Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Landowners Nicole Ritchie and Elisabeth McIntee, in collaboration with the Brewster River Mountain Bike Club, replaced an old footbridge on their property in Underhill, Vermont, with a new bridge to provide access to a recreational trail network. The new bridge was larger and more secure than the old one, and a ramp was added to connect it to the existing trail. Neighbors David Demarest and Jeff Moulton contested the improvements, arguing that they violated the town's zoning regulations.The Town of Underhill Developmental Review Board granted a retroactive conditional-use permit and variance for the bridge and ramp. The neighbors appealed to the Environmental Division, which found that the bridge's installation caused minimal land disturbance and was used for recreational purposes by the landowners and the public. The Environmental Division voided the permit, ruling that the bridge was a de minimis recreational use of private property and not subject to zoning regulations.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the bridge constituted a de minimis recreational use of private property, as it involved minimal land disturbance, had a small footprint, posed minimal health and safety risks, and was used for recreational purposes. The Court concluded that the bridge was outside the scope of the town's zoning ordinance and did not address the neighbors' other arguments regarding the permit and the Club's standing. View "In re Brewster River Mountain Bike Club, Inc. Conditional Use Application" on Justia Law

The Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) proposed a project to reconstruct the interchange between Interstate 89 and U.S. Routes 2 and 7 in Colchester, Vermont, into a Diverging Diamond Interchange (DDI). Timberlake Associates, LLP, the landowner of a gas station at the southeast corner of the interchange, contested the necessity of the land takings required for the project. Timberlake argued that AOT did not fulfill its pre-suit obligation to negotiate and that the trial court erred in its determination of necessity.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, held a four-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Timberlake failed to demonstrate bad faith or abuse of discretion by AOT. The court found that AOT had satisfied its burden of demonstrating the necessity of taking Timberlake’s property to the extent proposed. Timberlake appealed the decision, arguing that AOT did not adequately consider the statutory factors of necessity and failed to negotiate in good faith.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court found that AOT presented sufficient evidence showing it considered the statutory factors, including the adequacy of other property and locations, the effect on the landowner’s convenience, and the environmental impacts. The Court also determined that AOT’s selection of the DDI design was justified based on its superior performance in increasing capacity, reducing congestion, and improving safety compared to other alternatives. Additionally, the Court concluded that AOT made reasonable efforts to negotiate with Timberlake before filing suit, as required by statute.The Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining the necessity of the takings and that AOT fulfilled its pre-suit obligation to negotiate. The decision of the lower court was affirmed. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

Dawna Pederzani operated the Vermont English Bulldog Rescue from her home in Williston, Vermont, providing temporary foster care to rescued dogs. Her home is located in a residential zoning district governed by the Williston Development Bylaw. In September 2022, she received a notice of zoning violation for operating the rescue without a permit. She applied for an "after-the-fact" zoning permit as a "home business," which was denied by the Development Review Board. She then filed a new application in January 2023, which was initially approved by the zoning administrator but later reversed by the Board upon appeal by her neighbors.The Environmental Division granted summary judgment in favor of the neighbors, affirming the denial of the home-business permit. The court held that the bylaw's home-business provision prohibited any outdoor use for the business in the residential zoning district. It rejected Pederzani's argument that her operation qualified as a "kennel," which the bylaw allows in residential districts, reasoning that the kennel provision was limited by the outdoor restriction for home businesses.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and reversed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the rescue operation qualifies as a kennel under the bylaw, which allows kennels as home businesses in residential districts. The Court found that the kennel provision, which contemplates some outdoor use, should be read as an exception to the general home-business provision that prohibits outdoor workspaces. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Pederzani Administrative Appeal" on Justia Law

