Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

William and Mary Fulton purchased a 32-acre property in Jericho, Vermont, in August 2021. The property was enrolled in the Agricultural and Managed Forest Land Use Value Appraisal Program (Current Use program) under a forest management plan that generally prohibited tree cutting. Before finalizing the purchase, the Fultons contacted the Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation (FPR) and the Department of Taxes, Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR) to inquire about converting the property to agricultural use. They were informed that any tree cutting in violation of the plan would lead to disenrollment from the program and tax penalties. Despite this, the Fultons cut trees on the property shortly after purchasing it.The Fultons did not file the required application to continue the property's enrollment in the Current Use program or submit a notice of withdrawal. In September 2021, the county forester received a complaint about the tree cutting and confirmed the violation. FPR issued an adverse-inspection report in December 2021, leading to the property's removal from the Current Use program and tax penalties. The Fultons appealed to the Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, which granted summary judgment in favor of FPR, concluding that the property was still enrolled in the program at the time of the tree cutting and that the Fultons' actions constituted "development" under the program's rules.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the property was not automatically disenrolled from the Current Use program when the Fultons failed to submit the required application and fee. Instead, disenrollment occurs only upon the Director of PVR's action. The Court also held that the Fultons' tree cutting did not fall under the statutory exemption for "development" because it was not related to the construction or alteration of a structure for farming, logging, forestry, or conservation purposes. Therefore, the Fultons' tree cutting violated the forest management plan, justifying the property's removal from the Current Use program. View "Fulton v. Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation" on Justia Law

American Environmental, Inc. (plaintiff) challenged the Burlington School District (defendant) over a contract awarded for the demolition and remediation of Burlington High School, which was closed due to toxic substances. The District sent a Request for Qualifications to fifteen contractors, including the plaintiff and the winning bidder, EnviroVantage. The plaintiff argued that EnviroVantage did not meet the prequalification criteria and that the contract should have been awarded to them.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, citing potential financial harm to the District and public interest. The court later granted summary judgment to the District, finding the case moot because the project was substantially complete. The court applied factors from Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill ex rel. Kazickas v. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, determining that no effective relief could be granted due to the project's advanced stage.The Vermont Supreme Court took judicial notice of the project's completion, including demolition and soil remediation, based on public records and visual evidence. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that no effective relief could be provided under Rule 75, which does not allow for damages. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case met the exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, noting the plaintiff's delay in seeking expedited relief and the lack of demonstrated probability of encountering the same situation again. View "American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs own a 325-acre property in Tunbridge, Vermont, crossed by two legal trails. The Town of Tunbridge converted these trails from Class 4 roads in 1987. In 2021, the Town's selectboard revised the town plan to potentially expand trail use, including bicycling. Plaintiffs opposed this and claimed exclusive authority over trail maintenance on their property. In 2022, the selectboard adopted a policy allowing private individuals to apply for permission to maintain the trails, prompting plaintiffs to seek a declaratory judgment that the Town lacked such authority.The Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint as unripe, stating there was no justiciable controversy since no one had applied to maintain the trails. The court reiterated its stance from a prior action, emphasizing that discussions and policy adoptions did not constitute a concrete threat to plaintiffs' interests. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the new policy and procedure for trail maintenance created a sufficiently concrete controversy.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations demonstrated a sufficiently concrete threat of physical invasion and interference with their property rights. The Court held that the Town's formal assertion of authority to maintain and repair the trails, coupled with the procedure for private individuals to apply for permission, constituted an actual case or controversy. The Court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action to proceed. View "Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Town of Ferrisburgh and 2078 Jersey Street, LLC, the latter of which had purchased a parcel of land in the town and began constructing an access road to an existing rock quarry on the property. The town's Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) issued a notice of violation to the company, stating that the construction required a permit. After the ZBA rejected the company's appeal of the notice of violation, the company filed for a conditional-use permit. The ZBA denied the permit, concluding that the construction of the road would substantially