Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
Wich v. Corcoran
Two individuals jointly purchased a Vermont home during their marriage. After separating, they divorced in Florida, where the court assigned each a percentage ownership interest in the property but did not resolve matters concerning ongoing property expenses or order a sale or partition of the house. One party returned to Vermont and lived in the house with their children, solely paying all mortgage, taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs. The parties informally agreed that the out-of-state party would not assert ownership rights until their youngest child graduated college. After that event, the out-of-state party initiated a partition action in Vermont.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, found that the parties’ ownership interests were as set by the Florida court and converted their tenancy by the entirety to a tenancy in common. The court determined the party living in the house should be credited for property expenses paid but limited such credits to only those expenses incurred within the prior six years, applying Vermont’s general statute of limitations for civil actions (12 V.S.A. § 511). The court assigned the property to the in-state party, conditioned upon purchase of the other’s interest, and required that the party in possession continue to pay property expenses until transfer or sale.Upon appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that, in partition actions, contribution credits for property expenses are not subject to the six-year statute of limitations under 12 V.S.A. § 511, because partition is an equitable remedy and such credits are integral to the equitable division of property. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s limitation on contribution credits, remanding for recalculation. The Court affirmed the lower court’s order requiring the party in possession to pay ongoing property expenses until the final disposition. View "Wich v. Corcoran" on Justia Law
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Real Estate & Property Law
Land Use Review Board v. 3643 VT Route 103, N, LLC
The case concerns several quarry operations in Chester, Vermont. Chandler Quarry, operated on an eight-and-a-half-acre parcel, had been exempt from Vermont’s Act 250 land use permitting requirements since its operations predated the Act’s passage in 1970. In 2018, a landowner acquired Chandler Quarry, as well as North and South Quarries located nearby. The landowner then began coordinating operations across all three quarries, including processing stone from North and South at Chandler Quarry and constructing a new building to house processing equipment. This expanded activity increased quarrying, noise, and traffic, resulting in complaints from neighboring landowners.Following these complaints, the District 2 Environmental Commission issued a jurisdictional opinion in 2023, determining that Chandler Quarry’s integration into the larger quarry operation constituted a substantial change, subjecting it to Act 250 permitting requirements. The landowner appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, which, in March 2024, affirmed that Chandler Quarry’s coordinated operation with the other quarries triggered Act 250 jurisdiction. Afterward, the Land Use Review Board (LURB) issued an administrative order in June 2025, imposing a civil penalty and a stop-work order, requiring cessation of Chandler Quarry operations until appropriate permits were obtained. The landowner requested a merits hearing, during which it was shown that Chandler Quarry operations had been reduced to pre-2018 levels and decoupled from North and South Quarries.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that Chandler Quarry remains subject to Act 250 jurisdiction, despite the reduction of operations, because the expanded, unpermitted commercial activity persisted for years and caused lasting environmental impacts. The Court distinguished this case from In re Audet, finding that the landowner’s sustained jurisdiction-triggering activities could not be undone simply by reverting to previous operational levels. The Court also held that the Environmental Division’s affirmation of the stop-work order was not an abuse of discretion, as the Division reasonably considered statutory factors, including economic effects on employees. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "Land Use Review Board v. 3643 VT Route 103, N, LLC" on Justia Law
In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC
A telecommunications developer sought approval to construct a wireless tower near Lake Willoughby in Westmore, Vermont. Residents of the town, referred to as neighbors, opposed the project, raising concerns about the tower’s impact on aesthetics and its compliance with the Town Plan. The developer filed a petition with the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a Certificate of Public Good (CPG). The PUC hearing officer deemed the petition administratively complete and set deadlines for intervention and public comment. Neighbors were permitted to intervene, focusing on aesthetic impact and municipal plan compliance. The Town Planning Commission and Selectboard submitted comments both within and after the deadline, expressing mixed views about the tower’s conformity with the Town Plan.The Planning Commission’s late motion for party status and subsequent comments were denied by the hearing officer for untimeliness, citing procedural rules. The PUC excluded comments filed after the deadline and held an evidentiary hearing on the merits. The hearing officer recommended granting the CPG, and the PUC adopted this recommendation in its final order. Neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court. The Planning Commission and Selectboard did not appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s decision. It held that neighbors lacked standing to challenge the exclusion of the Planning Commission and Selectboard’s late comments, as they could not assert procedural injury on behalf of the town. The Court found that the PUC gave the required substantial deference to the Town Plan, concluding the tower did not violate clear community standards. The Court also determined that the PUC properly applied the Quechee test in its aesthetics analysis, considering all vantage points and finding the tower’s visibility limited and not offensive to the average viewer. The PUC’s findings and legal conclusions were upheld as rational and supported by the record. View "In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC" on Justia Law
Huber v. Currie