A group of Burlington residents appealed a summary judgment order from the Environmental Division that upheld a permit for the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception Parish Charitable Trust to demolish church structures on its property. The residents argued that the court erred in concluding that 24 V.S.A. § 4413(a)(1)(C) prevented the City of Burlington from applying its Comprehensive Development Ordinance (CDO) to restrain the demolition. They also contended that the court erred in denying their motion to compel discovery regarding the pending sale of the property to a nonreligious buyer, asserting that the sale was relevant to the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C).The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the Trust, finding that the intended functional use of the property was for religious purposes, specifically the deconsecration of the Cathedral through demolition, which was an ecclesiastical process. The court concluded that applying the CDO would interfere with this intended functional use. The court also denied the residents' motion to compel discovery, determining that the information sought was unrelated to the issue on appeal, which was limited to whether § 4413(a)(1)(C) exempted the property from regulation under the CDO.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C) depends on the intended functional use of the property at the time of the application, not on the identity of the owner or potential future uses. The Court found that the Trust's intended use of the property for religious deconsecration through demolition was protected under § 4413(a)(1)(C). The Court also upheld the denial of the motion to compel discovery, as the future use of the property by a potential buyer was irrelevant to the current application. Thus, the summary judgment in favor of the Trust was affirmed. View "In re Cathedral of the Immaculate Parish Charitable Trust Appeal" on Justia Law

Defendants discovered that a parcel of land near their property was seemingly omitted from the plaintiff's deed. They arranged for the heirs of a previous owner to deed that parcel to them without confirming the heirs' ownership or consulting the plaintiff, who used the parcel. After recording their deed, defendants informed the plaintiff that they owned the parcel and asked her to remove her belongings. The plaintiff sued for deed reformation and slander of title.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted the plaintiff's claim for deed reformation on summary judgment and concluded that Mr. Kolodziej slandered the plaintiff's title after a bench trial. Defendants appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the plaintiff had a transferrable ownership interest capable of disparagement, as the reformed deed related back to the original deed. The court found that the defendants published a false statement by recording a deed that falsely claimed ownership of the disputed parcel. The court also concluded that Mr. Kolodziej acted with malice by recklessly disregarding the plaintiff's potential claim to the property. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff's legal expenses incurred in clearing the cloud on her title constituted special damages necessary to sustain her slander-of-title claim. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the deed reformation and the ruling on the slander-of-title claim, including the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff. View "Massucco v. Kolodziej" on Justia Law

Nicole Stone, a person with disabilities who uses a motorized wheelchair, resides in St. Johnsbury, Vermont. In 2020, her mother’s boyfriend, Johnathan Chase, built an outdoor structure to facilitate socially distanced meetings for Stone. A neighbor complained about the structure, leading the town zoning administrator to inform Chase that it violated setback requirements and to advise him to seek a variance. The Development Review Board (DRB) denied the variance request without discussing Stone’s disability-related needs. Stone did not appeal the decision but filed a discrimination complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission.The Commission investigated and found reasonable grounds to believe the Town of St. Johnsbury discriminated against Stone based on her disability. The Commission filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, seeking various forms of relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and civil penalties. The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that only the Environmental Division had jurisdiction over such claims. The Civil Division dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because ruling on the discrimination claim would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the final zoning decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Civil Division has jurisdiction over all Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA) claims. The Court held that the finality provisions of 24 V.S.A. § 4472 do not preclude the Commission from seeking remedies for discrimination that do not require reopening the final zoning decision. The Court also determined that the Commission is not an "interested person" under the statute and is therefore not bound by the exclusivity-of-remedy provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

The case involves two sisters, Stacey Martin and Christine Lyon, who inherited their family residence as tenants in common after their father's death in 2019. Their mother lived on the property until her death in 2022, after which the sisters agreed to prepare the property for sale. They decided to restore the property, with Christine performing most of the labor. However, their relationship deteriorated, leading Stacey to file a complaint seeking partition of the property.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, held a one-day bench trial and issued written findings. The court calculated the contributions each sister made towards the mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities, and agreed-upon maintenance and improvements. It credited Christine for her labor but excluded her discretionary improvements due to lack of evidence of increased property value. The court concluded that Christine's share of the equity was $187,450 and ordered her to take assignment of the property by paying Stacey $92,550. If Christine chose not to take assignment, the property would be sold, and the proceeds divided.Christine appealed the denial of her request for prejudgment interest, arguing it should be awarded as of right under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) or as a matter of discretion. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest is not available for partition awards, as partition is an equitable remedy, not an action for damages. The court concluded that the credits for Christine's contributions were part of the equitable distribution of the property and did not qualify as damages, thus not triggering prejudgment interest. View "Martin v. Lyon" on Justia Law

