Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Taxpayer-Petitioner Michael Garbitelli appealed a superior court judgment that affirmed the Town of Brookfield Board of Abatement's denial of his request for a tax abatement. During a townwide reappraisal in 2007, Petitioner refused to allow the listers to inspect his property, other than the foyer and the basement. His property was assessed at $1.6 million. Petitioner then appealed this assessment, and the Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Petitioner had refused entry to the tax assessor and therefore failed to provide an adequate basis to demonstrate that the assessment was erroneous. Taxpayer later allowed entry to the listers for 2009, which resulted in an assessment of $957,000. Taxpayer then moved for a tax abatement for the years 2007 and 2008. The Board denied the request, finding that there was no mistake attributable to the listers since they were denied entry and were forced to use the best information available to them. Although the Supreme Court agreed with Petitioner's interpretation of the abatement statute’s meaning, it reached the same result as the superior court: "[Petitioner] argues principally that the 'extreme disparity' between $1.6 million and $957,000 is an 'obvious mistake' amounting to manifest error." The Court disagreed with that premise and affirmed the superior court. View "Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case raised the question of the meaning of "expungement" within the Vermont judicial system. Defendant F.M. sought the removal of references to a dismissed count from docket entries regarding his case. In December 2008, Defendant was charged with four counts. In June 2009, under a plea agreement with the State, Defendant pled guilty to Count 2, reckless endangerment; the State dismissed the other three counts; and Defendant received a deferred sentence and the promise that Count 2 would be dismissed if Defendant successfully completed mental health court proceedings. In February 2010, the court, upon request, Recognized that Defendant had successfully completed mental health court requirements and, per the plea agreement, dismissed Count 2 and ordered expungement of the record pursuant to 13 V.S.A. 7041(e). Following this order, however, the docket sheet for Defendant’s case still referred to Count 2, labeling it "expunged" in the list of disputes and referring in the descriptive docket entries to "disputes 1-4." The following month, Defendant moved to correct the clerical record to remove all references in the docket entries to the expunged count. The court denied the motion "[i]n light of the problems outlined in the emails" among count clerks, administrators, and information services personnel describing the complexities involved in deleting docket entries from the electronic system. Defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to enforce its expungement order because of the difficulty of compliance, noting that the docket entries concerning his case continue to refer to "disputes 1-4," rather than "disputes 1, 3-4," a direct violation of the expungement required by statute. The State filed a letter with the Court explaining its decision not to file a brief "given that the sole issue concerns how the judiciary carries out expungements rather than whether or not the record in this particular case should be expunged." Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and ordered the expungement: "[t]he difficulties inherent in deleting docket entries from our current docket entry system-while real-do not justify a violation of the statute on the part of the judiciary." View "Vermont v. F.M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Craig Pease appealed the trial court’s summary judgment determination that Defendants the Windsor Development & Review Board (DRB) and the Town of Windsor had fully responded to his Public Records Act (PRA) request and had not violated his constitutional rights. On appeal, Plaintiff contended that Defendants’ responses to his PRA requests were improperly made through counsel and the custodian of records and thus did not comply with the statute. He also contended that the trial court erred in both its conclusion that his free speech claims against defendants based on their filing of a motion for protective order were barred by litigation immunity and its conclusion that the remainder of his alleged free speech violations were cured by subsequent hearings. Plaintiff's property abuts another lot that is the site of a proposed subdivision development, Morgan Meadows. The Windsor Development Review Board (DRB) approved the subdivision application; Plaintiff, through counsel, appealed this decision to the superior court. In connection with that appeal, Plaintiff made written pro se public records requests to the Town’s Zoning Administrator, and to the seven individual members of the DRB. One DRB member responded personally to Plaintiff’s requests by sending Plaintiff the records he requested. The remaining members responded through the Zoning Administrator. Following a dispute over whether the DRB fully cooperated with Plaintiff's requests, the Town ultimately filed a motion for protective order asking the superior court to enjoin Plaintiff from requesting additional records or contacting DRB members other than through counsel. The Town argued that his public records requests were actually nothing more than discovery requests in the pending appeal, and therefore, Plaintiff’s attorney of record should be the one seeking the records. Upon review of the superior court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found the DRB complied with Plaintiff's requests, and that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated by any of the DRB's actions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the DRB. View "Pease v. Windsor Dev. & Review Bd" on Justia Law

Applicants Howard Smith and Morrill House, LCC appealed a decision of the Superior Court’s Environmental Division that denied their request for a variance to subdivide property located in the Town of Fair Haven, Vermont. They contended on appeal that their application should have been deemed approved because the town zoning board of adjustment failed to issue its decision denying the application within the deadline prescribed by the relevant statute and local zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court found in its review of the applicable legal authority that "[it] held that a decision is rendered so as to avoid the deemed approval language as long as it is 'finally made before the expiration of the forty-five day period, regardless of when, or if, the decision is reduced to writing.' … The board here made a decision within the prescribed period but failed to notify Applicants within that period and the bases for the decision. Following our previous case law, we will strictly construe the deemed approval remedy to apply only when the decision was not made within the prescribed period, which was not the case here." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Division's decision. View "In re Appeal of Morrill House, LLC and Smith Variance" on Justia Law

