Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Frank Hall, a longtime employee of the Agency of Transportation (AOT), sued the agency in 2007, alleging discrimination on the basis of a physical disability and retaliation for his having filed a workers' compensation claim. The jury found no disability discrimination, but awarded Plaintiff damages based upon its finding that the State had retaliated against him as alleged. On appeal, the State argued that: (1) Plaintiff's retaliation claim was precluded by a September 2003 Stipulation and Agreement signed by Plaintiff and AOT releasing the State from liability for any and all claims associated in any way with Plaintiff's reclassification and transfer stemming from hostile work environment allegations against him; (2) Plaintiff's retaliation claim was not supported by any causal connection linking his employment reclassification and transfer with his having filed a workers' compensation claim; (3) evidence of a video surveillance of Plaintiff connected with a second workers' compensation claim was insufficient as a matter of law to support his retaliation claim and the resulting damages award; and (4) even if the record supported his retaliation claim, the State's liability is limited to $250,000, as set forth in Vermont's Tort Claims Act during the relevant time period. Plaintiff cross-appealed, challenging the trial court's denial of his request for post-judgment interest and attorney's fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment against the State and remanded the matter for the trial court to rule on the potentially determinative issue of the scope of the September 2003 release. View "Hall v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC) and Ursula Stanley, an employee of the State Agency of Transportation, appealed the Washington Civil Division's decision to grant the State's motion to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ms. Stanley complained that, under the Vermont Parental and Family Leave Act (VPFLA), 21 V.S.A. 472(c), which requires continuation of certain "employment benefits" during family leave, she was entitled to accrue, but was denied, paid vacation and sick time during the course of an unpaid parental leave. The trial court held that under section 472(c) an employee does not continue earning paid leave during unpaid parental leave. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss, finding that sections 472(a) and (b) of the VPFLA point to why the accrual of paid time-off and sick time are not benefits that employers must provide during unpaid leave. Section 472(a) states that an employee is "entitled to take unpaid leave." However, the statute permits employees to use already "accrued paid leave," such as vacation or sick leave, during parental leave. As the trial court noted, if an employee could demand accrual of paid leave from an employer under the VPFLA while on family leave, it must follow that at least a portion of the parental leave would be rendered paid leave, "a result not just inconsistent with, but contrary to, the employer's VPFLA obligation to provide unpaid parental leave only." View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Claimant Katherine St. Martin appealed the Employment Security Board's determination that she voluntarily left her job without good cause, disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits. She argued on appeal that her decision to quit her job was with good cause because she reasonably believed she would not receive a paycheck for her work. Claimant worked for almost two years for her employer as an assistant financial supervisor, which required her to prepare payroll information weekly. At some point, her employer began to have financial difficulties, and the payroll submission day was moved back to later in the week. The president of Claimant’s employer told claimant not to submit payroll because there were inadequate funds to cover the checks. The president then attempted to borrow money to meet the payroll, which ultimately proved "fruitless." The chief of operations persuaded the president to close the business and pay the employees. Claimant submitted the payroll after being given permission to do so by the president. She then printed the checks, and distributed them to the employees. After the president told claimant that the checks would bounce due to lack of funds, Claimant quit. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Claimant should not have been penalized for leaving her job when she was told not to expect a paycheck. The president's statement amounted to "good cause." View "St. Martin v. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joshua Handverger, the former city manager of Winooski, appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Winooski city attorney. Plaintiff sued the city attorney, individually, for breach of fiduciary duty in the course of municipal infighting over Plaintiff's performance as manager and the city's decision to dismiss him. Plaintiff argued that contrary to the fealty owed him by the city attorney, the attorney embarrassed and humiliated him by threatening cross-examination at a municipal hearing concerning his suspension of the city's police chief, and by signing a disparaging letter and press release calling for his resignation. Plaintiff claimed compensation for personal anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, and nightmares resulting from the city attorney's actions. The trial court determined that the city attorney owed plaintiff no fiduciary duty beyond the attorney's duty to the city. The Supreme Court held that trial court was correct in construing the city charter as obligating the city attorney to represent the city's interests only. The "essential" question on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the city attorney was obligated "to act for or give advice for the benefit" of Plaintiff personally either as an ally, or a neutral, in the Plaintiff's employment dispute with the city. "Absent any language to that effect in the charter, or some evidence that the attorney otherwise entered upon such a role on behalf of Plaintiff, the answer remains no." View "Handverger v. City of Winooski and O'Brien" on Justia Law

"This is a case of avoidable error and its consequences." The Vermont League of Cities and Towns (VLCT), the workers' compensation insurance carrier for the Town of Randolph, settled a compensation claim of Claimant Stacey Colson and paid the settlement amount to the Office of Child Support pursuant to an earlier order that OCS issued to collect Claimant's back child support payments. VLCT failed to deduct the amount of an attorney's fee lien granted by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor (DOL) to claimant’s lawyer. VLCT acted with the understanding that the lawyer would not seek the fee if, as occurred, claimant was awarded a lump-sum compensation amount. The lawyer sought her fee, but VLCT resisted double paying that amount, and the dispute has ended up before the Supreme Court after two decisions from the Commissioner and one from Superior Court. Claimant appealed the Commissioner’s grant of summary judgment to VLCT, in which the Commissioner concluded that VLCT acted appropriately in paying over the entire proceeds of claimant’s workers’ compensation award to OCS. Claimant argued that his attorney's lien had priority over OCS's claim for child support arrearages. He claimed that the Commissioner's findings were incomplete and contradictory, that the Commissioner erred when she determined his attorney’s lien did not have priority, and that DOL should be compelled to enforce his attorney’s lien for fees. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the OCS lien was first in time and therefore took priority, and affirmed the Commissioner's holding that VLCT could not be required to pay the attorney's fee amount to Claimant's attorney. View "Colson v. Vermont League of Cities & Towns" on Justia Law

