Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Parents appealed the termination of their rights in A.M. and G.M., ages five and four. Parents struggled with substance abuse and were incarcerated periodically during the underlying proceedings. In January 2018, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging the children were in need of care or supervision (CHINS) based on parental neglect, including squalid living conditions, and parental substance-abuse concerns. The children were initially placed with their maternal grandmother pursuant to a conditional custody order (CCO), and then with mother pursuant to a CCO. In April 2018, with parents’ agreement, custody of the children was transferred to DCF. Parents stipulated that the children were CHINS, and following a June 2018 disposition hearing, the parties stipulated to continued DCF custody and to DCF’s disposition case plan, which contemplated reunification by November 2018 or adoption. Parents were required to take various action steps to achieve reunification. The children did not see mother after June 2018 and they stopped seeing father before that time. As of September 2018, the children were placed together in the same foster home. Appealing the ultimate termination of the parental rights to their children, Parents challenged the trial court's treatment of voluntary guardianship petitions filed during the pendency of the juvenile proceedings. Mother also argued the court erred in terminating her rights. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed termination. View "In re A.M. & G.M." on Justia Law

Vermont National Telephone Company (VNT) appealed the state Commissioner of Taxes’ determination that, pursuant to Department of Taxes Regulation section 1.5833-1, the capital gain VNT earned from the 2013 sale of two Federal Communications Commission telecommunications licenses was subject to Vermont Tax. Additionally, VNT argued the penalty the Commissioner assessed for VNT's failure to report the 2013 sale violated 32 V.S.A. section 3202(b)(3) and the state and federal Constitutions. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Commissioner. View "Vermont National Telephone Company v. Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

During the certificate of need (CON) application process, applicant ACTD, LLC (operator of the Green Mountain Surgery Center (GMSC), a for-profit multi-specialty ambulatory surgery center), indicated that it initially planned to offer surgical services in five identified specialties. After the CON was issued, applicant notified the Board that in addition to these five specialties, it planned to offer plastic surgery and ophthalmology procedures. The Board chose to review these changes and, after hearing, issued a decision clarifying that the original CON was limited in scope to the five specialties applicant had identified in its application, and that the proposed addition of plastic surgery and ophthalmology procedures was a nonmaterial change to the project. The Board concluded that applicant had demonstrated a need for greater access to plastic surgery and ophthalmology procedures currently performed in a hospital setting and approved the addition of these services. However, it rejected applicant’s proposal to offer ophthalmology procedures already available at another ambulatory surgery center nearby. The Board also extended applicant’s implementation reporting period for two additional years. Applicant argued on appeal of the Board's decision that the Board improperly restricted the scope of the CON and lacked the power to extend the reporting requirement. Finding that the Board acted within its authority, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "In re ACTD LLC, d/b/a The Green Mountain Surgery Center" on Justia Law

Father appealed a family division order terminating his parental rights to his son C.B., born in August 2016. The State filed a petition alleging that C.B. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) in October 2017 based on allegations that father had repeatedly engaged in domestic violence and mother continued to allow father to be around her and C.B. despite repeated abuse and court orders barring contact. A January 2018 order gave father the right to supervised parent-child contact, but he did not follow through and no visits took place. Father had a lengthy criminal history including a conviction for attempted aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. At the time of the final hearing, he had several charges still pending. Father required safe housing, employment, therapy, parenting classes, and time to develop a relationship with C.B. Given father’s lack of progress towards achieving case-plan goals, the trial court found there was no possibility he could safely parent C.B. in a time reasonable for C.B., given C.B.’s need for permanency, thus termination of his rights was granted. Father alleged on appeal that the court committed several errors related to paternal grandmother’s requests for a guardianship of C.B. in the probate division, and for visitation with C.B. in the family division. Father also claimed the court deprived him of standing at the merits stage, failed to assign him counsel, and erred in not directing a suitability assessment of paternal grandmother at the initial temporary-care hearing. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re C.B., Juvenile" on Justia Law

Both the Vermont State Employees’ Association (VSEA) and the State of Vermont appealed a Labor Relations Board decision sustaining and dismissing in part a grievance filed by the VSEA on behalf of grievant Michael Welch, an employee of the Vermont Department of Liquor Control (DLC). Between 2007 and 2015, grievant worked as a state transport deputy sheriff with the Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD). In 2015, he was hired by the DLC as a liquor-control investigator. The State determined that while working as a transport deputy, grievant had been a county employee, and therefore he was not eligible for salary and leave benefits available under the CBA to certain prior State employees beginning another State job. The VSEA then filed the instant grievance alleging that the State violated the CBA by failing to pay grievant at the contractually required step and failing to calculate his leave accrual at the contractually required rate. After considering the parties’ positions, the Board concluded that, for purposes of compensation and benefits, transport deputies are State employees exempt from the classified service. As a result, it found that the State violated Articles 30, 31, and 62 of the CBA in denying grievant compensation and leave benefits to which he was entitled. However, the Board determined that the State did not violate Article 45 because the promotional pay rate available thereunder applied only to those transferring between positions in the State classified service. The grievance alleged ongoing violations by the State of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed as to Articles 30, 31 and 62, but reversed as to Article 45. The matter was remanded for calculation fo the amount that grievant was owed under Article 45 of the CBA. View "In re Grievance of Michael Welch" on Justia Law