The issue on this appeal centers on who should bear responsibility for the cost of cleaning up petroleum contamination caused by releases from a gas station's underground storage tanks. The controversy in this appeal was between the State of Vermont, which runs the Vermont Petroleum Cleanup Fund (VPCF) and Stonington Insurance Co. (Stonington), which insured Bradford Oil, the owner of the underground storage tanks, for approximately a three-and-a-half-year period. The State appealed the trial court's judgment limiting Stonington's liability to a 4/27 share of past and future cleanup costs and awarded the State $45,172.05. On appeal, the State argued: (1) the Supreme Court's application of time-on-the-risk allocation in "Towns v. Northern Security Insurance Co." did not preclude joint and several liability under all standard occurrence-based policy language; (2) the circumstances here, including the reasonable expectations of the insured and the equity and policy considerations, support imposing joint and several liability on Stonington for all of the State's VPCF expenditures; and (3) even if time-on-the-risk allocation would otherwise be appropriate, Stonington was not entitled to such allocation because it failed to show sufficient facts to apply this allocation method in this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Towns" was the controlling case law here, and the Court was unconvinced by the State's reasonable expectations, equity, and policy arguments to distinguish the "Towns" decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Bradford Oil Co. v. Stonington Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a written agreement between the City of Rutland and the Vermont Swim Association (VSA) that granted VSA the right to host its annual swim meet at a facility in a city park. VSA appealed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the City. Because the plain language of the parties' contract did not require VSA to pay attorney's fees incurred by the City in pursuing either indemnity from VSA or other third-party actions, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Southwick v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a 180-foot telecommunications tower in the town of Hardwick would have an undue adverse effect on the aesthetics of the area in violation of Criterion 8 of Act 250.  Neighboring landowners appealed the issuance of an Act 250 land-use permit for the project.  Specifically, they contested (1) whether the project violated a clear, written community standard intended to preserve the aesthetics of the area, and (2) whether a reduction of the tower's height was a mitigating step that the developer should have taken to improve the harmony of the project with its surroundings.  Upon review of the briefs submitted by all interested parties and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Environmental Division of the Superior Court that determined that the tower would not have an undue adverse effect under Criterion 8. View "In re Rinkers, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa and Thomas Ketchum as trustees for the Saddlebrook Farm and North Farm Trusts appealed the Town of Dorset's decision to reclassify a town road from a class 3 to a class 4 highway.  Plaintiffs argued that the court erred in reviewing the selectboard's reclassification using a deferential standard instead of a de novo procedure involving appointment of a panel of commissioners.  In the alternative, Plaintiffs contended that, even under a deferential standard, the court's decision was erroneous because the findings were not supported by the evidence and they were denied an opportunity to supplement the record on appeal.  Plaintiffs own property that is serviced by a town highway known as Upper Kirby Hollow Road.  There is one residence on the road, and the remaining properties are undeveloped.  Some of the property is under a conservation easement and open to the public for recreational activities.  In October 2008, the Town provided notice that it intended to consider altering the classification of certain town highways, including a 0.55 mile section of Kirby Hollow Road.  The selectboard made a site visit to the property.  The Town also held a public meeting and heard from interested parties.  Plaintiffs attended and spoke against reclassification.  Other members of the public also opposed reclassification and questioned whether it would have an impact on the public's ability to use the conserved property.  The Town road foreman supported reclassification and testified that the road is dangerous to maintain and snow plow because it is narrow and steep.  In December 2008, the Town issued a written decision, finding, among other things, that: the road's width is too narrow to allow two vehicles to safely pass one another or for access for emergency vehicles; Town snow removal vehicles have slid off the road causing danger to the vehicles and impairing snow removal of other roads; and the cost to improve the road is prohibitive.  The Town also found that the road services only one seasonal residence with limited winter usage.  The Town concluded that continuing summer maintenance and winter plowing did not serve the public good of the Town and reclassified the road. The trial court concluded that there was no statutory authority providing for review of the reclassification and therefore the only jurisdiction for the appeal was pursuant to Rule 75 in the nature of certiorari.  Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while Plaintiffs argued that their opinions and evidence should have been weighed more heavily, the selectboard did not err in resolving the competing considerations in the manner that it did.  The decision was within the Town's authority and not erroneous. The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "Ketchum v. Town of Dorset" on Justia Law

Applicant Times and Seasons, LLC, appealed the Environmental Court's grant of summary judgment to the Natural Resources Board and the corresponding denial of Applicant's "Act 250" permit application to construct and operate a gift shop and deli with related improvements in the Town of Royalton. On appeal, Applicant argued that it could avail itself of the definition of "primary agricultural soils" in 10 V.S.A. 6001(15) as it was amended during the course of its litigation to secure compliance with the only Act 250 criterion for which it did not receive approval. Upon review of the legislative history of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that a reconsideration application is a continuation of an original Act 250 permit application. Accordingly, the submission of a reconsideration application is not a separate vesting event: "[c]ontrary to applicant's proposed interpretation, an applicant on reconsideration may not simultaneously take advantage of the laws in effect at the time of the initial application and those in effect at the time of the reconsideration application. It is not a two-way street." The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment against Applicant. View "In re Times and Seasons, LLC" on Justia Law

Mountain View Community School, Inc. appealed a trial court order that rejected its request for a property tax exemption for "lands owned or leased by colleges, academies or other public schools" under state law. Mountain View contended the court misinterpreted the law in denying the requested exemption. For a number of years, Mountain View operated a private nonsectarian school for students from preschool through eighth grade at two separate locations in the City of Rutland. Mountain View's only use of the properties was as a school. While maintaining that it was statutorily exempt from the payment of property taxes, Mountain View nevertheless paid them under protest from 1994 through 2007. When the school's assessed value increased dramatically in 2006 and 2007, however, it sought an exemption. The City declined to grant the exemption, and in response, Mountain View filed suit for declaratory relief and an injunction to prevent a threatened tax sale. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the lower the court mistakenly conflated the "public use" and "public school" exemptions in the statute, seeking to determine whether the school served "an indefinite class" under the former when, in fact, Mountain View was relying on the latter. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court. View "Mountain View Community School, Inc. v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law