Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Insurer Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Insurance Company appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendants Energy Wise, Inc. and Michael and Shirley Uhler in this declaratory-judgment action. Energy Wise was a Vermont corporation that specialized in insulating buildings and homes. It purchased a commercial general liability (CGL) policy from insurer, effective March 1, 2010 to March 1, 2011. In late 2010, Energy Wise installed spray-foam insulation at the Shrewsbury Mountain School. A school employee, Shirley Uhler, and her husband later filed suit against Energy Wise. Ms. Uhler asserted that she was "exposed to and encountered airborne chemicals and airborne residues" from the spray-foam insulation and suffered bodily injury as a result. The Uhlers raised claims of negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and loss of consortium. Energy Wise requested coverage under its CGL policy, and insurer agreed to defend Energy Wise under a bilateral reservation of rights. In September 2012, insurer filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, asserting that its policy did not cover the claims at issue. Insurer cited the "Total Pollution Exclusion Endorsement" in its policy, which excluded coverage for "[b]odily injury . . . [that] would not have occurred in whole or in part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of ‘pollutants' at any time." Insurer argued that the court should have granted summary judgment in its favor because the "total pollution exclusion" in its policy plainly and unambiguously precludes coverage in this case. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with insurer, and therefore reversed the trial court's decision and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in insurer's favor. View "Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Energy Wise Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996, claimant injured his left ankle during the scope of his employment as a game warden with the State of Vermont. On July 8, 1996, his treating orthopedic physician indicated in medical notes that claimant's injuries were consistent with someone who injured his ankle, it would take about a year to recover, and that claimant would be seen again "as needed." On May 15, approximately four months after claimant's injury and two months before his orthopedic physician wrote the July 8 note, the Department of Labor promulgated Workers' Compensation Rule 18(a), which in relevant part required employers/insurers to affirmatively determine whether an employee had a permanent impairment at the time the employee reached a medical end result. That determination was required to be made within 45 days of the filing of the notice of termination. Before the department's promulgation of Rule 18(a), a claimant could investigate a permanent impairment after reaching a medical end result by either directly obtaining an impairment rating from a qualified physician or asking the employer to arrange obtaining the rating; however, there was no express regulatory obligation on the part of the employer irrespective of any request from the injured employee to determine whether the employee had a permanent impairment. Claimant took no further action in this case until the fall of 2010, when he asked his employer's (the State of Vermont's) workers' compensation adjuster to schedule a permanency evaluation for his 1996 injury. In response, the adjuster scheduled an independent medical evaluation with a physician, who concluded that claimant had a one percent permanent impairment rating attributable to the 1996 injury. Claimant arranged for a second evaluation with a physician, who reached the same conclusion. In 2011, the State filed a form denying permanent benefits to claimant, asserting that the claim for permanent partial disability benefits was time barred because the six-year statute of limitations had expired. Claimant appealed two decisions in which the Commissioner of the Department of Labor concluded, as a matter of law, that the State did not waive its statute-of-limitations defense and was entitled to summary judgment based on that defense. Based on that evidence, the commissioner found that "as of July 1996 [claimant] knew, or should have known, that he had reached an end medical result, and that whatever deficits he was left with were likely permanent in nature." The Supreme Court, after review, agreed that the State did not waive the affirmative defense by agreeing to claimant's request for an impairment rating. The statute of limitations was not tolled because the employer did not determine the status of claimant's injury 45 after filing of the notice. The Supreme Court affirmed the commissioner's ruling that the claim for permanent partial disability benefits in this case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "Smiley v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Claimant worked at the Vermont State Hospital as a psychiatric technician and ward aide. His duties involved lifting and dealing with patients who could be combative. Claimant suffered work-related injuries on three separate occasions in 1987, 1992, and 1997. All of these claims related to low back pain. Claimant underwent surgery after each of these injuries and returned to work. After the 1992 injury, claimant's surgeon rated him with a 10% permanent impairment to his spine, and the State began paying permanent partial disability benefits. There was no new rating for the 1997 injury. This appeal came after a dispute over an order based on a