Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Health Law
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K.M., an adult with multiple disabilities, including autism and a seizure disorder, has been receiving Medicaid-funded developmental disabilities services for over twenty years. These services, provided by Washington County Mental Health Services (WCMHS), were supposed to include more than thirty hours of community support each week. However, since March 2020, K.M. has only received two to five hours of support weekly, leading to negative health effects.K.M. petitioned the Human Services Board to order the Department of Disabilities, Aging, and Independent Living (DAIL) to provide the full services he is entitled to. The Board dismissed his petition, stating it failed to specify the action required for compliance and that an order to provide services without available staff was too vague. The Board also interpreted K.M.'s request as seeking a broader policy change, which it deemed outside its authority, citing Husrefovich v. Department of Aging & Independent Living.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Board's dismissal. The Court held that the Board has the statutory authority to order DAIL to provide the services K.M. is entitled to under federal and state law. The Court clarified that while the Board cannot issue broad policy injunctions, it can provide specific relief to individuals. The Court found K.M.'s request for services clear and specific enough to inform DAIL of the required action. The case was remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Appeal of K.M." on Justia Law

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This case involves two consolidated appeals from Northwestern Medical Center and Rutland Regional Medical Center against the Green Mountain Care Board (GMCB). The GMCB had approved the proposed budgets of both medical centers for the fiscal year 2024, but with certain conditions. The medical centers challenged the GMCB's imposition of budgetary conditions that capped increases to rates charged to commercial payers. However, the medical centers had not properly raised their claims with the GMCB, leaving them unpreserved for review.The GMCB is an independent board that regulates the health care industry in Vermont. It reviews and establishes hospital budgets annually, with the aim of reducing the per-capita rate of growth in expenditures for health services in Vermont across all payers. The GMCB had released its established benchmarks for the 2024 fiscal year budget submissions, which included a benchmark that limited a hospital’s growth of net patient revenue/fixed prospective payment (NPR/FPP) to 8.6%, effectively capping increases to NPR/FPP growth by that amount. It also included a benchmark for commercial rate increases which provided that the GMCB would “also review and may adjust requested hospital commercial rate increases.”The GMCB approved the budgets of Northwestern and Rutland Regional, subject to certain conditions. These conditions included a cap on increases to commercial rates. However, neither Northwestern nor Rutland Regional had raised their claims with the GMCB, leaving them unpreserved for review.On appeal, Northwestern and Rutland Regional argued that the GMCB deprived them of due process by failing to provide adequate notice that it would impose the Commercial Rate Cap Conditions on their proposed budgets. They also claimed that the GMCB had no authority to impose the Commercial Rate Cap Conditions because the conditions lacked a factual basis and contradicted the GMCB’s initial approval of their proposed budgets. However, the Vermont Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of these claims because they were not preserved for review. The court noted that Northwestern and Rutland Regional had several opportunities to raise their claims with the GMCB before the GMCB issued its final budget decisions, but they failed to do so. Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the GMCB. View "In re Northwestern Medical Center Fiscal Year 2024" on Justia Law