A property owner sought to subdivide a 161.6-acre property in Westminster, Vermont, to create two residential lots with frontage on Old Codding Road, a private road discontinued in 1893. The Westminster Development Review Board (DRB) granted the subdivision permit, finding that the applicant had made a "threshold showing" of the right to use Old Codding Road. Neighbors appealed, arguing that the applicant did not have a legal right-of-way over the road.The Environmental Division affirmed the DRB's decision, concluding that the applicant had made the necessary threshold showing of a right to use the road based on historical use by the applicant's predecessors and other neighbors without deeded rights-of-way. The court declined to fully evaluate whether the road was formally laid out before its discontinuance, citing a lack of jurisdiction to determine private property rights.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Environmental Division erred in requiring only a threshold showing and in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the existence of an easement or right-of-way. The Supreme Court held that the Environmental Division has jurisdiction to decide whether the applicant has a permanent easement or right-of-way, as required by the Vermont Planning and Development Act and the Westminster Zoning Bylaws. The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the permit applicant to establish the necessary easement or right-of-way.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Environmental Division's decision and remanded the case for a determination of whether the applicant has an easement or right-of-way over Old Codding Road. The Environmental Division must now fully evaluate the evidence regarding the road's layout and the applicant's claimed right-of-way. View "In re Ranney Dairy Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

William and Mary Fulton purchased a 32-acre property in Jericho, Vermont, in August 2021. The property was enrolled in the Agricultural and Managed Forest Land Use Value Appraisal Program (Current Use program) under a forest management plan that generally prohibited tree cutting. Before finalizing the purchase, the Fultons contacted the Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation (FPR) and the Department of Taxes, Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR) to inquire about converting the property to agricultural use. They were informed that any tree cutting in violation of the plan would lead to disenrollment from the program and tax penalties. Despite this, the Fultons cut trees on the property shortly after purchasing it.The Fultons did not file the required application to continue the property's enrollment in the Current Use program or submit a notice of withdrawal. In September 2021, the county forester received a complaint about the tree cutting and confirmed the violation. FPR issued an adverse-inspection report in December 2021, leading to the property's removal from the Current Use program and tax penalties. The Fultons appealed to the Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, which granted summary judgment in favor of FPR, concluding that the property was still enrolled in the program at the time of the tree cutting and that the Fultons' actions constituted "development" under the program's rules.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the property was not automatically disenrolled from the Current Use program when the Fultons failed to submit the required application and fee. Instead, disenrollment occurs only upon the Director of PVR's action. The Court also held that the Fultons' tree cutting did not fall under the statutory exemption for "development" because it was not related to the construction or alteration of a structure for farming, logging, forestry, or conservation purposes. Therefore, the Fultons' tree cutting violated the forest management plan, justifying the property's removal from the Current Use program. View "Fulton v. Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation" on Justia Law

American Environmental, Inc. (plaintiff) challenged the Burlington School District (defendant) over a contract awarded for the demolition and remediation of Burlington High School, which was closed due to toxic substances. The District sent a Request for Qualifications to fifteen contractors, including the plaintiff and the winning bidder, EnviroVantage. The plaintiff argued that EnviroVantage did not meet the prequalification criteria and that the contract should have been awarded to them.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, citing potential financial harm to the District and public interest. The court later granted summary judgment to the District, finding the case moot because the project was substantially complete. The court applied factors from Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill ex rel. Kazickas v. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, determining that no effective relief could be granted due to the project's advanced stage.The Vermont Supreme Court took judicial notice of the project's completion, including demolition and soil remediation, based on public records and visual evidence. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that no effective relief could be provided under Rule 75, which does not allow for damages. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case met the exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, noting the plaintiff's delay in seeking expedited relief and the lack of demonstrated probability of encountering the same situation again. View "American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District" on Justia Law