worker's compensation agreement. Claimant injured his back again in 2002. Claimant received an 8% whole-person impairment rating, with 6% of that rating referable to a previous injury. Based on this rating, claimant executed an Agreement for Permanent Partial Disability Compensation (Form 22) with the State, which the Commissioner of the Department of Labor then approved. Six years after the commissioner ordered the award, claimant underwent two more permanency evaluations with different doctors who both used a method that the first doctor had not used. Each of the subsequent evaluations resulted in higher whole-person impairment ratings before consideration of the portion attributable to any pre-existing impairment. Based on the higher ratings, claimant made a claim for additional benefits related to the 2002 injury. Claimant asserted that the award should be modified because his medical condition had worsened, or, alternatively, that the parties had based their Form 22 agreement upon a material mistake of fact. The commissioner ruled in the State's favor. Claimant then appealed to the superior court, which reversed the decision of the commissioner and awarded claimant additional benefits after a bench trial. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the differences between the doctors' impairment ratings in 2010 and an impairment rating from 2003 were insufficient to serve as grounds for reopening the original order for compensation. The Court therefore concluded as a matter of law that failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a mistake of fact sufficient to require reformation of the approved Form 22. The Court vacated the decision of the superior court as to the issues on appeal. View "Marshall v. Vermont State Hospital" on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff was severely injured when a 2000 Dodge Neon that she was driving was struck from behind by another vehicle. In July 2010, she filed a personal-injury action against Midstate, the automobile dealer that sold her the vehicle; Chrysler Group LLC, successor-in-interest to Chrysler Corporation, which manufactured the vehicle but later declared bankruptcy; JCI, which manufactured the vehicle's driver's seat; and Autoliv ASP, Inc., which manufactured the vehicle's seatbelts. In September 2012, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with Midstate and Chrysler Group. Based on the settlement agreement, the trial court issued an order of dismissal with prejudice in favor of Midstate and Chrysler Group. A jury trial in June 2013 on plaintiff's remaining action against JCI resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the products-liability claim. The trial court also entered a final judgment in favor of JCI and against Midstate on the cross-claim for indemnity. Midstate appealed that judgment. The issue primarily briefed by the parties on appeal was whether an indemnitee invoking common law equitable indemnity must extinguish the liability of the indemnitor to collect indemnity. The Supreme Court found no basis to distrub the judgment in favor of JCI, and affirmed. View "Heco v. Foster Motors" on Justia Law

Cases consolidated cases for appellate review stemmed from alleged injuries suffered by plaintiff Faye Ainsworth while she was at defendant Charles Chandler’s business, Chandler Electric. Plaintiff sued claiming she was injured when she tripped on a coil of wires that had been placed in the stairway. Defendant sued his insurer, Concord Insurance Group, arguing that insurer had wrongfully and in bad faith failed to provide adequate coverage for the claim. The insurer filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration of noncoverage. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, concluding that plaintiff was a social guest of defendant at the time of her visit, that the duty of care defendant owed her was the lesser duty applicable to licensees under Vermont law (as opposed to that which is owed to business invitees), and that defendant did not breach this duty. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the insurer, on the basis that the underlying personal injury action had been dismissed and therefore no coverage was owed. Plaintiff and defendant both appealed, contesting the court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. Defendant contested the order granting summary judgment in favor of insurer. Upon review of the cases, the Supreme Court affirmed with respect to defendant’s motion to disqualify the trial judge, but reversed with respect to plaintiff’s suit and reversed and remanded for further proceedings with respect to defendant’s claim against the insurer and the insurer’s counterclaim for declaration of noncoverage. View "Ainsworth v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Neal Fox’s brother adopted defendant Eugene Fox when defendant was an infant. On April 6, 2012, defendant, a New Hampshire resident in his sixties, and plaintiff, a Vermont resident, attended a probate court hearing in Manchester, New Hampshire. After the hearing, defendant followed plaintiff to his car and proceeded to punch, kick, and step on plaintiff. Plaintiff was hospitalized as a result of the encounter. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in the context of a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order. Nonresident defendant appeals the family court order granting plaintiff’s request for a final RFA order. Defendant argued: (1) the family court lacked personal jurisdiction over him to issue the final order; (2) defendant and plaintiff were not family members for purposes of the domestic abuse prevention statute; (3) plaintiff failed to establish that a final RFA order was necessary; and (4) the court erred in finding that defendant engaged in stalking, as defined in Vermont’s stalking statute. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a final RFA order, and reversed. View "Fox v. Fox" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Helena Murphy appealed a superior court judgment in favor of defendant, Patriot Insurance Company, her homeowner’s insurer. The dispute between the parties stemmed from storm damage done to plaintiff's house in 2007, and the subsequent claims she made on her insurance policy. On appeal of the superior court's ruling in Patriot's favor, plaintiff argued: (1) Patriot was estopped from denying coverage for the removal and replacement of a chimney on her home; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing claims for negligence and bad faith. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murphy v. Patriot Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Progressive Casualty Insurance Company insured the vehicle involved in the accident at issue in this case. Given the number of victims, the policy’s liability coverage did not fully compensate at least one of the injured passengers. The parties disputed whether the injured passenger was therefore entitled to UIM benefits under Progressive’s policy. Progressive argued that coverage was barred by certain exclusions in its policy. The trial court found Progressive’s exclusions unenforceable as inconsistent with the definition of an "underinsured vehicle" set forth in 23 V.S.A. 941(f). Progressive appealed, arguing that its exclusions should be enforced, and that it should not have to provide both liability and UIM benefits to the injured passenger. The Supreme Court agreed with Progressive after its review of the case, and therefore, reversed the trial court’s decision. View "Progressive Casuality Insurance Co. v. MMG Insurnace Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rodney Demag worked for a car dealership which also provided automobile service. As a convenience for customers, he picked up vehicles belonging to customers, leaving his own vehicle and returning the customer’s vehicle at the end of the day. Plaintiff provided this service to defendant Better Power Equipment, Inc.'s (BPE) general manager and his wife, picking up their cars from BPE’s parking lot. This occurred five to six times a year. The arrangement had existed for approximately ten years. In 2009, plaintiff drove to defendant for scheduled service, parking in his usual spot next to the vehicle of the general manager and his wife. Although this area was not generally used for parking by BPE customers, the general manager and his wife typically parked there, and other employees sometimes parked there in the winter. Plaintiff spoke briefly with the general manager about the service needed for his vehicle. Plaintiff then returned to his own vehicle, retrieved a few items, took a step and fell into an uncovered storm drain. He filed this case to recover damages for the injuries he suffered as a result of that fall. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment against him in the resulting personal injury case. The trial court found that plaintiff was a licensee of defendant, [ . . .] rather than an invitee. It concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a lesser standard of care from BPE, which allowed for summary judgment against him. The Supreme Court determined "that the time has come to abolish Vermont’s common-law negligence distinction between licensees and invitees" and reversed and remanded. View "Demag v. Better Power Equipment" on Justia Law

On July 3, 2009, plaintiffs Michaela and David Martin and their three-year-old daughter Gracie spent the day at a campsite that the family rented at a campground in Island Pond, Vermont. Defendants John and Joanna Christman rented a campsite near the Martins. Michaela took Gracie to a playground adjacent to the Christmans’ site. The Christmans were camping with two of their boxer dogs, one of which was a two-year old male named Diesel. They had a table of their own which was sheltered with a gazebo. Joanna Christman tied Diesel to a pole supporting the gazebo. Gracie asked John Christman if she could pet Diesel, and he said that she could. Without warning Diesel attacked Gracie, knocking her to the ground and biting her face. John Christman forced his dog to let go of the child. The Martins took Gracie to North Country Hospital where she received surgery to repair her wounds. The Martins brought suit against the Christmans, their insurer, and the campground on several theories, including strict liability and negligence. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the strict liability claim on the ground that existing Vermont precedent required proof of negligence to recover against a dog owner for damages caused by his or her dog. It also dismissed a "direct action" claim against the Christmans’ insurer. The parties stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of the negligence claim and a related claim of premises liability. This appeal was limited to the trial court’s dismissal of the strict liability claim. The Vermont Supreme Court declined to change the common-law rule requiring proof of a dog owner’s negligence as the sole basis for liability for personal injuries inflicted by the dog. "In the face of longstanding precedent, both in Vermont and in the United States in general, we decline to change the substantive law by judicial decision." View "Martin v. Christman" on Justia Law