In May 2018, appellants Green Mountain Fireworks, LLC and its owner Matthew Lavigne, began selling fireworks from a retail store in Colchester, Vermont. As described in their complaint, the “intended purpose” for the store was “to sell retail fireworks to consumers.” In relation to the retail store, appellants obtained a license from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) as a “Type 53 - Dealer of Explosives.” They also got a building permit and a certificate of occupancy from the Town Zoning Administrator. These zoning permits were the only two permit applications appellants submitted to the Town. The issue this appeal presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether 20 V.S.A. 3132(a)(1) authorized municipalities to grant permits for the general retail sale of fireworks to consumers who do not hold valid permits to display those fireworks. Appellants appealed the superior court's dismissal of two actions: (1) their appeal of the Town of Colchester selectboard’s denial of their application for a permit to sell fireworks pursuant to 20 V.S.A. 3132(a)(1); and (2) their request for a declaratory judgment that, even without that distinct permit, they had “all possible and applicable permits” and were permitted under section 3132 to sell fireworks in the manner described in their complaint. The Supreme Court concluded that section 3132(a)(1) required a distinct permit for the sale of fireworks, but did not authorize a permit for the general retail sale of fireworks along the lines proposed by appellants. The only fireworks sales authorized by statute were sales to the holder of a display permit for the purpose of the permitted display. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. View "Green Mountain Fireworks, LLC, et al. v. Town of Colchester et al." on Justia Law

Taxpayer Gabriel Martinez appealed a Property Valuation and Review Division (PVR) hearing officer's decision setting the fair market value of his property for purposes of the 2017 Town of Hartford grand list. Taxpayer argued the hearing officer erred in estimating fair market value based on sales of comparable properties because the value was conclusively established by the price taxpayer paid for the property in a contemporaneous arms-length transaction. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court held that, although the recent arms-length sale price constituted strong presumptive evidence of the fair market value of the property, the hearing officer did not commit legal error in considering other evidence of fair market value. In addition, the Court concluded the appraisal was rationally derived from the findings and evidence. View "Martinez v. Town of Hartford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-investors appealed the dismissal of their claims against the Vermont Agency of Commerce and Community Development (ACCD) and current and former state employees arising from the operation of a federally licensed regional center in the United States Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) EB-5 program. USCIS designated ACCD as a regional center in 1997, and ACCD began operating the Vermont Regional Center (VRC). It was not the only state-affiliated regional center, but it was the only one that represented itself as a “state-run agency.” The VRC billed itself as an attractive option for development and foreign investment due to its superlative “oversight powers,” the overwhelming investor confidence that came from its “stamp of approval,” and the State of Vermont’s backing that would result in a “faster path to approval.” ACCD employees represented to prospective investors, including plaintiffs, that the added protections of state approval and oversight made the "Jay Peak Projects" a particularly sound investment. They told prospective investors that the VRC conducted quarterly reviews to ensure that projects complied with all applicable laws and regulations and “engag[ed] in the financial monitoring and auditing of projects to ensure legitimacy,” and they represented that MOUs imposed “strict covenants and obligations on the project to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.” Unbeknownst to the investors, but known to the VRC officials, no such state oversight by the VRC existed. The VRC never issued any of the quarterly reports contemplated in the MOUs. In April 2016, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed a lawsuit alleging securities fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud against the Jay Peak Projects developers. On the basis of these and other allegations, plaintiffs, all foreign nationals who invested in the Jay Peak Projects, filed a multi-count claim against ACCD and several individual defendants. The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint for a third time to a Fourth Amended Complaint, and then dismissed all thirteen counts on various grounds. Plaintiffs appealed. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims of negligence against ACCD, gross negligence against defendants Brent Raymond and James Candido, and breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against ACCD. The Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "Sutton et al. v. Vermont Regional Center et al." on Justia Law

Katherine Hall appealed an Environmental Division decision granting summary judgment to Chittenden Resorts, LLC and RMT Associates, d/b/a Mountain Top Inn & Resort (the Resort). The Environmental Division concluded the Resort did not need an amended Act 250 permit to run a rental program where, pursuant to a contractual agreement, the Resort rented out private homes near the Resort. On appeal, Hall argued that the Environmental Division erred in determining that the Resort did not need an amended Act 250 permit. Specifically, she argued the Resort needed an amended Act 250 permit because under 10 V.S.A. 6001(14)(A), the Resort and owners of the homes involved in the rental program were a collective "person." Alternatively, she argued the Resort exercised "control" over the rental homes within the meaning of section 6001(3)(A)(i). The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed with Hall's characterization of the Resort and home owners as a collective "person." Further, the Court found the Resort did not control the rented homes contemplated by section 6001(3)(i). Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's judgment. View "In re Mountain Top Inn & Resort, JO 1-391 (Hall, Appellant)" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a number of independent school districts, school boards, parents, students, and citizens, challenged the implementation of Act 46, as amended by Act 49, regarding the involuntary merger of school districts. The Vermont Legislature enacted those laws in 2015 and 2017, respectively, to improve educational outcomes and equity by designing more efficient school governance structures in response to long-term declining student enrollment and balkanized educational governance and delivery systems. In separate decisions, the civil division dismissed several counts of plaintiffs’ amended complaint and then later granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining counts. In two consolidated appeals, plaintiffs argued that: (1) the State Board of Education and the Agency of Education failed to carry out the plain-language mandate of Act 46; and (2) the Board’s implementation of the law, as manifested in its final order, violated other statutes in Title 16 and several provisions of the Vermont Constitution. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the Agency’s and Board’s implementation of the law was consistent with the challenged Acts and other statutes in Title 16, did not result from an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, and did not violate any other constitutional provisions. Accordingly, the civil division’s decisions were affirmed. View "Athens School District et al. v. Vermont State Board of Education et al." on Justia Law