Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Joshua Handverger, the former city manager of the City of Winooski, appealed a trial court's dismissal of his claim for extraordinary relief against the City under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 and a related wage claim for double damages under 21 V.S.A. 347. Plaintiff argued that the Winooski City Council improperly terminated his employment by failing to give him a public hearing between fifteen and thirty days after the city council voted to dismiss him, as provided in the Winooski City Charter. The trial court ruled that since the charter explicitly bars judicial review of any action suspending or removing the city manager, Plaintiff was not entitled to review of the City’s action under Rule 75. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and therefore affirmed its decision. View "Handverger v. City of Winooski and O'Brien" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Lay appealed a superior court’s order that granted summary judgment to Defendants William J. Pettengill, Elizabeth F. Novotny, and Daniel K. Troidl on his complaint. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from an internal investigation into his behavior as a state trooper and his subsequent resignation from the Vermont State Police (VSP). Plaintiff argued that the superior court erred in granting judgment to Defendants on his claims of fraudulent nondisclosure, retaliatory prosecution, malicious prosecution, and negligent referral. He also challenged several discovery rulings made by the court. Plaintiff was suspended from duty due to an ongoing investigation by the Internal Affairs Unit. He would later hire a lawyer and settle charges against him which included falsification and misuse of property and evidence; making a false statement; failing to follow-up or make reports in numerous cases; and abuse of authority for conducting a warrantless search. The Windham County State Attorney's office became involved in commencing a criminal prosecution against Plaintiff. A judge found probable cause to issue a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. At the time the second investigation was pending, Plaintiff had found new work by a private company. He was terminated from his job as a result of the arrest warrant. Upon returning to Vermont, he was charged with numerous crimes. He reached a plea agreement. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed suit against defendants raising numerous claims, including fraudulent nondisclosure, violation of his civil rights, and malicious process. In April 2010, the court issued the summary judgment decision from which Plaintiff appealed. Finding no legal basis for Plaintiff's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and dismissed his case. View "Lay v. Pettengill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Andrew Kennery, on behalf of the estate of Gladys Kennery, appealed the decision of the Windham Superior Court that granted the State's motion for summary judgment on his complaint alleging negligence, gross negligence, and civil rights violations against the State, two state troopers, and the Vermont Department of Public Safety (VDPS). Plaintiff's lawsuit stemmed from a "welfare check" the troopers performed on Plaintiff's decedent, Gladys Kennery. Gladys's daughter had requested that the troopers check on her elderly mother, but the troopers searched the wrong residence. Meanwhile, Gladys had collapsed in her backyard and was unable to get back up and reach shelter. Gladys was found the next morning and died twelve days later from hypothermia caused by prolonged exposure to the cold. The superior court held that the State owed no duty of reasonable care in performing the welfare check, thereby defeating Plaintiff's claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants. Genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether a duty of care was created under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A based upon the State's undertaking to perform the welfare check and whether the troopers breached that duty such that the State was liable under the Vermont Tort Claims Act (VTCA). The Court also held that the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claim of gross negligence against the troopers. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kennery v. Vermont" on Justia Law

"This is a case of avoidable error and its consequences." The Vermont League of Cities and Towns (VLCT), the workers' compensation insurance carrier for the Town of Randolph, settled a compensation claim of Claimant Stacey Colson and paid the settlement amount to the Office of Child Support pursuant to an earlier order that OCS issued to collect Claimant's back child support payments. VLCT failed to deduct the amount of an attorney's fee lien granted by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor (DOL) to claimant’s lawyer. VLCT acted with the understanding that the lawyer would not seek the fee if, as occurred, claimant was awarded a lump-sum compensation amount. The lawyer sought her fee, but VLCT resisted double paying that amount, and the dispute has ended up before the Supreme Court after two decisions from the Commissioner and one from Superior Court. Claimant appealed the Commissioner’s grant of summary judgment to VLCT, in which the Commissioner concluded that VLCT acted appropriately in paying over the entire proceeds of claimant’s workers’ compensation award to OCS. Claimant argued that his attorney's lien had priority over OCS's claim for child support arrearages. He claimed that the Commissioner's findings were incomplete and contradictory, that the Commissioner erred when she determined his attorney’s lien did not have priority, and that DOL should be compelled to enforce his attorney’s lien for fees. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the OCS lien was first in time and therefore took priority, and affirmed the Commissioner's holding that VLCT could not be required to pay the attorney's fee amount to Claimant's attorney. View "Colson v. Vermont League of Cities & Towns" on Justia Law