expand a nonconforming use of the property, in violation of local land use regulations.After the ZBA denied the permit, the company mailed a request for reconsideration to the ZBA. However, the company did not file an appeal to the environmental court within the thirty-day appeal period under Rule 5(b)(1) of the Vermont Rules of Environmental Court Proceedings. The ZBA did not take any action on the reconsideration request prior to the expiration of the time to appeal to the environmental court. After the expiration of the appeal period, the ZBA denied the request for reconsideration.The company then filed a notice of appeal with the environmental court. The town moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the company had failed to timely appeal. The court denied the motion, finding that, under Appellate Rule 4(b)(5), a request for reconsideration tolls the appeal deadline. The town then requested an interlocutory appeal, which was granted.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the environmental court's decision. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 4(b)(5) is inapplicable in this context and that tolling does not otherwise apply under these circumstances. Therefore, the company's appeal to the environmental court was untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The case was remanded with orders that the company's appeal be dismissed. View "In re 2078 Jersey Street" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision that the defendants, R.L. Vallee, Inc., and Crystal Clear Hospitality, LLC (CCH), accepted and used payments issued by the Vermont Agency of Transportation (the Agency) in connection with a condemnation order and are therefore barred from contesting the necessity of the taking or the public purpose of the Agency’s highway project under 19 V.S.A. § 506(c).The Agency sought to acquire certain property rights for a highway project. After a judgment of condemnation was issued, the Agency tendered payments to the defendants. The defendants deposited these payments into their respective accounts but maintained that they had not "used" the funds. They appealed the judgment, intending to challenge the necessity and public purpose of the project.The court held that depositing a check constitutes both "acceptance" and "use" of a payment under 19 V.S.A. § 506(c). It rejected the defendants' argument that they had not used the "funds" because the issue was whether they used the Agency’s payments when they deposited its checks into their accounts. The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the Agency was required to show that they knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their rights under § 506(c), noting that defendants are charged with knowledge of the law and were represented by counsel. Finally, the court did not address the defendants' argument that § 506(c) is unconstitutional, as the defendants failed to assign error to the lower court's decision not to address that argument. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a zoning enforcement action initiated by the Town of Pawlet against landowner Daniel Banyai. Banyai launched a firearms training facility on his property in 2017, which was found to be in violation of the town's Uniform Zoning Bylaws. The Environmental Division issued a judgment in 2021, ordering Banyai to remove unpermitted structures and have his property surveyed within 30 days. Banyai failed to comply with these orders, leading to the imposition of contempt sanctions.The contempt sanctions included fines of $200 per day until all violations were rectified, and the potential for Banyai's arrest. The court also granted the town permission to enter Banyai's property to remove the unpermitted structures if he continued to ignore the orders.Banyai appealed, arguing that the sanctions were punitive and violated the excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision, deeming Banyai’s arguments an impermissible collateral attack on a final order. The court stated that Banyai had failed to challenge the February 2023 contempt order or denial of reconsideration by a timely direct appeal, which would have been the appropriate channel for his grievances. As a result, his attempt to challenge the determinations now were considered an impermissible collateral attack on the February 2023 contempt order. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision to issue a no-stalking order against a man, John Langlois, who was found to have physically assaulted his neighbor, Gail Haupt, on two occasions. The altercations were the result of a property dispute between the two. The defendant argued that the court erred in considering his acts of physical violence as threats under the stalking statute, and that his actions were justified in defense of personal property. The court rejected both arguments.First, it held that physical violence can constitute a threat under the stalking statute because it communicates an intent to inflict physical harm. The court reasoned that by using violence against the plaintiff on two occasions, the defendant conveyed a message that he was willing and able to inflict physical harm, and therefore threatened the plaintiff within the meaning of the statute.Second, the court ruled that the common law defense-of-property privilege is not a defense to a civil stalking order. The court noted that the purpose of the stalking statute is to protect individuals from "severe intrusions on personal privacy and autonomy" and to limit "risks to the security and safety" of the individual. The court concluded that the "critical question in such proceedings is not who was at fault, but who, if anyone, is in need of protection." Therefore, the defendant's actions were not privileged and the court did not err in failing to consider his defense-of-property argument. As a result, the court upheld the no-stalking order against the defendant. View "Haupt v. Langlois" on Justia Law

