Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The question before the Supreme Court was whether, and to what extent, a state's attorney was entitled to official immunity from civil liability for allegedly tortuous conduct concerning a local police officer. The trial court concluded that liability for the acts complained of was precluded by either qualified or absolute immunity, or was otherwise barred. In February 2010 when Plaintiff was employed as a police officer with the South Burlington Police Department, filed a complaint against Defendant, the Chittenden County State's Attorney, stating claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference with Plaintiff's employment. The complaint alleged that Defendant (formerly a private lawyer and a member of what Plaintiff characterized as the Vermont "Drug Bar") harbored an animus against Plaintiff due to his police work. Plaintiff claimed that as state's attorney Defendant had "maliciously pursued a course of action . . . to undermine Plaintiff's work and credibility in the law enforcement community." As alleged in the complaint and in Plaintiff's later responses to discovery, Defendant's tortious misconduct included meeting with Plaintiff's supervisors to criticize his job performance and falsely accuse him of dishonesty; declining to file charges or seek search warrants based on Plaintiff's affidavits; threatening not to work with Plaintiff and thereby end his career if Plaintiff attempted to bypass the State's Attorney's office and obtain warrants directly from the trial court; criticizing Plaintiff's work when he was being considered by the State Police to serve on its Drug Task Force; impugning Plaintiff's honesty to other prosecutors; encouraging the filing of a civil-rights lawsuit against Plaintiff and testifying falsely in that action; and "leaking" harmful information about Plaintiff to criminal defense attorneys. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded "[t]he trial court's ruling was sound" and affirmed the trial court's ruling that the State's Attorney was entitled to absolute immunity. View "O'Connor v. Donovan" on Justia Law

James Bennett, the father of Brooke Bennett and the administrator of her estate, appealed a trial court's declaration of no coverage for the claims made in the lawsuit filed against homeowner Denise Woodward for negligent supervision and damages arising out of the abduction, assault, and death of his daughter, Brooke. Woodward was formerly married to Brooke’s uncle, Michael Jacques, who was alleged to have kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and murdered Brooke. Woodward's insurer brought a declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to hold that its policy does not cover these claims. The trial court decided the case on summary judgment, holding that the insurance policy excluded coverage and Bennett appealed. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer, concluding that insurer owed no duty of defense or indemnification in the underlying suit in part because the policy barred coverage for intentional acts by "an insured" that are not "occurrences." The court rejected Bennett's argument that the separate insureds, or severability clause provided coverage for homeowner because the complaint alleged that the uncle committed intentional acts. On appeal, father reiterated his argument that Jacques' alleged intentional acts did not preclude coverage for homeowner because the policy contained a severability clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the plain meaning of the terms in the insurance policy at issue did not include intentional tortious acts nor allowed for severability under the facts of this case. View "Co-operative Insurance Companies v. Woodward" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendants R. Brown & Sons, Inc., a scrap metal hauling company, and its principal, Robert Brown were found liable for breach of contract, common law fraud, trespass, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and consumer fraud.  Each of these claims stemmed from Defendants' commercial dealings with Plaintiff Rathe Salvage, Inc., a scrap metal salvage yard where Defendant would crush cars and transport the scrap for sale to steel mills.  Defendant was later granted judgment as a matter of law by the trial court overturning the jury's finding of a consumer fraud violation.  Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in denying judgment in its favor on the remaining claims because the verdicts were based on insufficient evidence; (2) it was entitled to a new trial because Rathe Salvage's attorney improperly argued to the jury that opposing counsel was implicated in withholding evidence; and (3) the case should be remanded due to the trial court's refusal to conduct a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of hauler's polygraph, or lie detector, testing before excluding such evidence from trial.  Rathe Salvage cross-appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of Defendant on the consumer fraud claim.  Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on all four issues. View "Rathe Salvage, Inc. v. R. Brown & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Andrew Kennery, on behalf of the estate of Gladys Kennery, appealed the decision of the Windham Superior Court that granted the State's motion for summary judgment on his complaint alleging negligence, gross negligence, and civil rights violations against the State, two state troopers, and the Vermont Department of Public Safety (VDPS). Plaintiff's lawsuit stemmed from a "welfare check" the troopers performed on Plaintiff's decedent, Gladys Kennery. Gladys's daughter had requested that the troopers check on her elderly mother, but the troopers searched the wrong residence. Meanwhile, Gladys had collapsed in her backyard and was unable to get back up and reach shelter. Gladys was found the next morning and died twelve days later from hypothermia caused by prolonged exposure to the cold. The superior court held that the State owed no duty of reasonable care in performing the welfare check, thereby defeating Plaintiff's claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants. Genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether a duty of care was created under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A based upon the State's undertaking to perform the welfare check and whether the troopers breached that duty such that the State was liable under the Vermont Tort Claims Act (VTCA). The Court also held that the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claim of gross negligence against the troopers. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kennery v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Celeste Puppolo, executor of the Estate of Eva Puppolo, appealed a jury verdict in favor of Defendant Donovan & O'Connor, LLC stemming from a legal malpractice action. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in denying a motion to withdraw her counsel, that she was denied a fair trial when the court allowed Defendant’s attorney to testify to the merits of the underlying medical malpractice action, and that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony that exceeded the scope of the defendant’s expert disclosure. Plaintiff's was unpersuaded by the results of investigations into the death of her aunt Eva, and consulted with Defendant about bringing a wrongful death and survivorship claim against the aunt's nursing home and attending physicians. In light of the autopsy report, and the conclusions of the police, Defendant declined to take the case. Defendant told Plaintiff that the limitations period for the survival action began to accrue when she was appointed executor of the estate. Defendant conceded that this statement was incorrect and that the limitations period had actually begun to accrue two months earlier, when the original executor was appointed. Defendant also conceded that it failed to specifically notify Plaintiff of the two year limitations period for the wrongful death action. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the home and physicians through another attorney. Both claims were dismissed on summary judgment as time-barred. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Defendant, claiming that her reliance on its legal advice deprived her of the opportunity to pursue the wrongful death and survivorship claims for her aunt's death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its decisions in Plaintiff's case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the jury verdict against Plaintiff. View "Puppolo v. Donovan & O'Connor, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff ProSelect Insurance Company filed this declaratory relief action to determine its duty to indemnify its insured in a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and sexual assault. The trial court construed a policy exclusion to bar coverage and entered judgment in favor of ProSelect. Plaintiff Robyn Levy appealed that judgment, asserting that: (1) the malpractice claims are covered under the concurrent causation doctrine; and (2) the policy exclusion as interpreted by the trial court contravenes public policy. Plaintiff alleged she began psychiatric counseling with Defendant's insured, Dr. Peter McKenna from 2003-2005. In that time, Plaintiff alleged Dr. McKenna negligently failed to properly diagnose her psychological disorder, prescribed harmful medications, encouraged her to pursue "unhealthy lifestyle choices," failed to refer her to a community-based mental health program, and engaged in treatment "at variance with accepted professional protocols." In a separate count, Levy alleged that, "[i]n the course of . . . treatment," Dr. McKenna had committed sexual assault and battery. ProSelect filed suit seeking a declaration that its professional liability policy excluded coverage of Plaintiff's suit. The trial court reasoned that the underlying action was indisputably a "suit" that contains an allegation of sexual assault. Therefore, by its plain terms the policy barred coverage of the complaint in its entirety, "[e]ven assuming" that the medical malpractice count was—as Plaintiff claimed—"totally unrelated" to the sexual assault and therefore otherwise covered. The trial court thus granted ProSelect’s motion and entered judgment in its favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's malpractice and assault claims could not be viewed as separate or independent causes, and coverage can not be grounded on the "concurrent causation doctrine." Furthermore, without a basis in the concurrent causation doctrine, there was no violation of public policy Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "ProSelect Insurance Co. v. Levy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Thomas and Margaret McGoff appealed a superior court order that granted Defendant Acadia Insurance Company summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ underinsured motorists (UIM) claim arising from an automobile accident in which Thomas McGoff was injured. Thomas McGoff was employed by A.R. Sandri, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation that operates gas stations and other businesses in New England and New York. At the time of the accident that led to the instant lawsuit, Sandri had supplied McGoff with a company car which he kept at his Barre, Vermont home. The Plymouth was owned by Sandri, registered in Massachusetts, and insured by Acadia. Sandri had two fleet insurance policies with Acadia—one for vehicles registered in Massachusetts and one for vehicles registered in other states. The Plymouth was covered by the policy issued for vehicles registered in Massachusetts. The policy listed the vehicles as being garaged in Massachusetts, apparently based on Sandri’s representation. McGoff made a claim against the other driver and a claim for additional UIM coverage against Acadia. Acadia denied coverage because the policy’s UIM coverage was less than the alleged tortfeasor’s liability coverage. Based on this, Acadia moved for summary judgment. In May 2010, the court granted Acadia’s motion, ruling that Vermont’s uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM) insurance requirements do not apply to the Acadia fleet policy because the policy was not "delivered or issued for delivery in this state." Without setting forth "[a] statement of the issues presented for review," Plaintiffs generally claimed on appeal that the superior court erred by granting Acadia summary judgment. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued the court erred in ruling that Vermont’s UIM requirements do not apply to the instant policy on grounds that the policy was not delivered or issued for delivery in Vermont. Because the Plymouth was garaged in Vermont rather than in Massachusetts (as indicated in the Acadia policy), they maintained the vehicle should have been registered in Vermont rather than Massachusetts and the Vermont UIM requirements should apply. Upon review of the parties briefs and the trial record, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs' position was contrary to the plain language of the UIM statute as well as the nearly unanimous relevant case law, and therefore the Court decline to adopt it under the present circumstances. The Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the insurer. View "McGoff v. Acadia Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Terrance White appealed a superior court's order in his wrongful death action that granted summary judgment to Defendant Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc. This case arose from the suicide of Plaintiff's fourteen-year-old daughter. Plaintiff sued Defendant, which employed a psychiatrist who was briefly involved with the decedent's case through a telepsychiatry research study. Plaintiff argued that summary judgment was improperly granted on the issue of the duty owed to decedent by the psychiatrist. Ultimately, the trial court found that the psychiatrist's contact with decedent was "so minimal as to not establish a physician-patient relationship," and consequently found that no duty existed at the time of decedent's death. Even assuming that a doctor-patient relationship was established, the court concluded that it was terminated following the video-conference and, thus, any duty was extinguished by termination of the relationship and no duty existed at the time of decedent's death. The court thus granted defendant's summary judgment motion. Plaintiff argued that the court erred in finding that the doctor owed no duty to decedent. They maintained that the doctor had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect decedent from the danger she posed to herself, and that the doctor did not effectively terminate the doctor-patient relationship prior to decedent's death. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiff and thus reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for additional proceedings. View "White v. Harris" on Justia Law

The issue on this appeal centers on who should bear responsibility for the cost of cleaning up petroleum contamination caused by releases from a gas station's underground storage tanks. The controversy in this appeal was between the State of Vermont, which runs the Vermont Petroleum Cleanup Fund (VPCF) and Stonington Insurance Co. (Stonington), which insured Bradford Oil, the owner of the underground storage tanks, for approximately a three-and-a-half-year period. The State appealed the trial court's judgment limiting Stonington's liability to a 4/27 share of past and future cleanup costs and awarded the State $45,172.05. On appeal, the State argued: (1) the Supreme Court's application of time-on-the-risk allocation in "Towns v. Northern Security Insurance Co." did not preclude joint and several liability under all standard occurrence-based policy language; (2) the circumstances here, including the reasonable expectations of the insured and the equity and policy considerations, support imposing joint and several liability on Stonington for all of the State's VPCF expenditures; and (3) even if time-on-the-risk allocation would otherwise be appropriate, Stonington was not entitled to such allocation because it failed to show sufficient facts to apply this allocation method in this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Towns" was the controlling case law here, and the Court was unconvinced by the State's reasonable expectations, equity, and policy arguments to distinguish the "Towns" decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Bradford Oil Co. v. Stonington Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The issue at the heart of this appeal asked the Supreme Court Court to decide if an eighteen-year-old has a duty to control the behavior of a fifteen-year-old friend and, if the fifteen-year-old later commits suicide, whether the eighteen-year-old is at fault.  Alexandra Brown was fifteen years old when she committed suicide in the early morning of February 21, 2007.  Two nights before, she and eighteen-year-old Defendant Kayla Leonard decided to go to a party at an acquaintance's apartment.  Each girl had lied to her parents, telling them that she was sleeping over at the other's house.  Kayla picked Alex up at her home and drove them both to the apartment.  There the girls danced and drank alcohol Alex provided. Ultimately, the girls spent the night, sharing a room with a nineteen-year-old man who lived in the apartment.  During the night Alex had sexual intercourse with the nineteen-year-old.  Kayla was aware the two were intimate but did not know they had intercourse. Kayla drove Alex home the next morning.  Her stepfather became suspicious when he saw Alex leave the house, walk down the driveway to a car, and drive away.  He called Alex's mother, who was in Florida at the time, and told her of his suspicions.  Alex's mother called the girl's house and found out that there were no plans for Alex to spend the night.  She then called Alex's cell phone and left a message to confront Alex.  The police were called. Alex's mother called several more times and left messages, including one that threatened "massive, massive consequences" because of Alex's behavior. Throughout the night, while driving around Rutland with a friend and later alone at her house, Alex sent numerous text messages to her friends telling them she had been caught by her parents and describing the trouble she was in.  She also sent numerous text messages to her boyfriend, who was away at college, one of which said, "I got caught tonight.  I'm grounded forever. Goodbye." While she mentioned suicide in some of her text messages, she never sent Kayla such a message. At some point in the evening, back at her house, Alex composed a suicide note.  Alex carried out the plan she had discussed in her note and hanged herself from a tree in her yard.  Her body was discovered by a neighbor the next morning. Plaintiff, Alex's mother acting as administrator of her estate, sued Kayla alleging that Kayla was negligent for bringing Alex to the apartment party, that Kayla should have intervened to prevent Alex from having sexual intercourse with the nineteen-year-old, and that, because she failed to do so, Kayla negligently caused Alex to suffer emotional harm.  Plaintiff further claimed that Kayla's negligence caused a delirium or insanity in Alex and "as a proximate result thereof, she committed suicide."  Kayla moved for summary judgment arguing that she owed no duty to Alex and that her actions were not the proximate cause of Alex's suicide.  The trial court granted Kayla's motion, and from that decision Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant and concluded she had no duty to intervene to prevent the tragedy that occurred: "Plaintiff essentially advocates that we find a duty simply because one girl was eighteen and the other was fifteen.  The law does not impose such a duty in this situation a duty for an eighteen-year-old to protect a high school friend who has not reached the age of majority from the consequences of the younger person's independent behavior or to control such behavior." View "Lenoci v. Leonard" on Justia Law