Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a jury award of emotional distress and economic damages in a legal malpractice action. Defendant challenged the damages award on the grounds that emotional distress damages were not available in a legal malpractice case and that the award of economic damages equal to the amount plaintiff paid to settle the underlying case was improper because plaintiff failed to establish that the underlying settlement was reasonable. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed as to the award of emotional distress damages and affirmed as to the economic damages award. View "Vincent v. DeVries" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kelley O'Brien sued defendants Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) and FAHC nurse Catherine Synnott for drawing his blood at the request of law enforcement officers and without his consent, and for injuries he suffered when allegedly assaulted by police officers after defendants negligently allowed those officers unrestricted access to him in the hospital while he was recovering from surgery. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the police officers would harm plaintiff if allowed unsupervised access, and that nurse had plaintiff's apparent consent to draw the blood. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiff has not identified any evidence that defendants should have anticipated that the police officers would attack plaintiff if left unsupervised. As the trial court noted, plaintiff was in police custody at the time, so some police presence around him was to be expected. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that defendants could not be held liable for negligence on account of nurse's alleged conduct in leaving plaintiff alone with law enforcement officers even viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiff. Given that the Legislature has not indicated an intent to limit the liability of medical personnel who draw blood at the request of law enforcement, the Court concluded that, at least in a situation as alleged by plaintiff here in which a patient is conscious and the authority to draw blood depends upon actual, as opposed to statutorily implied, consent the police officers’ request did not protect defendants from liability for drawing the blood without plaintiff’s consent. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court in part (as to granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's negligence claim), and reversed in part (as to granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's battery claim). View "O'Brien v. Synnott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a jury verdict finding that defendant’s conceded breach of a duty of care, and the resulting low-impact, rear-end auto accident, was not the proximate cause of any injuries and harm to plaintiff. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s instruction concerning proximate cause improperly and prejudicially directed the jury to consider the foreseeability of plaintiff’s injuries, even though “duty” and “breach” had been established as a matter of law. On that ground, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The Court considered several other issues raised by plaintiff that were likely to arise on remand and concluded that none would require reversal. View "Fagnant v. Foss" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff appealed the trial court's entry of judgment in defendants' favor following the court's discovery sanction, which precluded plaintiff from offering expert testimony or evidence regarding defendants' negligence due to plaintiff's repeated failure to adequately reply to interrogatories. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the discovery response was sufficient and the court abused its discretion in concluding that more detailed factual information was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the sanctions were within the trial court's power and were not "untenable" or "unreasonable," and that the sanctions precluded plaintiff from offering certain evidence "but was not a dismissal." As such, no special findings were required. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Stella v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a workers' compensation insurer was entitled to reimbursement of death benefits it paid when a claimant's beneficiary also received proceeds from a life-insurance policy. Upon review, the Court held that under 21 V.S.A. 624(e) a workers' compensation carrier cannot seek reimbursement from life-insurance payments because such proceeds are not "damages," as contemplated by the statute and paid because of a third party's tortious actions. The Court therefore affirmed the Commissioner of Labor's grant of summary judgment to the estate of the claimant. View "Estate of Dunn v. Windham Northeast Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Shaddy appealed a trial court's dismissal of his complaint against the Brattleboro Retreat and some of its employees. Plaintiff, a former Retreat employee, brought claims of defamation, obstruction of justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and intentional interference with a contract, arising from the Retreat’s allegation that he unlawfully diverted regulated drugs from the medication room at its facility. The court dismissed the entire complaint on the ground that, having been resolved in proceeding before the Department of Labor and in plaintiff’s criminal case, the issue of whether plaintiff diverted the drugs was res judicata. The court also stated alternative grounds for dismissing all of the claims against the individual defendants, as well as the IIED, obstruction-of-justice, and intentional-interference-with-a-contract claims against both the individual defendants and the Retreat. Plaintiff argued that the court erred in dismissing his claims on the basis of res judicata and by failing to properly consider his complaint in light of his pro se status. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court’s dismissal of the defamation claim against the Retreat, but otherwise affirmed its decision. View "Shaddy v. Brattleboro Retreat et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stephen J. Pcolar appealed Superior Court verdict in favor of defendant Casella Waste Systems, Inc. Plaintiff filed suit alleging negligence in connection with an incident where the gripper arm of a garbage truck owned by Casella and operated by defendant Robert Smith struck him. The superior court charged the jury to compare the negligence of the parties, and the jury returned a verdict assigning seventy percent of the causative negligence to plaintiff, barring any recovery. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pcolar v. Caselle Waste Systems and Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of his medical malpractice action for failing to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Allan Eisemann, M.D., practicing through a medical practice which bore his name, negligently failed to advise Plaintiff or his dentist of the known risks associated with a tooth extraction while Plaintiff was taking intervenous doses of a medication called "Zometa," prescribed for multiple myleoma. Defendant allegedly approved the procedure; Plaintiff's dentist pulled the tooth. Following the procedure, Plaintiff developed osteonecrosis of the jaw. All parties agreed that the statute of limitations period for Plaintiff's malpractice claims would expire October 9, 2009. By a letter dated in September, Plaintiff's counsel proposed to Dr. Eisemann's counsel and other potential defendants a "time out" agreement to toll the statute of limitations for ninety days so that the parties could pursue settlement. Although Dr. Eisemann signed off on the agreement, not all defendants did. As a result of Plaintiff's failure to reach an agreement with all defendants, Plaintiff filed suit on October 7, 2009. Counsel for Dr. Eisemann returned the acceptance of service to Plaintiff's counsel in January, 2010. Plaintiff did not filed the acceptance with the court at that time. The trial court dismissed the case on its own motion on April 15, 2011 based on Plaintiff's failure to prosecute his claim. Three days later, Plaintiff filed the signed acceptances of service. Dr. Eisemann moved to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the Eisemann defendants are equitably estopped from invoking the statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel because his own "omissions or inadvertences" contributed to the problem. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal of his case. View "Beebe v. Eisemann" on Justia Law

Defendant Vaillancourt Tree and Landscape Service appealed a trial court decision denying its post-trial motion for attorney's fees and costs under a theory of implied indemnification.  The issue on appeal was whether indemnity for attorney's fees is appropriate where a jury has found the putative indemnitor not liable in the underlying suit. Plaintiff Leonard Knappmiller owns a commercial property directly abutting a property owned by Defendants Joseph and Carolyn Bove.  This case grew from a dispute between Knappmiller and the Boves regarding the Boves' decision to cut down and remove a row of white cedar trees that allegedly straddled their property line.  The Boves hired Vaillancourt to cut and remove the trees.  Following the removal, Knappmiller filed a claim against the Boves for wrongful cutting of trees, alleging that the trees were located on Knappmiller's property and were removed without his consent.  Knappmiller later amended his complaint, adding Vaillancourt as a codefendant.  Vaillancourt consequently cross-claimed against the Boves for negligence, breach of contract, and indemnity.  Vaillancourt's cross-claim alleged that it had entered into a contract with the Boves, and that the Boves did not, but should have, informed Vaillancourt about tree ownership issues with Knappmiller before the trees were cut down and removed.  Vaillancourt's cross-claim demanded "judgment against the Boves . . . for indemnity, if Vaillancourt is found liable to Plaintiff and for any other damages suffered by Vaillancourt resulting from the Boves' negligence and breach of contract." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: "[e]ven if [the Court] were to dispense with a requirement of finding fault on behalf of the Boves, the jury specifically found neither the Boves nor Vaillancourt liable for any wrongful act.  The jury did not reach Vaillancourt's cross-claim against the Boves because Vaillancourt requested attorney's fees only if Vaillancourt was found liable in the underlying suit.  More importantly, Vaillancourt did not object to the jury charge or the special verdict form -- both of which unequivocally instructed the jury to reach Vaillancourt's indemnity claim only if Knappmiller prevailed.  [The Court] therefore cannot discern any support for an award of attorney's fees, other than Vaillancourt's conclusory allegations that the Boves knew the trees straddled the boundary line and had a duty to inform Vaillancourt of that fact." View "Knappmiller v. Bove" on Justia Law

Appellants Warren and Wynne Kirschbaum appealed a trial court's ruling in favor of Appellee First Quality Carpets, Inc. arising from a dispute they had over carpet installed in 2007. The Kirschbaums argued that the civil division erred in awarding First Quality attorney's fees under 9 V.S.A. 4007(c) of the Prompt Pay Act because that section of the statute authorizing attorney's fees recovery effectively expired in 1996 pursuant to a sunset provision included in the Act. Alternatively, the Kirschbaums argued that because they withheld payment to First Quality in good faith, they were entitled to a directed verdict and that First Quality should not have been awarded attorney's fees under 4007(c). Finally, the Kirschbaums argued that the court erred in denying their counterclaim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "First Quality Carpets, Inc. v. Kirschbaum" on Justia Law