In Vermont, a dispute arose among the owners of seven lots connected by a private road named Purple Mountain Road over how to allocate maintenance costs for the road. The plaintiffs, who own five of the seven lots, argued that each lot owner should contribute based on the percentage of distance traveled from the public highway along the private road to reach their respective lot. The defendants, who own the remaining two lots, argued that all parcel owners should divide costs equally. The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court ruled that in the absence of an express agreement governing the maintenance of a private road, all parties deriving common benefit from the road must contribute "rateably," or in a manner that is reasonable and equitable given the benefits each owner receives, to the cost of maintaining the road, as per 19 V.S.A. § 2702. The court reasoned that all the parties have the right to use the entire private road at any time and share equally in the benefits offered by the road, such as enhanced private and commercial access to their properties and the privacy provided by the cul-de-sac. Therefore, all parties must pay an equal fee for the maintenance of the road. View "Rawley v. Heymann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William Doherty appealed the grant of summary judgment to defendant Alphonse Sorrentino. On the morning of November 8, 2019, plaintiff walked a short distance from the Village Inn to the Woodstock Inn in Woodstock, Vermont. It was not precipitating at that time. He remained at the Woodstock Inn for about fifteen minutes. It began to snow as he left the Woodstock Inn to return to the Village Inn. Plaintiff slipped and fell on a sidewalk abutting 81 Central Street. Snow had lightly accumulated on the sidewalk. Defendant arrived after plaintiff fell but before an ambulance transported plaintiff to a local hospital. Defendant was also the sole owner of ACS Design Build and Construction Services, LLC, both of which had main offices at 81 Central Street. The sidewalk was owned by the Town of Woodstock. The Town had an ordinance that required owners of property abutting a [Woodstock] Village sidewalk clear accumulated snow or ice for pedestrian traffic to a minimum width of three feet, and within twenty-four hours of such accumulation. No accumulated snow had been cleared at the time plaintiff fell. Plaintiff sued, alleging that defendant, in his personal capacity, breached a duty to plaintiff to clear the sidewalk of snow, which was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. In moving for summary judgment, defendant argued that he owed no duty to plaintiff because: neither defendant nor the owner of the building, Tanglewood, owned or controlled the sidewalk on which plaintiff fell; landowners abutting public sidewalks owed no duty to the public to keep the sidewalk in a safe condition; and the municipal ordinance did not otherwise create a duty to plaintiff. The civil division awarded summary judgment to defendant concluding plaintiff did not bear his burden to show that defendant knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on the sidewalk. The court determined that plaintiff failed to offer any basis to reach defendant’s personal assets as sole shareholder of Tanglewood, and that plaintiff did not allege defendant owned or controlled the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. The court found that the municipal ordinance did not create a duty of care to plaintiff. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Doherty v. Sorrentino, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of her motion to enforce a provision in the parties’ final divorce order that gave her the option to purchase jointly owned real property from defendant. The property at issue was a five-acre parcel of land with buildings on the Connecticut River where the parties lived and operated a marina business during their marriage. In the final divorce order, the court gave each party the option to buy out the other’s share of the property. If plaintiff chose not to exercise the purchase option and defendant wished to do so instead, he had to notify plaintiff and send her a check. If neither party wished to purchase the property and business, it was to be sold through a realtor and the proceeds would be split between the parties. In January 2022, plaintiff moved to enforce her option to purchase the marina property. Plaintiff asserted that an April 2020 court order had given her thirty days to notify defendant of her intent to purchase. She argued that the order was stayed by her motion to alter or amend the judgment and subsequent notice of further proceedings, and did not become final until the trial court issued a November 2021 decision. According to plaintiff, she had thirty days from that date to exercise the option and did so by sending a letter with a $25,000 check to defendant on November 30, 2021. Defendant opposed plaintiff’s motion and filed his own motion to enforce the sale of the property to him. Defendant asserted that after plaintiff indicated in her motion to alter or amend that she did not want to purchase the property, he had notified her of his intent to purchase it on June 1, 2020, and mailed her a $25,000 check. At that time, plaintiff responded by offering to sell the property for a much higher price but did not express any interest in purchasing it herself. After the court issued its decision on remand, defendant sent plaintiff a check for the remaining $217,500 along with a quitclaim deed for her to complete. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s first appeal did not stay or alter the deadlines for exercising the purchase option, which expired in June 2020. The family division of the superior court concluded that plaintiff’s purchase option had expired and that defendant effectively exercised his option to purchase the property instead. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thurber v. Thurber" on Justia Law