Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two disputes were presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review in this opinion. One dispute stemmed from a landowner’s replacement of his boathouse and construction of retaining walls that encroached onto his neighbors’ property. This dispute included claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages on account of the landowner’s alleged trespass. The neighbors challenged the trial court’s conclusions that the landowner was entitled to build the encroaching structure by virtue of a deeded easement and that they could not prevail in a claim for trespass on account of consent or estoppel. The second dispute (flowing from and intertwined with the first dispute) involved acts of vandalism to the disputed boathouse by the occupant of the neighbors’ property. The occupant appealed the judgment against him, and the landowner cross-appealed, raising a host of issues in connection with that judgment. After review of the particular facts entered into the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s construction of the deeded easement was erroneous, and the court improperly addressed the other issues in derogation of the neighbors’ request for a jury trial. The trial court was reversed with respect to the first dispute. Finding no error with regard to the second, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "LeBlanc v. Snelgrove" on Justia Law

Equinox on the Battenkill Management Association, Inc., appealed a superior court's grant of summary-judgment denying insurance coverage. The appeal arose from a declaratory judgment action against management association’s insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, Inc., to determine coverage under a commercial general liability policy for damage to cantilevered balconies on condominium units it managed in Manchester. The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether "Gage v. Union Mutual Fire Insurance Co,." (169 A.2d 29 (1961)) was still good law with regards to the meaning of "collapse" and whether "Gage" controlled the result here. After review, the Court concluded that the policy language in this dispute was broader than the language in Gage and that therefore Gage did not control. The Court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for that court to resolve disputed questions of fact and interpret the applicable policy language. View "Equinox on the Battenkill Management Assn., Inc. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Board of Directors of the Arapaho Owners Association ("BOD," appellant) petitioned for a declaratory judgment seeking to reform the condominium's declaration to reflect the actual number of condominium units built and to allocate ownership interests among the units. Fifty-four units were actually built: five of the planned units each were subdivided into two "split" units, and one planned townhouse unit was never built. The master schedule of units (known as "Schedule D,") was never amended to reflect the number of units built. Sometime around 2008, issues were raised to the BOD concerning a disparity in assessments of common expenses, the claim being that owners of similar units were not paying an appropriate share. In addition, there existed potential questions concerning marketability of title due to the subdivision of certain units and the inclusion in the Declaration of the planned unit that was never built. The BOD, on behalf of the Association, brought an action in the superior court seeking to reform the Declaration to reflect the units actually built and to restate each unit's ownership share in the common areas according to the new formula that allegedly was adopted in a second amendment. The BOD in its complaint also sought a declaratory judgment to clear title to the existing units. Several owners of the split units (appellees) opposed the request for reformation, and also filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the second amendment failed because it, like the first, required unanimous approval under the Vermont Condominium Ownership Act (VCOA) section 1306(b). Appellees in their counterclaim also sought an injunction and money damages, claiming their assessments had been illegally increased by the new formula. The BOD filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the reformation issue, and appellees filed a cross motion for summary judgment seeking a ruling as a matter of law that the second amendment did not pass. The trial court denied the BOD's motion for summary judgment, and granted appellees' motion for attorney fees and costs. The questions on appeal before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether a unanimous decision of unit owners is required to amend the formula for assessing common expenses; (2) what equitable powers of reformation are available to cure a defect in a condominium declaration; and (3) what amount of attorney's fees, if any, was appropriate. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) a unanimous decision of unit owners was required to change the assessment formula; (2) the fact that the newly created ownership interest resulting from the distribution of Unit 23F's interest might not match the percentages the developer assigned to the six half units from the original plans did not make the reassignment inequitable or improper. The trial court's reformation did not change the percentages reflected in the 1979 Schedule D that the original developer had allocated to the existing units; and (3) the amount of fees the trial court awarded to appellees was not an abuse of discretion. View "Arapaho Owners Association, Inc. v. Alpert" on Justia Law