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Employer Howard Center appealed a trial court order that confirmed an arbitration award in favor of grievant Daniel Peyser and AFSCME Local 1674. In May 2019, employer expressed concern over grievant’s billing practices, specifically, his submission of billing paperwork in May for services provided in April. Employer told grievant that it was considering disciplining him for “dishonesty and unethical action” concerning the backdated bills. Grievant brought two billing notes from patient records to show that other employees engaged in the same billing practices. Employer did not reprimand grievant for the billing practices. In August 2019, however, employer informed grievant that he breached employer’s confidentiality policy by sharing the billing notes with his union representative at the June meeting. Employer issued a written reprimand to grievant. The reprimand stated that sharing client records without redacting confidential information violated protocols and state and federal regulations, and that grievant knew or should have known of these standards. Employer also explained that it was required to report the breach to state and federal authorities and to those individuals whose records were disclosed. Grievant filed a grievance under the terms of his collective-bargaining agreement, arguing in part that employer lacked just cause to discipline him. In an October 2020 decision, the arbitrator sustained the grievance. Employer then filed an action in the civil division seeking to modify or vacate the arbitrator’s award, arguing in relevant part that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in sustaining the grievance. Employer asked the Vermont Supreme Court to adopt “manifest disregard” of the law as a basis for setting aside the arbitration award and to conclude that the arbitrator violated that standard here. The Supreme Court did not decide whether to adopt the manifest-disregard standard because, assuming arguendo it applied, employer failed to show that its requirements were satisfied. The Court therefore affirmed. View "Howard Center v. AFSCME Local 1674, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Vermont Human Rights Commission, on behalf of plaintiff Latonia Congress, appealed a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to defendant Centurion of Vermont LLC on the Commission’s claims of discrimination under the Vermont Public Accommodations Act (VPAA). Congress was incarcerated at a prison owned and operated by the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC). The DOC contracted with Centurion to provide all medical services for inmates at the prison. Under the previous provider, Congress was seen by an audiologist, who determined that she had substantial bilateral hearing loss, and she was given hearing aids for both ears. In December 2016, Congress reported that the hearing aids were not working, and Centurion planned to send them “to Audiology for check of functioning.” Later in December 2016, a doctor examined Congress’s ears and did not find any indication of an obstruction or other problem that might be affecting her hearing. Congress delivered her hearing aids to the medical unit to be sent out for testing. They were returned to her without having been tested. The record established that no one knew what happened to the hearing aids during that time; they were apparently misplaced. Through 2017 and early 2018, Congress attempted numerous times to obtain functioning hearing aids. Because Congress was deemed “functional” for some period of time despite her reported difficulty in hearing conversations, she was not eligible for hearing aids under Centurion’s policies. Eventually, in March 2018, an audiologist concluded Congress had moderate to severe bilateral hearing loss, which was worse in one ear, and recommended hearing aids. She was provided with one hearing aid in April 2018, which improved her hearing in that ear. Congress was released from prison in October 2019. In March 2020, the Commission filed a complaint against Centurion, the DOC, and other state defendants, alleging, as relevant here, that they discriminated against Congress in violation of the VPAA by failing to provide her with functioning hearing aids and thereby denying her equal access to certain benefits and services offered at the prison. Finding no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of Centurion, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Human Rights Commission v. Vermont, et al." on Justia Law

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Blue Cross Blue Shield of Vermont (Blue Cross) appealed the Green Mountain Care Board’s (GMCB) decision modifying its proposed health-insurance rates for 2022. The GMCB approved Blue Cross’s proposed rates with several exceptions, one of which was relevant here: its contribution to reserves (CTR). Blue Cross had sought a base CTR rate of 1.5%, but the GMCB ordered Blue Cross to lower it to 1.0%, thereby diminishing overall insurance rates by 0.5% and reducing health-insurance premiums. The GMCB found that a 1.5% base CTR was “excessive” because Blue Cross was expected to be above its target Risk Based Capital (RBC) range by the end of 2021, “individuals and small businesses are still struggling financially after a year-long economic slowdown,” and a 1.0% CTR would allow its “reserves to sit comfortably within the company’s RBC target range.” Blue Cross moved for reconsideration, arguing that the term “excessive” was strictly actuarial in nature, and that the GMCB misconstrued it by weighing non-actuarial evidence— testimony concerning affordability—as part of its examination of whether the proposed rate was excessive. On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, Blue Cross raised essentially the same issue. Because none of the actuarial experts who testified concluded that Blue Cross’s proposed CTR was excessive, Blue Cross argued, the GMCB could not properly conclude that it was. Blue Cross conceded that health-insurance rates for 2022 could not now be changed, but it urged the Supreme Court to rule on the merits, arguing that this matter was not moot because the CTR rate for this year will disadvantage Blue Cross in future rate-review proceedings. The Supreme Court determined Blue Cross did not demonstrate that this kind of case was capable of repetition yet evading review or subjected it to continuing negative collateral consequences. Therefore, Blue Cross failed to meet the exceptional thresholds necessary for the Court to reach the merits in a moot case. View "In re Blue Cross and Blue Shield 2022 Individual & Small Group Market Filing" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Sean Kelly appealed the grant of summary judgment to the University of Vermont Medical Center (UVMMC) on employment discrimination and breach-of-contract claims arising from UVMMC’s decision not to extend his one-year medical fellowship. UVMMC selected plaintiff for the 2017-18 fellowship. UVMMC was aware that plaintiff suffered from an adrenal deficiency that had delayed the completion of his residency. In the first five months of the fellowship, plaintiff missed nineteen full days and parts of nine more days for various reasons. By February 2018, after missing several more days and expressing that he felt “frustrated with [his] absences” and “overall inadequate as a fellow,” program personnel became concerned that plaintiff was falling behind in his training. In a March 30 meeting, the program director told plaintiff his performance had “deficiencies and these need[ed] to be addressed.” At some point during this period, the director also told plaintiff he “should plan on extending [his] fellowship due to [his] time out and some minor deficits through August.” Plaintiff emailed other program personnel expressing frustration at the prospect of staying through August to complete his training. On April 14, 2018, plaintiff suffered a stroke, and on April 19th he attempted suicide. He was hospitalized from April 14 through May 3 and was not cleared to return to work until June 1, 2018. In all, plaintiff missed approximately six more weeks of the fellowship. On or about May 31, the director called plaintiff and told him that while UVMMC had determined he needed six more months of training to finish the fellowship, it could not accommodate additional training for that length of time. UVMMC paid plaintiff his remaining salary. Plaintiff filed a grievance under the Graduate Medical Education rules; the grievance committee affirmed UVMMC's decision. Because the decision not to extend his fellowship was an academic decision, there was no employment action and consequently no adverse employment action. The Vermont Supreme Court did not find plaintiff's arguments on appeal persuasive, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in UVMMC's favor. View "Kelly v. University of Vermont Medical Center" on Justia Law

