Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed two superior court decisions in a personal-injury negligence action: (1) an order dismissing all claims against defendant Robert Merrill, Sr., in his individual capacity, on summary judgment; and (2) an order granting partial judgment as a matter of law during trial, concluding that any liability of defendant Springfield Lodge No. 679, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., could not be predicated on the action or inaction of Mr. Merrill, Sr., its governor. Plaintiff, attended a New Year's Eve party at the Springfield Lodge when a fight broke out between two other party guests, Danny Snide and Robert Merrill, Jr., the adult son of defendant Robert Merrill, Sr. At the time, Merrill, Sr. was the governor of the Lodge, the highest position in the Lodge hierarchy, and was an unpaid volunteer. Eventually, there was a scuffle in the men’s room involving Merrill, Jr. and an unnamed man. Merrill, Sr. arrived and asked another person to keep Merrill, Jr. in the bathroom while Merrill, Sr. went to look for the unnamed man. Merrill, Jr. and began fighting Snide, by which plaintiff was injured. In addition to alleging his injury, plaintiff submitted selected pages from an Orientation Guide for New Officers listed the duties of the governor of the Lodge, which plaintiff asserted obligated the Governor to take action to prevent the misconduct of members on Lodge property. In reviewing plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court found the Guide offered no such language obligating the Lodge Governor as plaintiff maintained. "For that reason, the trial court’s summary judgment decision dismissing the claims against Merrill, Sr. is correct in its result. We also conclude that the court could have gone further and provided the Lodge summary judgment on the claims against it that were premised on a theory of common-law respondeat superior for the action or inaction of Merrill, Sr. . . . Merrill, Sr.’s status as a social guest in the Lodge dining and bar facility is an additional reason why he had no duty to plaintiff to prevent the incident that caused injury to him and why the Lodge has no liability based on Merrill, Sr.’s inaction." View "Buxton v. Springfield Lodge No. 679, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose following a fire that destroyed a commercial building in Rutland in 2010. Plaintiff Johnathan Lasek leased the northern half of the building and used the space as a workshop for his house-staining business. He stored staining products and other equipment and constructed a business office in the northeastern corner of the building. The southwestern corner of the building contained a fully enclosed room that was occupied by another commercial tenant, Vermont Vapor Inc. (VVI). The remainder of the building was used by landlord Downing Properties, LLC, as storage for ATVs, motorcycles, and snowmobiles. VVI used its space as a laboratory for mixing the liquid filler for electronic cigarettes. VVI owner Adam Tredwell and his father Warren altered the room to Adam's specificationsm, adding sheetrock and other materials to create a “clean room.” He also installed an eight-inch fan on the south wall of the laboratory that vented to the outside of the building. An industrial space heater was suspended from the rafters of the warehouse, above the ceiling of the laboratory. The Tredwells connected the heater to a propane tank so that they could heat the space in the winter months. Warren was the last person in the laboratory the night before the fire. When firefighters arrived shortly after the fire was reported, the northwest corner of the building (plaintiff's corner) had a large hole in the roof and was heavily engulfed in flames. VVI's corner was not on fire at that time. Plaintiff sued VVI for negligence and strict liability, alleging that VVI had caused the fire by mishandling liquid nicotine. He also sued landlord for breach of the implied warranty of suitability for commercial use, negligence, breach of the duty to warn, and unjust enrichment. After plaintiff's presentation of his case, the trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. This appeal followed. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred: (1) in excluding the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness on causation; (2) in granting defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law; (3) in excluding an eyewitness's statements to police; (4) by denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial; (5) by awarding all deposition costs to defendants; and (6) in refusing to disqualify counsel for defendant-landlord. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects, with the exception of the award of deposition costs. View "Lasek v. Vermont Vapor, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Thomas and Marie Baptie, administrators of the estate of their son, John Baptie, appealed a superior court's decision granting defendant and former police officer Aron McNeil, summary judgment dismissing their negligence case against him. Specifically, plaintiffs argued the officer was liable for the death of their son as the result of the negligent investigation of their complaint against defendant Jonathon Bruno, the man who murdered their son four days after they made a complaint. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusions that defendant was entitled to qualified official immunity from plaintiffs' lawsuit and that, they could not prove all of the elements of their negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims. View "Baptie v. Bruno" on Justia Law

