Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Burlington Administrators’ Association and Nicolas Molander (collectively the Association) appealed a trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration decision that Molander, in his capacity as an interim assistant principal, was not entitled to the contractual and statutory protections applicable to regular assistant principals who were not hired on an interim or acting basis. In particular, they challenged the trial court’s conclusion that it had no authority to review the merits of the arbitrator’s ruling for “manifest disregard of the law,” and argued that in this case, the arbitrator’s ruling evinced such a disregard. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator’s award did not in any event reflect a manifest disregard of the law, it did not address the question whether the trial court had authority to review an arbitration award under such a standard. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burlington Administrators' Ass'n v. Burlington Bd. of School Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Claimant Debra Morisseau appealed a decision by the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Labor awarding summary judgment to employer Hannaford Brothers on the question of whether the employer was obligated to pay for voice recognition technology, either as a vocational rehabilitation or medical benefit, as a consequence of her compensable work injury. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Morisseau v. Hannaford Brothers" on Justia Law

The Vermont State Employees’ Association (VSEA) filed eight petitions with the Vermont Labor Relations Board to elect collective bargaining representatives under the Vermont Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA). VSEA sought to represent the employees within the State’s Attorney’s Offices (SAOs), including deputy state’s attorneys, victim advocates, and secretaries, in the counties of Chittenden, Essex, Franklin, Orange, Rutland, Windsor, Addison, and Windham. The Board ultimately denied all eight petitions. "Plainly, the Legislature has endeavored to act comprehensively in covering government employees, including those working for local government entities such as the SAOs." The Supreme Court reversed the Board’s decision, and remanded the matter for the Board to proceed with the certification process. View "In re Election Petitions" on Justia Law

The Vermont Human Rights Commission and three female employees of the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) filed suit against the State (the DOC and the Vermont Department of Human Resources (DHR)) claiming that the DOC violated the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (VFEPA) by paying a male employee in the same position as the female plaintiffs as much as $10,000 more annually without a legally defensible, gender-neutral reason. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that although plaintiffs established a prima facie case, the undisputed facts established that the wage disparity was due to legitimate business reasons and not gender-based. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs' case. View "Vermont Human Rights Comm'n v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Claimant Roxanne Moran appealed a superior court's dismissal of her complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Claimant, a former employee of the Vermont State Hospital, separated from state service and applied for ordinary disability-retirement benefits in November of 2011. The Medical Review Board denied benefits, and claimant requested an evidentiary hearing after which benefits were again denied. Claimant then pursued an appeal to the superior court under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75. The court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, and claimant appealed. On appeal, claimant argued that because the superior court had jurisdiction over the appeal the Rule 75 action should not have been dismissed. In the alternative, claimant argued that, even if the superior court did not have jurisdiction to review the Board's decision, her timely filed Rule 75 complaint was sufficient to preserve the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Vermont Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4. In addition to its brief directly responding to claimant's arguments on appeal, the State also filed a motion to dismiss a portion of the appeal as untimely. Finding no reversible error and that the superior court indeed lacked jurisdiction to hear claimant's appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moran v. Vermont State Retirement Board" on Justia Law

David Gauthier began work at Green Mountain in May 2007 on an at-will basis as a full-time maintenance technician and was responsible for maintaining and repairing production machinery. In response to a request by Gauthier’s supervisor that the human resources (HR) department investigate internet use in the maintenance department, a Green Mountain HR generalist requested a “Websense” report for eleven maintenance technicians, including Gauthier (a Websense report “provides detailed information about internet use and access in connection with a particular employee’s log in information.”) The report showed that, during July 2011, Gauthier had 41,750 internet hits, an amount of internet hits “more than double the internet usage that [Green Mountain] generally considered excessive usage.” The day after the report was requested, but several days before it had been compiled, Gauthier sustained an injury while at work. Gauthier made a workers’-compensation claim, which Green Mountain accepted, and he continued to work until the day before he underwent an operation for his injury. Based in part on the result of the Websense report, an HR generalist submitted a disciplinary action plan to Gauthier's supervisor recommending that Gauthier be terminated. The report recounted that Gauthier was not required to access the internet frequently for business purposes and that he had been “engaged in the [Green Mountain] discipline process” for several years, including being placed on a CAP and receiving a written warning for violation of Green Mountain’s internet-use policy." Due to the timing with Gauthier’s workers’-compensation claim, however, the HR generalist was instructed to first send Gauthier a letter indicating that “there were some issues related to his performance that needed to be discussed once he returned from leave.” When Gauthier returned to work from his medical leave, he was placed administrative leave, then ultimately terminated. Gauthier filed a three-count complaint alleging: (1) workers’-compensation retaliation; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Green Mountain successfully moved for summary judgment on all three counts. This appeal followed, with Gauthier arguing that the court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of Green Mountain on his claim for workers’-compensation retaliation and abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend his complaint. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gauthier v. Keurig Green Mountain" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Board hired plaintiff Juanita Burch-Clay as principal of West Rutland School with a two-year contract beginning July 1, 2011. Plaintiff’s contract authorized the Board to not renew her contract by providing written notice of its reasons for non-renewal on or before March 15. By letter dated March 14, the Board notified plaintiff of its decision not to renew her contract, citing “school climate” as the reason for non-renewal. The letter also stated that the Board would be willing to reconsider its decision upon plaintiff’s successful participation in a remedial plan developed and approved by the superintendent and the Board. Plaintiff followed up with a letter dated March 19 expressing her desire to work collaboratively with the Board to address its concerns. While plaintiff and the Board made inroads into fixing "deficiencies" raised by a review of her performance, plaintiff refused to stipulate to those deficiencies as characterized by the evaluation. The Board affirmed its earlier decision not to renew plaintiff's contract. Plaintiff filed a motion at the superior court for review under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 74, raising claims of both procedural defects and a lack of just cause for her termination. The superior court found no error in the conduct of the hearing and concluded that the Board had just and sufficient cause for termination. Finding no error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burch-Clay v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Gwendolyn Hallsmith was the planning and community development director for the City of Montpelier. Her employment was protected by a "justifiable cause" provision in the City's personnel plan. In November 2013, City Manager William Fraser placed Hallsmith on paid administrative leave, and sent a letter to her indicating that he was contemplating firing her under the City's personnel plan. In the letter, the city manager described various acts of unprofessional behavior and insubordination, damage to relationships with key individuals and governing bodies within city government, and inappropriate use of City resources. He asserted that these acts were grounds for disciplinary action under the City's personnel plan, and offered to meet with Hallsmith to consider any response she wanted to make. Hallsmith, accompanied by counsel, met with the city manager and argued her case. Following that meeting, the city manager dismissed Hallsmith from employment with the City. Hallsmith timely filed a grievance pursuant to the personnel plan, which provides for review of disciplinary action. At the grievance hearing, the city questioned Hallsmith and her witnesses extensively. Hallsmith was not permitted to cross-examine the city manager, the City's only witness. The assistant city manager, serving as the hearing officer, upheld the City's termination decision. Hallsmith subsequently filed a Rule 75 petition at the trial court, seeking reinstatement, reimbursement for lost compensation, and other remedies. In her petition, Hallsmith contested the merits of her termination, arguing that the City's decision to terminate her employment was not supported by sufficient evidence of justifiable cause, and that the hearing officer's decision to uphold the termination was not supported by the evidence and applied the wrong legal standard. She also raised a due-process challenge to the post-termination hearing procedures. In response, the City moved to dismiss the due-process claim, arguing that Hallsmith got all the process that was due. The City did not argue that the post-termination grievance hearing was constitutionally adequate. Instead, its sole argument was that the pre-termination "Loudermill" meeting, combined with the availability of a post-termination judicial remedy "Rule 75" petition challenging governmental action or a common-law action for breach of contract satisfied due process. On the merits, the City argued that there was credible evidence establishing justifiable cause for the assistant city manager's decision to sustain the City's firing of Hallsmith. The trial court rejected the City's argument that the availability of a post-termination judicial remedy in the form of a Rule 75 petition or a breach-of-contract action satisfied due process. The City appealed that decision, but after careful review of the trial court and Board records, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Hallsmith v. City of Montpelier" on Justia Law