Taxpayer-Petitioner Michael Garbitelli appealed a superior court judgment that affirmed the Town of Brookfield Board of Abatement's denial of his request for a tax abatement. During a townwide reappraisal in 2007, Petitioner refused to allow the listers to inspect his property, other than the foyer and the basement. His property was assessed at $1.6 million. Petitioner then appealed this assessment, and the Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Petitioner had refused entry to the tax assessor and therefore failed to provide an adequate basis to demonstrate that the assessment was erroneous. Taxpayer later allowed entry to the listers for 2009, which resulted in an assessment of $957,000. Taxpayer then moved for a tax abatement for the years 2007 and 2008. The Board denied the request, finding that there was no mistake attributable to the listers since they were denied entry and were forced to use the best information available to them. Although the Supreme Court agreed with Petitioner's interpretation of the abatement statute’s meaning, it reached the same result as the superior court: "[Petitioner] argues principally that the 'extreme disparity' between $1.6 million and $957,000 is an 'obvious mistake' amounting to manifest error." The Court disagreed with that premise and affirmed the superior court. View "Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case raised the question of the meaning of "expungement" within the Vermont judicial system. Defendant F.M. sought the removal of references to a dismissed count from docket entries regarding his case. In December 2008, Defendant was charged with four counts. In June 2009, under a plea agreement with the State, Defendant pled guilty to Count 2, reckless endangerment; the State dismissed the other three counts; and Defendant received a deferred sentence and the promise that Count 2 would be dismissed if Defendant successfully completed mental health court proceedings. In February 2010, the court, upon request, Recognized that Defendant had successfully completed mental health court requirements and, per the plea agreement, dismissed Count 2 and ordered expungement of the record pursuant to 13 V.S.A. 7041(e). Following this order, however, the docket sheet for Defendant’s case still referred to Count 2, labeling it "expunged" in the list of disputes and referring in the descriptive docket entries to "disputes 1-4." The following month, Defendant moved to correct the clerical record to remove all references in the docket entries to the expunged count. The court denied the motion "[i]n light of the problems outlined in the emails" among count clerks, administrators, and information services personnel describing the complexities involved in deleting docket entries from the electronic system. Defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to enforce its expungement order because of the difficulty of compliance, noting that the docket entries concerning his case continue to refer to "disputes 1-4," rather than "disputes 1, 3-4," a direct violation of the expungement required by statute. The State filed a letter with the Court explaining its decision not to file a brief "given that the sole issue concerns how the judiciary carries out expungements rather than whether or not the record in this particular case should be expunged." Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and ordered the expungement: "[t]he difficulties inherent in deleting docket entries from our current docket entry system-while real-do not justify a violation of the statute on the part of the judiciary." View "Vermont v. F.M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Craig Pease appealed the trial court’s summary judgment determination that Defendants the Windsor Development & Review Board (DRB) and the Town of Windsor had fully responded to his Public Records Act (PRA) request and had not violated his constitutional rights. On appeal, Plaintiff contended that Defendants’ responses to his PRA requests were improperly made through counsel and the custodian of records and thus did not comply with the statute. He also contended that the trial court erred in both its conclusion that his free speech claims against defendants based on their filing of a motion for protective order were barred by litigation immunity and its conclusion that the remainder of his alleged free speech violations were cured by subsequent hearings. Plaintiff's property abuts another lot that is the site of a proposed subdivision development, Morgan Meadows. The Windsor Development Review Board (DRB) approved the subdivision application; Plaintiff, through counsel, appealed this decision to the superior court. In connection with that appeal, Plaintiff made written pro se public records requests to the Town’s Zoning Administrator, and to the seven individual members of the DRB. One DRB member responded personally to Plaintiff’s requests by sending Plaintiff the records he requested. The remaining members responded through the Zoning Administrator. Following a dispute over whether the DRB fully cooperated with Plaintiff's requests, the Town ultimately filed a motion for protective order asking the superior court to enjoin Plaintiff from requesting additional records or contacting DRB members other than through counsel. The Town argued that his public records requests were actually nothing more than discovery requests in the pending appeal, and therefore, Plaintiff’s attorney of record should be the one seeking the records. Upon review of the superior court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found the DRB complied with Plaintiff's requests, and that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated by any of the DRB's actions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the DRB. View "Pease v. Windsor Dev. & Review Bd" on Justia Law

Applicants Howard Smith and Morrill House, LCC appealed a decision of the Superior Court’s Environmental Division that denied their request for a variance to subdivide property located in the Town of Fair Haven, Vermont. They contended on appeal that their application should have been deemed approved because the town zoning board of adjustment failed to issue its decision denying the application within the deadline prescribed by the relevant statute and local zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court found in its review of the applicable legal authority that "[it] held that a decision is rendered so as to avoid the deemed approval language as long as it is 'finally made before the expiration of the forty-five day period, regardless of when, or if, the decision is reduced to writing.' … The board here made a decision within the prescribed period but failed to notify Applicants within that period and the bases for the decision. Following our previous case law, we will strictly construe the deemed approval remedy to apply only when the decision was not made within the prescribed period, which was not the case here." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Division's decision. View "In re Appeal of Morrill House, LLC and Smith Variance" on Justia Law

The issue on this appeal centers on who should bear responsibility for the cost of cleaning up petroleum contamination caused by releases from a gas station's underground storage tanks. The controversy in this appeal was between the State of Vermont, which runs the Vermont Petroleum Cleanup Fund (VPCF) and Stonington Insurance Co. (Stonington), which insured Bradford Oil, the owner of the underground storage tanks, for approximately a three-and-a-half-year period. The State appealed the trial court's judgment limiting Stonington's liability to a 4/27 share of past and future cleanup costs and awarded the State $45,172.05. On appeal, the State argued: (1) the Supreme Court's application of time-on-the-risk allocation in "Towns v. Northern Security Insurance Co." did not preclude joint and several liability under all standard occurrence-based policy language; (2) the circumstances here, including the reasonable expectations of the insured and the equity and policy considerations, support imposing joint and several liability on Stonington for all of the State's VPCF expenditures; and (3) even if time-on-the-risk allocation would otherwise be appropriate, Stonington was not entitled to such allocation because it failed to show sufficient facts to apply this allocation method in this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Towns" was the controlling case law here, and the Court was unconvinced by the State's reasonable expectations, equity, and policy arguments to distinguish the "Towns" decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Bradford Oil Co. v. Stonington Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a written agreement between the City of Rutland and the Vermont Swim Association (VSA) that granted VSA the right to host its annual swim meet at a facility in a city park. VSA appealed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the City. Because the plain language of the parties' contract did not require VSA to pay attorney's fees incurred by the City in pursuing either indemnity from VSA or other third-party actions, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Southwick v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law