Choices for Care (CFC) Services on a tie vote of the Board. The issue before the Board was whether petitioner met the eligibility requirements for either highest need or high need services. Petitioner was seventy-four years of age at the time of the Board's evidentiary hearing and lived alone. She suffers from chronic seizure disorder, osteoarthritis of the knees and ankles, cerebral vascular disease, depression, anxiety, and obesity. She applied for CFC benefits to obtain home-delivered services to allow her to remain safely in her home. To avoid being placed on a waiting list, she must meet eligibility requirements for highest need or high need services. The hearing officer issued her proposed findings of fact, a recommended decision to affirm the DAIL denial, and a statement of reasons. The Board met to consider this and other cases with six of seven members present. After hearing argument, the six members tied on whether to accept the hearing officer's recommendation. The Board did unanimously accept the hearing officer's findings of fact. It decided that in the case of a tie vote, the "Department's original decision stands." Following the Board decision, petitioner moved to reopen the case, seeking a Board decision based on the vote of all seven members. Petitioner also argued that the decision did not contain findings on the elements of the CFC eligibility standards. DAIL opposed the motion. The Board denied the motion. It concluded that the findings were complete. In response to petitioner's request for a vote by all seven members, the Board stated that, if the case were reopened, there would be no guarantee "that all seven members would be present." The Board noted that it was following the rule of courts for instances where there is a tie vote and that reopening would only delay an authoritative decision from the Supreme Court on the meaning of the CFC regulations. On appeal, both parties argued that the Supreme Court should reach the merits of the case; in the alternative, petitioner sought a remand for proper findings and to have all seven of the Board members decide the case. DAIL opposed the alternative and suggested that the Court instead declare the meaning of the regulations and remand for the Board to find the relevant facts and render a decision. The Board denied petitioner's motion to reopen in part because it did not want to delay the case reaching the Supreme Court for an authoritative interpretation of the CFC regulations. The Court did not agree with this reasoning. In its view, the quality of the Court's decision improved when it had "the informed analysis and decision of the Board. The decision before us has no reasoning or conclusions, and we do not know why either of the sides voted as it did." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Rumsey" on Justia Law

Appellants John and Margaret Toor appealed a decision of the Superior Court, Environmental Division, which upheld a notice of violation issued by the Town of Grand Isle Zoning Administrator for changing the use of their single-family home in Grand Isle without obtaining a zoning permit. On appeal, appellants argued that renting their home did not constitute a change in use under the Town's zoning ordinance, and accordingly they were not required to obtain a zoning permit prior to renting. Upon review of the applicable zoning ordinances and the parites' briefs on appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with Appellants and reversed the Zoning Administrator's decision. View "In re Toor & Toor Living Trust NOV" on Justia Law

Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) appealed a decision of the Vermont Employment Security Board finding claimant, Abdullahi Mohamed, eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Board found that claimant’s discharge for off-duty criminal conduct did not constitute gross misconduct disqualifying him from unemployment compensation benefits. On appeal, FAHC argued that the Legislature’s recent amendments to the Vermont Unemployment Compensation Act required the Board to disqualify claimants from receiving unemployment compensation benefits when an employer can no longer retain them as a result of off-duty criminal conduct. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mohamed v. Fletcher Allen Health Care" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kevin Turnley appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Town of Vernon. Plaintiff, formerly the Town’s Chief of Police, claimed that he was entitled to receive overtime pay under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which entitles nonexempt employees to overtime pay for time worked in excess of forty hours in a week. The trial court held that plaintiff was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements because he was an "executive" employee. Upon review of the applicable legal standard and the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed that Plaintiff was indeed exempt from receiving overtime pay. View "Turnley v. Town of Vernon" on Justia Law

Vermont Golf Association challenged the superior court’s dismissal of its appeal from a decision by the Department of Taxes assessing sales and use tax on prior activities. The court based its dismissal on Vermont Golf’s failure to provide security to the Commissioner of Taxes to perfect its appeal to the superior court. Finding no error in the superior court's disposition of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont Golf Association, Inc. v. Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

The Windsor County State's Attorney filed an interlocutory collateral final order appeal seeking review on the question of whether 13 V.S.A. 4815(g)(1) violated the Vermont Constitution's separation-of-powers provision by divesting the trial court of the authority to order an inpatient mental health evaluation of a potentially incompetent defendant. The Attorney General intervened on behalf of the State, arguing that the appeal was improvidently granted, and that the statute is constitutional. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no justiciable claim because the necessity of an inpatient evaluation and the constitutionality of the statute were not decided below. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Vermont v. M.W." on Justia Law

Hartford police officers responded to a report of a possible burglary in progress, and used considerable force in restraining the suspect. The alleged burglar turned out to be the homeowner, who was disoriented due to a medical condition. Journalist Anne Galloway requested records relating to the police contact with the homeowner from the chief of police. The chief denied Galloway's request, as did the town manager when Galloway appealed the chief's decision. After Galloway filed an action to compel production of the records, the superior court ruled that under the Public Records Act's (PRA) exemption for police investigations, the police did not need to provide Galloway with any records produced or acquired before the point at which the officers decided against charging the homeowner with a criminal offense. Galloway then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the homeowner's detention amounted to an arrest, the records in question must be disclosed under the PRA's proviso that "records reflecting the initial arrest of a person . . . shall be public." View "Galloway v. Town of Hartford" on Justia Law

The Franklin County Sheriff's Office appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the St. Albans City Police Department. The Sheriff's Office contended that the City Police Department engaged in an unfair method of competition with the intent to harm competition under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act's (VCFA) predatory pricing provision. Specifically, the Sheriff's Office argued that the City Police Department submitted an "artificially low" bid in response to the Town of St. Albans's request for proposals for law enforcement services. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. "Here, the 'competitors' are all statutorily created entities, meaning that one entity cannot lower its prices so as to put another out of business, nor can potential entrants be deterred from entering the 'market' because the statutory scheme allows no new entrants. Although there is competition within a limited sphere as between the statutorily empowered entities, there is no threat of monopolization by any one of them. Thus, the Sheriff's Office's injuries alleged in the complaint do not fall within the zone of interests to be protected by Vermont's predatory pricing statute. . . .the Sheriff's Office was not denied something in which it had a legally protected interest, nor is its claim within the zone of interests protected by the statute, and it therefore lack[ed] constitutional and prudential standing." View "Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. St. Albans City Police Department" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Daniels wanted to foreclose on a mortgage on two parcels of real property owned by defendant Elks Club of Hartford, Vermont. Defendant creditors, who include the Vermont Human Rights Commission, four individual women, and the Watts Law Firm, all have junior security interests in the property at issue and opposed foreclosure. Creditors appealed a trial court decision granting plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff had standing to foreclose and was entitled to a judgment of foreclosure against all parties, and dismissing creditors' counterclaims. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision to include certain advances in the mortgage amount and the dismissal of the counterclaims. View "Daniels v. Elks Club of Hartford" on Justia Law