The case concerns a dispute stemming from a loan agreement between Christopher Huber and Janet Currie. In 2019, Currie sought to purchase a hemp business and borrowed $185,000 from Huber, agreeing to repay $370,000 within approximately six months—an effective annual interest rate of 200%. The agreement also required Currie to provide a mortgage to secure the loan, which she did not do. After acquiring the business, Currie transferred the property to another entity she controlled without compensating Huber and failed to repay the loan. Huber sued Currie and related entities for breach of contract and fraudulent transfer, seeking the contract amount, interest, and an equitable lien on the property.The Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, granted partial summary judgment to Huber on the breach-of-contract claim because Currie did not contest the essential facts or substantiate her listed affirmative defenses, including usury, in her response to Huber’s motion. The court denied summary judgment on the fraudulent-transfer claim. Currie later moved to vacate the summary-judgment order, arguing that the contract was usurious under Vermont law. The court denied this motion, finding Currie had waived the usury defense by failing to raise it at the summary-judgment stage. The court awarded Huber $185,000 with interest at the legal rate and imposed an equitable lien, but did not rule on Currie’s third-party claims.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment for Huber, holding that Currie procedurally waived the usury defense by not properly raising it in response to the summary-judgment motion, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to revisit the issue. The Court remanded the case for consideration of Currie’s outstanding third-party claims. View "Huber v. Currie" on Justia Law
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Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law
Human Rights Commission v. Durkee
A landlord leased a rental property unit to a tenant, who later filed a complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC), alleging discrimination in violation of the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA). The HRC, acting on behalf of the tenant, filed suit against the landlord, seeking legal and equitable relief for these alleged violations. After the suit was filed, the landlord died. His wife, who jointly owned the property, then also passed away. Ownership of the rental property shifted by operation of law and through an enhanced life-estate deed to their four adult children. No estate was opened in the landlord’s name.After being notified of the landlord’s death, the HRC moved in the Vermont Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, to substitute the landlord’s four children and his wife’s estate as parties, intending to amend the complaint to impose liability on the new parties due to their receipt of the property. The trial court denied this motion, concluding the proper party for substitution under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 25 would be the decedent’s estate or those standing in its place, not unrelated individuals against whom new claims were sought. The court gave HRC an opportunity to file further pleadings to name a proper party but, when HRC declined, dismissed the case without prejudice.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court correctly interpreted Rule 25 in denying substitution. The Supreme Court held that, although the underlying remedial claim survived the landlord’s death, the HRC failed to demonstrate that the proposed substitute parties—the children and wife’s estate—were proper parties for substitution under Vermont law, as there was no evidence they were executors, heirs, devisees, or legatees of an estate. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to substitute and upheld the dismissal. View "Human Rights Commission v. Durkee" on Justia Law
Treadway v. Green Mountain Power Corp.
A twelve-year-old child suffered severe burns after trespassing into an electrical substation owned by a utility company. The substation was secured by a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire and posted with multiple warning signs about high voltage and danger. Despite these precautions, the child managed to enter the substation through the gate and was injured after coming into contact with, or near, electrified equipment.The child, through his representative, brought a negligence claim against the utility, alleging the company failed to adequately protect children from the dangers posed by the substation. Both parties agreed the child was a trespasser. The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to the utility, ruling that Vermont’s common law does not impose a duty of care on landowners to protect trespassers from injury caused by dangerous conditions, except to avoid willful or wanton misconduct. The court noted it was bound by prior Vermont Supreme Court decisions rejecting the attractive-nuisance doctrine and thus could not recognize an exception for child trespassers.On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, the child asked the Court to adopt the attractive-nuisance doctrine as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, which would permit child trespassers to pursue certain claims against landowners under specific conditions. The Vermont Supreme Court declined to overrule its longstanding precedent, reaffirming that Vermont landowners owe no duty to trespassers, including children, absent willful or wanton conduct. The Court held that any change to this rule, given its policy implications and legislative context, should be made by the Legislature, not by judicial action. The decision of the trial court was affirmed. View "Treadway v. Green Mountain Power Corp." on Justia Law
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Real Estate & Property Law
Gerlach v. Town of Chittenden
The dispute involved property owners who sought a declaration that the Town had no rights in a right-of-way crossing their land, arguing the right-of-way was never validly established as a public road or, if it was, had been discontinued. Their predecessors-in-interest had previously litigated similar claims with the Town, ultimately settling by agreeing that the Town would discontinue one road and alter and reclassify the disputed right-of-way as a public trail for non-motorized recreational use. This settlement was memorialized in a stipulation, binding on successors, and accompanied by a map showing the right-of-way’s location.After the stipulation, the Town completed proceedings to discontinue the other road and, together with neighboring towns, held hearings and officially reclassified the right-of-way as a public trail. The property was later conveyed to the current plaintiffs, who brought a new suit in the Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, again disputing the Town’s rights. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town, finding that the prior owners had clearly intended to dedicate the right-of-way for public use under the common-law doctrine of dedication and acceptance, and that the Town had accepted this dedication.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. It held that the undisputed facts, including the language of the stipulation, the prior owners’ conduct, and their acquiescence to public use and statutory proceedings, demonstrated clear intent to dedicate the right-of-way for public use as a trail. The Court further concluded that the Town had accepted the dedication. The decision of the trial court was affirmed. View "Gerlach v. Town of Chittenden" on Justia Law