Employer Bradford's Trucking, Inc. appealed an Employment Security Board ruling that certain individuals were employees of the company for purposes of assessing unemployment taxes. Eileen Bradford has worked for employer, Bradford's Trucking, as a bookkeeper. Her son was the company's president. Ms. Bradford opened a bookkeeping business in 2008. She did not register her business with the Secretary of State, and one of her clients was Employer. She testified that she had no written agreements with the other two companies and did not send them invoices. Ms. Bradford was paid $25 per hour by employer for her bookkeeping services. In 2010, Ms. Bradford started working full time for another company, and consequently hired a friend, Neil Swenor, to help with employer's books. Swenor was then working full time as a bookkeeper at a meat market and was looking to supplement his income. He worked for employer for about a year, working out of Ms. Bradford's home in Vergennes. He usually worked about seven to ten hours per week, for $14 per hour. Ms. Bradford signed Swenor's checks on behalf of employer. When Swenor left at the end of 2011, Ms. Bradford hired Kelsey Reed, her son's fiancee, to replace him. Reed ran a daycare business. She worked for employer from January to August 2012, for approximately the same hours and rate of pay as Sweenor, and also worked out of Ms. Bradford's home. After Reed left, Ms. Bradford resumed doing all of the payroll and bookkeeping services for employer. In June 2012, the Department of Labor assessed employer for unpaid unemployment compensation contributions for Ms. Bradford and those that helped her keep the books for Employer. Employer appealed with respect to those three individuals. Following an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) sustained the Department's assessment of contributions. Employer then appealed to the Employment Security Board, which adopted the ALJ's findings and affirmed its decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Board's decision, and affirmed. View "Bradford's Trucking, Inc. v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

The New England Police Benevolent Association (NEPBA) appealed the Vermont Labor Relations Board's dismissal of NEPBA's petition for election of a collective-bargaining representative for NEPBA's failure to provide justification for its untimely filing. On January 30, 2014, NEPBA filed a petition for the election of a collective-bargaining representative to represent the sworn law enforcement officers of the Vermont Department of Fish and Wildlife, Vermont Department of Liquor Control, and Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles (collectively "the officers"). The officers seeking new representation were among those in the Non-Management Bargaining Unit, which was covered by a collective-bargaining agreement between the Vermont State Employees Association (VSEA) and the State of Vermont. The existing collective-bargaining agreement was set to expire on June 30, 2014, and the Non-Management Bargaining Unit was scheduled to conduct a ratification vote on a successor agreement on January 31, 2014, the day after the petition was filed. On appeal, NEPBA argued that the Board failed to consider its proffered justification and instead improperly concluded that the NEPBA provided no justification. Moreover, NEPBA asserted that the Board failed to conduct any analysis in support of its position, explain its findings, or define the applicable legal standard. NEPBA also argued that its proffered justification that the pending ratification of the successor agreement would foreclose the officers' opportunity to select a collective-bargaining representative ­is sufficient to waive the normal period for timely filing. The Supreme Court disagreed with NEPBA on the first issue and held that the Board did not err in dismissing the petition for NEPBA's failure to provide a justification for the untimely filing. View "In re New England Police Benevolent Association Petition for Election of Collective Bargaining Representative" on Justia Law