Defendant Douglas Tuthill, Administrator of the Estate of Paul Oakes, appealed a jury's award of $150,000 in punitive damages to plaintiff Doreen Carpentier and the trial court's denial of his motion for remittitur. Defendant also challenged the trial court's denial of his post-judgment motion to vacate a writ of attachment. Paul Oakes was charged with numerous crimes based on acts alleged to have occurred at plaintiff's home. Oakes killed himself shortly before his arraignment on these charges. Following Oakes's death, plaintiff sued his estate, raising claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She sought compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff also requested a writ of attachment against certain real property owned by Oakes. Finding none of defendant's arguments persuasive, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Carpentier v. Tuthill" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the omnibus clause in a automobile insurance policy provided coverage to a permittee to whom the insured owner loans the car when that first permittee was subject to a negligent entrustment claim for loaning the car to a second permittee. A vehicle owner gave her car keys to defendant, who in turned passed them to another driver. The driver was involved in a fatal, single-car accident and the driver's estate sued defendant for negligent entrustment. Defendant sought coverage under the vehicle owner's automobile insurance policy. Defendant appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer and finding that, as a matter of law, defendant did not qualify for coverage under the policy. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant’s entrustment of the vehicle to the driver constituted "use" under the omnibus clause of the policy and that the undisputed evidence supported the conclusion that the insured did not consent to defendant's allowing the driver to drive the car, but that a material issue of fact existed with respect to whether defendant entrusted the car keys to driver reasonably believing that driver would not drive the car. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Co. v. Colby" on Justia Law

Defendants, Nancy and Thomas Bernheim, appealed the trial court’s summary judgment decision granting plaintiff GEICO Insurance Company’s claim against them for reimbursement of $10,000 that GEICO had paid defendants under the medical-payments provision of their automobile insurance policy. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that defendants should have reimbursed GEICO, it reversed and remanded for a determination of the proper reimbursement amount. View "GEICO Insurance Co. v. Bernheim" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a high school female athlete, became a patient of defendant who was an orthopedic surgeon and a professor at the University of Vermont medical school, in September 2000, a few months after her sixteenth birthday. Plaintiff had suffered a hip injury while training for soccer season, and her pediatrician referred her to defendant, whose office notes indicated that she had groin pain near the pubic area. After several visits, defendant told plaintiff that her parents did not need to accompany her to appointments, which sometimes took place on a weekly basis, sometimes after hours. On at least three occasions during the course of his treatment of plaintiff, including one time before her first surgery and another time before her second surgery, defendant inserted his ungloved fingers into plaintiff's vagina. No one other than defendant and plaintiff was present on these occasions. Defendant insisted these penetrations were legitimate medical internal examinations conducted for diagnostic purposes. Plaintiff sued defendant for sexual assault and battery and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. She appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to defendant based on a six-year statute of limitations applicable to childhood sexual abuse. The court determined that the limitations period had run as a matter of law before plaintiff filed her lawsuit relied primarily on her statements to police and her deposition testimony concerning her awareness of defendant's wrongful conduct at the time of the alleged assaults. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court erred by determining the limitations accrual date as a matter of law rather than allowing the jury to weigh inferences from the factual record regarding plaintiff's state of mind and knowledge during the relevant period of time. View "Clarke v. Abate" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a final relief-from-abuse order in which the family division of the superior court concluded that plaintiff was a vulnerable adult and that defendant abused and exploited her. The Supreme Court found there was ample evidence in the record for the trial court to have found that defendant engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with plaintiff, who was a vulnerable adult. View "Smith v. Wright" on Justia Law

Claimant Deborah Lydy was a traveling licensed practical nurse employed by defendant Trustaff, Inc. While on duty, a patient attacked her causing her to suffer (among other things) an acute cervical sprain. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether employer-health insurance premiums should have been included when calculating claimant's average weekly wages under the state workers' compensation laws. The Department of Labor concluded that such premiums were not "wages" and should not have been included. Concluding that the Vermont Legislature did not intend for wages to include payments made on behalf of employees for the purpose of acquiring health insurance. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commissioner's judgment. View "Lydy v. Trustaff, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Claimant Robert Brown tore the rotator cuff in his right shoulder while at work. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the workers' compensation laws precluded a certain impairment rating and associated award of permanent partial disability benefits for Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) when the claimant was not diagnosed with CRPS, but an expert confirmed he had it. The Commissioner of the Department of Labor and the trial court both concluded that the applicable law denied the Commissioner discretion to assign the impairment rating and award benefits associated with CRPS when the diagnosis did not meet the diagnostic standards. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Commissioner erred in his conclusion, and reversed and remanded for reconsideration. View "Brown v. W.T. Martin Plumbing & Heating, Inc." on Justia Law