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Real Estate & Property Law
Westwardhos LLC v. Anatoly Glass LLC
A tenant leased a commercial space from a landlord beginning in December 2020. The landlord alleged that the tenant failed to pay rent during 2022 and 2023, leading to an ejectment action in early 2024 seeking both possession of the premises and damages for unpaid rent. After the court ordered rent escrow and the tenant failed to comply, the landlord obtained a writ of possession, and the tenant vacated the property. The remaining dispute centered on alleged rent arrearages. The tenant requested a jury trial and was allowed limited discovery. Prior to trial, the tenant sought continuances based on alleged inadequate discovery responses and personal health concerns, which were denied. The tenant failed to appear for jury draw, and the landlord moved for default judgment.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, granted default judgment to the landlord on the same day as the missed jury draw, without holding a separate hearing or providing the tenant with seven days’ notice. The court later entered judgment awarding the landlord damages and attorney’s fees. The tenant appealed, challenging the denial of continuances, discovery rulings, and the procedure used to enter default judgment.The Vermont Supreme Court held that, under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c)(4), when a party has appeared in a case, the court must provide at least seven days’ written notice and hold a hearing before entering default judgment. The Court found that these requirements were not met because the hearing on default judgment occurred without notice and immediately after the tenant’s nonappearance. The Supreme Court vacated the default judgment and remanded for the trial court to provide the required notice and hearing before considering default judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court’s discovery rulings and declined to address inadequately briefed arguments. View "Westwardhos LLC v. Anatoly Glass LLC" on Justia Law
32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington
Seventeen property owners in Burlington sought a declaratory judgment that the city’s newly adopted ordinances regulating short-term rentals did not apply to their twenty-two nonowner-occupied properties, arguing that these uses were preexisting and nonconforming, and thus exempt from the new regulations. The city’s ordinances, passed in 2022, imposed significant restrictions on short-term rentals, including prohibiting most nonhost-occupied rentals and establishing new definitions and requirements. The property owners asserted that the ordinances threatened their ability to continue operating their properties as short-term rentals.Previously, these owners brought a similar action in the Civil Division of the Vermont Superior Court, seeking a declaration that their properties were legally permitted nonconforming uses. The Civil Division dismissed their claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that issues of nonconforming use arose under Chapter 117 of Title 24, over which the Environmental Division had exclusive jurisdiction. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal in a prior case—32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington—concluding that the Civil Division properly declined jurisdiction.While that earlier appeal was pending, the owners filed a new declaratory judgment action in the Environmental Division. The city moved to dismiss, arguing that the claim was not ripe and that the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction because the ordinance at issue was not enacted under the zoning statutes. The Environmental Division agreed, concluding that the owners’ claims were premature, involved factual issues inappropriate for declaratory relief, and should first be addressed through the statutory appeals process.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s dismissal. The Court held that a declaratory judgment was inappropriate because the owners’ claims were not ripe: no enforcement action was imminent, and the factual questions about each property’s status required more concrete controversy. The owners were not left without remedy, as they could pursue administrative determinations or appeals if enforcement occurred. View "32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law
In re Petition of Apple Hill Solar LLC
A renewable energy developer was awarded a standard-offer contract in 2014 to build a solar facility in Bennington, Vermont, with a requirement to commission the project by 2016. The developer repeatedly sought and received extensions to this deadline, while simultaneously pursuing a certificate of public good (CPG), which is also required for construction. The Public Utility Commission (PUC) granted the CPG in 2018, but it was appealed, reversed, and ultimately denied on remand due to violations of local land conservation measures and adverse impacts on aesthetics. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the final CPG denial in 2023.While litigation over the CPG was ongoing, the developer continued to seek extensions of its standard-offer contract’s commissioning milestone. The fifth extension request, filed in 2021, asked for a deadline twelve months after the Supreme Court’s mandate in the CPG appeal. The hearing officer recommended granting it, but the PUC did not act on the request until 2024, by which time the developer’s CPG had been finally denied. The PUC dismissed the fifth extension request as moot, finding the contract had expired by its own terms. The PUC also denied the developer’s motion for reconsideration and a sixth extension request, on the same grounds.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the PUC’s actions with deference, upholding its factual findings unless clearly erroneous and its discretionary decisions unless there was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the PUC properly concluded the requested extension was moot, the contract was null and void by its terms, and there was no abuse of discretion. The Court also rejected arguments that the PUC’s actions were inconsistent with other cases or violated constitutional rights. The orders of the PUC were affirmed. View "In re Petition of Apple Hill Solar LLC" on Justia Law