Claimant Katrina Blue appealed an Employment Security Board decision that denied her claim for unemployment compensation benefits.  Claimant contended the Board erred in: (1) finding that she was disqualified from receiving benefits because she left her employment voluntarily; and (2) assigning her the burden of proof.  Claimant worked for about four years for Hickok & Boardman Realty.  In the early summer of 2010, claimant left her employment to participate in a three-month cross-country bicycle ride for multiple sclerosis. Claimant acknowledged that she did not submit a written request for leave, as required in the company's personnel policy, which stated that employees who apply for unpaid personal leave, "must apply in writing" and that, "reinstatement is not guaranteed" but rather, "at the Company's sole discretion."  While conceding that her leave arrangement "was not typical," Claimant maintained that her supervisor had agreed, "that an exception would be made in this instance." In its ruling, the ALJ's findings indicated that Claimant "requested a three-month leave of absence" but do not state whether the request was granted or, if so, on what terms.   Its key conclusion, however, was that, "[w]hile the claimant maintain[ed] that she was fired when the employer would not allow her to come back from a personal leave of absence, it was the claimant who initiated the separation from employment by requesting the leave of absence . . . thus making this a voluntary separation from employment."  Since there was no claim that the separation was for "good cause attributable" to the employer, the ALJ concluded that claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits. In a divided ruling, the Employment Security Board adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions and sustained its decision.  The dissenting member of the Board would have found that claimant's "departure for her cross-country ride was . . . not a voluntary abandonment of her employment, but a temporary unpaid leave of absence," that claimant was let go upon her return in late August, and therefore that she was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits from that time forward.  This appeal followed. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the Department of Labor's ALJ: "[m]indful that our unemployment compensation scheme must be broadly construed so that no claimant is "excluded unless the law clearly intends" it … we direct the ALJ on remand to enter additional findings and conclusions on the material issues presented, and to award unemployment compensation benefits to claimant in the event it is determined that she  did not leave her employment voluntarily." View "Blue v. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Employer Ethan Allen, Inc. appealed the Commissioner of the Department of Labor's decision that Claimant Robin Houle's right shoulder condition was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.  Claimant experienced pain and weakness in her left shoulder and arm, and her job duties as a furniture refinisher were modified to account for her medical restrictions.  Claimant was assigned to an inventory control/stockroom clerk position where she engaged in a variety of duties.  Interspersed among these duties, claimant also wrapped finished shelves to prepare them for shipping. Claimant was initially treated for the increased symptoms in her shoulder and neck by her primary care provider.  The primary care provider referred her to an orthopedist for further evaluation.  The orthopedist suspected that her left shoulder complaints were most likely due to her repetitive work for Ethan Allen.  He attributed claimant's right shoulder pain to normal wear and tear to be expected of someone claimant's age.  Claimant was dissatisfied with this evaluation and was then referred to an orthopedic surgeon for further evaluation and treatment. In view of the competing expert medical opinions, the Commission relied on a traditional five-part test to evaluate their persuasiveness. Ethan Allen raised numerous arguments on appeal to the Supreme Court. Principal among them, Ethan Allen challenged the Commissioner's use of the five-part test to evaluate competing medical opinions, both as applied in this case and in general.  According to the Employer, the use of this test improperly shifts the burden of proof from claimant to employer, unfairly places employers at a disadvantage, and erroneously employs a "winner take all" approach to evaluating a claimant's expert testimony. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Ethan Allen failed to show that the Commissioner's findings were clearly erroneous or that her conclusions were unsupported by the findings. The Court affirmed the Commissioner's decision in this case. View "Houle v. Ethan Allen, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pamela Allen-Pentkowski appealed the Vermont Employment Security Board's (Board) determination that she was discharged from work for actions constituting misconduct, a decision which temporarily disqualified her from collecting unemployment compensation benefits.  Prior to her discharge, Plaintiff had worked for over five years at Liebert Engineering, Inc. as a computer assisted design operator. Over the course of her work for Liebert, a dispute arose when Plaintiff's work schedule changed. She claims she told her supervisor that she could make a requested change in her work hours after she had her baby, but until then, could not work an extra hour beyond 4:00 p.m. on days requested by her supervisor. In an e-mail to the company's president, Plaintiff explained she could not work the extra hour, that her supervisor would not listen to her, and that she felt harassed by his repeated insistence. Hearing an exchange between Plaintiff and the supervisor, the president came from his office and told Plaintiff that "can't is equal to refusal, refusal is reason for termination," at which point, he discharged Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed for unemployment compensation benefits but the claims adjudicator determined the nature of plaintiff's discharge from her employer was misconduct connected with her work. On appeal, plaintiff argued that her inability to work the hours requested by her employer was not misconduct within the meaning of the statute and should not disqualify her from unemployment compensation benefits.  Upon review, the Supreme Court held the employer failed to carry its burden of proof and reversed the Board's decision. View "Allen-Pentkowski v. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law