This was a case of protracted litigation between neighbors over a maple tree. The maple tree in question was about sixty-five years old and stood about sixty-five feet tall. The trunk or stem of the tree was located entirely on Bruce and Janet Alvarez's property, approximately two feet from the property line. Although the superior court considered the tree to "effectively" be on the property line, the parties agreed that the property line did not pass through the trunk of the tree, but laid to the south of the tree trunk. When the Alvarezes bought their property approximately twenty-five years ago, the tree was about one foot in diameter at the base. Approximately half of the branches and roots from the tree now cross the property boundary and encroach onto the lot belonging to Claudia Berger and Sheldon Katz. Some roots extended under the existing deck on the Berger/Katz home. For several years Berger and Katz sought to expand their home by constructing a two-story addition on the rear which would occupy roughly the same existing footprint as the house and deck at present. Berger and Katz received the necessary permits for construction of the addition. The plans for the construction of the addition to the Berger/Katz residence necessitated cutting the roots and branches that are encroaching onto their property. Efforts to amicably resolve the problem of the maple tree in light of the planned Berger/Katz addition were unsuccessful. In 2013, when Berger and Katz considered taking unilateral action to trim the tree's roots and branches, the Alvarezes filed for and received a temporary injunction, and later a permanent one. The superior court found it more likely than not that removal of 50% of the tree's roots and branches as contemplated would result in the premature death of the tree, perhaps within five years and probably within ten from the time of cutting. The final injunction barred the trimming of more than 25% of the roots and branches of the tree. The trial court granted the temporary injunction, employing what it dubbed as the "urban-tree rule." Under the "urban-tree rule," as described by the trial court, trimming the roots or branches of an encroaching tree may be proscribed if the trimming will destroy the tree. Although the judge hearing the permanent injunction questioned the validity of the "urban-tree rule," he felt it improper to apply a different legal analysis, relying upon it as the "law of the case." Berger and Katz argued on appeal of the superior court error that the court erred in granting an injunction because the common law allowed for an absolute right of a landowner to trim intruding branches and roots regardless of the impact on the offending tree; because there was no showing that the cutting would cause irreparable harm sufficient to support an injunction; and because injunctive relief resulted in a taking of their property without compensation. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Vermont's long-standing right of a property owner to trim branches and roots from an encroaching tree without regard to the impact that such trimming may have on the health of the tree, and vacated the injunction on that basis. As such, the Court did not reach appellants' other arguments. View "Alvarez v. Katz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Heidi and James Glassford appealed a superior court decision denying their motion for summary judgment and granting it to defendant Dufresne & Associates, P.C. on plaintiffs' claims of negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Plaintiffs were homeowners who purchased their home direct from the builder, D&L Homes by Design, LLC (D&L). D&L hired defendant to certify that the on-site mound sewage disposal system constructed for the home satisfied state permitting requirements. On April 19, 2005, the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources issued a Wastewater System and Potable Water Supply Permit for construction of the sewage disposal system on the property, subject to receiving a certification pursuant to 10 V.S.A 1973(e). On October 20, 2005, defendant's employee sent the certification required by the statute. On December 20, 2005, plaintiffs signed a purchase-and-sale agreement to purchase the home from D&L. Although the seller represented that the home and property had received all the necessary permits, plaintiffs never saw the certificate or the letter from the Agency stating that the certification requirement was satisfied. Sometime thereafter, plaintiffs hired an attorney in connection with the closing. On January 13, just prior, plaintiffs' attorney prepared a certificate of title that noted the wastewater and water supply permit. In February 2006, the sewage disposal system failed. In November 2008, plaintiffs hired defendant to investigate the system's failure because they knew defendant had inspected the system prior to their purchase. Defendant prepared a report stating that he had "completed the original" inspection in 2005 and found the system had been installed according to the permitted design. Plaintiffs received other opinions about the disposal system's failure both before and after hiring defendant to inspect the system. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in superior court alleging pecuniary losses from defendant's failure to properly inspect the sewage disposal system and subsequent misrepresentation about the construction of the system in the certification to the Agency. Upon review of the superior court decision, the Supreme Court found that the completion and filing of defendant's certificate was a prerequisite to D&L's ability to sell the home, the certificate was unrelated to the sale. The law required that it be sent only to the government agency that issued the permit. Furthermore, there was no allegation that D&L used the certificate as part of its sales pitch, and no allegation that defendant had any part in the sales. The standard for CPA liability required that a person be directly involved in the transaction that gave rise to the claimed liability. That standard was not met here. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Glassford v. Dufresne & Associates, P.C." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a dispute between a residential subdivision property owners' association and the owner of commercial property both in and adjacent to the subdivision over access to property over a subdivision roadway. It also involved the conduct of the property owners' association. Defendant, Sunne Village Development Property Owners Association (POA), appealed the trial court's judgment that it created a nuisance affecting the commercial landowner; the court's calculation of compensatory damages arising from the nuisance; and the court's award of punitive damages and attorney's fees. Plaintiffs, Post and Beam Equities Group, LLC, and Post and Beam of Mt. Snow, LLC (collectively "P&B"), cross-appealed, challenging the trial court's conclusion that its deeded easement over the subdivision's road did not extend to its patrons' use for access to its restaurants. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the judgment for nuisance and the award of punitive damages and attorney's fees, but reversed the award of compensatory damages to P&B. With respect to the cross-appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment relating to interpretation of the deeded easement. View "Post & Beam Equity Group, LLC v. Sunne Village Development Property Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

Owner and developer, Stratton Corporation and Intrawest Stratton Development Corporation, sued a condominium construction project's general contractor Engelberth Construction, Inc., who in turn filed a third-party claim against subcontractor Evergreen Roofing Company. A jury found that Engelberth Construction breached its contract with developer and breached an express warranty, which proximately caused developer to sustain damages related to roof repairs. The jury also found that Evergreen Roofing breached its subcontract with Engelberth Construction, and that Evergreen Roofing was obligated to indemnify Engelberth Construction. Evergreen Roofing appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying a pretrial motion for summary judgment filed by Engelberth Construction on various issues, including the scope of the contract between developer and Engelberth Construction and whether proof of non-insurance or lack of availability of insurance coverage was a prerequisite to developer's recovery against Engelberth. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Evergreen Roofing failed to preserve its argument. View "Stratton Corp. v. Engleberth Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a decision by the Town of Middlebury Development Review Board (DRB) to approve appellee Jolley Associates, LLC's application for a Planned Unit Development (PUD) to add a car wash to an existing gas station and convenience store within the Town limits. Appellant MDY Taxes, Inc. operated an H&R Block tax franchise in property rented in a shopping center adjacent to the Jolley lot. Appellant Village Car Wash, Inc. operated a car wash located approximately one-quarter of a mile from the Jolley lot. Appellants did not participate in the DRB proceeding, but sought to challenge the approval of the PUD through an appeal to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court. The environmental court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that appellants did not have standing, to appeal the DRB decision because they had not participated in the proceedings before the DRB as required by statute, and because they did not meet any of the exceptions to that statutory requirement. On appeal, appellants argued that a procedural defect prevented them from appearing before the DRB, and that it would be manifestly unjust if they are not afforded party status to appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Appeal of MDY Taxes, Inc., & Village Car Wash, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Horizon Heights Condominium Association sought to recover from joint condominium owners Ronald and Joan Dusablon the monthly dues that accrued after the Dusablons redeemed their foreclosed-upon condominium. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a condominium owners' association could collect the monthly assessments that accrued in between the end of the date range stated in an agreement that formed the basis of a foreclosure judgment as between those parties, and the date on which that judgment was entered. The Court held that the association could recover these debts because they were not covered by a prior agreement or its attendant foreclosure judgment. Owners who continue to live in their condominiums and reap the association's services may not use an old foreclosure decree as a shield to avoid paying subsequent monthly assessments. View "Citimortgage, Inc. v. Dusablon & Horizon Heights Cond. Ass'n." on Justia Law

Tenant was the successor lessee to a thirty-year lease on a commercial property in Brattleboro. The lease was executed in 1987. The lease established a basic annual rent of $26,500 in paragraph 8, and then set forth how the rent would increase in subsequent years. Pursuant to the rent-increase provision, each year landlords calculated the annual rent increase and sent a notice to tenant. The increase was calculated as the percentage change in the CPI from the previous year to the current year multiplied by the previous year's rent. This increase was then added to the prior year's rent to arrive at the new annual rent. In March 2007, tenant assumed the lease. From 2008 to 2012, landlords sent rent-increase notices and tenant paid rent annually adjusted for increases, calculated according to this method, without objection. In 2013, landlords sent the annual rent increase notice to tenants. The notice reflected the new 2013 rent as $54,060. Tenant objected to the amount of rent and the calculation method for rental increases. The parties were unable to resolve their dispute, and tenant filed an action seeking both a declaration that its interpretation of the lease language was correct and damages for overpaid rent. Tenant appealed the court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant landlords on the parties' dispute concerning a rental-increase provision of the lease. Tenant argued on appeal that the court erred in using extrinsic evidence to interpret a portion of the lease tenant believed was unambiguous, and in reaching an inequitable result. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "B&C Management Vermont, Inc. v. John, Ringey & Beck" on Justia Law