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During the certificate of need (CON) application process, applicant ACTD, LLC (operator of the Green Mountain Surgery Center (GMSC), a for-profit multi-specialty ambulatory surgery center), indicated that it initially planned to offer surgical services in five identified specialties. After the CON was issued, applicant notified the Board that in addition to these five specialties, it planned to offer plastic surgery and ophthalmology procedures. The Board chose to review these changes and, after hearing, issued a decision clarifying that the original CON was limited in scope to the five specialties applicant had identified in its application, and that the proposed addition of plastic surgery and ophthalmology procedures was a nonmaterial change to the project. The Board concluded that applicant had demonstrated a need for greater access to plastic surgery and ophthalmology procedures currently performed in a hospital setting and approved the addition of these services. However, it rejected applicant’s proposal to offer ophthalmology procedures already available at another ambulatory surgery center nearby. The Board also extended applicant’s implementation reporting period for two additional years. Applicant argued on appeal of the Board's decision that the Board improperly restricted the scope of the CON and lacked the power to extend the reporting requirement. Finding that the Board acted within its authority, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "In re ACTD LLC, d/b/a The Green Mountain Surgery Center" on Justia Law

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Defendants Michael Touchette and Centurion Healthcare brought an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's certification of a class of plaintiffs in a Vermont Rule 75 action. The certified class was comprised of people in the custody of the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC), each of whom suffered from opioid-use disorder, and alleged defendants’ medication-assisted treatment (MAT) program did not meet prevailing medical standards of care as required by Vermont law. Defendants, the former Commissioner of the DOC and its contract healthcare provider, argued the trial court erred both in finding that plaintiff Patrick Mullinnex exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit, and in adopting the vicarious-exhaustion doctrine favored by several federal circuits in order to conclude that Mullinnex’s grievances satisfied the exhaustion requirement on behalf of the entire class. Defendants also contended the trial court’s decision to certify the class was made in error because plaintiffs did not meet Rule 23’s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy-of- representation requirements. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, concluding that - even if the vicarious-exhaustion doctrine was appropriately applied in Vermont - it could not apply in this case because, on the record before the trial court, no member of the putative class succeeded in exhausting his administrative remedies. Because plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust left the courts without subject-matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court did not reach defendants’ challenges to the merits of the class-certification decision. View "Mullinnex et al . v. Menard et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Elizabeth Lawson alleged she incurred damages as the result of an emergency room nurse informing a police officer that she was intoxicated, had driven to the hospital, and was intending to drive home. The trial court granted defendant Central Vermont Medical Center (CVMC) summary judgment based on its determination that nothing in the record supported an inference that the nurse’s disclosure of the information was for any reason other than her good-faith concern for plaintiff’s and the public’s safety. In this opinion, the Vermont Supreme Court recognized a common-law private right of action for damages based on a medical provider’s unjustified disclosure to third persons of information obtained during treatment. Like the trial court, however, the Supreme Court concluded CVMC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, viewing the material facts most favorably to plaintiff and applying the relevant law adopted here, no reasonable factfinder could have determined the disclosure was for any purpose other than to mitigate the threat of imminent and serious harm to plaintiff and the public. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Lawson v. Central Vermont Medical Center" on Justia Law

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In consolidated appeals, an executor of an estate sued the clinic and physician's assistant who treated the decedent for wrongful death. The trial court dismissed the case because plaintiff failed to file a certificate of merit, as was required by statute. The refiled case was dismissed as untimely. The executor appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, which reviewed the trial court's dismissals and found that dismissal was proper in both cases. View "Quinlan v. Five-Town Health Alliance, Inc., dba Mountain Health Center" on Justia Law